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- 6 THE INTER-RELATION OF THE KAVI AND THE
SAHRDAYA IN SANSKRIT LITERARY CRITICISM
Shri V. Venkatachalam M.A., SIROMANI.
*Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Vikram University,
Ujjain* 35
- 7 BLUSHING A MISSING-LINK IN SANSKRIT
LITERATURE AND POETICS
Dr. R S Jaitly, M.A., PH.D.
Lecturer in Sanskrit, Rajasthan University, Jaipur 51
- 8 A SYNTHESIS OF THE DHVANYABHĀVA ĀDINS
AND THE DHVANYĀ ĀDINS
Dr. D N Shukla, M.A., PH.D., D. LITT.
*Sāhityācārya, Kāśya-Tīrtha, Professor & Head of the
Department of Sanskrit, Punjab University, Chandigarh.* 67
- 9 VAKROKTI AND LITERARY CRITICISM
Dr (Mrs) Hemalata R. Tatpat, M.A., PH.D.
Department of Sanskrit, Karnatak University, Dharwar. 84
- 10 AN EXPOSITION OF THE RASA-THEORY IN THE
RASAKAUMUDĪ OF ŚRĪKANTHA
Dr A. N. Jani, M.A., PH.D., D. LITT.
*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit,
M. S. University, Baroda.* 92
- 11 CONCEPT OF RASA IN THE BHĀṬTIKĀVYĀ
Dr Satya Pal Narang, M.A., PH.D.
Ramjas College, Delhi 98
- 12 BHĀVA IN SANSKRIT POETICS A HISTORIELLE
Shri Basant Jaitly, M.A.
Department of Sanskrit, Rajasthan University, Jaipur 102
- 13 SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF
POETRY
Dr T.G. Mainkar, M.A., PH.D., D. LITT.
*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit,
University of Delhi* 114

- 21 CONTRIBUTION OF THE VAIṢṆAVA RASA ŚĀSTRA
TO SANSKRIT POETICS
Shri Raghunath Sharma, M A
*Lecturer in Sanskrit, School of Correspondence
Courses and Continuing Education, University of Delhi* 195
- 22 DHVANI AS THE MEETING-POINT OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORY
Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, M.A., B.T., PH.D
*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit,
Karnatak University, Dharwar* 201
- 23 OBSERVATIONS ON SOME ELEMENTS OF SANSKRIT CRITICISM
Shri L.L. Joshi, M A
*Formerly Chairman of the Rajasthan Public Service
Commission, Ajmer* 209
- 24 अलङ्कारस्वरूपविवेचनम्
डा० ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा, एम. ए., पी. एच. डी.
अध्यक्ष, संस्कृत विभाग, गवर्नमेंट कॉलेज, अजमेर 212
- 25 संस्कृतसमीक्षाशास्त्र और हिन्दी-आलोचना
डा. उदयभानुसिंह, एम. ए. (हिन्दी, संस्कृत)
पीएच डी., डी. लिट्.
हिन्दी विभाग, दिल्ली विश्वविद्यालय 219
- 26 प्राच्य और पश्चात्य काव्यशास्त्र में विम्वसिद्धान्त
डा. रामगोपाल शर्मा 'दिनेश',
एम. ए. (हिन्दी, मम्हून), पीएच डी.
व्याख्याता, हिन्दी विभाग, उदयपुर विश्वविद्यालय 235
- 27 अभिनवगुप्तरादप्रतिपादितं रसनिबन्धनम्
श्री गुरुजनदाम स्वामी, एम. ए., आचार्य
अध्यक्ष, मम्हून विभाग, जोधपुर विश्वविद्यालय 247

summed up and edited without leaving out any important point of fact or view, was generally through the medium of the paper; however, in cases of exceptions it has been translated in the language of the paper and a note (tr) to this effect has been given at the end of each such case.

The Seminar was acclaimed a grand success academically and organisationally. This was so due to enlightened participation and active co-operation of eminent Professors and scholars of Sanskrit, English and Hindi. Academic success was due mainly to the General President of the Seminar, Dr. K. C. Pandey, to the Chairmen of its Sessions : Dr. P. L. Bhargava, Dr. R. S. Tripathi, Dr. A. P. Mishra and Dr. A. N. Jais, to Shri Bhim Sen who presided over the General Lecture delivered by Dr. K. C. Pandey, and to Shri Laxmi Lal Joshi who was in the Chair at the concluding session. I am deeply and most sincerely grateful to them.

I should not forget to express my gratitude to my colleagues in the Department of Sanskrit: Shri V. R. Nagar, Shri M. C. Pathak, and Dr. G. C. Tripathi (who also prepared draft of the discussion on the papers), who toiled bravely and unceasingly for organising the seminar. I am equally thankful to Dr. K. L. Sharma, Shri V. C. Shrivastav, Shri B. L. Samdani and Shri S. N. Joshi of the Department of English, to Shri D. N. Chaturvedi, Department of Geography, Head of the Department of Geology, to Shri Nandmurti, Department of Music, and to my Post-graduate students, and Research Scholars, Shri Bihari Lal Jain and Shri G. S. Purohit, for their enthusiastically active help in doing all sorts of jobs.

During my long stay in Delhi in May and June, 1969, to see the book published I enjoyed rich hospitality of my publishers M/s Motilal Banarsidass and benefited from inspiring association with Lala Shri Sundarlal Jain and smiling and affectionate company of Shri Shantilal Jain and his wife Smt. Lilavati Jain. I can hardly pay back my debt of gratitude to them and theirs, more particularly to Shri Prakash and Smt. Anurādhā. Credit for possibly correct printing is shared by Shri Jagdish Lal Shastri who spared no pains in correcting the proofs. I am sincerely thankful to him and to Shri M. R. Suri, energetic Manager of the Press, and

Supreme is the *poet's principle*, namely, the poet-critic, which creates novel object without operation of causal law, renders the stone-like world soft and soothing with its *razz* and lights it through the flash of imagination and creative self-expression.

कवेरभिप्रायमशब्दगोचरं

स्फुरन्तमात्रेषु पदेषु केवलम् ।

यदद्भिरङ्गैः हृत्तरोमविक्रियै-

र्जनस्य तूष्णीं भवतोऽयमञ्जलिः ॥

[Vijñā]

Beyond reach of words is the meaning of a poet, which bristles in words brimming with sentiment; Salutations to him (the critic) who keeps silence while his limbs eloquently express the meaning through horripilated limbs.

सरस्वती श्रुतिमहतां महीयताम् ।

[Kālidāsa in the Śakuntalā]

Let the words of the learned flourish !

all recall what MaCaulay once observed - '*As science advances, poetry declines*'. The age of epics is past. We may find in modern times a near-epic like *Testament of Beauty*, but it will be a miracle if an epic like '*Mahābhārata*', '*Rāmāyana*' or '*Paradise Lost*' were to be now composed. When humanity was young and its sense of wonder was not blunted by science, imagination was more active and heated to produce great epics.

4 Take again our attitude to tragedies. I have no precise information if before the Greeks, tragedies were written. Bharata's *Nāṭya-veda* ruled them out. It is interesting to note that even after the Greeks introduced tragedies, Bharata's view found support in the West. There is a fine passage in Bacon which has a bearing on this point. "The principal modification that history undergoes when dramatised by Shakespeare are due to the tendency to idealisation which forms the great distinction between poetry and history." Bacon calls poetry 'feigned' history and well remarks that 'the use of this feigned history has been to give some satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doeth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul, by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness and more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not the magnitude which satisfies the mind of man, poetry feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions *not so agreeable to the merits of virtue* and vice, therefore poesy feigneth them more just in retribution and more according to revealed providence, because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and more unexpected and alternative variation; so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and confereth to magnanimity, morality and delectation. And therefore, it (poetry) was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doeth raise and erect the mind by submitting the show of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doeth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things."

5 In early dramatic literature we were transported to some setting far-removed from reality—a sort of ideal, imaginary

8 Lastly, there is the time-worn question of the objective—the purpose of literature poetic, dramatic or prose Does Art exist for the sake of Art only or should it have a didactic aim ? Should literature depict and reflect all what one sees in the contemporary society, or should it adopt ways to correct and remove the evils and at least rise above them ? What does literary criticism say about the writings of D H Lawrence ?

9 Criticism is often rendered by the word *Tikā*. But today we do not limit literary criticism to only *Mallināthī Tikā*. We rather have to keep to the expanded meaning in which Bradley's 'Shakespearean Tragedies' was written *Ghaṭa-paṭādi* discussion is indeed helpful, a close study of *Mammātā's Kāvya-prakāśa* is certainly delightful Nevertheless a search for literary principles which govern literature of many countries, many languages and many ages, is an exciting adventure.

and poetry of these two great movements of India, namely Jainism and Buddhism, were composed in Sanskrit. Even the faith of Sikhism, Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj and so on was expressed through this language of immortality, precision, and sanctity. Sanskrit has played effectively its role of understanding new movements of intellect and giving them a composed, graphic and classical expression. It has been thus a repository of all expressions of Indian consciousness. It could achieve this magnificent result by honouring the sentiments of the linguistic temper of the people. Like Dandin, Ānanda-Vardhana, Mammaṣa, and Rūpagoṣvāmin of the past, the modern scholars of Sanskrit criticism, owe a responsibility to this sensible tradition and thus bring under their analytical ken the literature of contemporary India.

Non-Sanskrit critics of contemporary literature of India which is imbued with modern sensibility, complain that the principles of literary criticism enshrined in old Sanskrit texts, though sacred yet largely ambiguous and unintelligible, are inadequate and even invalid to evaluate the new literary consciousness. They argue that an ultimate sense of despair, helplessness and alienation that permeates the creative writing of today cannot be properly evaluated by the canons of criticism which are largely based on a philosophy of ultimate hope and a vision of the quietude. The philosophy of Absolute and a religious morality sanctioned by Smritis, which provide a broad framework for the literary criticism in Sanskrit have no relation with the modern literature that has lost faith in the absolute and has discovered a new sense of morality. In this world of relativity absolute has no place. However, the contemporary critics of *akavitā*, *alahānī* and what not, have not formulated so far any objective principles for the judgment of modern literature, which could be acceptable to all concerned. Interpretations and critique of old principles don't satisfy them. Strong impact of science & technology has shrunk the world and brought our contact with the moon. Change of social and economic forces has brought about a new structure of morality; faith in the old order of things, thoughts and patterns stands mutilated. Modern stage of the world has no room for outworn plays of old characters. New literary consciousness needs its understanding and critical evaluation in its own context. In the

SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM

(General President's Address)

Dr K C Pandey

It is customary for the president of a Seminar to speak on the subject, on which it is held. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a Bird's-eye view of the subject and leave the rest for the learned specialist, who can deal with it with an intimacy of knowledge and expert touch, which I cannot hope to emulate.

In the course of my summary I shall deal with :—

- (i) Meaning of the principles of literary criticism
- (ii) Seven principles of literary criticism
- (iii) The relation of the first six principles to the seventh.
- (iv) Conclusion

(i) *Meaning of Literary Criticism*

Criticism is the judgement on the form of a literary work, saying that it causes certain experience, has a certain effect on the mind, and that this experience is due to special peculiar features of the literary piece. From the point of view of the critic, Principles mean the essential elements which determine a result. From the point of view of the producer of a literary piece, principles are the laws which have to be followed in producing a work of art.

Thus 'principles of literary criticism' means the essential elements, present in a literary piece, which form the basis of judgement that a critic pronounces, whether it is good or bad, according as they produce a certain effect on his mind, i.e. cause a certain experience in him.

Literary criticism is an objective and analytical approach to poetry. It is based on certain principles, which have been discovered through close analytical study of literary works. The artistic medium of poetic presentation is articulate sound. The

(ii) *Seven Principles of Literary Criticism*

There are seven essential elements or principles which the analytical approach to poetry has revealed. (i) the characteristic (Lakṣaṇa), (ii) embellishment (Alaṅkāra), (iii) quality (Guna), (iv) defect (Dosa), (v) style (Rīti), (vi) suggestion (Dhvani), (vii) aesthetic configuration (Rasa).

I THE CHARACTERISTIC (LAKṢAṆA)

If we confine ourselves to the available literature, we may say that the idea of the characteristic marks of poetry first arose in the mind of Bharata. To him, they are distinct from embellishments, figures of speech or Alaṅkāras. While the former are in the body itself, like slenderness of waist or plumpness of breasts, the latter are external additions, like necklace and bracelet. The conception is based on the analogy of lines in the shape of a lotus, flag, or disc, on palm or sole of foot, which are to a palmist unmistakable marks of greatness of the man (Mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa) and because of which he can recognize the man as such even in the absence of all external paraphernalia. Bharata definitely distinguishes thirty-six such marks, adding that there are many more which a close analytical study can reveal. Some of the important ones among them are : compactness, excellence, logicity and wit. His pupil, Kōhala, and followers discovered more. King Bhoja traced out many more and in his *Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharana* declared them to be sixtyfour.

II. ALAṅKĀRA OR EMBELLISHMENT

The analytical approach to literary art was made from two points of view, that of the dramaturgist and that of the poetician. The former distinguished between characteristic and embellishment. And Bharata admitted only four embellishments or figures of speech, though he mentioned thirty-six characteristics as stated above.

The poetician, however, abolished this distinction, holding that a mark is a mark whether in the body, like lines in the palm, or added to it, like a badge. Thus Bhāmaha (600 A.D.)

III QUALITY (Guna) Quality belongs to a body, a substance. Words and meanings constitute the body of poetry (*Śabdārthau sahitaṁ Kāvyaṁ*). Poetic qualities inhere in the body of poetry much as heat inheres in fire. There is a difference of opinion about the number, functions, and relation of the qualities. Bharata admitted ten and recognized them to be means of presenting Rasa. (i) sweetness (*Mādhurya*) (ii) forcefulness (*Ojas*), (iii) perspicuity (*Prasāda*)—such a clarity in thought and expression as leads to the arousal of unexpressed ideas, (iv) the pun (*Ślesa*), (v) smoothness (*Samādhi*)—proper adjustment of ascent (high-flown language) and descent (simple language), (vi) magnificence (*Udātātā*)—fanciful grouping of words, (vii) clearness of meaning (*Arthavyakti*), (viii) uniformity (*Samatā*)—sameness of style, (ix) softness (*Saukumārya*)—absence of harshness, (x) polish (*Kānti*)—brightness of style.

Bhāmaha accepted the first three only. The reason is obvious. Some of them can be classed as verbal figures of speech. the pun, for instance, others may be looked upon as mere absences of defects. softness and polish, for instance, which consist respectively in the mere absence of harshness and vulgarity, both well-recognized defects. As an exponent of the view that the embellishment, the distorted utterance (*Vakrokti*) is such a characteristic (*Laksana*) as gives sufficiency to a composition to be recognized as poetic, he subsumed many of the above qualities under embellishment. Vāmana (Eighth century A.D.) denied that the poetic embellishments are of primary importance, held that poetry is like a picture, and asserted that the comparative importance of embellishments and qualities in it is the same respectively as that of paints and lines in a picture. Just as the beauty of a picture depends on the lines, of which the sketch is made, while paints simply enhance it, so the beauty of a poetic production depends upon the poetic qualities, and embellishments simply enhance it. Accordingly he accepted all the ten qualities mentioned by Bharata.

Ānanda Vardhana (Ninth century A.D.) realized the force of the argument against the acceptance of the ten qualities, asserted that the distinction between qualities and figures of speech is, that though both add to the charm of poetic com-

Pradesh, and Gujarat, and, named after them, called Vaidarbhī, Gaudiyā, Pāñcālī, and Lāṭī (i) Vaidarbhī is characterised by sweetness, abounds in sounds, is sweet to the ear, and has very few or no compounds (ii) The characteristic of the Gaudiyā is presentation of a heroic disposition in the forceful sounds in long compounds and alliterations. (iii) Pāñcālī is marked by the use of natural sounds, and by fewer and smaller compounds than are found in Gaudiyā (iv) Lāṭī is simply a mixture of the two styles, Vaidarbhī and Pāñcālī.

Vāmana studied the styles exclusively from the point of view of the qualities. He found Vaidarbhī, to possess all the ten, Gaudiyā only two, forcefulness and brilliance, and Pāñcālī also only two, sweetness and tenderness. He raised the question, 'what is the soul of poetry?' the first time and declared that style is the soul of poetry (Rītirātmā kāvyaśya). For a proper understanding of his analysis of styles it is important to take into account his wider conceptions of qualities, which include even the presentation of Rasa, e.g., brilliance (Kānti).

DIVERGENCE EXPLAINED Abhinavagupta noted the divergence of views about the characteristic, embellishment, and quality, referred to in the preceding sections, and consequently asserted that it is impossible to draw a very clear line of demarcation among them. The distinction which Bharata drew, however, is based on the analytical study of the process of the externalization of poetic vision, as well as of that of apprehension. That it has an educational value is assumed, because of its utility in educating a would-be-poet as regards the steps, by which he should proceed in creating a work of art and a connoisseur as regards the various elements which he ought to take into consideration in judging a work of art. Abhinavagupta attempts to show the mutual relation and comparative importance of these elements by analogy with an architectural work. The characteristics are like walls in the absence of which no architectural work can have being. Qualities are like smooth plaster, and embellishments or figures of speech are like painting, drawn on the smooth surface. The defects may belong to any of the above three. And style is nothing but the manner of organizing matter in such a way as to give due place to the qualities and embellishments.

constituents, it is not a mere jumble. The precise nature of the relation of the constituents is conceived on the analogy of a juice that an expert cook prepares by putting together in due proportion various things of distinct tastes, sweet, bitter, astringent, sour, and saltish, in water, cooking them properly, and then filtering them. The analogy implies that the constituents of the aesthetic configuration have to be well refined, they have to be in right proportion and have to be so related that they present a unity which has an aesthetic value, distinct from that of each constituent separately. It means that the aesthetic experience at the emotive level, is not the experience of a basic emotion in isolation from other constituents of the configuration, but in harmonious union with them, and that it is poetic genius alone which can conceive such a configuration and present it in such predominantly suggestive language that a connoisseur can get the same experience from it as that presented by the poet.

(iii) *Relation and Comparative Importance of the Seven Principles of Literary Criticism*

The relation of the first five Lakṣana, Alankāra, Guna, Dosa and Rīti has been pointed out on the basis of analogy of work of Architecture in an earlier section: the four meanings of the word 'Dhvani' have been given, two meanings of the word 'Rasa' have been referred to; and words and meanings have been declared to constitute the body of a literary piece. Lakṣana, Alankāra, Guna and Dosa are all related to the body, which is made up of words and meanings; and style is nothing but mode of utilising them so as to present a poetic vision effectively. Dhvani, in the sense of that from which the suggested meaning arises, is nothing more than the body of a poetic work, because it is nothing more than word and meaning; and Dhvani, in the sense of that which can never be presented by word primarily, secondarily, implicatively, but can only be suggested, is nothing more than Rasa, which is recognised in Indian tradition to be the soul of poetry and, therefore, most important of all of them. The relation of the six essential elements of poetry to the last, the Rasa, is similar to that of the body, which is well ornamented, possesses excellent qualities

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SANSKRIT AND THE GREEK DRAMATIC THEORY

Dr P L Bhargava

The art of dramatic composition and representation has been practised in India and Greece since very ancient times and a comparison of the dramatic theory of the two countries has often attracted the attention of scholars. Yet there are a number of points which call for a fresh appraisal. The authority for the Greek dramatic theory is the *Poetics* of Aristotle, whereas for the treatment of Indian dramaturgy three works stand pre-eminent viz. the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ascribed to Bharata, the *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya and the *Sāhitya Darpana* of Viśvanātha.

A comparison of the two dramatic theories shows that though the scope of Aristotle is much narrower than that of Bharata and his successors, the fundamentals of the two theories show a remarkable agreement, despite equally remarkable differences in certain details.

Aristotle has mentioned only two types of drama viz. the Tragedy and the Comedy. According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Ch. XX) there are ten types of drama. The tragedy of Aristotle as we shall show later is much in common with the *Nāṭaka* and the *Prakarana* of Bharata, while the one-act plays called *Vyāyoga* and *Utsrstikāṅka* agree with the definition of tragedy in a still greater measure. As for Aristotle's comedy it corresponds to the *Prahasana* and *Bhāna* of Bharata. The other types mentioned by Bharata have no parallel in Aristotle.

Coming to the definition of drama, Aristotle, strangely enough, regards not only tragedy and comedy but also epic and other kinds of poetry as well as music as modes of imitation.¹ The means and manner of imitation differs in different arts but the objects which the imitator represents are actions.² The *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Ch. I) defines the drama alone as imitation of

1. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry translated by Ingram Bywater, p. 23.

2. Aristotle, P. 23.

of junctures which carry each of the stages of the action to its natural close. They are the mukha or opening, pratimukha or progression, garbha or development, vimarśa or pause and nirvāhana or conclusion (N. S. Ch. XXI)

As regards unity of time Aristotle says: Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun or something near that¹ Bharata, however, wisely limits the unity of time to individual acts. Says he, "An act should cover events that can take place in the course of a single day." (N. S. XX, 23) But it was not considered necessary by him that act should follow act without interval, on the contrary anything upto a year was allowed to intervene between the action of one act and that of the next. To reveal to the audience the events during such intervals the Nāṭyaśāstra (Chapter, XXI) gives a choice of five scenes of introduction.

As for the unity of place Aristotle hardly mentions it. He merely says that tragedy cannot represent actions which happen simultaneously in *different places*. This statement is applicable to all dramas, be they written in Greek or Sanskrit.

According to Aristotle the first essential of a tragedy is plot. It is defined by him as the combination of the incidents of the story and regarded as the most important element of the drama². It can be either simple or complex. It is simple when the change in the hero's fortune takes place without peripety or discovery and complex when it involves one or the other. A peripety is the change from one state of thing to its opposite, while a discovery is a change from ignorance to knowledge.³ The second element consists of the characters or agents represented who must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it or just as we are.⁴ Third comes the element of thought i.e. the power of saying what is appropriate to the occasion.⁵ Fourth among the literary elements is the diction of the personages.⁶ The fifth element is *song which is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy*.⁷ The last

1 Aristotle p. 31

2 Aristotle p. 36

3. Aristotle pp. 46-47

4. Aristotle p. 26

5 Aristotle p. 38

6 Aristotle p. 39

7. Aristotle p. 39

the costumer alone in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata. Dresses and make-up constitute only one of the four elements of histrionic representation, the other three being that by gestures, that by words and that by manifestation of involuntary states like tears, tremor etc. Bharata gives elaborate description of these four elements of the spectacle. Not only this, Bharata gives interesting rules about the construction of the play-house and mentions the various conventions which enable the actors to surmount difficulties inseparable from the dramatic form. He deserves high praise for his sense of decency in prohibiting certain acts. Thus he says. (N. S. XXIV, 292-95) No kiss or embrace or any other private acts should be presented on the stage. As a *Nāṭaka* is to be witnessed by the father and the son, the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law all sitting together these acts should be carefully avoided.

The most important object of the drama according to Bharata and indeed all Indian writers is to evoke rasa or sentiment in the readers or spectators. According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Chapter VI) sentiment is produced from the union of the determinants, or causes, which give rise to an emotion, the consequents or external manifestation of emotion and the transitory feelings. There are eight sentiments which are reducible to four according to Bharata (N. S. Ch VI)

Two of these are the erotic and the heroic sentiments. About the other two Bharata seems to have erred. The entire Sanskrit dramatic literature provides proof of the fact that the most important sentiments after the two enumerated above are the pathetic and the comic. In fact the pathetic and the comic are the predominant sentiments in two of the ten types of drama viz. the utkrāntikāṇḍa and the prahasana respectively. The question which naturally comes to the mind while making a comparative study of the Indian and Greek dramatic theory is whether there is anything corresponding to rasa in the Greek dramatic theory. The answer must be given in the affirmative. The very definition of tragedy given by Aristotle lays emphasis on the arousing of the sentiment of pity or what is called karuna rasa by Indian authors of poetics. This is what Aristotle says: "A tragedy is the imitation of an action that is serious and also as having magnitude complete in itself; in language with pleasureable accessories, each kind brought

the Greek drama viz characters and plot and see in what categories the Indian dramas fall according to Aristotle's views. It will be seen that judging from what Aristotle says about these two elements in the tragedy and the comedy respectively the best Indian dramas are certainly not comedies as they have been hitherto called but tragedies pure and simple, while the only types of Indian play which can be given the designation of comedy are the Prahāsana and the Bhāṇa. As regards the characters of the tragedy Aristotle lays down that tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man. In the Sanskrit drama also the chief characters are supposed to be better than the ordinary man, barring the characters of the Prahāsana and the Bhāṇa. Let us now hear what Aristotle has to say about the plot of the tragedy. "In a perfect plot", says Aristotle, 'the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness but on the contrary from happiness to misery and the cause of it must be not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part.'¹ As for the tragic deed which brings about a change in the hero's fortunes from happiness to misery Aristotle says: "When enemy does it on enemy there is nothing to move us to pity and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within ^{the} family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after.....The deed of horror may be done by the ^{deed} knowingly and consciously....or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship and discover that afterwards....A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. The worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed and leaves it undone. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed meditated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance and the relationship discovered afterwards. But the best of all is the last (where the person meditating some deadly injury to another makes the discovery in time to draw

worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault but only as regards one particular kind, the ridiculous. The ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for example, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.¹ It is clear from this description that the comedy of Aristotle corresponds to the *Prahasana* and *Bhāna* of Bharata. There can be no greater travesty of truth than to use the word comedy for the Sanskrit *Nāṭaka* or *Prakarana*.

DISCUSSION

V. C. Shrivastava : Cannot our dramas be called "Tragi-comedies" following the term used for the later Shakespearean comedies as *Winter's Tale* and *Tempest* etc. ? Indian dramas are hardly comparable to Greek tragedies as Indian and Greek views of life are essentially different. We believe that the gods are fundamentally noble, the good ultimately prevails and destruction is followed by regeneration, consequently the hero meets with a happy end. Whereas the Greek conception of divinity makes some supreme supernatural power responsible for the conduct of men under whose unchallengeable sway a hero is crushed.

P. L. Bhargava : I agree that so far as the objects are concerned they differ in most cases. However, judging from what Aristotle says about Comedy, the Indian dramas can certainly not be stamped as 'Comedy' since a Comedy contains characters inferior to common men, which is not the case in Sanskrit dramas. The definition of Tragedy comes very close to our dramas since the best kind of tragedy according to Aristotle is one where a person perpetrates an act of violence but draws back in time. This is exactly what happens in *Mṛcchakaṭika*, where the situation is very tense as the hero Cārudatta is being taken to the gallows and

P L Bhargava : There are other kinds of tragedy also. Aristotle enumerates four of them; among them one is where the action has actually been carried out. However, he says the best is one where a person draws back in time.

G S Mahajan : If the action of 'drawing back' is considered to be the most important element in a tragedy then most of the Shakespearean tragedies, which Bradley considers to be the best cannot be adjudged as the best since dreadful deed is always shown to be carried out in them

K C Pandey : There has been an evolution in the conception of tragedies. Aristotle's remarks are based on Greek tragedies existing in his time. By the time of Shakespeare the conception of tragedy underwent change and his tragedies should be evaluated according to the conception of his time.

G S Mahajan : Aeschylus' *Antigony* is a Greek tragedy, is it best or not ? — — —

P L. Bhargava : It would be a tragedy but not the best one.

do not actually find the word *araṇkāra*, we have the expression *aramkṛt*. The rhotacism is very common in the oldest Vedic language as well as in its sister language, the old Persian of Avesta, especially of *Gāthās*. In fact all the l-sounds of Indo-European language have invariably become r in its *Āryan* branch and if in some cases l still remains or rather has been reverted to, it is to be ascribed to the later influence of the *Prākṛta*-dialects upon the Vedic. I would just cite only one example of the Vedic word *ūrnā* with Lat. *lana* and Eng. *wool*.

Now, the word 'ara' is derived from the *guna* form of the root *r* with the versatile *a* suffix added to it. The root *r* in the *Rgveda* means as an intransitive verb *to move*, to come fast, to ascend etc. and as a transitive verb *to set in motion*, to bring or to send and to stir up. The verb is mainly conjugated according to either the third (*juhotyādi*) group with reduplicated vowel as *iyartu*, *iyarmi* etc. or according to the fifth group (*svādi*) with infix *nu*, *rnotu* *rnomi* etc. Forms like *rechatu* etc. are however also found especially in the *Brāhmanas*. The causative of this verb is *arpayati*, formed with *pa* infix as *dāpayati*, *snāpayati* etc. which would literally mean to let go something (to somebody). The transitive meaning 'to set in motion' is clearly discernible in the word *arani*, meaning firewood, literally 'those two pieces of wood which are moved or rubbed against each other.' As far as its intransitive meaning is concerned the sense of 'to move fast' soon attracts an object to itself and the sense becomes somewhat like 'to move towards a certain goal' or 'certain object' which further develops a slightly different nuance of meaning i.e. to move or go *into* something. Here I remind you of the word 'ara' meaning the spokes of a wheel. Etymologically it simply means 'a thing which moves or rather shoots from the hub *into* the rim of the wheel.'

This 'arā' has the main accent on the second syllable, that is on *rā*. But there is one more 'āra' in the *Rgveda* having *udātta* on the first syllable i.e. *a*. This second 'ara' is an adjective and it denotes a characteristic, a quality which a thing attains after having got into something, i.e. to be *fit*. We can say that a particular object *fits in* a certain thing if it goes into it and sits there smoothly. But as in English this concrete picture has developed an abstract sense of fitting or befitting,

sūktaiḥ" . . what propriety is there in connection with you through hymns? . . meaning that the hymns, the speech cannot express the greatness of Indra. The words of the hymns are just not *sufficient*

And exactly this sense, the sense of being sufficient has preserved itself in classical Sanskrit with the word, 'alam' which is used adverbially without the root kr either with instrumental or with dative case . 'alam vivādena' means— it is sufficient, enough with discussion which suggests that no discussions should be made now; alam Śramena—it is enough with your efforts, do not try any more. This is the prohibitory sense, of alam the Vārana. And in dative in the expressions like alam Rāmo Rāvanāya, the meaning enough, sufficient is too obvious to be elaborated.

There is a very short leap from 'fit'—the original meaning of alam in the Rgveda—to "sufficient". The transition is not at all difficult to understand if one thinks that if some thing fits in a particular object, it is exactly 'sufficient' for it. A very similar semantic development is seen in the Hindi word *bhara* which means enough, sufficient as well as whole : mujhe eka gilāsa pāni bhara cāhiye, a glass of water would be *sufficient*. Vaha rāta bhara jagatā rahā—he kept awake the *whole* night. This word comes from the root bhr—which means to carry (bharati, bibharti), then to carry in or fill in (bharanā, bharā = filled up). Bhar is an adverb meaning "in a way that a particular thing is filled up" i.e. sufficiently or wholly.

As far as the third usage of alam is concerned with which we are mainly concerned here, it is evident from the foregoing passages of Rgveda that 'āra' in its abstract adjectival sense simply means appropriate, proper, 'as it should be like' and arankṛti (or let us put alaṅkṛti which is the same as alankāra) the appropriateness, propriety.

Alankāraśāstra is therefore the science which tells *what a kārya should be like* and judges as well evaluates it with certain canons of propriety.

The title Kāvyaālankāra given by Bhāmaha to his work simply means the appropriateness, *propriety pertaining to kārya*. And I confess, I cannot think of a better expression for Poetics in Sanskrit. In fact the word alankāra comprises not only the elements of Poetics but also of Aesthetics in it.

R. P. Dwivedi : You say that Alankāra means 'propriety' which should be rendered as *aucitya* in Sanskrit as far as I understand. Now *Aucitya* is not identical with Alankāra since the former is an effect of employment of the alankāras. (tr.)

A. N. Jais : Dr. Tripathi has pointed out the very core of the meaning of the word Alankāra and it should not be confused with the later or the present day usage of the word. The words have their own history and they develop themselves not only phonetically but also semantically. The meaning "appropriateness", "propriety" etc. etc. is true with regard to Rgveda and ancient Literature only and not to its later concept.

himself in the Rāmāyana, dimly formulated by Kālidāsa in a rather casual manner in his reference to Vālmīki in the Raghu-vamśa and deftly employed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta to support the theory that *rasadhara* constitutes the quintessence of poetry, provides us with a clue to understand the nature of the poet's experience as envisaged by Sanskrit critics. We are clearly told by Abhinavagupta in unmistakable terms that the *śoka* referred to by Ānandavardhana should not be taken to mean what it usually denotes in ordinary usage. The *śoka* spoken of here is the *sthāyin* of *Kaumarasa* and is clearly distinct from the earthy sorrows, which human flesh is heir to. And it is this *sthāyibhāra*, transmuted into the *rasa* state in the heart of Vālmīki that found expression in Vālmīki's immortal song. The various stages of this aesthetic experience of the poet ultimately blossoming forth as beautiful poetry, are also indicated by Abhinavagupta in the same context. Abhinava writes—स एव त्वानूतविभावतदु-
त्पाक्रन्दाद्यनुभावचर्चयया हृदयमवादतन्मयीभवनत्रमादास्वाद्यमानता प्रतिपन्न
कश्चरसरूपता . प्रतिपन्न. The sequence of the stages involved in this experience is set forth in the *Kaumudī* as follows—
प्रथम प्रागुक्तलक्षणमहृदयत्वविशिष्टस्य प्रतिपत्तुः हृदयमवाद, ततस्तन्मयी-
भावलाभ, तदनन्तरमखण्डो रसास्वाद इत्यर्थः ।

Abhinava employs the analogy of a jar filled with a liquid overflowing when it becomes full (रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवत्) to elucidate the effusion of poetry from the emotion-filled heart of the poet and adds that his idea of this emotional overflow is supported by the *Hṛdaya-darpana* too, where it is clearly affirmed that the primary pre-condition for the genesis of poetry is that the heart should be full to the brim with *rasa*—
यावत् पूर्णो न चेतन तावन्नेव वसत्यमुम् .

The above analysis of the psychology of the poet's creative moment makes one thing abundantly clear that the poet goes through the complete process of *rasanumūṭhi* before he creates his poem. The terms of this description of the poet's aesthetic experience are identically the same as those of the *sahridaya*'s aesthetic experience when he enjoys the poet's artistic creation either as a spectator or as a reader. There is nothing here to warrant the conclusion that Abhinavagupta conceived of any difference between the poet's creative mood and the con-

to a view, attributed to an anonymous Ācārya that such distinction is unwarranted and that the two should be taken as identical, this view is refuted by citing the view of Kālidāsa that *kavītra* and *sahajayatra* are two distinct, mutually exclusive phenomena. No reason for such a conclusion is given, beyond saying that the stone that yields gold and the stone that can test it are quite different. या शब्दग्रामम्, व्यपनार्यम्, बलद्वारतन्त्रम्, उक्तिनार्यम्, अन्यदपि तदाविषम् अधिहृदय प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा ।
 ... सा च द्विधा कारयित्री भावयित्री च । कवेरपद्रुवाणा कारयित्री
 ... भावकस्योपद्रुवाणा भावयित्री । सा हि कवेः श्रमनिश्रायं च भावयति । तथा खलु फलितं कवेर्व्यापारतरः ।...

‘न इति कालिदासः । पृथगेव हि कवित्वाद् भावकत्वं, नावकत्वाच्च कवित्वम् स्वरूपभेदाद्विषयभेदाच्च । यदाह —

कविद्वयाच्च रचयितुमल श्रोतुमेवापरस्ता
 कल्पापी ते मतिरुभयया विस्मय नस्तनोति ।
 न ह्येकस्मिन्ननिशयवता मन्त्रिपात्रो गुणाना-
 मेकं सूते कनकमुपलस्तत्तरोक्षाक्षमोज्यः ॥

The author of the anonymous *Tīpṇāna* on Hemacandra's *Kāvyañuśāṣana* also declares *Ītra* to be different from *sahajayatra* and quotes Abhinava's own benedictory verse in support :

कवेरपि भावकावस्थायामेव रसाम्बादः संपद्यते । पृथगेव हि कवित्वाद् भावकत्वं । यदाह—तरस्वत्यास्तत्त्व कविमहदनाम्य विवक्षते ।

Though the necessity to make some kind of distinction between the creative and the appreciative attitudes cannot be ruled out, it should, at the same time, be admitted that the conclusion of the identical nature of the *rasānubhāsa* of the poet and the connoisseur, which is an inevitable corollary of the *śloka-śloka* equation can not be disputed. The only way out of the tangle will be to deny *rasānubhāsa* to the poet while he is in the creative mood. This is obviously the stand taken by Rājasekhara and the commentator of *Kāvyañuśāṣana* mentioned above. But Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, to whom poetry is the effusion of the rasa-filled heart of the poet,

poet The fact is the germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya too The creative faculty, which is the distinguishing mark of the poet is to be found in the sahrdaya too, with just a little difference Whereas the poet creates a world of his own and shapes it in words the sahrdaya re-creates from those very words the poet's world once again The creations of both are purely subjective, but again there is a difference The poet imports objectivity to the subjective world of his creation through his words Consequently, the creation of the poet is *mainly intended for others*, though he too does incidentally share it with them On the other hand, the sahrdaya recreates the poet's world *all for himself* In spite of these differences, it can not be denied that the sahrdaya too is a creator, in his own right

The distinction between the poet's creation and that of the sahrdaya can well be appreciated by an analogy from Vedānta Advaita Vedānta postulates two different categories of empirical reality, the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* Of these the *vyāvahārika* world is the world we live in, which is created by Īsvara and the experience of which is shared by one and all Jivas alike. As opposed to this, the *prātibhāsika* is the dream world or the world of illusion which an individual Jīva creates for himself and the experience of which is confined absolutely to himself The position of the kavi and the sahrdaya is closely similar to this Like Īsvara the poet creates a world, which like the *vyāvahārika* world is shared by all The sahrdaya, on the other hand, is like the Jīva and creates a little world, which, like the *prātibhāsika* creation, is limited to his experience. Even as the Jīva is the creator of his dream-world in spite of its limitations, there should be no difficulty in conceding that the sahrdaya is the creator of *his* world, for which he draws his materials from the world created by the poet The parallelism is, in fact, complete In the universe of नानुसृष्ट the kavi and the sahrdaya bear identically the same relation towards नानुसृष्टि as Īsvara and Jīva bear to सृष्टि.

The above Vedāntic analogy, though it can not prove anything, is adequate to elucidate my stand-point that the sahrdaya is also a creator in a limited sense I shall now further elaborate my contention that "the germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya" and that the sahrdaya can be equated with a kavi.

Vijikā preserved for us in the Subhāsitāvali runs as follows :—

कवेरभिप्रायमशब्दगोचर

स्फुरन्तमात्रेषु पदेषु केवलम् ।

वदद्भिरङ्गै क्वटरोमविक्रियै-

र्जनस्य तूष्णीमवसोयमञ्जलि ॥

This much should suffice, I believe, to explain the latter part of my hypothesis, namely that the sahrdaya has in him "the germ of the poet" This relationship of the sahrdaya with the kavi may be expressed as the sahrdaya-kavi equation

This near identity between the kavi and the sahrdaya becomes apparent from one more consideration. The make-up of the kavi and the sahrdaya as described or hinted at by Sanskrit critics also points to their identical nature The three factors, प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति and अभ्यास which are enumerated in the case of the poet are implied in the case of the sahrdaya too. Pratibhā, in the case of poet is described as पूर्ववासनागुणानुबन्धि. In the case of the sahrdaya too, this *pūrvā-sāsanā* is mentioned as an essential precondition for *sahrdayatva*. With reference to the spectators of the play it is said—

सवामनाना सन्धाना रसस्यास्वादात् भवेत् ।

निर्वासनास्तु रङ्गान्तर काष्ठ, इत्यादममग्निभा ॥

Similar statements like वासना चेदानीन्तनी प्राक्तनी च रसास्वादहेतु and पुष्पवन्त प्रमिष्वन्ति योगिवद् रससन्ततिम् also point to the fact that पूर्ववासना is an essential factor for aesthetic relish. Likewise the reference to काव्यानुशीलनान्वास in his definition of the sahrdaya touches upon the other two factors namely व्युत्पत्ति and अभ्यास in the equipment of the poet. This shows that the equipment required of the sahrdaya is not far different from that of the poet. Likewise, the very concept of *hrdayasamsāda*, which is the final determinant of *sahrdayatva* and which implies a kinship of hearts between the kavi and the sahrdaya (ममान हृदय यस्य स) also provides further support to my stand. Thus the parity of equipment and the kinship of hearts of the kavi and sahrdaya provide interesting confir-

only it had been चिरन्तनकाव्यरक्षणविधायिनाम् अपीयतीमिरपि बुद्धि-
निरनुभोयितपूर्वं The benedictory verse of Abhinavagupta in his
Locana, in my opinion contains this very idea. Thus runs the
verse :—

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रययति विना कारणरत्ना

जगद्भावप्रत्य निजरमनरात्सारयति च ।

क्रमात्प्ररूपोपास्त्राप्रनरनुभय भासयति त-

त्तरस्वत्यास्तत्त्व कविसहृदयाख्य विजयते ॥

The whole verse in my opinion, deserves to be reinter-
preted in the light of what I have said above about the basic
identity of the kavi and the sahrdaya. The last quarter of this
verse सरन्वत्यास्तत्त्व कविसहृदयाख्य विजयते provided a hard nut to
the commentators as the preceding lines apparently fitted well
only with the kavi and not the sahrdaya. In fact, the author
of the Kaumudī has directly raised this question as follows :

ननु काव्यात्मकत्वं कविशब्दोपादानेनैव सेत्स्यति, किमर्थं सहृदयशब्दोपादानमिति
चेत्; सहृदयकृतं कविमिष्टविचारक्रियामोचरीभूतस्यैव काव्यस्य मुख्यतया
काव्यरूपत्वादिति ब्रूमः । अत एव वचनम्—कविरपि विदग्धोऽपि मूर्खानुदा-
विचारकः इति । तथा चाचार्यैर्णैव 'या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुम्' इत्यत्र
श्लोके 'ति द्वे अप्यवदम्भ्य' इति । तथा ममानकार्यं (यां) निर्वर्तवत्त्वेन सन्-
चि(च्चि) तस्यैव दृष्टिद्वयस्य विश्वनिर्णयने हेतुत्वं अपि शब्देनोक्तम् ।

This should explain why the commentary बालप्रिया and the
commentary कौमुदी should have, suggested in all more than
half a dozen alternative explanation for this line.

In my opinion, all these difficulties can be resolved by
resorting to कर्मधारय for कविसहृदय instead of इन्द्र.
In the light of the kavi-sahrdaya equation, there should be no
difficulty in explaining this as कर्मधारय compound. The
compound may be split either as कविरेव सहृदय or कवि सहृदय
एव or कविरिव सहृदयः ।

It is interesting to note that Ānandarārdhana too appears
to be thinking of this unity as the vision of the poet and the
sahrdaya in his verse :—

circles of the city by his pseudonym 'Sahrdaya'. In the course of the discussion, I affirm that the Kavi and the sahrdaya are fundamentally one in so far as the kavi is fundamentally a sahrdaya and vice versa, "The germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya" On being questioned whether sanskrit critics have said so anywhere, I premonitorily quote Abhinavagupta's सम्बन्धास्तत्त्व कविमहृदयाख्य विजयते and add that the compound कविमहृदय here should be explained as Karmadhāraya (not Dvandva) so as to signify their mutual *abheda* (कविरेव महृदय) or *sādharmya* (कवि महृदय इव and कविरिव महृदय)

At this stage the dream ends. The previous night just before retiring to bed, I had read an article in the Dharmayuga dated 8th December, 1968, which gave an interesting account of a remarkable dream seen by Sir E. A. Wallace, in which he had seen the full question paper of a test that he was to write the next day. The coincidence might have been a mere accident, but to me it was meaningful. The dream put an end to my vacillation. I promptly decided to make this the central theme of my paper for this seminar.

DISCUSSION

R. G. Divedi : It is a very interesting paper, which proceeds on philosophical distinction between the *vyārahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* *sattā* according to Vedānta. The *sahrdaya* is the author of the *prātibhāsika* poetry and the poet is that of the *vyārahārika* poetry. I raise one doubt. It has been stated in the paper that the *sahrdaya* re-creates with those very words the poet's world once again. It means that the world of the Sahrdaya is no longer the world of the poet, he has his own world, secondly the world of the poet is not *vyāvahārika* since to be so it should be the same as the world of the sahrdaya.

P. Venkatachalam : I have drawn the above example from Vedānta in order to make my point clear. I mean to say that fundamentally both worlds are the same. So far as the nature of the world or its content is concerned, the world of the *sahrdaya* is

tions are present in the latter. It is the idea of the poet which is presented in the medium and in such a way that it is capable of giving rise to a mental picture in the heart of a *Sahrdaya* which is in all respects almost the same which arose in the mind of the poet. The *sahrdaya* too is common i.e. as Croce has said, in both cases there is 'intuition'. However, the distinction between the poet and the *sahrdaya* is that the former is capable of presenting intuition through the medium, the latter is not, i.e. if नैमग्निकी च प्रतिमा etc. are present one is able to produce and if these are absent, he is unable to create the medium which is common to all i.e. *Vyāvahārika*.

Venkatachalam : I think Dr. Dwivedi understands my point. I try to explain my view point through one more illustration. A musician sings a particular Rāga to his audience. The audience re-creates it in its own mind though it is incapable of presenting it.

R. C. Dwivedi : There is a maxim - देवो भूत्वा देवं दधेत् which sufficiently explains that only by becoming a sort of poet that one can evaluate or appreciate literature. There is a verse in the Rāmāyana which may be interpreted to mean that only the inhabitants of Ayodhyā who have passed through the actual experience of separation from Rāma can have the real aesthetic experience of the Rāmāyana. So I perfectly agree with what you say. The tradition is there in the above-quoted maxim. My point of objection was only limited to those two sentences where you say that the worlds of the poet and the *sahrdaya* are of two different kinds—the former is the *vyāvahārika* and the other is the *prātibhāsika* even when they are the same because the *sahrdaya* according to you re-creates the poet's world.

R. S. Tripathi : Vāmana who has been quoted in the *Abhinava-bhāratī* (Ch. VI), *Gaudavaho* and V. Raghvāna's *Śrngārapalāśa* may be referred to

you assume for a critic cannot be one with the practical reality of the poet. The apparent reality is always marked by subjective elements. Rasānubhūti is possible when individuality is cast off and subjective elements don't mar the relish of *rasa* and there is a perfect harmony of the poet, the hero and the spectator, which is hardly possible if you contend that the world of the spectator, or *sahṛdaya* is only *prātibhāsika* i.e. apparent, unreal .
(tr)

Venkatachalam I never say that the world of the *sahṛdaya* is really apparent (*prātibhāsika*) I used this term and the analogy from the doctrine of Vedānta simply to illustrate my point.

Shame is another powerful factor which excites blushing. It has within its orbit two types of causes. moral causes and some improper behavioral patterns. The second one has no connection with the moral sense. If a man of conscience commits a crime in solitude, he may sincerely regret or suffer deep remorse for his guilt, but certainly not blush until his crime is detected, specially by those whom he holds in high esteem. Breach of the laws of etiquette i. e. impoliteness, any impropriety or an inappropriate remark, quite commonly seen and regarded improper behavioral patterns, are the second type of causes which excite intense blushing of which a man is capable. In both the cases mentioned above, the same fundamental principle, namely the regard for the opinions of others, is involved.

Modesty is another powerful agent that excites blushing. A modest man always has an humble opinion of himself and is extremely sensitive about an indelicate word or deed. The modest person readily blushes at slight praise, any indelicate word uttered or such a deed narrated before him is bound to crimson his face, because his humility and extreme sensitiveness to indelicacy make him so.

Whatever may be the real cause, whether due to shyness, to shame for real crime, to shame for the breach of the laws of etiquette, to modesty from humility or—indelicatecy, blushing depends in all cases on the principle of regard for the opinions of others. The cases mentioned above affect the cardiovascular system in such a way that blood-vessels at the body-surface are dilated, and more blood flows into the capillaries that crimson the face.

As it has already been stated above that blushing is an effect of shyness, shame or modesty and it is the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions, innumerable fascinating examples of it can be seen in every literature where the causes of blushing with all its accompanying movements and gestures are depicted wherefrom blushing as an effect emanates. The cause and effect theory is thoroughly maintained. But in Sanskrit literature the case is otherwise. There is hardly any example where the said cause and effect theory is handled as it ought to be. This is not to say that Sanskrit literature is devoid of such situations. It rather abounds in it, but the

“Evam vādim devarsau pārśve pituradhomukhī
Lilākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa Pārvatī”¹

Griffith translates it thus —

“Thus While he spake the lady beat her head
To hide her cheeks, now blushing rosy red
And numbered over with seeming care the while
Her lotus petals in sweet maiden guide”²

In the original verse besides the context i.e. the proposal for Umā's espousal, there are only two indications that complete the sense of blushing. They are ‘Pārśve pituradhomukhī’ and ‘Lilākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa’. These are the movements and gestures which accompany blushing. These are really accessories—subsidiary factors. The thing in question for which these subsidise, is missing.

The other examples from the same context will also justify my assertion. When the proposal for the marriage was accepted, Himavān bade her daughter bow before the Seven Saints to have their fullest blessing. This must have put her out of countenance. Kālidāsa describes her state excellently in the following verse :

“Tām pranāmādarasrasta-jāmbūnadavatamsakām
Ankamāropayāmāsa lajjamānām muhurmuḥuh”³

Griffith translates it thus —:

“So low she bowed, the gem that decked her hair
And sparkled in her ear all loosened there.
Then with sweet modes and joy oppress
She hid her blushes on the Lady's breast”

The original verse has some points in favour of blushing. They are ‘Muhurmuhūḥ lajjamānām’ and ‘Arundhatī ankamāropayāmāsa’. Umā was really dreading the notice of the Seven Saints who were strangers to her and were looking at her at this solemn occasion. This must have covered her with confusion. Noticing this the lady Arundhatī came to her rescue and hid her face on her breast. It will, thus, be seen that the

1. Kumārasambhavam, 6/84

2. Ibid, p. 76

3. Kumārasambhavam : Edited by S R Sehgal (Trans. Poruor

Lajjānamramukhi priyena hasatā bālā cīram cumbitā.¹
 Mahamahopadhyaya Dr Ganga Nath Jha translates it thus —

“Finding the love-chamber empty the girl rose gently from the couch and having intently gazed at the face of her husband who was feigning sleep, she kissed him with confidence, but noticing a tremor in his cheeks, she hung her head through shame and was repeatedly kissed by her smiling lover”²

This is a situation where the excitation of blushing is a must. The movements and gestures which accompany blushing are here. She is unable to meet the gaze of her lover, casts down her eyes due to shame. The reported kissing by the smiling lover is a further heightening of her state. This is almost a “made to order” situation for blushing. But all this has been conveyed by only one word “*Lajjānamramukhi*”—(hanging her head through shame). The original verse mentions the cause—shame—clearly, but the term that conveys the effect of it i.e. blushing is totally missing.

On the grounds of the examples discussed above from different sources the conclusion can safely be drawn that nowhere in Sanskrit literature has ‘blushing’ or a ‘blush’ been expressed or stated though the expression has been a natural and inescapable necessity. The cause and effect theory has nowhere been maintained in the case of *Lajjā* and all its synonyms. Only the use of *Lajjā*, *Trapā*, *Vridā* etc. was considered enough without caring to express the various types of effects caused by them. Consequently it was not possible for Sanskrit intelligentsia to evolve a commonly accepted term for blushing. And so it may be averred that the word with all its effects was perhaps unknown to Sanskrit scholars. But with the readers of today the case is quite different. These days medical sciences and Psychology with all its branches are so advanced and have become so popular that the knowledge of emotions, psychosomatics and the general principles of expression have become essential material for the students of literature. They are familiar with the major physiological changes, which accompany emotions. So whenever the con-

1. Amarśatakam, verse No. 82

2. Kāvya-prakāśa (Dr Ganganath Jha's English Trans.) Chapter

tion leaves no doubt that the Ācārya has no idea of blushing and therefore, it was not possible for him to handle it in his colour-scheme. This justifiably leads to the conclusion that *Vaivarnya* or blushing was perhaps not known to our Sanskrit Ācāryas.

But the description of *Vaivarnya* in the context of '*Vṛidā-vyabhichārīn*'—the feeling of shame—attaches weight to the interpretation of the term as blushing. The change of colour caused by *Vṛidā* may be blushing as well. It is, therefore, proper to tackle and critically examine *Vaivarnya* in the context of *Vṛidā* and do justice to the subject. Bharata says that *Vṛidā* has improper action as its basis. It is caused by *Vibhāvas* (Determinants) such as humiliation, repentance on account of transgressing words of superiors or disregarding them, non-fulfilment of vows and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by *Anubhāvas* (consequents) such as covered face, thinking with downcast face, drawing lines on the ground, touching clothes and rings and biting the nails and the like.¹ In the opinion of Viśvanātha Kavirāja *Vṛidā* is the absence of boldness causing the face to hang down in consequence of misconduct.² Dhanañjaya first of all adds *Vaivarnya* to the definition of *Vṛidā*. He says that *Vṛidā* is a lack of boldness in consequence of misconduct and so forth. It can be inferred from keeping the body averted, from concealment, change of colour, lowering of the head and the like.³ In the said definition *Vṛidā* has received only a partial treatment. It has been defined in the context of *Durācāra*—(misconduct) only. Moreover the *Vṛidā* caused by *Durācāras* (actions against the set code of behaviour) can excite *Vaivarnya* of pallor-type, not of blushing-type, which is an ornamentation of the face. Hemacandra defining *Vṛidā* mentions *Vaivarnya* as its consequent. He also treats the subject on the same lines.⁴ The definition of *Vṛidā* given by Panditarāja Jagannātha is really striking. He treats the subject in a comprehensive manner. According to him *Vṛidā* is a particular disposition of mind which is occasion-

1. Nāṭyaśāstra—Vol. I, P. 363 Pub. Oriental Institute, Baroda.

2. Sīṅhadyadarpana—3, 165.

3. ————, 4/24.

4. ————, 2/23 (edited by Rasiklal C. Parikh).

“Nirudhya yāntim tarasā kapotīm
 Kūjātkapotasya puro dadhāne
 Mayī smitārdram vadanāravindam
 Sā mandamandam namayāmbabhūva”¹

‘When I placed before the cooing pigeon, his mate that was going away by stopping her forcibly, she (my beloved) slowly bent down her smiling lotus-like face towards me.’²

Here ‘*smitārdram*’ and ‘*Vadanāravindam mandamandam namayāmbabhūva*’ suggestive of *Vṛidā bhāva* mixed with pleasurable sensation, create appropriate atmosphere for blushing. ‘*Smitārdram*’ is a sure indication of that. An intense blush is sometimes accompanied by a slight effusion of tears and this is due to lacrimal glands partaking of the increased supply of blood which rushes into the capillaries of the adjoining parts including the reuna. Blushing being an involuntary expression i.e. *Sāttvikabhāva*, which serves the purpose of *bhāva* and *anubhāva* both, it must have an external manifestation, otherwise it will lose its charm. *Sāttvikas* must be dealt with as *Sāttvikas*. In such cases the application of the theory of suggestion is meaningless. It is, therefore, obvious that blushing could not get its proper place in Sanskrit Poetics also.

In sum, it can be confidently asserted that the concept of blushing was almost unknown or very vaguely known to Sanskrit poets and Ācāryas. Sanskrit poets did often create such situations, where *Vṛidā* with all its finest shades of import is beautifully suggested and its various effects—voluntary or involuntary—are excellently expressed, but this most important effect, i.e. blushing remained unmanifested. *Alankāraśāstra* also did not do justice to it. Our Ācāryas who had very shrewd eyes and were very fond of or rather crazy about classifying dividing and sub-dividing the topic in hand and discussing it threadbare did not handle *Vaivarnya* exhaustively by including blushing in its fold.

1. Bhāminivilāsa, Śṛṅgāra Vilāsa, 28 (Pub. Oriental Book Agency, Poona)

2. Ibid

(Translated Portion)

देवय्यं स्वरभगमञ्चतितमा मन्दाक्षतम्रानना

कष्ट भो प्रतिनावतोऽप्यधिसुन वाणी नवोद्गायते ॥

Here the expression *ṭawarṇya* may include blushing, the reddening of the cheeks. Thus we can say that though blushing has not got its fair deal, it has not been completely ignored.

R. G. Divedi : As far as literature is concerned it is actually not a missing link since, one could recall or search a number of ślohas in Sanskrit, as the one which Mr. Venkatachalam has quoted, where the situation of blushing has been described and almost anybody can reproduce one or two of such verses. This temptation at least I should resist following the embarrassment of a damsel who had to stop the parrot from repeating the sweet talks with her lover in the night : व्रीडानां प्रकरोति दाडिमफल्-
व्याजेन वादन्वनम्. Secondly Vidyācakravartin in his commentary on the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* gives description of changes in colour due to blushing etc. on the basis of some lost work named *Bharatasamgraha*—which may either be a metrical summary of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* or his own commentary on this work Thus as far as literature goes, blushing is not unknown. Now as far as the field of poetics is concerned, I think there can be two reasons for its non-inclusion in the *sāttvikabhāvas*. Firstly, the later writers on poetics were perhaps so obsessed by the authority of Bharata that they did not increase the number of the *sāttvikas* given by Bharata but treated these as *upalaksana* so as to enable them to include other *bhāvas* also as the need arose. The second strong reason for not mentioning blushing directly is to my mind, the feeling of suggestibility about it. Blushing is an internal state of embarrassment and shyness involving the whole personality, and it is not restricted to the face or cheeks only. It can, therefore, be better felt than expressed externally.

writer, but would like to point out that it was really very vaguely known to them. In fact the śloka that they have quoted describe the situation of shyness and embarrassment and not the blushing itself. Shyness is a cause and blushing is the effect of it. The effect should be described as such and not left to be guessed by the reader by simply describing the cause of it. Since blushing is an involuntary action, a *sāttvika bhāva*, which comprises not only *bhāva* but also *anubhāva* in it, it must be clearly indicated and can never be suggested. Anubhāvas are never implicit, they are explicit. What surprises me is that Sanskrit poets create and critics describe situations where shyness—the cause—is present, but instead of giving crimsoning of the cheeks as its logical effect, they are waylaid to describe fear (*bhaya*) and nervousness (*trāsa*) etc. and never mention the crimsoning of the cheeks. Panditarāja Jagannātha nicely defines shyness :

स्त्रीणां पुरुषमुखावलोकने पुमांश्च प्रतिज्ञानमपराधमवादेरत्यश्रो-
वैवर्ण्याधोमुखत्वादिविकारः ॥ मन्दचित्तवृत्तिविरोधो व्रीडा but
he mentions only *śarṇa* and downhanging of the face as its effect, and does not include the reddening of the cheeks. That on comparatively dark faces of Indians such crimsoning is not visible is also not true. Blushing is visible even on the faces of Negroes. Charles Darwin has given several pictures of the Negroes while blushing with the remark that the dark colour of a Negro becomes still darker when he blushes.

It is difficult to agree with the view that blushing is included by our ācāryas in *Vairagya*. With our so well known tendency for minute hair-splitting—going into divisions and sub-divisions and further divisions of the sub-division—it would really be surprising if the crimsoning of the cheeks were to be included in such a general term as *Vairagya*. Besides *Vairagya* is only of one kind. If the ācāryas had hinted at the possibility of many more varie-

exact synonym for the English word "blushing" in Sanskrit. Which word, Dr. Jaitly, would you like to use or coin for it in Sanskrit ?

R. S. Jaitly : Well, it is for the scholars present here to decide. I do not have any ready word in my mind

R. S. Tripathi : To my mind blushing was included in Sanskrit Poetics in *lajjā*. Abhinava-gupta associates *lajjā* with sex and observes like Freud : लज्जा हि मन्दय-विजृम्भास्त्वैव । सा हि भन्त अवसदा तान् तान् विकारान् करोति which clearly means that the *lajjā* as well as its effects, i.e. blushing etc. were both included in the term *lajjā*. Just as there is non-difference between *śakti* and *śaktir-ān* so also both cause and effect may be referred to as one and the same. In the Abhinavabhāratī Abhinavagupta remarks that the previous ācāryas have well counted all the *bhāṅgas* and no others are possible. If there be any other they are of minor nature and must be included in *bhāṅgas* already known. I, therefore, think that blushing should be included in the *lajjā*.

Finest Art. From Hindu point of view aesthetics is the science and philosophy of Fine Arts. Drama, the *Drśya-kāvya* is intimately connected with Dance or vice versa. Similarly poetry and drama are equally intimately connected. We know poetry or *Kāvya* is three-fold, *Drśya*, *Śravya* and *Miśra*. This is an ordinary or limited classification, but if we view all the arts, we may formulate the theory that appreciation or realisation of arts depends on only two senses, those of sight and those of hearing. On the basis of these senses the works of the independent arts and the arts themselves have been divided into three classes, those addressed (i) to the sense of sight (*Drśya*), to that of hearing (*Śravya*) (iii) to both (*Drśya-Śravya*). To the first class belongs architecture, with sculpture and painting as its subordinate arts, to the second belongs poetry and music, and to the third drama which is nothing but the highest form of poetry.

Now the question is how can we afford to ignore the historical elements of development or views on poetry or more appropriately the poetic categories. These may be enumerated as follows. There are seven poetic categories under which the results of the analytical approach have been placed (i) the characteristic (*Laksana*) (ii) Embellishment (*Alaṅkāra*), (iii) Quality (*Guna*), (iv) Defect (*Dosa*), (v) Style (*Riti*), Suggestion (*Dhvani*), (vi) Aesthetic configuration (*Rasa*). Of these the first five are objective and the last two are subjective. This is the analysis of Dr. K.C. Pandey whose contributions to aesthetics are well known to the world.

Aesthetics is the soul of the Dramatic art which is its supreme development as well as its fundamental characteristic. According to Hindu view, aesthetics is the science and philosophy of Independent Arts. Bharata, the father, the founder and the exponent of this art, seems to have divided the art into principal and the subordinate ones. For he holds that all arts occupy a subordinate position to the dramatics in as much as they find due place in it. It is with this fundamental background of dramatic art that I have somewhere remarked that Muses of Fine Arts did not descend one after another, Poetry; Drama, Dance, Music, Painting all these Fine Arts are interrelated like Kith and Kin.

Svarga and Apavarga Naturally, therefore, all arts, be it poetry or music, painting or dance, are to be viewed from this lofty idealism of aestheticism.

In nearly all the phases of Indian art, the Rasa (or impassioned feeling) has played a very prominent role. The Indian belief is that the supreme being is Rasa-Svarūpa (cf the Indian theory of Rasa-Brahma-Vāda: रसो वै सः Again image-worship, for which icons used to be made of the manifold materials with manifold symbols, to be worthy of desired end, has to be done in a manner of accomplished art. In dance and drama there is identification of the spectator with the nata, actor. A similar identification is essential between the worshipper and the worshipped. This is possible only through the arousing of rasa, the aestheticism in art. The scriptural monuments in our possession do corroborate this dictum and there we find a number of different Rasas which the artists endeavoured to chisel upon the dry stones and metals.

Thus aestheticism in art becomes instrumental in producing the bhāvavyakti and this in its turn is dependent on the rasas or rasadrstis. The following lines of the Samarāṅgaṇa make this clear:

रसानामयं वक्ष्यामो दृष्टीनामिदं लक्षणम् ।

तदायत्ता यतस्त्रित्वे नाबल्यवित् प्रजायते ॥

Citra in this text stands for pictorial images and sculptural ones, but Bhoja was equally gifted with poetic insight (vide his two remarkable treatises—the Śrngāraprakāśa and the Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharana), hence to my mind this term, Citra, also stands for embellished poetry, but unless it arouses some 'Bhāva' or 'rasa' it is no Citra at all. Hence the previous doctrines as advocated by the early reputed authors on Alankāraśāstra, like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, there is no alankāra in poetry unless it arouses some bhāva and it is just a question of degree only whether it is predominant or secondary. In the end I hope to expound and illustrate this point.

I think in this very advanced stage of re-thinking we cannot afford to be dogmatic. We have to cultivate a more

always aimed at this great Ideal. Any creation, unless it is conducive to the well being of life, unless inspiring and ennobling, and unless high enough for creative urge, is not worth the ideal. It is from this fundamental angle that aesthetics in iconographical art is to be viewed and purviewed.

The following lines from the Samarāṅgana-Sūtradhāra will suffice to illustrate this theme

हस्तेन सूचयन्तर्षं दृष्ट्या च प्रतिपादयन् ।
 मञ्जीव इव दृश्येन सर्वाभिनयदर्शनात् ॥
 आगिके चैव चित्रे च इदं माघनमुच्यते ।
 तस्मादनयोर्विचित्रमाश्रितम् ॥

The Viṣṇudharmottara lines विना तु नृत्यशास्त्रेण especially 'त एव चित्रे विज्ञेया नृत्त चित्र पर मतम्' etc. also propound the same truth.

The Samarāṅgana-Sūtradhāra recognises as many as eleven Rasas and eighteen Rasadr̥ṣṭis, Lalitā, Hras̥ṭā, Vikasitā etc., etc.

The important points in relation to the aesthetics in the pictorial art still need to be expounded. Firstly, all these rasas, though characteristics of only human beings, men, women and children and in their likeness the anthropomorphic forms of the gods and demigods or demons have an application to all sentient creations 'गुरुकृत्य सर्वमत्त्वेषु योजयेत्'. This statement goes to the very core of the art and shows that if birds and animals in paints could be shown manifesting the sentiments, it is really the master-piece, the supreme achievement of the artist, it becomes a new creation, superior creation to that of Brahmā, the Primordial Creator Himself. It is through the symbolism of Mudrās, hand-poses, bodily poses and the postures of the legs, that the mute gods speak to us giving vent to the sublimest of thoughts and noblest of expressions, these so-called brutes can also share our experience. There is nothing extra-ordinary nor supernatural about it. It is the marvel of the art. If poetry can create an idealistic world, full of beauty and bliss, the painting, her sister, must also follow the suit.

society and what was our society in India at the time of Ānandavardhana ?

The massive impact of monistic doctrine of the Advaita Brahma, as promulgated by the great Śankara was being felt and cultivated in practically all the spheres of life and doings. Kashmir, the birth-place of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta could not afford to neglect to feel this impact. Kashmir Śaivism is an aftermath of Śankarācārya's influence. According to my thesis no thought and deed in India is bereft of its metaphysical and spiritual content. The fundamental postulate of our society was Dharma and there can not be a better definition of Dharma than what is given by our Ācāryas

यतोऽभ्युदयनिश्चयसंसिद्धिः स धर्मः ।

Dharma does not mean dogma or ritual, it means the sustaining factor of life in its most complete aspect. Abhyudaya stands for material prosperity and Niśśreyasa for Mokṣa, the release of the soul from bondage. These are two cardinal postulates which have perfected our culture. Thus we can appreciate the balancing of materialism and spiritualism in our culture.

With this introduction to the impact of the philosophy on practically all the Fine Arts in India, let me come to present a new dissertation that if such a matter of fact science and art, the Vāstu and Śilpa, are guided by lofty ideals of monistic principle, the poetry in India cannot be overestimated when we say that its highest development was perfect in the womb of philosophical speculations of Hindus.

In our traditions Sāhitya Panditas have always regarded themselves as brother followers of Vaiyākaranas. The learned scholars are surely conversant with the Sphoṭa doctrine or Śabda-Brahma-theory of Grammarians. The credit for this goes to one of the most reputed grammarian philosopher, Bhartrihari, the celebrated writer of the Vākyapadiya, on which Dhvani doctrine has been evolved. Ānandavardhana himself admits that this doctrine was borrowed from the Vaiyākaranas :

Thus sphota, like Nāda, Vāstu and Brahman, is all-pervading, eternal and indestructible word-principle.

The principle that word is vested with a power which is different both from Abhidhā and Lakṣanā and by which it manifests 'Rasa' 'Vastu' or 'Abhidhā', is based on the principle of the manifestation of 'Śabda' technically called, 'Sphota' of the Vākya-pāṇīya. Sphota, as explained in this work, is something eternal like 'Brahman'. It is this sphota which being itself a 'Dhvani' is also the cause of 'Dhvanis' as the light existing in an 'Ārani' gives rise to other light. The 'Sphota' is like the fine air which pervades all the concrete objects and like the same becomes perceptible when manifested by its own means.

Ānandavardhana in his Dhvanyāloka contends that a word is capable of expressing more than one idea at one and the same time. Similarly according to Bhartṛhari a word can simultaneously express several ideas.

In the Dhvanyāloka, the example of the jar and the candle has been cited to prove that 'Vyāṅgya' (suggested) sense is perceived alongwith the perception of the denoted sense, i.e. Vācya. It does not disappear when 'Vyāṅgya' is perceived just as the light of the candle does not exist when it makes the jar manifest. In other words, the contention of the propounder of Dhvani is that a word is capable of expressing more than one idea at one and the same time. Now, according to Bhartṛhari a word simultaneously expresses several ideas. The word 'cow', though used simply to mean an animal and nothing else, will express something else also :

घटादिषु यदा दीपो येनार्थेन प्रयुज्यते ।
ततोऽन्वयस्यापि नाविद्यात् स वरोऽपि प्रशस्तम् ॥
सकृन्नेषु तदार्थेषु शब्दो येन प्रयुज्यते ।
तस्मान् प्रयोजकान्वाद्यपि प्रत्यायनत्वनो ॥

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also supports this foundation of Dhvani :

यदा घटादेर्दीपादिशब्दो व्यञ्जय इत्यन्ते ।
सकृन्नेषु तदार्थेषु चरति स्वाच्छोदनममृते ॥

not perceived at all when it manifests *spṛṣṭa*. Ānandavardhana seems to have taken the hint from the second view which regards sound to be independent of *spṛṣṭa* but imperceptible at the time of manifestation of the *spṛṣṭa*.

The *spṛṣṭa* theory as fully propounded and established by Bhartrhari in the *Vākya-Padīya* is probably older than Pāṇini. Pāṇini himself mentions a predecessor, *Spṛṣṭāyana*. The clear object of the Founder of *Dhvani* doctrine is to bring the impact of the philosophy of *Rasa* Theory (*Raso Vai Sah*) as enunciated in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which was later adopted by many *Ālankārikas*, esp. the famous aesthetician Pt. Jagannātha, the author of the *Rasagangādhara*. Mammāṭa's elucidations of this theory, in a more profounder and illustrative as well as systematic way, is a second landmark in the history of Indian Aesthetics. These writers regard *Rasa*, *Ānanda*, and *Ātman* as identical.

Now let me come to Abhinavagupta in a brief review. Abhinavagupta, the greatest gift of Kashmir, has been able to bring the East and West to one amalgamated plane. His psychological approach is a landmark in Indian Aesthetics. Abhinavagupta was a rational mystic. Accordingly the essential constituents of aesthetic personality consist and presuppose the following :

(i) Taste, *Rasikatva* (ii) Aesthetic Susceptibility, *Sahy-dayatva* (iii) Power of Visualization, *Pratibhā* (iv) A contemplative habit, *Bhāvanā* or *Carvanā* (v) The capacity to identify, *Sādhāranīkaraṇa*. (vi) Psycho-physical condition, *Anubhūti*, *Vyakti*.

Hindu aestheticians have no doubt recognised five levels of aesthetics experience (i) sense, (ii) imagination, (iii) emotion, (iv) catharsis and (v) transcendency, but the greatest emphasis as laid down by this great philosopher and poetician Abhinavagupta-Pādācārya, is on the transcendency. Thus transcendental level is recognised by him as the highest. Thus the final stage in aesthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, is of supreme bliss (*paramānanda*). Aesthetic experience therefore in its final stage belongs to the level of *Vyatireka-turiyātīta*, in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject, the self, shines in its *Ānanda*.

Vāmana says that 'aujjvalya' is that quality of the colouring of a picture which makes the picture look new and fresh. Aujjvalya is brilliancy which ensures the life of a picture. Otherwise the picture fades and looks very old. This quality is borrowed by him in poetry and says that poetry looks brilliant and preserves brilliancy by the quality of Kānti in the chosen words.

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्ति ।

Ibid. III 1.25

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्ति । वन्यस्य उज्ज्वलत्व नाम यत् अगो कान्ति-
रिति, तदभावे पुराणच्छायेत्युच्यते ।

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्तिरित्याहुर्गुणान् गुणविभारदा ।

पुराणचित्रस्थानीय तेन वन्य कवेर्वच ॥

Ibid. III, I

A similar idea of an old picture is visualised by Rāja-śekhara, the dramatist, in a fine description of Nature in the fading twilight and approaching darkness in the prologue to his drama, the Bāla-bhārata. He compares Nature at dusk to an old picture dulled by smoke :

किञ्च स्तोत्रतम कलापकलनश्यामायमान मनाक्
धूमश्यामपुराणचित्ररचनारूपं जगज्जायते.

Vāmana in his Kāvya-lankāra-sūtra (I, iii, 30-31) compares drama to picture and calls drama as literature *par excellence* because of its likeness to a picture.

सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपक नाटकादि श्रेय तदि चित्र चित्रपःवत् विधेय-
सावत्प्रात्.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta, as he has been quoted by his pupil, Abhinava in his Abhinavabhāratī, says that Rasa realisation or emotional response is easily and excellently got only from a drama. That is, there poetry attains the visual state when one can realise through the eye what one can only imagine otherwise. It is because of this quality that drama is called picture by Vāmana—a series of pictures before our eyes. It is because of this quality also that drama is called Rūpa

his *Abhilasitārthacintāmaṇi* (Mysore ed.), king Someśvara speaks of one type of picture called *Bhāva-citra*:

शृंगारादिरसो यत्र दर्शनादेव गम्यते ।

भावचित्रं तदाह्मात् चित्रकौतुकवारकम् ।

Jayadeva, author of the *Candrāloka* and his commentator, Vaidyanātha, apply the *Rasa* theory to *Citra*.

काव्ये नाट्ये च वायें च विभावार्थविभावित ।

आम्बाधमानकतनुः स्यायो भावो रस स्तुत ॥

The application of the Dhvani theory to Citra

The application of the *Rasa* theory of drama and poetry to picture means that in pictures also *Rasas* are to be depicted by conditions which rouse them, viz the object of emotions, the excitements of emotions, the effects of emotions and the minor emotions which can be called fleeting feelings and which are accessory to the major emotional mood. This means the application of the *Dhvani* theory to *Citra* also. It certainly means so. For, in an artistic presentation, it is the suggestion that forms the very life of that artistic expression. This can also be proved by taking the canons given by the *Vṛnūdharmottara* for depicting things like evening etc. A perusal of the verses in chapter 24, which show how mountains, sky, earth etc. must be depicted, will prove the truth of this statement. The subjects e.g. gamblers should be suggested by depicting them as bereft of their upper cloth—'उत्तरीयविहीनारव घृतानक्ताग्रदग्नेन्'; a highway must be suggested by portraying a caravan of camels, etc. carrying articles of transport (युक्त मनारैरुद्गाहैः मार्गमार्यं प्रदग्नेन्). The night must be suggested by drawing a thief walking stealthily, by an *Abhisārikā* hurrying to meet her lover in her secret meeting place and so forth. Rather it is in picture that this principle of *Dhvani* which according to modern English critics, is 'Symbolism' in poetry, applies excellently. For here, in picture, there is no scope for the word which can name the subject depicted. In poetry, it is a fault to mention anything by its name. The mention of their names will never arouse

VAKROKTI AND LITERARY CRITICISM

Dr (Mrs) Hemalata R. Tatpati

Vakrokti, for the first time in Sanskrit Poetics, got a very important and highest position as the all-pervading poetic concept in Kuntaka's Vakroktujivita. Vakrokti is the very life of poetry according to Kuntaka and not a mere Alankāra of Śabda or Artha. Innumerable alankāras of Śabda and artha are discussed by the earlier rhetoricians but according to Kuntaka they are not having as much striking beauty as his Vakrokti has, hence the necessity of discussing this apūrva alankāra.

Kuntaka is influenced by Bhāmaha who says,

सैषा सर्वत्र वक्रोक्तिरनयाऽर्थो विभाव्यते ।

यत्नोऽस्या कविना कार्यं कोऽनङ्करोऽनया विना ॥

(Kāvyaalankāra, II, 85)

Following Bhāmaha Kuntaka has revived again the old school of Alankāra. For Bhāmaha, Vakrokti is the underlying principle of all the alankāras, but Kuntaka's treatment of Vakrokti is very broad to include all other poetic concepts in it. It is the principle of Beauty underlying the poetic language itself. He defines Vakrokti as,

“वैदग्ध्यमगीमणिति” (V. J. I, 10) .

Vakrokti decorates the vācya and the vācaka and is inseparable from them. All the three Vācya, Vācaka and Vakrokti, together make a pleasant poetic composition which delights the connoisseurs. For the first time in Alankāraśāstra Kuntaka defines Sāhitya as the combination of beautiful and competent Śabda and artha with Vakrokti or Strikingness as its essential embellishment. He shows his independent genius in defining Sāhitya. Later rhetoricians like Bhoja and Rājaśekhara follow him but the originality and the modern approach is found only in Kuntaka's treatment of it.

“सातिशयत्वदून्यवमंयुक्तस्य वस्तुनो विभूषितस्यापि पिनाबादेरिव
तद्वदाह्लादकारित्वविरहादनृपादेयत्वमेव ॥”

(V J P. 303, Dr Nagendra's Edn.)

Kuntaka does not admit Svabhāvokti, Rasavat, Preyas, Urjasvin, Udātta and Samāhita as alankāras. According to him Vastu-Svabhāva and Rasa, Bhāva etc are always alankārya and can never be called Alankāras. His treatment of Svabhāvokti as an alankārya is novel and unique in the history of Alankāra-Śāstra. There cannot be any existing Vastu without Svabhāva, and if Svabhāva itself is called an alankāra there will be no alankārya in Svabhāvokti. And the alankārya cannot be one and the same.

Kuntaka mistakes the Svabhāvokti alankāra of earlier rhetoricians as a *lokokti* or a common speech of ordinary people. So while proving Svabhāvokti as an alankārya he stresses on the striking Vastu-Svabhāva having poetic imagination.

In the same way, like Svabhāvokti, Kuntaka strongly protests to admit Rasavat as an alankāra. He criticises the definitions of all earlier rhetoricians, including that of Ānandavardhana, to prove rasavat as an alankārya. The term rasavat, though split into various Samāsas, does not indicate any other Vastu except poetry. And the rasavat alankāra cannot be called as a whole poetry, because embellishment is a part of poetry and not the whole.

Rasa is always alankārya according to Kuntaka, so he criticises Ānandavardhana for giving rasa a subordinate position in the rasavat alankāra. Rasa is always Pradhāna and it can never be subordinate to any other Vastu. It cannot have a double position to be alankārya and alankāra both. Ānandavardhana's treatment of Rasa in the rasavadalankāra as a *gunibhūtavyangya kāvya* is a self contradiction when he gives highest position to rasadhvani as the soul of poetry in his theory of Dhvani. Kuntaka has correctly pointed out the mistake and has tried to correct the same in his own way.

Rasavat, as alankāra, can be explained as the alankāra getting the equal position and importance with rasa in

most superior and consider other ritis as less superior or inferior. According to Kuntaka geographical differences cannot explain the ritis or differentiate them from one another. Moreover, there cannot be an inferior way of poetic expression. If it is not beautiful and superior it cannot be called poetry at all and so it will be useless and futile to discuss the ways of expression which are not admissible to poetry. The main purpose of poetry is to please the *rasikas* by beautiful and artistic way of expression which gives the supreme delight. So the *Rīti* cannot be classified as *Uttama*, *Madhyama* and *Adhama* as the *adhama rīti* will be a poetic flaw.

Kuntaka includes his *mārgas* in *Vākyavakratā*. Though he generally classifies *mārgas* in three categories, namely, *Sukumāra*, *Vicitra* and *Madhyama*, he admits that there are infinite artistic ways of poetic expression as the *Kavi-pratibhā* is endless. The *mārgas* are completely dependent on *Kavisvabhāva* according to Kuntaka. A poet adopts a *mārga* according to his *Pratibhā*, *Vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa*.

In *Sukumāra mārga* the power of *alaukika pratibhā* is seen and the importance is given to *rasa*, *bhāva* or *svabhāva*, hence naturally the use of *alankāras* is less. This is a pleasant and delicate way of expression and the famous poets like *Kālidāsa* have followed it. In *vicitra mārga* the fascination for *alankāras* is seen. The poet wants to show his artistic skill and the power of imagination by using a series of striking figurative expressions in poetry. Of course, these *alankāras* mainly reveal the beauty of *alankārya* and the composition is not bereft of *rasa*. *Vakrokti* is the life of this *mārga* and it is very difficult to follow as it requires eminence and lot of practice along with the power of imagination. Poets like *Bāṇa* have followed this way of expression. *Madhyama mārga* is a combination of *sukumāra* and *vicitra mārgas* and the poets having taste for novelty in expression follow this *mārga*. All these three *mārgas* are delightful. Thus Kuntaka justifies all the beautiful poetic ways of expression giving all of them the equal importance.

Kuntaka has shown originality and novelty in adopting *gunas* depending on *mārgas*. The four *gunas*, *Mādhurya*, *Prasāda*, *Lāvanya* and *Ābhujātya* belong to all the three

1. Varnavinyāśavakratā which includes anuprāsa, Vṛtta and Yamaka in it.
2. Padapūrvārdha-Vakratā, and
3. Padaparārdhavakratā which includes the beauty of Subanta and uñanta words. Kuntaka has discussed many varieties of using the striking and fit words to beautify the whole Kavi-vākya.
4. Vākya-vakratā or Vastu-Vakratā includes all the alankāras, mārgas, gunas and rasa.
5. Prakaranavakratā includes striking conversations in the work, beautiful nature descriptions, changes made in the incidents from that of the main source according to the theme of the concerned work, for the sake of propriety, development of the main character and rasa. All sandhis and their aṅgas also are included in this classification.
6. Prabandhavakratā is a total effect of all these five varieties of Vakratā. It also includes the change of rasa in a literary work from its original source, the proper arrangement of the whole work to help the full development of rasa and bring propriety in the work. The fit title indicating the main theme of the work, and the phalaprāpti by the hero at the end come under this variety of Vakratā.

Kuntaka includes all the varieties of Dhvani in these six varieties of Vakratā making Vakratā a most broad and all-pervading concept. Both the Dhvani and the Vakrokti theories are finally related to the Kavipratibhā. But the medium of approach of both the rhetoricians is different from each other. Ānandavardhana reaches Pratibhā of the poet through rasa which is suggested. His treatment is subjective, guiding the critics to appreciate the best poetry and get the highest delight. Kuntaka reaches Pratibhā through Vakrokti which is an alaukika abhidhā including other śabdavyāpāras like Vyāñjanā etc. and is found only in the best poetry and not in the ordinary language. His treatment of the poetic concepts is objective, guiding the new practitioners in poetry, as well as helping the critics to

AN EXPOSITION OF THE RASA-THEORY IN THE RASAKAUMUDĪ OF ŚRĪKANTHA

Dr. A. N. Jani

Śrīkantha, a Kannada musicologist was patronised by the Jain King Śatruṣālya of Navanagar near Dvārakā in Saurashtra. He wrote his work Rasakaumudī¹ during the reign (1569-1608 A.D.) of his patron to harmonize the theory and practice of the Northern Indian music.

The work is divided into two parts. The first half consisting of five chapters deals with music and the latter half, also consisting of five chapters, deals *en passant* with some topics of literature connected with music.² Thus the latter half seems to be an appendix of the earlier part which forms the main theme. He tries to justify the superiority of music over literature³ and for giving precedence to music in the treatment. However, he prefers to call his work Rasakaumudī rather than Sangītakaumudī probably to suggest to the readers that the latter half of his work is also equally important and that he is not only a musicologist but also a poet and a rhetorician.

1. Published in the G.O. Series, Baroda, 1963, can be had of the Sangcet Natak Akademi, Rabindra Bhavan, Ferozeshah Road, New Delhi, Price Rs. 13. It was submitted to the University of Bombay for the degree of D.Litt. for which Dr. Jani was declared eligible in July 1968.

2. cf. सङ्गीतशास्त्रे किल पूर्वखण्डे

विधाय साहित्यमयोत्तरेण ।

विरच्यते भूरिगुणैकनाम

तदगमूतं हि गुरूपदिष्टम् ॥ ६-२

3. cf. मङ्गीतसाहित्यमिति प्रयोग

प्रयोगविज्ञा प्रवदन्ति नित्यम् ।

तथाविधा नो कथयन्ति मिथ्या

मङ्गीतमाहात्म्यमतोऽधिकं स्यात् ॥

the *rasa* becomes manifest through the *ālambana vibhāvas* e.g. the beloved, and the *uddīpana vibhāvas* e.g. garden, notes of cuckoos etc., it being discernible in the form of the *anubhāvas* e.g. the movements of the neck, the eyebrows, the eyes and the hands etc., and being enhanced by the *sañcāri-bhāvas*, the *nirveda* etc.

In the third and the fourth stanzas¹ he repeats the idea expressed in the second stanza and holds further that this *rasa* is ascertained in the actor who cleverly imitates the hero

These two stanzas (3-4) are nothing but versification of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa as recorded by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya-prakāśa*²

In the first quarter of the fifth verse the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is given without mentioning his name explicitly as he is referred to only by the word *kecit*³ The second quarter seems to represent the view of Śaṅkuka as the expression '*sāmāyikaprakara-sādara-carvyamānaḥ*' reminds us of the words '*ratyādir bhāvas tatrāsannapi sāmāyikānām vāsanayā carvyamāno rasa ity Śrīśaṅkukah.*'

The last two quarters of the fifth verse and the sixth verse represent the view of Abhinavagupta⁴

1. vide Note 2, p 93 above.

2. cf. 'विभावर्त्तललोचानादिभिरालम्बनोद्दीपनकारणं रत्यादिको भावो जनितः, अनुभावः कटाक्षमुजाक्षेपप्रभृतिभिः कार्यः' प्रतीतिर्योग्यं वृत्तो, व्यभिचारिभिर्निर्वेदादिभिः सहकारिभिरुपचितो मुख्यया वृत्त्या रामादावनुकार्ये तद्रूपतानुसन्धानान्तर्गतेऽपि प्रतीयमानो रसः' इति भट्टलोहटप्रभृतयः।

3. cf. भोगेन मुज्यत इति प्रवदन्ति केचित् (७५ अ)

4. लोके प्रमदादिभिः स्यान्मनुमानेऽभ्यासनाटवचना नाट्ये नाट्ये च तरेव कारणत्वादपरिहारेण विभावनादिव्यापारवत्त्वादलीकविभावादिभ्यश्चवृत्तयैः
..... सन्ध्वितोषस्वीकारपरिहारनियमानध्यवसायात् साधारण्येन प्रतीतिरभिव्यक्तः सामाजिकानां वामनात्मनया स्थितः स्थायी रत्यादिको नियतप्रमानुगतत्वेन स्थितोऽपि साधारणोपायबलात् तत्कालविगन्धिपुपरिमित-प्रमानुभाववशोन्मिषित्वेद्यान्तरमपकंशून्यापरिमितभावेन प्रमात्रा मुक्लहृदय-मवादनाया साधारण्येन स्वाकार इकाभिन्नोऽपि गोचरीकृतस्त्वभापतं प्रमाणो विभावादिजीवितावधि. पानकरग्रन्थाद्येन चर्व्यमाण. पुर इव परिस्फुरन्

These varieties are illustrated in 11-18.

Remaining rasas are illustrated one by one in one stanza each - hāsyā (19), karuṇā (20), raudra (21), vīra (22), bhayānaka (23), bibhatsa (24), adbhuta (25) and śānta (26)

Thus the overall pattern of this chapter shows the author's close study of the Kāvya-prakāśa and the above comparative study makes it evident as to what extent Śrī-kanṭha presses Kāvya-prakāśa into service

Incidentally, this throws light on the popularity and hold of Kāvya-prakāśa over the rhetoricians of Gujarat even during the 16th century when the present work was composed.

DISCUSSION

V Venkatachalam The expression सामाजिकप्रकरमादिवर्ण्यमाण in 5b has been interpreted by you to contain a reference to the theory of Śāṅkuka on the Rasa-sūtra as reproduced by Mammata in his Kāvya-prakāśa. But I think this line cannot be detached from the preceding line (5a) in which the view of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka has been explained. Both lines form a composite unit and if you take out सामाजिक etc. there is no subject left and the sentence is hardly complete. In fact Śrī-kanṭha makes no mention of the view of Śrī Śāṅkuka and goes straight over to Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka after giving a summary of the view of Bhaṭṭa-loṭaṭa. Not only in view of Śāṅkuka but also in the exposition of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka the Sāmājika has his share—which he gets out of his own *vāsanā*.

R C Dwivedi There arises one difficulty if we assume that the line 5b has a reference to Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka. We should not be oblivious of the fact that Śrī-kanṭha is not only trying to give a summary of the four theories regarding Rasa as contained in the Kāvya-Prakāśa but also to reproduce the language of Mammata as is perfectly clear from the whole stanza No 4 and the line 5b. Now, if

CONCEPT OF RASA IN THE BHATTI-KĀVYA

Dr Satya Pal Narang

Bhaṭṭi, the author of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvyā, is an important figure not only in the history of Sanskrit Grammar but also in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He was the author of a Śāstra-Kāvyā which aimed at illustrating grammar, alankāras, poetics as well as conjugational forms in various tenses and moods. Thus, in practice, Bhaṭṭi-Kāvyā is an important link between the Nāṭyaśāstra, and the Kāvyalankāra of Bhāmaha.

A question arises, when the grammar, alankāras and the gunas like Prasāda and Mādhurya were illustrated by Bhaṭṭi, why did he not illustrate Rasa? The answer striking to my mind is that he deliberately did not want to illustrate it. As the trend of poetry during his contemporary period (6th Cent. A.D. last part) had changed, so every poet aimed at writing such a poem which could excel another in its scholarly approach. Bhaṭṭi could not escape that trend. He asserts 'my work is like a lamp to those who possess grammatical sight, but it is useless like a mirror for a blind person, who is not proficient in grammar'. In this respect, Bhaṭṭi can be compared to Subandhu, who boasts to have composed a Kāvyā which contains Ślesa in each and every word (प्रत्यक्षरश्लेषमयप्रबन्ध....).

Even the poet like Kālidāsa who is said to be the foremost of the Indian poets could not escape this tendency as he has employed Yamakas in the Raghuvamśa Canto IX. Bhaṭṭi also adopted the same trend to write a poem which serves two-fold purposes. Bhāmaha seems to take notice of such a tendency when he says that 'if poems were to be explained like a scripture (Śāstra), ah! the dull-witted are killed.'¹ In fact,

1. Kāvyalankāra II 20

वाच्यान्वयि यदीमानि व्याख्यागम्यानि नास्त्ववन् ।

उन्मद मुषिरानेष हन्त दुर्बोधो ह्यग ॥

tional characteristics of a Mahākāvya and has thus written some verses which can be said to be the examples of various Rasas. Both Bhāmaha and Dandin have accepted Rasa as one of the characteristics of a Mahākāvya.

In the description of the physical beauty of Śūrpanakhā and Sītā, the poet has tried to dwell upon Śrngāra Rasa. Vipralambha Śrngāra is found in about twelve verses in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya (VI 73-84) which is mostly blended with grammatical illustrations and appears like a catalogue of suffixes rather than genuine Vipralambha Śrngāra in particular. But in the eleventh canto of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya, an excellent picture of the Sambhoga Śrngāra is found. In fact this canto is named as Mādhurya Guna which again shows that Bhaṭṭi wanted to incorporate Rasa in a Guna.

In about 50 verses (I.20, III.20-22, 49-50, V.95-96; VI 831, 124-125, XIV. 55-60) sentiment of pathos is found in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya. In fact, all these verses are scattered in various cantos and are not the examples of a systematic sentiment of pathos which again shows that Bhaṭṭi had no consistency with regard to Rasa (Rasabhāva-nairantarya) like later poets (Mahākāvya-kāras).

Similarly, in about five verses each Raudra, Bhayānaka and Bibhatsa Rasa are also found but they are not very important to show the existence of respective Rasa in theory or practice.

Heroic sentiment (Vīrarasa) is dominant in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya. Being a heroic poem, it was difficult for the poet to avoid the physical description of various individuals and battle-fields. But in most of the descriptions it is completely blended with illustrations of rules and conjugational forms which apparently appear to be adequate to enhance the beauty of the Vīra Rasa. But it is only with a motif of illustrating grammar. On the whole, the Vīra Rasa is merely outer physical expression of various heroic activities.

Thus, having examined the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya both in theory and practice, it appears that all the contemporary rhetoricians were stressing upon either Alankāra or Guna.

BHĀVA IN SANSKRIT POETICS : A HISTORIETTE

Basant Jaitly

The word Bhāva has acquired various meanings in Sanskrit literature. However, if we examine it from the standpoint of poetics we shall have to admit that it is the soul of poetry. The other three elements of poetry viz. imagination (Kalpanā) perception (Buddhi) and style (śilpā) are in fact based on the Bhāva. This is the element which clearly draws the line of demarcation among poetry, science and history. Bhāva is born of feeling, therefore, it is related with the mind. Mind may be taken as an executive power of the soul and Bhāva is described as the agitation or Vikāra in the mind. The word Bhāva is often used at the ends of compounds which stand for situation and mimetic changes but even then they cannot be placed under the heading 'Bhāva' because it has been used in a technical sense and the number of Bhāvas has been fixed by the acāryas.

Bharata, as usual, is the first aesthetician who has dealt with Bhāva in details. The problem is, why the Bhāvas are given this particular name? Whether this name is given because of their happening or the quality of effecting?¹ Bhāvas are called dispositional in nature (Cittavṛttisvarūpa) and therefore the etymology of the word may be the first situation in which Bhāva is taken to the peak and is never found in a static state. Secondly, Bhāva takes place in the Cīttavṛttis Bhāvana Prakriyā through the media of experience and knowledge in the least possible time and by mingling into the heart provides pleasure as sentiment. That is why Bharata has used two verbs Bhavanti and Bhāvayanti simultaneously. It is to be noted here that both the verbs used by him have a causal sense—one that happens or one that causes something to be. He further clarifies his stand in the three Ānuvamsya slokas which convey three different meanings of the word.

1 Nāṭyaśāstra, 7 p 405, Motilal Banārsidās Ed.

with the help of his treatment of Bhāvayitrī Pratibhā. He holds that the Bhāvayitrī Pratibhā forces one to evaluate the point taken by the poet and his purpose at large. It is under the shadow of this pratibhā only that the tree of Kāvya-vyāpāra flourishes and without its help remains unfruitful¹. The description forces us to conclude that Rājaśekhara considers Bhāva to be of great importance, as it is with the assistance of the Bhāvayitrī Pratibhā that the poet succeeds in fusing his emotional experience into a poem and thus making it full with life. But it is to be admitted that this description more or less shows the importance of Bhāva in general and does not throw any light as far as its specific qualities or definition part is concerned.

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika come forward with a new approach. The Kārikā of Daśrūpaka states that when the heart of the spectator is fully associated with the pleasure, pain, joy and sorrow of the substratum (Āśraya) that stage is Bhāva². Dhanika, commenting on the Kārikā, emphasizes that when the emotions of the Anukārya are manifested in the the spectator, then this Vāsanā or Bhāvanā is called Bhāva.³ The conclusion may, easily be drawn that Dhanañjaya and Dhanika take Bhāva as the feeling of pleasure or pain in the spectator and thus look at the problem from the spectator's view-point only. Their analysis is narrow in comparison to that of Bharata. While in Bharata's analysis all the Sthāyins Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas are included, the approach of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika is upto Sthāyins and Vyabhicārins only. Sāttvikas have been referred to and dealt with separately in nature and it is only for the sake of being in accordance with the convention that they have been entitled 'Bhāva'.

It has been stated previously that Bharata does not consider Bhāva as Cittavṛtti only. Abhinavagupta disagrees with Bharata and accepts it only as a Cittavṛtti or emotion⁴. The stand of Abhinava clearly shows that his analysis of Bhāva includes Sthāyins, Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas and excludes all

1 Kāvya-mīmāṃsā p. 34, Chowkhamba Ed.

2 Daśrūpaka, 4 verse 3, Ibid.

3 The same (Avalokaportion), 4 p. 187, Ibid.

4 Abhinavabhāratī p. 342, Gackwad's Ed.

a tree and the tree gives birth to the flowers and fruits, in the same way Rasas are the root cause of the Bhāvas and Bhāvas are caused by the Rasas¹ Bhoja, too, considering the evoked Ratyādi Rasa as Bhāva supports the stand of Bharata, Abhinava and many other ācāryas² Anyway this is not the definition of Bhāva. Ramsingh the commentator on *Sarasvatikanthābharana* brings out the definition of Bhāva commenting on Bhoja's Śabdaguna, bhāvika, which is nothing but the expression of Bhāva. He writes, the vṛtti of that citta is Bhāva which is entangled in an emotional crisis.³ This definition is very much akin to that of Abhinava and it would need no support if we observe that the Cittavṛtti-Viśeṣa of Abhinava has acquired here the shape of Bhāvanā-dasāpanna

Further, clarifying the nature of Bhāva, Bhoja explains that all the Bhāvas are fundamentally of the form of love. A warrior fights because he loves fighting, the clown laughs because he loves laughing and so on. But this too is not an original stand. The difference occurs when he recognizes as many Rasas as there are Bhāvas. He believes that all the Bhāvas are equal in the middle stage of Ahankāra (madhyamāvasthā), previous being the parā stage. In this second or middle stage the basic Ahankāra Rasa reveals itself as Abhimāna for many external objects with which it has come in contact. At this stage the basic or one Rasa multiplies into several Bhāvas and these Bhāvas which rose out of the Ahankāra reach the climax being attended by their particular evoking conditions. These Bhāvas, though at climax, are in fact Bhāvas but may secondarily be called Rasas because the Ahankāra Rasa provides its character to these Bhāvas also. This is the same stage where Ratu, Hāsa etc. come to the mature stage of Śṛṅgāra, Hāsyā etc. It is due to this analysis that Bhoja, in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, accepts no division among them as eight or nine Sthāyins, thirtythree Vyabhicāriṇs and eight Sāttvikas. Every Bhāva, for him, is

1 Abhinavabhāratī, p. 249, Ibid.

2 *Sarasvatikanthābharana* 5 verse 13, Pandurang Javaji Ed.

3 *Sarasvatikanthābharana* p. 63, Ibid.

cannot be external only Bhānumisra takes Sattva to be the body of living beings or Jīva Śarīra¹ and explains Sāttvikas in terms of external manifestations This is really wrong to the extent that the absurdity of his statement may be realised through the appliance of simple logic. The emotion, which is in no way present inside, cannot be externally manifested in the true sense This is the main reason which has forced the Ācāryas to submit that Sāttvikas at the first stage emerge as Bhāvas and later on they are manifested as Anubhāvas. Why Bhānumisra has taken this one sided view regarding Sāttvikas is still a puzzle which awaits an answer. However, if we interpret the term 'Rasānukūla Vikāra' as indicating all the internal and external changes this definition of Bhāva becomes specifically broad

Viśvanātha Kavirāja gives a more lucid definition of Bhāva According to him the principal accessories, love concerning a diety, teacher, sage, king or the like and the Sthāyi Bhāva not properly awakened are denominated Bhāva². The definition of Viśvanātha makes it clear that the Bhāva has been given a broader perspective in his Sāhityadarpana. While in Mammata's definition the case of improperly awakened Sthāyin was just inferred, Viśvanātha has given it full treatment by mentioning it clearly and thus he has stolen a march over Mammata

Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha starts with a discussion. He comments, if we accept Bhāva as different from dependents, excitants and ensuant emotions but at the sametime suggestive of Rasa, it will be victimised by ativyāpti because Śabda and Artha are necessarily suggestive of Rasa Besides it will only be applicable to the Rasavyaṅjaka Bhāvas and not to the self-suggested ones³

He further argues, if we define Bhāva to be that Citta-vṛtti which expressess Rasa, even then the situation does not alter as this definition too is a victim of Ativyāpti For example if a Virahini has taken Kālāgaru liquid as poison a garland of blue lotuses as snake, it is her false knowledge of the objects which is born of separation In fact it is an

1. The same 4 p 38, Ibid

2 Sāhityadarpana, 3 260, Motilal Banarasidas Ed

3 Rasagaṅgādhara, 1 p 277, Banaras Hindu University Ed

ticians, he does not philosophise the problem concerning the root cause of the Bhāvas and takes it in an easy way. He simply says that the Vibhāvas are the root cause of the Bhāvas and Anubhāvas are their Kārya¹. His definition does not provide any new ground for the analysis of Bhāva as he has repeated the view of Abhinava and many others who take it to be a Manovikāra or disposition only.

The Bhakti Cult dealt with the Bhāvas in its own way and provided a new dimension for its analysis. The treatment, as found in the Bhakti Cult, is lucid and convincing but requires a separate article for a proper exposition of the subject. At present we would have to keep ourselves content with the above estimate of the Bhāva which points out how it has developed in Sanskrit Poetics and acquired various shapes in the hands of different Ācāryas. Further, this analysis makes it clear that there are three main elements in it. Firstly, that which remains in the shape of congenital instinct i.e. Vāsanā. Secondly, that which causes something to be and resides in our consciousness i.e. Bhāvanā of Ālambana etc. Finally, that which is externally manifested through the behaviour or figure of a person, i.e. Anubhāvas. If we look at the above mentioned elements in the context of modern Psychology it would be quite easy to draw the conclusion that the first seems to contain a synthetic form of instincts and dispositions. The second rightly deals with the emotions and the third indicates towards the physical expression of emotions. Though deviations may be found here and there yet on the whole the deviations do lose their importance if we keep in our mind dates of these works when they were composed.

DISCUSSION

V C Shrivastava Suppose a person, for example a Westerner, does not believe in impressions of former birth will he be able to accept this analysis of bhāva (which is based largely upon a belief in former birth) because I think that congenital instincts

¹ The same, p. 2

are called *bhāvas* and as soon as they become externally manifested they are called *anubhāvas* (tr)

R P. Dwivedi One more question arises here The *Anubhāvas* are of two types, those caused by *Sāttvika-bhāvas* and those caused by *Saṁcārī bhāvas* It means that the mental state in the *anubhāvas* is not independent from that of the *sthāyin* or *saṁcārībhāvas* Since they are caused by either *sthāyin* or *saṁcārīn*, they are obviously effects—i e external I, therefore, think that since *sāttvikas* cannot exist without *sthāyin* etc they are only external i e *kriyārūpa* and they do not possess any internal nature about themselves, as propounded by Dr R S Jaitly yesterday; otherwise we will have to assume that the *sāttvikas* are not only caused by *sthāyins* etc but that they exist in the *ātma* independently also

R S Jaitly. I never said that the *sāttvikas* are only external and not internal. In fact I always emphasized the internal as well as external aspects of them The one is unmanifested, the other manifested Every *Sāttvika* can be found in the same person in its unmanifested form as *bhāva* before it is externally manifested as *anubhāva* (tr)

R P Dwivedi Is this internal state of *sāttvikas* different from that of *saṁcārīns* and *sthāyīns* ?

R S Jaitly: Yes, it is decidedly different from that of the *Saṁcārīns* and the *sthāyīns*. How and where would you otherwise accommodate the *bhāvas* like *stambha* etc ? (tr.)

R P. Dwivedi The ācāryas consider the *anubhāvas* of two types according to their origin, of these the first type emanates from the *sthāyībhāvas* and the other from the *Saṁcārībhāvas*. Except these two there is no other cause of *anubhāvas* But you accept the internal state of the *sāttvika* which means that there is also third type of the *anubhāvas* (*sāttvikas*) which have their own internal latent state as their

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF POETRY

Dr T G Mainkar

It can be safely asserted that though many like Poetry, *kāvya*, few are able to define it. When about to define, they often end by unsatisfactorily describing it. The difficulty is really inherent in the problem itself. There are many words as well as concepts, familiarity and understanding of which is usually taken for granted but a deeper examination of which reveals that there is only a vague awareness of the meaning and content of the same. One may refer in this context to the words and concepts like the Beautiful, Good and the like. Familiarity breeds contempt, the saying goes, and one might add in matters like these, familiarity ignores ignorance, is often unaware of the same. It is an awareness of such a situation that makes men to attempt to define such concepts and thus try to be as precise as possible and have as close an understanding as possible in the use of such words and concepts. *Kāvya* has such a powerful sway over the human mind that cultured minds like those of Bhartrhari have scorned kingdoms in exchange of poetry, '*śukavilā yadi asti rājyena kim*'. It is no wonder then, that those given to a study of poetry should start with an attempt at defining it. So all rhetoricians, both in the east as well as the west, are seen from quite early periods in poetic studies, devoting much time and energy to the problem of defining poetry in as satisfactory a manner as is possible.

What is *kāvya* and why we like it are questions which are often asked and rarely answered satisfactorily. Hence fresh attempts and a discerning criticism of the earlier attempts become a sheer necessity. It would be no exaggeration if it were said the science of rhetorics is nothing but an attempt to arrive at a new and satisfactory answers to these questions of the definition of poetry, *kāvya*, and the poetic experience and its precise way of affecting the reader. A definition by itself is a difficult problem and it has been rendered

too include all that is so denoted. Such a harsh logical insistence also adds not a little to the difficulties of the problem. One can be justified in thinking that poetry is an art and that since the main purpose of an art is to give delight; *sakala-prayojana-maulibhūta, vigalita-vedyāntaram, Brahmāśrēṣṭhasahodara* etc.—the definition should have a reference to these excellent pieces rather than to the ordinary ones which are regarded as poetry only through sheer generosity and courtesy. A definition that covers all the specimens, from the best to the worst may perhaps satisfy a strict logician but rarely one who is a *rasika*, a *sa-hrdaya*, a lover of poetry. A definition should not exclude anything that is good but at the same time it should not land us into the difficulty of calling even the bad piece as a work of art. Rhetorics is primarily discussion of good literature and not of its lowest variety, which has no pretence whatsoever to art, or to anything that art implies.

As soon as Poetry, *Kāvya*, is regarded as an art, its relation with the other arts comes to the mind, for all these other arts too are seen as having the same main purpose of giving highest delight to man. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish *Kāvya* from the other arts which having a common purpose differ between themselves because of the medium they use. This medium is the chief distinguishing factor, *vyavacchedaka*, and hence ought to be given in a definition for thereby the art stands separated from the group. Word is the medium of *Kāvya* and hence almost each and every definition of *Kāvya* in Sanskrit refers to the *śabda* which is the base. It is therefore that Bhāmaha defines *Kāvya* as '*śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam*' and Dandin defines it as '*īśārtha-vyavacchinā padārthi*'. Vāmana defines it as '*rīti ātmā kāvyasya*' yet his *rīti* is '*śīṣā padaratanā*'. Rudraṭa's definition is '*śabdārthau kāyam*' while Mammata's definition is '*śabdārthau saguṇau anantarīti pūṇa bhāṣā*'. Viśvanātha, who defines *Kāvya* as '*vākyam rasātīkari*', cannot resist the temptation of telling that it is a '*vākya*'. Jagannātha too has to observe that the *Kāvya* is '*śabdārthau pratipādaka śabda*'. All these writers lay stress on the *śabda* because of its being the medium of this art.

Yet it would be improper to stop at this mention of

but it is common knowledge that this is not poetry. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish the *rākya* or the *śabdārthau* as used in day to day life and as used in poetry.

In poetry the *śabdārthau* or the *rākya* are used by an artist to say something significant in a deliberately chosen manner and he therefore seeks it to make more powerful *alankr* or add something to its bare form so that they become significant and evoke from us a response that the sentence or the words in our day to day life used, seldom do. It is to convey this distinction that Mammata adds the words *sagunau* and *adoṣau* by way of giving the necessary qualifications of *śabdārthau* in poetry. Jagannātha also clearly adds '*raṇanīya-artha-pratīpāḍaka*' as a qualification of *śabda* and also gives the explanation that *raṇanīyatā* is the power to give delight that is unique and wonderful, *lokoṭtara*. To stress the fact that a sentence in poetry appeals to emotion, Viṣva-nātha informs us that it is '*rasātmaka*' and takes for granted that the sentence contains a *sthāyībhāva* that can develop into a *rasa*. To Dandin also the '*īstārtha*' appears to be a common property of the body, *śarīra*, of the words in life and in poetry, but in poetry, the *alankāras*, the *dehasobhākara dharmas*, the properties that decorate the *padārthā*, are of supreme importance. Vāmana's word *kāvya* refers to *śabdārthau* while his '*rītiḥ ātmā kāvyasya*' points out this distinction between ordinary language and poetry. Ānandavardhana also in his celebrated '*sa-hṛdayālīhādī śabdārthamangalam*' clearly points out this very pertinent power of poetical language. It will thus be seen that all these critics appear to suggest that the medium of poetry is words but these have a special power by which they affect emotion, convey a charming meaning and cause delight. It should not be understood that words here are *alankṛta* while those in day to day use are not so. In our day to day life also *Upamā*, *Anyoṭī*, *Īyāśruti* are used and in poetry at times *alankāras* as such may be absent altogether. It is therefore that Mammata observes '*analankṛtī krāpī*'. We are all familiar with poetry that is without any *alankāras* and one which appeals through its emotional purity, intensity and simplicity and one may refer in this context to verses like '*mātrbhīḥ cīntyamānāsām te hi nah divasāḥ gatīḥ*' '*Dukḥha-samvedanāyaiva rāme caṣṭanayam āhitam*' and so many of this class.

and has not the very *varanātha-ārtha* to do much with these?

One would be justified in thinking that since poetry all over the world and in any language is the same, any definition worth the name should refer to this universal element in poetry. Thus we see poetry being defined as 'best words in best order' and an analysis reveals that 'best words' are very much the same as *saguna* and *varanātha-ārtha-pratipatti*. The adjective 'best' has obviously a reference to *saguna*, *artha* and *samāhita*. Similarly 'best order' would suggest exactly what Vāmana desires to suggest by his *vā* and *śikṣā padā-rasat*, for *śikṣā* could be perfectly understood as 'best' since Vāmana himself tells us *śikṣā guṇin*. In both these views what is contemplated is the beauty and perfection in style and also implies singular capacity to convey a charming meaning. All this discussion recalls to our mind the words of Daṇḍin *śikṣā-guṇataraṇa padāvali*. One might also be justified in thinking that the definition of Viśvanātha, *ādhyatma-rasānukāṣa-kāya*, makes one think of the celebrated words in the context of poetry that it is 'spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings' and 'emotion recollected in tranquillity'. The only difference that one is likely to be aware of is that while Wordsworth appears to think primarily of the origin of poetry and from the point of view of the poet Viśvanātha appears to have the *rasika* before him. But when it is remembered that the *rasa* is nothing but the *śikṣābhāsa* in the composition, it becomes clear that ultimately Viśvanātha leads us to the 'emotion' in poetry that is capable of being 'relished' by a *sa-bhāṣa*.

Two things strike one when one looks at these definitions of *kāya* that these Sanskrit rhetoricians give us. Firstly, it is to be noted that none has 'condemned' poetry as it makes people dream, it entices with words, it creates illusions and ultimately makes inactive and so on or that it inherently rests on a falsehood. Similarly one does not come across 'didactic' definitions like the one that Poetry is criticism of life and so on. Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Ānandavardhana, Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, none of these adopts this point of view while speaking of poetry or when defining it. Though one might say that there is a reference to the *apāda* in *śikṣā-sarvāṅga-śikṣā-śikṣā* but it is clear that this

śṛṅgāra and *raśi*. Life is so full of incidents or mirth and sorrow and experiences of various types more meaningful, when a person is compelled to come out with an expression that is highly significant as well as charming. Sanskrit dramas themselves are full of so many utterances of this type, which convey something deeper, more valuable and of more lasting value in life. Yet Mammata, leaving everything else should have thought of this 'double-dealing' and *vyāñjanā* through the word '*adhama*' and the objectives that cleverly suggest the other meaning either as charming or as one deserving to be classed as the best '*uttama*' is something which one cannot easily comprehend. Indeed, what has this verse in it that could be compared with the 'Ode to Nightingale' or 'Ode to the West Wind,' or the 'Sky-lark' or 'the Ode to the Intimations of Immortality,' to name at random? In fact, one feels tempted to observe that as a matter of fact the verse that Mammata himself has quoted to illustrate the '*asphuta alaukāratva*' is a far better piece of literary art than this one which he regards as one of the '*uttama*' type. Judged by all the canons of poetry the verse :

“Yah kaumāraharah sa eva hi varah tā eva caitraksapāh
te conmīlita-mālatisurabhayah praudhāh kadambānilāh
sā caivāsmi tathāpi tatra surata-vyāpāra-līlā-vidhau
revā-rodhasi vetasī-taru-tale cetah samutkranthate”

is a superior piece of art. The emotional quality makes it a comparable lyric with any other lyric in any language. The keen and familiar intense longing of the human mind for joys once experienced has found a very eloquent yet poetic expression here. The very happy choice of words, the soft alliteration and the predominance of soft sounds, y, v, r, l and t, the long metre—all these have combined effectively to give a fine expression to the longing and the awakening of the mind into that heaven of experience in the green cane-thicket bowers on the bank of the river Revā on the night in Caitra fragrant with the intoxicating aroma of the Mālatis. There is an effort to catch the magic of the atmosphere and experience that once was and in this effort, the element of love or of *śṛṅgāra* has become subordinate or further sugges-

touches the life itself. Suggestions that one gets after reading the sonnets of Shakespeare, Odes of Wordsworth and Shelley and Keats and the thrill that one receives after it is the real pleasure in poetry and deserves to be considered as *dhvani* or *Vyāñjanā*. Neither the definitions nor the illustrations of Sanskrit rhetoricians indicate anything that they ever thought of poetry or the *dhvani* in this manner. On the other hand one notices the anxiety and care with which they desire to see that a composition without emotion and embellishment is not excluded from the definition of '*kāvya*' and one is surprised to find Viśvanātha also to be following the traditional way, after having properly realized the great importance of *rasa* in poetry. It is very difficult to see either force or reason in the argument that when a '*prabandha*' is '*sarasa*' then the verses in it or sentences in it also are '*sarasa*'. One will readily grant that the *Mṛcchakaṭika* is '*sarasa*' but one would not agree to the view that the verse of Cārudatta, '*Maitreya, kṣipa nṛgadam purānakūpe*' is '*sarasa*'. What is commonplace and bad must be so termed.

These limitations of the Sanskrit rhetoricians in a way explain to us the limitations of Sanskrit criticism and literature. This also to a certain extent explains to us the criticism that is levelled against them. (Both these by modern students of literature and those whose vision has been widened on account of their study of western criticism and western literature.) Śṛṅgāra and Alankāra appear to be the weak points of these writers. It is also difficult to understand why should have they spent so much energy in discussing whether the *doṣa* could be present in a *kāvya*, if so to what extent, could a human composition be free from all the *doṣas* and so on. In the context of real poetry all these appear to be not important at all. These writers themselves have shown that flaws like *ridhīyāmarsa*, *prasarakti* do not seriously affect the quality of a piece. Generations of critics and lovers have accepted Shakespeare with his so-called obscenity, Lawrence, Joyce and Pound with their 'faults'. It is often interesting to think what would be the estimate of these writers according to the canons of these rhetoricians.

When one considers all these definitions and the ingenuity shown in all these discussions and also the final out-

total of these factors. Even if all these factors are understood, there will always remain something that eludes our grasp and it is really this 'eluding' part that bestows the individuality on the mind. The individual fights hard to maintain this distinctness and logic is only a maid, an instrument in the struggle for a preservation of this aspect. This will serve to explain the futility of discussions and deliberations in this matter. The individual mind tries to preserve its own empire intact. But this does not mean that the mind does not seek any contact with other minds. The fact is just the other way. This individual mind, so anxious to retain its individuality intact is also 'extremely curious and eager' to know about the world and the self. This keen desire, a fundamental trait, establishes a contact between an individual mind and the other minds with whom it likes to have a discourse. It is eager to 'listen' to other minds. Reading literature is, as a matter of fact, listening to other minds. It is only when a proper communication is established that an experience of one mind can be transferred into the mind, can be appreciated by it, can be allowed to enter the erstwhile closely and zealously guarded empire of the mind. Experiences that do so enter are honoured and preserved as precious possessions. The empire of the mind expands, for it does not know the bars of culture, country, or time. These are experiences that are eternal and universal.

Poets use images to convey what they want; they want to invade these individual empires of the readers, or of the 'sahridayas'. It at once does strike a chord of sympathy in experience and reveals to us something unperceived hitherto. The more we think on it, the more it expands and its content assumes universality and depth. The image is the spell, the charm of a magician, since it conjures up the universe of experience and content before us. The beauty of this image has little or nothing to do with the constituents of the image, for its beauty lies in its content, in its rich ever-expanding suggestion. It is this suggestion that is really the *Dhvani*, the *Vyañjanā*, in poetry. This meaning differs from the grammatical meaning and the scholarly interpretations. This

that desired such dialogues realized all this and it is through their dialogues that our minds today have attained that culture that they seem to possess today. The mind today is the creation of this ancient literary tradition. It is because of this tremendous impact and power of literature, that it is of urgent importance that it is properly read, understood and appreciated. Rhetoricians help us in some measure no doubt but their limitations in this matter also should be understood.

Bharata is returning to Ayodhyā from the home of his maternal uncle. He has learnt of the serious illness of his royal father; but does not know that he has died. He stops for a while in the vicinity of Ayodhyā and enters into the memorial of kings (Pratimāgrha) where the statues of the past kings of the dynasty of Ikṣvāku, beginning with Dilīpa, are kept. He admires the excellence of sculptured images in the pillars, in which divinity and humanity are thoroughly harmonised. He is wonder-struck at the expression of life and emotion in them. The keeper of the memorial recognises the family resemblance between the statues of the past kings and the physical frame of Bharata. And Bharata, when he comes to the statues of Daśaratha, immediately recognises his father in it, though terribly shocked at such a sight, he refuses to believe his eyes and asks the keeper "*Whose statue is this?*"

There is a reference to imitative painting in Bhāgavata, Section 10 and subsection 62. This reference occurs in connection with the marriage of Usā, daughter of Bāna, and Aniruddha, grandson of Kṛṣṇa and son of Pradyumna.

Usā beheld Aniruddha in a dream and became passionately enamoured of him. She took her friend Citrālekṣhā, daughter of a minister, into confidence. Citrālekṣhā was such an expert in imitative painting and was so familiar with the figures of all the past and present kings and princes, that she could draw such pictures that the original could be recognised in the pictorial presentation. She offered her help and to enable Usā to recognise her object of love among the kings or princes, she started drawing their imitative pictures. When she drew the picture of Aniruddha, Usā recognised her object of love in the pictorial presentation, smiled and exclaimed "This is that".

Imitation as a principle of presentation of drama on stage, was well-recognized in India at the time of Patañjali (3rd c B C). For, commenting upon Pāṇini's aphorism (3-1-26) "हेतुमति च" he refers to it as follows:—

A scene, presenting the killing of Kamsa by Kṛṣṇa, is being staged. The stage-manager is directing it personally. Some one enquires, "What is the stage-manager doing?" The reply is that "He is directing the killing of Kamsa by Kṛṣṇa." The objection to the use of the present tense is raised:

imperfectly impressed by the world of ideas, are both irrational (II) since one of the component parts of human being, the body, to which all impulses, passions and feelings belong, is irrational (III) since out of the three forms of human knowledge (a) comprehension of ideas (b) sense-perception and (c) opinion, the last two are irrational and (IV) since imitative art is confined to partial copying of the object of phenomenal world, is the object of sense perception and arouses passions and feelings, it is irrational all round. It does not, therefore, strengthen the mind but corrupts it. Hence it should have no place in the ideal Republic.

The theory of imitation in art has been criticised and rejected in India also, but not because of any metaphysical bias and political consideration like those of Plato. It is rejected on the logical and aesthetical grounds. There are two Indian Aestheticians, Bhaṭṭa Lollata and Śrīaṅkuka, both belonging to Kashmir, who are said to have propounded the theory of imitation in art. (I) One says that imitation is to create illusion of the historical and (II) the other says that it is to make the inference of the imitated basic mental state, the central fact in the aesthetic experience, possible respectively.

The theory that art creates illusion through imitative presentation of the historical is criticised as follows :—

If art creates illusion, it would arouse ordinary attitudes and responses. And such an admission would mean the denial of an independent value to art. It would also mean condemnation of all tragic presentations. For, we will have to admit the rise of tragic feeling of sorrow from them, which as such is not reliable.

The theory, that art imitates to make the inference of the basic mental state of the imitated possible, is logically and historically subsequent to the theory that art, through imitation, creates illusion. The exponent of the imitation-inference theory raises the question :—

“How can the awareness of the basic mental state be possible from an imitative presentation, which creates illusion? For, the illusion is purely perceptual. It is responsible for taking one perceptible thing for another which is also perceptible. It is incapable of directly bringing about

as to delude the spectator to take it for the real phenomenon and to arouse the same tumult of feelings as does the original. And it was because of such a conception of imitation that he condemned art, the product of imitation, and therefore, illusion and deception. Aristotle improves upon this conception. He discusses the meaning of imitation in respect of the (I) object (II) the means and (III) the manner.

The Object of Imitation

If we remember the metaphysical view of Aristotle there will be no difficulty in understanding and accounting for the difference of Aristotelian conception of imitation from the Platonic. For Plato, the external world was mere irrational matter, on which form was somehow imperfectly impressed. The idea was beyond the world of stars and, therefore beyond the reach of the imitative artist. The objective world, therefore, to him was a mere material symbol of the ideal, a mere reflexion, a pure and simple world of the sense. Imitation therefore, according to him, naturally consists in deceptive reproduction of the sensuous.

According to Aristotle, however, the objective world is idea and matter together. The idea is the soul, the essence, the purpose, the motive force, which determines the direction of the growth, evolution, or development of matter where it inheres. It is not beyond the reach of the creative artist. For, art is one of the two kinds of virtue—moral and intellectual. It is intellectual virtue. It is creative activity under intellectual direction. If, therefore, an artist is not guided by intellect in his creative activity, if he is concerned with the realm of senses only, if he presents the sensuous only and completely ignores the idea, which can be grasped through intellect only, he is no artist at all. Imitation, therefore, according to Aristotle, is idealisation, the presentation of things not as they are, but as they should be; not as they are known to senses, but as they are visualised by the intellect; not as they exist in the external world, but as they are to be under the controlling force of the ideas.

In applying the theory of idealisation to the works of

formed. Therefore, while tragedy is concerned with the presentation of the supremacy of idea over matter, comedy is concerned with the presentation of self-assertion of matter, paying no heed to the commands of reason.

But the principle of 'imitation', which consists in presentation of an advance on the given reality and not as it is, holds good in both the cases. The difference between the tragic and comic presentations lies only in this, namely, while tragedy presents a more advanced stage in the expression of idea in the material medium than we can find in the objective world, comedy presents a more advanced stage in the self-assertion of matter, in utter disregard of the commands of reason, than can be met within the phenomenal world.

But comedy does not cease to please simply because it is the presentation, not of the beautiful but of the ugly. There is an inherent tendency in man to take delight in imitation, irrespective of the fact whether the presented is beautiful or ugly. The mere consciousness that the object, present before us, is an imitation of something that exists in the world of nature, though that object in itself may be ugly, is sufficient to please the human mind. It is the recognition of a natural object in an artistic production "This is that" which is responsible for pleasure. There is a kind of inference and, therefore, some exercise of the intelligence is involved in such a recognition. And as the exercise of reason, the highest aspect of the human soul, is always pleasant to the mind the comedy is pleasant.

It was Aristotle, who first noticed that presentation of ugliness in representative art has its own fascination. He was the first to contradict the Platonic idea that the artistic presentation affects us as does the corresponding reality. According to Aristotle, it is not the content of likeness but the fact of likeness which is the secret of attraction in comedy.

Wider Meaning of Imitation

Imitation, therefore, has a wider meaning to Aristotle than it has to Plato. It is not merely production of thing, so like that, which we perceive in nature, as to create illusion. It is production of things better or worse than they are to be

bringing about purgation, discharge, of the excessive element of emotions, through freeing emotions from the unwanted and thus producing harmony among them i.e. bringing them to 'the mean' Aristotle, thus discovers for the first time that art brings about the elimination of certain elements of personality. He paves the way for the Hegalian conception of Katharsis as complete deindividuation.

In Indian Aesthetics also, there is the pedagogic view of art, but that is not presented in terms of katharsis. There are two views on the moral end of art, one propounded by the poetics and the other by the dramaturgists. The former holds that poetry improves her lover morally like a certain lecture, which proverbially is recognised to be more effective than hundred sermons from pulpit. And the latter asserts that drama improves the spectator morally by bringing about the identification with the focus of the situation and thus making him experience the goodness of the path of virtue and badness of the path of sin.

It may, however, be pointed out here that no Indian Aesthetician maintains the moral improvement of the lover of art as the sole end of art. The end of art is to arouse aesthetic experience. Aristotle was led to the assertion that tragedy has the ethical end, because he wanted to justify the existence of art in an ideal republic, in which Plato had refused a place to it. In the history of Indian Aesthetics, however, there is no such condemnation of art and consequently there is no such counter-assertion as Aristotle made against Plato.

In works on Indian Aesthetics there are references to the values of products of poetic and dramatic arts for the artist or connoisseur. Works of art are thus recognised to have made immortal the names of poets and dramatists, such as Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. They are admitted to have brought royal patronage to the artist, for instance, Dhāvaka, the real author of the *Ratnāvali*, got considerable wealth from King Harsa. They are also known to have won the favour of gods. Poet Mayūra, for instance, is known to have got cured from leprosy, because of the favour of the sun, in praise of whom he wrote the *Sūrya Śataka*. They are also recognised to have educative value. And lastly they are acknowledged to have

with such pleasing sights and sweet sounds, that their bitterness is not felt and they are accepted with delight, much as a bitter medicine mixed up with honey. It covers the apparently unwelcome nature of the moral principle with the agreeably beautiful, as a wise medical man coats a bitter pill with sugar, so that it is taken in with pleasure. Morality is a demand of the beautiful as its ornament. It is a demand of a smiling and lovely darling, which it is difficult to refuse and to meet which is a pleasure. It is such a presentation of the moral principles, which justifies the existence of art as a medium of moral instruction, separate from sacred scripture and history.

There is historical evidence to show that the presentation of dramatic art had such an effect on the spectator. We know that Śāriputta renounced the world and embraced Buddhist asceticism, because of the effect produced on his mind, by a dramatic presentation.

Mysticism of Plotinus and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in the Context of Aesthetics

Plotinus belongs to the line of writers who took certain aspects of the whole of the aesthetic problem, discussed by Aristotle. His predecessors busied themselves with discussion of the means of artistic production, they examined the powers of language which is the means of dramatic and poetic production. Plotinus occupies himself with the end of art. He takes up the problem of experience, for which art is responsible. He attempts the problem from metaphysical, epistemic and psychological points of view. He improves upon the Aristotelian position in this respect. According to Aristotle, aesthetic experience was only an emotive experience, consisting in the "mean" to which an emotion is brought by the kathartic effects of tragedy. According to Plotinus, it is beyond the emotional level, it belongs to the transcendental, the spiritual level. Plotinus thus frees art from subordination to morality and recognises the experience that it arouses as akin to mystic experience of the Ultimate, the One, the God.

Similarity of this view of aesthetic experience to that

SOME THING OF ARISTOTLE

Bhim Sen

Let me first state Plato's position in regard to the poets. He had felt the power of poets to delight and move. He had an affectionate respect for Homer and had read and absorbed him. But he could not approve of them and wanted them to go out of his Republic. He saw the basic truth that art seeks to imitate or represent what he calls phenomena. But then he also felt that it was an imitation of an appearance, a copy of a copy and so twice removed from reality. The abiding reality for him consisted in the ideas, the unchangeable 'forms', of which the material things were an imperfect image. Beautiful objects he saw as having a reflection of the 'absolute beauty' which constituted for him the true reality. This awareness that art was twice removed from reality, was with him one reason for his disapproval of poetry. Secondly, he saw that the appeal of the poets was not to the reason but essentially to the emotional part of our being which he regarded as the most worthless part of the soul. He thus saw an antithesis between art and morality and accordingly spoke disapprovingly of poets and poetry.

Plato confused the study of art with the study of morals. Aristotle with a single lucky stroke of his logical mind removed this confusion, and in writing his 'Poetics' gave to the fine arts an independent place in the scheme of human activity and created the study of aesthetics. He takes for granted that a work of art whether a picture or a poem is a thing of beauty and that it affords pleasure appropriate to its own kind. Mark his definition of tragedy, "It is an imitation of an action that is complete and whole and of certain magnitude....." which means that it is beautiful. Further he makes a clear distinction between the truth of nature and poetic truth. "It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen according to the law of probability or necessity."

pity and fear to a disturbing pitch. The whole emotional state and balance are for some time completely changed. The paradoxical impulses are roused to a climax but in the catastrophe that follows they are reconciled and stilled in the calm of the achieved attitude. There remains none of their emotional agitation; their devastating force is spent, and the mind of the spectator is at rest. This is one part of catharsis.

Another side to it seems to be that the experience is exalting and cleansing. It certainly seems to have a reference to a moral effect which great tragedy produces and which has been accepted by an unbroken tradition through the centuries. Tragedy is a tale of great passions of a noble sufferer. There is greatness and nobility in the suffering. The feelings of pity and fear as they are roused, are both relieved and elevated. It is a chastening calm which finally comes from a sense of the essential breadth and justice of things. There is heightening and widening of consciousness.

It could certainly be maintained that this does not come about merely through an appeal to emotions of pity and fear. Tragedy does evoke other emotions also. Love and admiration are equally important in the effect of tragedy.

Indeed, all this is rendered possible through the profound moral sense of the tragic dramatist. He has his own instinctive sense of joy and sorrow, of pity and terror, of good and evil. He has his perception of the essential meaning of an event and the ability to feel the pathos in human suffering. He has his vision of the sorrow of mortal destiny as also of the awful grandeur and potentiality of the human spirit.

Tragedy true to its grain is essentially spiritual. Its infinite value is in the release of a noble vision and power. It is a vision of man's marvellous spiritual potentialities. We see man invested with the dread awfulness and attributes of Gods. "Even as man perishes he is seen revealing transcendent potentiality for higher and higher attainment in the realm of the spirit. This seems to be at the core of great tragedy and perhaps counts for some part of the experience associated with the word catharsis.

denied it and propounded Rīti instead¹. These words of Ānandavardhana are very important in evaluating the originality and importance of the doctrine of Rīti. The appreciation and estimation of the excellence of poetic compositions through the means of the doctrine of Rīti continued to weigh heavily even though imperceptibly on Ānandavardhana's mind. Although he claims that the rhetoricians like Udbhaṭa and others preceding him have presented a critique of the beauty or excellence of the external (i.e. the vācya) side of kāvya only, the internal (i.e. the pratiyamāna) side remained untouched or unanalysed². Yet Vāmana must be out of the category of such rhetoricians. Had the fact been otherwise, Ānanda would not have given him credit for visualising, howsoever indistinctly, Dhvani as the essential element of Kāvya. It is to be seen, how far the real or the intrinsic charm of Kāvya can be explained on the basis of Rīti doctrine.

Vāmana is in fact the first rhetorician who first conceived of the soul of poetry. Thought about the soul of poetry was in fact the first attempt to have a vision of the essential or the intrinsic element of poetry. Vāmana propounded Rīti to be the soul of poetry, and defined it as 'Viśiṣṭa padaracanaḥ'. Again he explained the word 'viśiṣṭa'

- 1 Ibid. II 346 and the Vṛtti on it —

अस्फुटस्फुरितं काव्यतत्त्वमेतन्मयोदितम् ।

अशक्नुवद्भिर्ध्यायितुं रीतयः सम्प्रवर्तिताः ॥

एतद्ध्वनिप्रवर्तनेन निर्णीतं काव्यतत्त्वमस्फुटस्फुरितं सद् अशक्नुवद्भिः प्रतिपादयितुं वैदर्भी गोडो पाञ्चालो चेति रीतयः प्रवर्तिताः । रीतिरूपविधाविना हि काव्यतत्त्वमेतदस्फुटतया मया स्फुरितमस्मीदिति लभ्यते ।

- 2 Vide Dhvanīśloka, II 1 3 —

तत्र वाच्यं प्रतिज्ञो यः प्रकाररूपमादिभिः ।

यदुवाच व्याहृतः सोऽन्यस्ततो नेह प्रत्यन्ते ॥

- 3 Vāmana's Kāvyaśāstrakāśikā and its Vṛtti. —

रीतियामा काव्यस्य । विशिष्टा पदरचना रीतिः । विशेषो गुणात्मा ।

How can it be accepted that separate tastes of guda, marica etc., are not different from the one and the only one peculiar taste of the drink called Pānaka? Can any one have the taste of the Pānaka by taking guda, marica etc., separately? Thus it is clear that howsoever the exponent of Dhvani may try to include Rīti in the Gunas, he cannot deny the specific beauty or excellence of a poetic composition produced by Rīti. When the votary of Dhvani-School himself regards the loveliness or the charm (lāvanya) of a beautiful woman, charm which is the collective effect of all the limbs placed or joined together in the body in a beautiful manner, as different from the beauty of the individual, why can't then, the exponent of Rīti-School also regard the excellence of a poetic composition produced therein by the specific employment of Rītis wherein there is assemblage of gunas as different from the excellences of the individual gunas? When the loveliness of the body as a whole cannot be included in the loveliness of the limbs, when the 'vyangya' cannot be included in the 'vācya', how can then the 'Rīti' be included in the 'gunas'?

The history of the evolution of the concept of Rīti is a long one. At first, the excellence of a poetic composition must have been based on different gunas separately. Before rise of the concept of the Vaidarbha and the Gauda styles (mārgas) described in the Kāvyaadarśa of Dandin, separate gunas would have been representing different poetic styles (Kāvya-mārgas). In later times, these gunas would have collectively formed the specific characteristics of different styles of poets of different tastes and temperaments. Dandin visualised the Vaidarbha and the Gauda styles as forms of poetic composition. The ten gunas described as the soul of Vaidarbha style by Dandin were visualised by him in a collective manner and not separately. Only he did not present any analysis of the collective excellence or beauty produced by the gunas collectively. Vāmana recognised this excellence as the effect of the proper employment of Rīti. Thus in the order of evolution, the former concept that the excellence was produced by the proper employment of the individual gunas, achieved climax in the concept of Rīti of Vāmana.

Out of these the first four with different definitions, of course are taken to exist in both the Mārgas, viz., the Sukumāra and the Vicitra. Even though an independent thinker in his concept and analysis of Mārgas, Kuntaka is a strong supporter of Dandin and Vāmana in a different way. According to him the three Mārgas are based on the poet's nature, taste or temperament and not on any geographical divisions or regions as conceived by Dandin. His Sukumāra Mārga is in fact Dandin's Vaidarbhamārga and Vāmana's Vaidarbhi-rīti in a new form. Kuntaka undoubtedly differs from Dandin and Vāmana in atleast one very important point, and it is this. Whereas Dandin and Vāmana consider Vaidarbhamārga or Rīti to be the best of all because of its innumerable gunas, Kuntaka unlike them considers all the three to be equally meritorious or good because if the fact had been otherwise, no poet worth the name would have ever tried to write in the Vicitra (Gaudamārga of Dandin and Gaudī Rīti of Vāmana) or the Madhyama mārga (Pāñcālī Rīti of Vāmana). But the fact remains that even the most illustrious poets like Subandhu, Bāna, Kavirāja and others have written in these styles. In his opinion, therefore, no Mārga or Rīti is inferior to the other two.

Any way, this is an incontrovertible fact that by showing the assemblage of gunas, Rasa, alankāras and pratibhā in his mārgas, Ācārya Kuntaka only redeemed or resuscitated Vāmana's doctrine of Rīti. Thus the same doctrine of Rīti first sprouted in Dandin's Kāvyaādarsa, then developed and twigs in Vāmana's Kāvyaalankārasūtra, finally blossoms and fruits in Kuntaka's Vakroktujivita.

Vide Vakroktujivita, Dr S K De's edition P. 71 —

माग्रेषु गुणानां समुदायधर्मता । यथा न केवलं शब्दादिधर्मत्वं यथा
तन्मन्त्रशब्दादिव्याख्यानावसर एव प्रतिपादितम् ।

Philosophy? The use of the same term (*gūṇa*) in poetics as well as the number three point towards some such influence

A P Mishra Yes, I do think that there is at least some relation between the two, though at present it is rather difficult to establish the real nature of this relationship

V Venkatachalam Mādhurya can easily be related with *Sattva*, and *ojas* with *rajas*, but what about *Prasāda*?

Basant Jaitly You talked about the importance given to *Rīti* and *Vṛtti* by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, what I feel is that both of these Ācāryas gave more importance to *Vṛtti* and not to *Rīti*, because Ānanda-Vardhana considers *Vṛtti* to be a result of *gūṇa* and the *Kāśikī* has been referred to in terms of ideas suitable to *Rasa*, *uparāgarikā* as words suitable to *Rasa* etc. Abhinava too takes the *Vṛtti* in the same sense and explains them as रसोचित व्यवहार of the *artha* in the case of the *Kāśikī* etc. and of the *Śabda* in the case of *uparāgarikā* etc. Now if meaning and the word thus distributed become *Vṛtti* the question arises what shall be the place for *Rīti*? It is true that Ānanda-Vardhana has referred to *Rīti* but strictly speaking there is no room for them either in his or in Abhinava's scheme since *Rīti* can only be रसोचित व्यवहार which has already been associated with the *Vṛtti*. If this be granted, it would be wrong to say that Ānandavardhana and Abhinava have attached great importance to *Rīti*.

A P Mishra I think, I never said that Ānanda gives importance to *Rīti*. I only meant to say that he gives credit to Vāmana for his flash of *dhṛvanī*, i.e. the element of *dhṛvanī* flashed first in the mind of Vāmana. There is great misunderstanding about *Vṛtti* on the basis of the saying: वृत्तयो नाद्वयमानर. These *Vṛtti* are in the sense of *rājaka-rājya-rājya-pāra*. The *Vṛtti* of Śrīyaśālāya i.e. *uparāgarikā* etc. are totally different from the *Vṛtti* of drama

स तत्त्वदर्शनादेव शास्त्रेषु कथितं कविः ।

दर्शनाद्वर्णनाच्चायं रुद्धा लोके कविश्रुतिः ॥ Loc. Cit

Even the sage Vālmīki, who had a clear vision of the reality of things, was not acclaimed a poet until his poem emerged to express aesthetically what he had seen or experienced :

तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे नित्येऽप्यादिकवेर्मुने ।

नोदिता कविता लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥ Ibid

While the conception of poet in India has borne comparison with the philosopher and creator, the literary critics have always asserted independence and freedom of literary creation¹ and have even established its supremacy over the former. The benedictory verse of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* clearly formulates the freedom and supremacy of the poetic creation.

नियतिवृत्तनिवमरहिता हृत्कारैकमयीमनन्यपरतन्त्राम् ।

नवरसहचरा निर्मितिमाश्रयती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

The poet is able to see and express by virtue of his innate faculty called *Pratibhā*. Bhāmanāha declares that poetry dawns rarely and on an only person gifted with this faculty :

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रणिभावनः ।

Bhāmahālakāra, 1. 5

This rarest gift², an innate faculty³ and the very seed of poetry⁴ is conceived by Rājasekhara as both a creative inspiration (*kārayitṛi pratibhā*) and aesthetic sensibility (*Bhāvayitṛi Pratibhā*)⁵. Bhaṭṭa Tota, the master of *Abhinavagupta*, has offered best definition of *Pratibhā*. He says :

“*Pratibhā* is a form of intuitive consciousness, *prajñā*, which is an inexhaustible source of exceptionally novel blooms. It is by virtue of this *Pratibhā* alone that

1. Vide *Dhvanyāloka* III-43. *Abhinavabhāratī*, I 40.

2. Cf. *Agni Purāṇa* quoted in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* Ch. I.

3. *Daṇḍin's Kavyādarśa*, I 103.

4. *Vāmana Kāśī* I 3 16.

5. See Rājasekhara, *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, pp. 12-14.

the above mentioned flaws and added ten more to the list. I need not go into the details of his treatment but would confine myself to two observations. This is obvious from Bhāmaha's treatment of logical fallacies¹ that logic (Buddhist as well as orthodox) exercised considerable influence on him. This was natural because Bhāmaha belonged to an age which was marked by encounter of ideas and was dominated by the works of Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. However, even when he bases his treatment of the poetic flaws on the way shown by the logicians of the country and constructs the grammar of poetry after the style of the grammarians, he also asserts the independence of the literary criticism from the Śāstras. The logic of poetry is distinct, says Bhāmaha

अपर वक्ष्यते न्यायलक्षणं वाच्यमश्रयम् ।

इदं तु शास्त्रमर्थेषु वाक्येष्वभिहितं यथाः ॥ KA IV. 30

This is constructed by critics on the basis of the poetic tradition and is based on empirical experience while the Śāstras are concerned with the reality of things:

तज्ज्ञं वाच्यप्रयोगेषु तत्प्रादुर्भूतमन्यथा ।

तत्र लोकाश्रयं वाच्यमगमस्तिरदशमिनः ॥

It was perhaps to underline immanent nature of the poetic meaning that Bhāmaha advised not to believe the transcendental theory of meaning propounded by the grammarians, it would be tantamount to a belief in the reality of a sky-flower.² In his discussion on the correct use of words (*Śabdā-sādhana*) Bhāmaha is indebted to grammar as well as to all other disciplines but when we read the *Kāvya-lankāra* in its proper perspective it becomes clear that according to Bhāmaha it is not *śauṣabdyā* or perfection of the word or its correct cognition that can constitute a poem rather an aesthetic harmony of both the words and meanings: *शब्दाप्यो सहितो वाच्यम्*.

1. Vide KA IV 1-2

2. See also IV 72

3. शरपैरपि चादेर्यं वचो न स्फोटवादिनाम् ।

नमः कुसुममन्तीति श्रद्धयात् कः सचेतनः ॥ KA

should not take any independent notice of the grammatical and logical defects unless they are related to the poetic sense (*kāvyaārtha*, the *rasa*). Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of the five poetic flaws, borrowed by Mammata later on, is very systematic and is broadly speaking aims at the stylistic perfection through avoidance of impediments to clear grasp of meaning. Mammata followed the Dhvani school in his conception of the poetic blemish as marring the principal sense (i.e. *rasa*) and his broad classification of the blemishes includes *rasa-dosas* along with the verbal or formal and the material (relating to meaning or content). Progressive evolution of *dosa-concept* and treatment of its varieties makes it clear that the literary critics concerned themselves more and more with obstacles—formal or material—of the poetic content (*alankāra*, *Guna* or *rasa*) than with the grammar and logic, pure and simple.

Another important principle of Literary Criticism is the *guna* or poetic excellence. Despite many important differences among critics from Bharata to Post-dhvanī period about the nature (whether it is positive entity or simply a negation of the blemishes) and number (ten or three) the *guna* principle has concerned itself exclusively with the stylistic perfection through aesthetic mode of arrangement of words of literary creation and was in its final analysis intimately (not indirectly as in Bharata) related to *rasa*, and writers on *dhvani* analysed properly the mental states that *gunas* help to arouse. In their analysis they must have been influenced by the nature of triad of *gunas* admitted in the Sāṃkhya but in any case no writer seems to be obsessed with the śāstric concept, the critic largely on his own analysed the mental states that gunas help to arouse.

It is true that Ānandavardhana took the cue from grammatical theory of Sphoṭa which treats each letter as suggestive of sphoṭa—one, constant and unchanging like Brahman of the Vedānta, but he has himself made it abundantly clear that the *dhvani* as a literary principle was developed by him on the basis of a tradition of critical judgement of the readers. In his auto-comment (*vṛtti*) on 'Kāvyaśāstram dhvanirīti budhairāḥ samāmnāta-pūrvah' and elsewhere also in his epoch-making work, the *Dhvanyā-*

of great repute in literary criticism Abhinavagupta, who has given a solid foundation of Kashmir Śaivism to Sanskrit Criticism, passes strictures on the efforts of over-jealous exponents of philosophical views, as being inspired solely for deluding supple minds (*Sukumāramanohana*) or mere poses (*bhramanikāmātra*)¹ Independence of judgment of poetry (*kāvyaadhī*) was brought out on the basis of pre-eminence of poetic function by another critic, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in his now lost work, the *Hrdayadarpana*

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र गान्धर्वं पृथग्विदुः ।

अर्थतत्त्वेन युक्ते तु वदन्त्याख्यानमेतयोः ।

द्वयोर्गुणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत्

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in fact, did not view highly didactic value or ethical tone in literature. According to him what matters most is intrinsic merit of a poem. Abhinava has similarly questioned the didactic purpose of literary creation in his commentaries on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*² and the *Dhvanyāloka*³ According to him principal element is not knowledge, for in that case there would be no difference of literary work from ethics and historiography. Ānanda had also said न हि कवेरिति-वृत्तमात्रवर्णनेनात्मपदलाभ इतिहासादेरेव तन्मिदं. Dhanañjaya stressed this idea by saying that dramas flow with joy, and knowledge is no fruit therefrom and one who seeks it as from the history etc. must be saluted, as he is hostile to the real taste of literature.

आनन्दनिष्यन्दिषु स्वकेषु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।

योऽनेतिहासादिवदाह साधुस्त्वमै नम स्वादपराङ्मुखाय ॥

Daśarūpaka, I. 6

Rājaśekhara has stated criticism (discipline of the literature, *Sāhityatīkṣā*) to be the fifth Veda⁴, which asserts its independence

¹ Abhinavabhāratī, III, pp 176-77

² ननु किं मुख्यदुपदेशं करोति, नेत्याह विन्तु बुद्धिं विवर्धयति स्व-प्रतिभायेव तादृशी विवरति । Abhinavabhāratī, p 41

³ Vide Locana on Dhvanyāloka p 40
KM (G O S)

⁴ पञ्चमी साहित्यक्रियेति यागवरोय ।

who believed that principles of Criticism are not to be interpreted exclusively on the basis of any particular system, deride at attempts for over-philosophisation of what are essentially literary concepts evolved from the judgment of literature.

Venakatachalam Before we wind up, I would like to put one question at this stage. You have shown that various themes of the poetics have been influenced by the principles of Indian philosophy yet they have developed themselves independently, but as far the Rasa-theory is concerned, I think that a perusal of various theories on Rasa shows that in this sphere the ācāryas seldom rose above the philosophical tangle in which they had entered perhaps of their own accord. There is, therefore, very little independent development in the field of Rasa-theories. What do you think of it?

R. C. Dwivedi Rasa-sūtra has been explained in the light of almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy. This very fact *ipso facto* implies that no particular system of philosophical thought can be applied to or held to be exclusively valid in relation to the exposition of the Rasasūtra of Bharata. This makes a particular system of Indian philosophy in relation to rasa-sūtra only incidental and not essential to it.

Moreover I think that Rasa-theory is one of the few topics in Poetics whose development can be persued back to its very inception. The Rasa-sūtra of Bharata is by itself pure and simple and is devoid of every kind of doctrinaire influence of Indian philosophy.

R. P. Dwivedi : The Rasa-Sūtra which is the basis of Rasa-theories that developed later on has been proved to be an interpolation in the Nāṭya-Śāstra (tr.)

R. K. Dwivedi : If this be finally accepted, it would support me in as much as one can hold that the later

tradition ? Is this not an independent contribution of Poetics towards Rasa-theory ? And all the examples of the *rasadharmā* which I have quoted towards the end of my paper should also be regarded as complete originality in the Rasa-theory. Bhaṭṭanāyaka conceived two poetic functions, *bhāvanā* and *bhoga* to explain the process and realisation of *rasa*. Both these functions are independent of philosophic impact and were propounded independently. *Dharmā*-theorists replace in a way the above two functions by *Īśājyā* which is not only an independent concept of literary criticism but is also staunchly refuted by the philosophers of every shade in India. For example, Jayanta Bhatta, the great *rayāṇika*, clearly controverts its admission to the class of *śabda-vijāpāra*.

of action,¹ and thus enriches and complexes the communicative content of language, it also presents successfully a comprehensive and valid record of experience in relation to the ultimate questions of life

On one side, the symbolic imagination is the symbolising trend, bringing more and more area of experience into formal expression, and thus enlarging the field of aesthetic perceptions, on the other, it is a peculiar and explorative mode leading men forward in various ventures in philosophy, science and general speculation. It provides a breakthrough where other modes of cognition falter or stop. Thus symbolic imagination refers both to the extent and the mode of imaginative pursuit. Its mode of operation is through analogies. Analogies provide a spring-board for knowing the unknown, for realising the un-realizable.

Every artist begins with knowing man, his feelings and emotions, his relations with other men and environment, questions of morality, justice, significance and all the complex problems of living a life. His pride and passions, his struggles with his spirit, truth, and his place in the gamut of creation form the core impressions about life and this world on the consciousness of the artist. During this journey of knowing the world emotionally and imaginatively and discovering himself also in the process, he starts "giving the body of this world" a name, a symbolic interpretation.² It is in this stride of experience that the author of the *Mahābhārata* conceived of the world as a place of action, struggle, actual combat. In a similar spirit the writer of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* remarked that the whole world was a field of action, and exhorted individual human beings, through Arjuna, to work out their destiny through knowledge, devotion or action (*Jñāna*, *Bhakti*, and *Karma*). Tulsidas as the author of the *Rāmacaritamānasa*, looked upon life in terms of ethical and moral values, culminating in a harmonised practice of varying and warring sects (*Saiva*, *Vaiṣṇava*) of religion. The *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedas* symbolise the human quest for

¹ Tale, Allen, "The Symbolic Imagination" *The Kenyon Review* XIV 2, Spring 1952, pp. 256-57

² Ibid.

more ironically disposed soul, the 'President of Immortals' was a very cruel God, and all human beings are dispensed with an inevitably tragic lot.

In comparison with the tragic and ironic view of the artists in the west, the literateurs in India present a blissful, beatific attitude toward life, a bent of spirit that manifested its *prasāda*' characteristic. Most of the dramas in Sanskrit are neither comic (*S-khāṇḍa*) or tragic (*D-aśāṇḍa*) but ennobling and divinising (*pradīpita*). The same elevating feature may be noted in poetry also. Perhaps this can largely be accounted for in terms of the cultural pattern of society, the preponderance of a religious spirit in life, an unshakable faith in the doctrine of *Karma*, and the concept of God as *Sarvānanda*. The *Vīdya* and the *Upaniṣads* conceived of this creation as created in bliss, preserved in bliss, finally dissolved in bliss. Obviously, such a philosophy of life would reflect itself in literature of the period as well. Men steeped in such a faith adopted a happy, stoic attitude which shaped their destiny not so much in relation to one another, as in relation to the ultimate reality or God. The poets and dramatists, fashioned by the strongly religious framework of society, responded harmoniously to the cosmic moral order, the order of *Rita* and *Satya*.

In the *Caṇḍīgya-Upaniṣad* Om (ॐ), with its phonetic analysis and in the symbolic and auditory-imaginative sense, is defined as the essence of reality. Here, an infinite reality, the prime cause of this creation, is perceived in visual and sonal terms. Similarly, the phrase *एकं बहू व्यस्यन्* symbolises the desire of the One to multiply and diversify itself for the exultation and delight in the many. The phrase has been conceived symbolically, and explains, in one way, one or the many causes of the creation of this universe. Such a summarised and epitomised expression points to the way the world was looked at and interpreted, at one stage of the development of man's mind. In the same way the concept of *Ātman*, life, death, death-in-life, ages (*Satya-yuga*, *Tretā-yuga*, *Dvāpara*, *Kali-yuga*) *Avasthas*, and deluge are figuratively, symbolically conceived expressions of realities difficult to grasp and master. Since time immemorial, man has passionately craved for, attempted to go out of and to transcend the limitations of

a co-mixture of various forces and factors operating, affecting simultaneously. In the history of the development of thought in men there was a period or a stage when Synthetic human approach was not split by logical thinking or scientific reasoning. At that time no analytical approach had detailed elaborated, specialised it or misdirected it to a myopic range. At that stage people still enjoyed an elevated and integrated level of thought, experience and ideals. During this period, the period of mythic, metaphoric, pre-scientific non-abstractionist, and undissociated thinking, the mode of symbolic imagination helped people to live an integrated intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual life. They exercised freely in symbolic interpretations and their unified sensibility added to their stature as aesthetes, artists, devouts. In 19th century in the west, symbolic imagination and thinking was revived re-invoked to give an integrated vision of life to the artist and free his consciousness from a dissociative onslaught of science, scientific thought, over-specialisation, and the mass organisation of life. The process continues in the 20th century also.

Different genres of literary expression use various figures of speech as simile, metaphor, personification, myth etc. It may be interesting to study their relationship with symbolic imagination. It is a common notion today that the figures of speech are not the devices of adorning poetry or other branches of literature. They are integral to expression. When a poet employs a simile, or, seems indulging in a metaphor, his is not a forced use, rather this parallel or the transformed image has been suggested to him, as if in a flash by the subject under aesthetic contemplation. As such this facile use of a simile or metaphor gives a clue to the working of the poetic mind which unconsciously jumps at similarities, parallel images, metaphoric transformations. In fact, these things suggest the direction of the symbolic imagination in a poet, and serve as the preliminary stages to its final culmination. Metaphor, in a stanza or in a complete poem, may be one unit of artistic communication in a recognisable form, but it is essentially a mode of thinking and experiencing, working on the principle of 'similitude' and 'dissimilitude'.

and indicative use, give only the literal, the commonly shared or the semantic meaning. But when poet, with his creative power of imagination, used the word in suggestive sense, it shot forth echoes and re-echoes, and further echoes of meaning and sense. In this sense, the suggested meaning of the word took an evocative character which endlessly affected various readers and produced varied literary pleasure. The whole process is described in the term *anuranana*. Just as a pebble cast in calm water sends out rings of waves generated by its plunge, and the circles continue to expand in all directions, showing no end, so is the case with the suggested meaning of words. The poet, the *Pratibhā-ān Puruṣa*, effects this magic with a careful arrangement of *Bhāva*, *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva*, and *Saṁdṛibhāva*. He may use other figures of speech also. Here it should be noted that the various figures of speech are taken as integral ingredients in poetic expression in Sanskrit poetics also as in English. They are not contrived or strained devices embellishing an artificial expression.

Imagination or *Pratibhā* as it is termed in the Sanskrit poetics is a significant term and an essential trait of a poet. Basically it is his experiencing, transforming and creative faculty. Without it a man cannot claim his title to the rank of a poet. Though imagination primarily suggests the faculty for creating images, in a pervasive sense it covers the entire range of creative psyche in the poet. An imaginative poet feels rhythm and rhyme in a novel form; the auditory imagination in him takes him to the forgotten past of language where he invigorates himself with the raw energy of every syllable, accent, beat and other individual components of a word. the visual imagination flashes before the poet continuously new, concrete and pictorial images, and the imaginative lights endow him with a new creative vision, bathing his words and sentiments in fresh and charming forms. In Sanskrit also word the sound and word the sense (both phonetic and visual) are fused by the energy of imagination of the poet. When the poetic imagination works in harmony with *Dhṛaṇi*, it creates a master-piece. An energetic touch of the poetic imagination transmutes the old themes, treated by the poet earlier, and even common words into things of

dismantled, molten and refashioned into new objects and phenomena. It may appear extreme, but in a sense all imaginative activity is symbolic, since what is produced or brought forth stands for what has been experienced, what has shaped the sensibility of the artist and goaded him into creation. Or as Eliot put it: "The poet's mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images which remain there until the particles which unite to form a new compound are present together." Imagination, brings 'all the particles' 'together' and forms the required 'new compound'. Even the most realistic piece is as a literary composition, much different from the reality outside the written pages. It is not so much to insist on the formal limitations of a literary production as to bring forth the essential, symbolically transforming nature of imagination in the poet that this fact should be noted. In Sanskrit poetics, the acceptance of *Śābhāroktī Alankāra* as an integral figure of speech is an affirmation of this symbolic activity of imagination. Similarly, in a most life-like statue the connoisseur or the sensitive critic will discern not the details but conception of integrity of the artist, projected in a transformed, suggestive manner.¹ It was to this creative, symbolically imaginative faculty of the poet that Ānandavardhana referred to and paid a glowing tribute when he called the poet the master of his world, doing with it anything that pleased him.² Abhinavagupta, going still further, maintained that in poetry even the operation of the causal phenomenon was not called for.³ Mammaṭa, who was more eloquent over this aspect of the poetic genius, called the poet even greater than God. The poet was not bound by the sense of destiny; he created a world of ecstasy and rapture which was self-sufficient, totally independent of any extraneous factor.⁴

And finally a word about the word, or the behaviour of language. Some schools take all words as symbols, and

1 *Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, p. 194

2 *Ibid* pp. 183-84

3 *Ibid* p. 184

4 *Ibid* p. 184

PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM OF THE DHVANI SCHOOL A REVIEW

Dr. Bhusanath Bhattacharya

The study of Poetry as a distinct discipline owes its origin to Bhāmaha and Dandin, belonging to north and south respectively and almost to the same period, from the middle of the seventh century to the first quarter of the eighth. Since then the study continued unabated, and many scholars came forward with their views, and gave rise to a grand body of literature which they christened as the *Alamkāra Śāstra* or the Science of Poetic Embellishments. Undoubtedly, the term *alamkāra*, in its technical sense, was first used by Bharata in the context of embellishments of the drama. Discussing the diction of a play in the 17th Chapter, devoted to Verbal Representation in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata recommends the use of four figures of speech suited to the drama. As far as our knowledge goes, this reference to figures of speech as a means to embellish dramatic diction is the first.

In the absence of definite material, relating to the intervening period, we can safely surmise that by the time we reach to Bhāmaha, and with him to the historic period, so to say; of the *Alamkāra* literature, discussions must have been going on in the circle of scholars. In all probability, these discussions were directed, following the clue supplied by Bharata to the question of finding out what constituted the charm of poetic creation. That is why, it appears, Bhāmaha named his treatise—*Kāvyaśāstra*, the poetic figure, attempted to define the figures of speech relating to poetry, as was done by Bharata in relation to the drama.

Though Bhāmaha was acquainted with the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the Bharatan school, as is evident from his classification of poetry as well, he omitted to treat of *Rasa*, the evoking of which was the chief end of the drama. This proved to be a lamentable loss as it deprived the poetry of its purpose. Bhāmaha had to define *Kāvya* and supply a purpose of it, and spoke

that would ensure flawless composition. The importance of poetic imagination also was not fully comprehended, although 'pratibhā' (genius) was considered valuable for the poet. To Bhāmaha, ultimately, it was the Alamkāra, both of sound and sense, that was essential for poetry.

Alongwith this, it should also be noted that the study of poetry assumed, from the very beginning, the nature of more or less a mechanical discipline—all theorists calling it a Śāstra—that too not of poetry but of the *alamkāras*. Hence the entire treatises took the shape of authoritative prescriptions concerning 'dos' and 'don's'. The critics were more interested in discussing in great detail the individual figures of both sound and sense, and based their views mostly on individual verses. The whole Kāvya was seldom subjected to a critical assessment. That is why, in spite of the fact that such great poets as Kālidāsa, Bhāravi etc. antedate all the Alamkāras, they do not find full treatment at their hands. At times, instead of referring to the poems of celebrated poets, many theorists supply even their own examples.

This mechanical and prescriptive attitude continued right up to the time of the Dhvanikāra and more correctly to that of Ānandavardhana towards the middle of the 9th Century. From Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana, the intervening period is roughly that of 200 years. This period was marked by great intellectual activity and Dr. S.K. De is right to call it the creative stage in the development of Sanskrit poetics, marked as it was by the formulation of all important theories regarding poetry.

The approach to Kāvya, during the interval, may be said to have been from the crude to the subtle. Starting with the external factors, the study of poetry developed slowly into a serious and deeper enquiry into all the essential elements. The progress may be pointed out thus :— From the Alamkāra to the Riti; from the Riti to the Rasa; and from the Rasa to the Dhvani. These are the well-known schools of Sanskrit poetics, which hold the Alamkāra, the Riti, the Rasa and the Dhvani to be the soul of poetry, and the evolution of these schools followed more or less a chronological order. It is remarkable that a regular attempt for a synthesis of earlier concepts is traceable in all the follo-

to the follower of this school, the style, the Gunas and the Alamkāras are to be judged in a Kāvya. In addition, Dosas are however to be shunned by the poet, grammatical correctness maintained and poetic conventions honoured.

The Rasa school, of which our knowledge is rather scanty, based its observations on the famous aphorism of Bharata 'the combination of the Determinants, (vibhāva) Consequents (anubhāva) and the Transitory states (vyabhicārī-bhāva) evolves the Rasa'. On the basis of the fragmentary references extant of the views of the three main exponents—Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it appears that they thought Rasa to be the end of poetry and so in the Kāvya, one should carefully judge the right use of the proper *Vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and the *Vyabhicārī-bhāvas*. All the three exponents are unanimous about the end of poetry, i.e. evolving the Rasa, but they differ with regard to the relation between the *Vibhāva* etc. and the Rasa, and the process of its evolution.

Thus it can be said that upto the advent of the Dhvani theory, the study of poetry, starting more or less like a mere study of rhetoric or persuasive manner of expression, gradually assumed the grandeur of poetics: All the factors—right from the word and meaning, the figures of sound and sense, the blemishes of composition to the soul and essence of poetry—were discussed elaborately and threadbare. All the different theories, however, remained as theses and anti-theses until the genius of the Dhvanikāra brought about a synthesis of all by putting forward his theory of Dhvani.

(3)

It is well known that all the schools of Sanskrit poetics can broadly be divided into two groups—the pre-Dhvani and the post-Dhvani schools. The concept of Dhvani serves as the central point which marks the change of the whole outlook regarding poetry, and everyone will agree with Rājasekhara in paying homage to the great savant, Anandavardhana who, following the Dhvanikāra, established with

of speech, the *Doras* *Gunas* and the like, which had so long been invariably associated with all the treatises on Poetics. This dissociation of rhetorical matter from the treatment of *Kāvya* is very important, as it removes the imbalance from the treatises on *Alamkāra*, which devoted the largest space to these items. One should not however think that the *Dhvani-kāra* was ignorant of their importance. On the other hand, it is he who for the first time saw these in the proper perspective. It is *Kāvya* that he is dealing with and not merely the embellishments or blemishes of poetic composition.

The *Dhvanyāloka* also gives an answer to the old question—'What is the special feature of the poetic expression?' As we have seen, different schools answered the question differently. To one this speciality is the *Alamkāra*, to others it is the *Guna*, to some others it is *Rasa*. But the *Dhvani* theorists say that the special and characteristic feature of poetic expression is Suggestion (*dharma*). The words used by the poet do not convey merely the conventional expressed Sense (*Īśyārtha*), nor the Indicated (*Lakya*) one, but the Suggested sense (*vyangjārtha*). The standpoint of the *Dhvani-vādin* is that the self-same Expressive words (*vācaka*) when used by a poet become Suggestive (*vyangjaka*) and convey the Suggested sense. Since neither the suggestive word, nor the suggested sense nor even suggestion as a function of words (*vyangjana-vyāpāra*) is accepted by any of the philosophical schools, the theory of suggestion truly belongs to the literary field. The *Dhvani-vādin* holds that the function of suggestion is typical to poetic expression and hence, is its unique feature.

The *Dhvani* School puts forward the view that *Dhvani*, i.e. the suggested sense is the soul of poetry. *Ānandavardhana*, through his cogent and convincing arguments, proves the existence and validity of *Dhvani*. He accepts the challenge of the earlier schools of Poetics on the one hand and the philosophical schools on the other, and successfully establishes the distinct and separate entity of the Suggested sense in addition to the Expressed and Indicated senses accepted by all. Likewise, the function of Suggestion also as a distinct function of words and sense is convincingly established.

(5)

Let us now enumerate the principles of judgement of Kāvya according to the Dhvani School. These may be said to be as follows —

(1) In the Kāvya, the Suggested sense is of the foremost importance. The critic must see what is being suggested—Rasa, Vastu or Alamkāra, and whether it is all important. On this will depend its classification as the best or the second-rate or as the lowest.

(2) Careful assessment is to be made of the Alamkāra, Guna and the style. The criterion of judging these is whether they enhance the charm of the suggested sense. The Dosas are also to be viewed from this point of view. In relation to certain Sentiments, some Dosas may not appear as blemishes.

(3) Suggestion of Sentiment is the highest type of suggestion, and so the use of *alamkāras* should be carefully taken account of. It should be noted that employment of complex figures of both the sound and sense does not only add charm to poetry, but actually impedes the relish of the Sentiment suggested.

(4) There is thus no fixed rule regarding the use of Alamkāras, Gunas and the Rītis in the Kāvya. Their aptness should always depend on the sense suggested by it.

(5) Last but not the least, is the importance of Poetic imagination. Ānandavardhana declares the poet to be a creator, in the world of poetry, capable of doing whatever he likes. Suggestion of sentiments, proper use of the figures, the style and the Gunas, in other words both Content and Form are all determined by Poetic imagination. The *pratibhā* of the poet can mould even the age-old theme into something rich and strange. It bestows a new significance, a novel charm, *chāyā* upon the Kāvya and renders it a source of joy for ever. In the judgement of Kāvya, therefore, an evaluation of the imagination of the poet is also called for.

(6) The Dhvani school does not say that the Kāvya should be didactic. The suggestion of Sentiment is the highest purpose of poetry and, when suggested, sentiment is

etc are suggestive of it. The Determinants, the consequents and the Transitory States are themselves Expressed (*vācya*) but become suggestive (*vyāñjaka*), and by the power of suggestion (*vyāñjanā*) suggest the Permanent Mood (*Sthāyin*) in the heart of the listener or spectator. He then tastes this suggested mood This tasting of one's mood is Rasa

Abhinavagupta goes on to clarify that the Kāvya, by its power of suggestion, arouses the Permanent Mood in man and then he tastes it objectively although it is inseparable from his own self From this it follows that for the Rasa-realisation one must have the respective Permanent Moods in him in a latent form or as, what is called, *vāsanā* Those who do not have this *vāsanā* are incapable of relishing the Rasa In relation to Rasa-realisation, the theory of universalisation (*Sādhāranīkarana*) of both the object (*vibhāva* etc) and the subject (*rasika* or *sahrdāya*) establishes the super-normal character of aesthetic pleasure Forgetting, even if temporarily, one's narrow individuality is the highest bliss that rasa-realisation brings about By this very process the self-same 'thing of beauty' is enjoyed equally by both the oppressor and the oppressed, the old and the young, men and women. Man, by nature, sympathises with his fellowmen, but the Kāvya urges him to sympathise with the sympathies of others When we read, for example, of the pathetic laments of Rāma, we are not merely sorry at his loss but sympathise with his feelings. This remarkable feature of the Kāvya makes the pleasure derived from it *a-laukika*, super-normal It liberates our self-centred mental process and makes it all-embracing.

To conclude, we may say that the principles of the Dhvani School, in so far as these have touched the fundamentals of the poet's art hold good even to-day. The form and content of literature do change with the passage of time and judgement in literature is, to a great extent, individualistic and so never final. But whatever be the form and content, the appeal of the Kāvya will ever consist in what it suggests This is true even in case of the most modern poets who are unwilling even to accept the control of grammar

JAGANNĀTHA'S RAMAṆIYATĀ

Dr (Kumar) Surian Pandit

Jagannātha is the last luminary in the galaxy of literary critics. Bharata is the first known exponent of the system of literary criticism who expressly designates the contents of his Nāṭyaśāstra as Kāvya-guna, Kāvya-Doṣa or—Alankāras pertaining to kāvya. The period from Bharata to Jagannātha covering nearly two thousand years of time is marked by an intense ideological investigation into the essence of poetry. During this long period of scholastic speculation various currents of thoughts dominated the field adhering vehemently to one principle or another. Six such schools are known as—

1. Rasa School—which Stresses—emotion
2. Alankāra " " " —figures of speech
3. Rīti " " " —style
4. Dhvani " " " —suggestiveness
5. Vakrokti " " " —fascinating uncommonness of idea and expression.
6. Aucitya " " " —propriety of idea and expression

These six schools should not be considered as thoroughly exclusive of each other or antagonistic to each other, rather they represent the gradual stages through which the study of literary criticism was marching towards the inner core of poetry. It is a continuous search and hence a *gradual growth of the doctrine, which can thus be classified* in four stages also :—

1. Formative stage—from unknown beginning to Bhāmaha
2. Creative stage—from Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana
3. Definitive stage—from Ānandavardhana to Mammaṭa
4. Scholastic stage—from Mammaṭa to Jagannātha.

In the third the process starts with चमत्कार and ends in चमत्कार.

The three elements शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार thus loom out clearly. It is the भावना that interconnects शब्द and चमत्कार. Kāvya is thus the result of these three—शब्द, भावना & चमत्कार. The word चमत्कार stands for लोकोत्तराह्लाद "लोकोत्तरत्वं चाह्लाद-गन्धचमत्कारत्वापरपर्यायोऽनुभवनाक्षिको जातिविशेषः" It is a supermundane pleasure of which personal experience is the proof. It cannot be derived from ordinary words like a son is born to you. This चमत्कार is related to word through भावना which is described by Jagannātha as "पुनः पुनरनुमानात्मना" It consists in continued contemplation.

Of the three elements, शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार the last one is supreme. To this Jagannātha refers as—'वाच्यदीदृशं चमत्कारित्वं चावशिष्टमेव'¹ On this चमत्कार only he has based the classification of poetry. Upto Jagannātha the position of प्रतीयमानार्थः was the fundamentum Divisions of poetry, which was not very just. Some very beautiful instances of poetry were thus thrown in the third class. In the post-dhvani period Viśvanātha had gone to the extent of recognising only two varieties—ध्वनि & गुणीभूतव्यग्न only. He did not recognise the third variety even as a kāvya. At this time Jagannātha on the basis of चमत्कार so re-arranged the poetry that instances which Viśvanātha refused to recognise as Kāvya, could assume the status of उत्तमकाव्य. Jagannātha is not the first one to recognise चमत्कार. In the sixteenth century प्रभाकर in his 'रसप्रदीप' had defined poetry as "चमत्कारविशेषकारित्वम् सुव-विशेषकारित्वम् वा". Before him in the 18th century विश्वेश्वर too had written his चमत्कारचन्द्रिका. According to Narāyaṇa, the great grand-father of विश्वनाथ, चमत्कार is the soul of poetry. All these must have influenced Jagannātha. To Jagannātha not only the चमत्कार but all the three elements शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार are important. His शब्द is रमणीयता-साधक. While dealing with Rasa he says—

Jagannātha. It is thus a synthesis and a symbol of all the principles of poetics

R G. Duttēdi : The idea of *Camatkāra* which, according to some scholars, owes its origin to the sound *Camal* produced at eating a good dish was later on philosophically propounded under the influence of Śaivism. It would be interesting and instructive to learn Jagannātha's original source of *ramanīyatā* concept, the author and the book in which it is hinted at for the first time and to trace its development through the centuries till it is finally raised to such an exalted position and declared the soul of poetry by Pandita-Rāja Jagannātha. The idea of *ramanīyatā* was accepted by all the poeticists who preceded or followed Jagannātha. It would indeed be interesting to explore its precise correlation with kindred concepts and various terms used by ācāryas through the ages to express their pre-eminent concern with *ramanīyatā* and how it is effected by a poet. I am afraid Jagannātha, by making *ramanīya* (beautiful) an adjective of meaning, *artha*, in his definition of poetry, laid more stress on content rather than form. Indian tradition of literary criticism has by and large laid equal emphasis on both the word and meaning, which Jagannātha and some other poeticists seem to contradict.

In the beginning, the tradition in poetics seems to have made no mention of *Bhakti* at all. Vedic and Paurāṇic treatises were considered, as if, super-literary works that could not be dealt on par with other compositions of poetry expressive of the human feelings. Bharata, therefore, in line with the tradition prevalent in his times recognises only eight sentiments,¹ where the Erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*) is expressive of an attachment between a male and a female on the human plane. It is only in Abhinavagupta (C 1100 AD) that we find a great stress on *Śānta*, though Bharata has also made a mention of it.² *Bhakti* finds a mention at this stage as one of the ingredients as a *Saṁcāri* emotion centred in gods as distinct from the attachment for a human heroine.³ This attachment need not necessarily be centred in gods etc. but may be expressed as Devotion and Faith with concentration on God. These were regarded as ingredients of the *Śānta rasa*.⁴ Mammata⁵ and Hemacandra⁶ also endorse this view in placing *Bhakti* in the category of a *Bhāva*.

A departure from the tradition is manifest with Panditarāja Jagannātha who seems to have been influenced by the *Bhakti* stalwarts like Śrī Rūpa and Jīva Gosvāmins. He maintains, "Therefore why these the only *rasas*? Propped on the supreme God-head, manifested through the enthralling horripilation and flow of tears etc., well nourished by the emotions of joy at the time of listening to the narrations of the Purāṇas like the Bhāgavata and others, the intimate and immediate experience of the *Bhakti* sentiment in devotion to the Lord is utmost difficult to conceive. The devotion here in the form of love for the Lord, is the stable emotion. This cannot be included under the *Śānta rasa*, there being a contradiction between attachment and detachment."⁷ It is really a pity that in spite of strong advocacy for the *rasahood* of *Bhakti*, Panditarāja declares his slavery to the tradition and

1. Nāṭyaśāstra, Garkwad Series, Baroda 1934, Vol. I, IV. 16

2. Ibid. Vol. I, IV. 120

3. Dhvanīlōka locana, Ed. Chowkhamba Series, p. 175

4. Abhinavabhāratī, Delhi 1960, p. 656

5. Kāvya-prakāśa, Ed. Jhalakara, Poona 1938, p. 118

6. Kāvya-mūrtiśāra, Ed. Malaviya Jain Vidyalaya, Bombay 1938, p. 106

7. Rasagangādhara, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay 1916, p. 45

no intrinsic defect or shortcoming in *Bhāṭi* being potentially capable of culminating in the status of a fullfledged *rasa*. Its inclusion, therefore, under one or the other emotions or sentiments serves practically no purpose and cannot, therefore, be justified, if *rasa* in its pure intrinsic nature is the very essence of the Highest Bliss "Rasa, verily is He". "One enjoys Supreme Bliss on attainment of this Rasa."¹ This authority of the highest philosophic value goaded the protagonists of the *Bhāṭi* school not to recognise it as a mere *rasa* but to proclaim it as *rasa-rāt* or the king of *rasas*, the only sentiment capable of transformation into the eight, nine, or twelve traditionally recognised *rasas*.

The motive force behind a *rasa* is not merely a recognition by a group of literary critics but the very underlying vitality, the real joy, that forms the fundamental numenon of love, pathos, fear etc. capable of taste by the men of taste.

The stable emotion of all-engulfing, sweet attachment develops through the eight successive stages of *Bhāva*, *Premā*, *Sneha*, *Māna*, *Pranaya*, *Rāga* and *Anvāga* to mount into the *rūḍha bhāva* that is the rarest wealth by itself.² The joy and ecstasy are inexpressibly tasted both in union and separation, the poison, honey and nectar being fused into one in both the aspects. It is an irony of anguish and enjoyment to be suffering severe pangs of separation even amongst the most intimate embraces of the lover or the beloved. And it is the highest boon to dive deep into the loving embrace where a glance would be a well nigh impossibility in the case of love with *parakīyā*.³ The poor wretch knocking about for a handful of gram strikes against the inconceivable fortune of the rain of golden treasure overhead.⁴

mony within the just man's psyche, and from the fact that when a man is attracted to excellence in men and actions everywhere he is only being drawn by an anxiety for the most valuable part of himself. There can never be a real conflict between a man's concern for himself and his concern for what is valuable in the world around him.

1. *Rasa rasī sah. Rasam bhāṭiṁ lokaśāntam ātmaḥ* Tattvīya-
nigad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, V E 2019 p 173

2. *Ujjvalanīlamani*, p 416

(1) *Bahu vārvate yataḥ lhalu yatra prachyuta kīrṇakṣam ca*

(ii) *Yā ca mūho durābhātā ā paramā mānratāṇa rasī* ॥

3. *Ibid* p 34

4. *Ibid* p 300-31

This is the supreme Copernican change wrought by the Vaisnavite rhetoricians in the nucleus of the Sanskrit poetics in so far as the traditional literature used to revolve round the mundane objects of senses and now the whole structure moved on the pivot of the Absolute Lord, the dearest of the dear, the loveliest of the lovely and the final goal of all poetry, poets and poetics

- (b) Bhagavadbhakti Rasāzha-
 Kāntādi visayā vā ve rasādvāstatra nedham,
 Rasatvam puṣṭate pūrnasukhāparatvalāraṇā,
 Paripūrṇarāsā Kṣudrarasabhyaḥ bhagavadratib,
 Abhāvotcchva nāditiprabhava bahavattarā

to us than what they would mean to any schoolboy or linguist or lexicographer or scientist, I am afraid we are no literary critics and we cannot claim to interpret rightly the principles of criticism.

Much earlier than Bhāmaha, in Kālidāsa himself, we have the invocation to *śabda* and *artha* as happily wedded to each other in a harmony which is the privilege of poetry. No Indian theorist could take this aesthetic harmony (*sāhitya*) for granted, that would be begging the question. His business was to explain it in detail, in terms of literary categories. In all poems, whether taken in parts or as a whole, there is beauty and the business of the theorist is to demonstrate the hidden art of the poet in the use of *śabda* and *artha* to result in the reader's aesthetic delight.

This brings us to the second basic premiss of all the Sanskrit theorists that all poetry must end in the reader's delight, whether it is called *prīti* (joy), or *ānanda* (bliss) or *rasa* (aesthetic experience). I would like to know if there is a single writer in the whole range of Sanskrit *Alankāraśāstra* who denies this essential fact, viz, the reader's delight while enjoying a poem. In this broad sense, and this is the only sense which is justified, all concepts propounded in the *śāstra* are aesthetic concepts, i.e. concepts concerned with the elucidation of beauty as attained by the unique *sāhitya* of *śabda* and *artha*.

III

Now let us see how each of the concepts throws light on 'beauty' in poetry and how each provides a sufficient explanation in itself without opposition to, but in relation to, the other concepts.

First comes *Alankāra*, perhaps the most misunderstood of all concepts. Its differentia itself is *ratirokti* or the principle of *atīta* to use Bhāmaha's expression. Without imaginative handling by the poet there is no *alankāra* of any type—of *śabda* or of *artha*. One is regarded as a poet at all because his perception involves the activity of his imagination or *pratibhā*. It is the imagination which perceives things in multi-coloured relations, similarity, contrast, identity, etc.

never *ornamental*. It is the poetaster or imitator that we have the mechanical adding up (*atira*) where art is reduced to artifice, and this abuse only proves the rarity of *mahākars* or master-poets. This consideration of propriety or *auritya* is the first requirement in the making of a literary critic and without it, one would be no more than a pretender in the critic's dress.

What then is the nature of the total impression of beauty with reference to which something may be accepted as appropriate (*ucita*) or rejected as inappropriate (*arucita*)? This question turns on the criterion which is at the basis of all literary judgement, of all statements of *gunas* or excellences and *doṣas* or flaws in literature. *Gunas* and *doṣas* are related concepts and their dichotomy is disastrous. The Indian tendency towards normative classification usually makes one lose the binding thread of underlying principle behind all accepted *gunas* and *doṣas*. Again, we fall back on the literary taste as the guiding factor and on the aesthetic delight of the critic in deciding this issue.

At this stage we have to face another question. Is all poetry uniformly good? Are there no gradations of goodness or different manifestations of goodness? By goodness is here meant aesthetic and not ethical valuation, of course. Again from the earliest writer on poetics proper, viz., Bhāmaha, up to the latest, we have converging evidence to the fact that at least two types of beauty are clearly distinguishable, their mixture constituting a third. One is the sweet and spontaneous path of genius which can be contrasted with cultivated artistry revelling in gaudy glitter of thought and language. If the first is natural art, the second is cultivated and sophisticated art. Criticism has to recognise both. This is at the back of the concept of two styles or *mārgas* or *rītis*, viz., *Vaidarbhī* and *Gaudī*, later including *Pāñcālī*, the mixed one. Kālidāsa represents the first, as Subandhu the second by common consent; while Bāṇa illustrates the third. One may be interested in further subdivision of *Rīti* or one may not be. But the fundamental recognition of *Rīti* cannot be avoided by any *sahṛdaya* or literary critic.

What then is the basis for all *Rītis*? The answer is to be sought in the total impression of beauty conditioning all

Perhaps it could be the stuff of drama. But what about poetry, accepted as poetry by one and all? Is there no beauty in language valued for its own sake, no beauty in thought commonly held as valuable? If we agree that we have something more in poetry than mere represented emotion, we must at once realise that any definition making *rasa* in the narrow sense the *sine qua non* of poetry like *rāgyarṇ rasātrichar-kāryam* by Viśvanātha, should fall wide of the mark. For as Jagannātha himself admitted ungrudgingly, the word *rasa* is a much abused term in Sanskrit poetics. Its precise significance must be caught by the critic before bandying it about recklessly.

I avoid all the textbooks on *Alaṅkāraśāstra* and take what the dictionary writer has to say on *Rasa*. Kṣīrasvāmin, the brilliant commentator on Amarakośa, has this to say on *rasa* —

ratyādayo bhāvā anukriyamānāḥ
sāmāyikāiḥ rasyanta itī rasāḥ;

yadāhuh —

“vibhāvairanubhāvaiśca vukto'tha vyabhicāribhiḥ
āsvādyatvāt pradhānatvāt sthāyīeva tu rasībhavet.
[Kṣīrasvāmin on *Amaraśloka*, Nāṭya-varga, H D.

Sharma's edn., Poona, 1941, p 51.]

Avoiding all controversy, this must be accepted as the crucial meaning of *rasa*. It is a *sthāyibhāva* (i.e. one of the eight recognised by Bharata) which gets heightened into *rasa* by the blending of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. All these are mental states, moods, feelings or emotions except *vibhāvas* which are the stimuli, physical or personal, occasioning mental states. Their imitation or representation by actors make them relishable to spectators in drama. This is the very essence of Bharata's concept of *Rasa* and should not be lost sight of in abstract theorisings about aesthetic experience indulged in by several writers in the name of *rasa*.

Let us ask ourselves whether in our *Mahākāvya*s, such *rasa* can be felt or explained. Take the first canto of the *Kumārāsambhava*. We have Kālidāsa's fine description of Mount Himālaya. Now it is a simple *parvata-rasavati*. Can we assert that there is *rasa* in Bharata's sense? If any one were to assert so, we should ask him these questions :—What

all concepts in *Alankāraśāstra*, ancient as well as modern. It admits intellectual ideas (*vastu*) and figurative modes (*alankāra*) on a par with mental states and emotions (*rasādi*) into the realm of poetry provided they undergo the minimum transformation through the imagination (*pratibhā*). The poetic process itself is searchingly re-defined as *suggestion* or *dhvani* to clear the common misunderstandings of it by scholars as identical with primary or secondary denotation (*abhidhā* or *lakṣanā*). *Dhvani*, then, is not a new concept as such, it is the understanding philosophy of all concepts, viz, *rīti*, *alankāra*, *gūṇa-doṣa*, *aucitya*, *rasa*, etc. Even the worst critics of Ānandavardhana, viz, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa accepted the searching analysis of Ānandavardhana, while quarrelling with him on the issue of the name to be given to the underlying poetic function, which is unique. Though I have not used the word *Dhvani* so long in this paper, all my re-valuation of the different concepts has been from the attitude of *dhvani* only, and I claim no originality for it.

The implications of such a re-valuation on practical criticism are obvious. Practical criticism will have to analyse poetic beauty inhering in form as well content, now taken as one unit, and now taken in part, under all the different heads of *Alankāra*, *Gūṇa*, *Rasa* etc, and no one analysis would be complete by itself. To talk of a poem's *rasa* as existing without its *alankāra* or *gūṇa* is anathema. The earlier the analogy of detachable ornaments (*hārādīvad alankārah*) is shed, the better it would be for practical criticism. We may talk of a poet's failure when *alankāra* miscarries; but not of poet's success without a shred of *alankāra* or *gūṇa*. If the truth of this is realised, we could write independent studies of every Sanskrit poet in as many chapters as we have concepts, to bring out the success or failure of the poet. Such studies might put a stop to our cheap imitation of Western critical jargon and raise the prestige of Indian literary criticism itself.

may or may not be a Rasika. The audience enjoys the feelings of pleasure and pain in a detached, impersonal manner and thus the enjoyment of Rasa becomes a sort of universal experience. Bharata, therefore, seems to be quite right in not using the word Sthāyibhāva as equivalent to Rasa. The aesthetic pleasure which has been called carvanā, is essential for Rasa-experience. The masterpieces of Sanskrit literature provide us abundant food for the enjoyment of the intellectual palate. They provide not only sweet products for immediate enjoyment but are also tasteful to ruminate on for the whole of our life. Sanskrit poetry is a fountain of pleasure for one's solitary moments. I am never tired of impressing on our youngmen the pleasures of Sanskrit literature, as apart from value of this language as a vehicle for literary writings and modern scientific terminology.

Every writer of Sanskrit poetics has expanded on the importance of Śabda or Artha, and some have emphasised their inter-relation. The simple truth is that we cannot separate the Śabda from the meaning anymore than the Ardhanārīśvara Śiva from Pārvatī. Kālidāsa has invoked them both together, वागविव मन्दवती वाग्यम्वदितपदे. The most comprehensive and acceptable definition of poetry therefore appears to be Panditarāja's : स्वगीतव्यं शब्दविन्यास इव वाच्य and not a host of other definitions which are well known, but which leave out one aspect or the other of good poetry. The use of language with a view exclusively to beauty—and not for bombast or meaningless jargon—is the only true explanation of all Alankāras. Hence it is but Dhṛm, used in its wide sense. The Dhvani school has rightly dominated the field of literary criticism ever since it was propounded by Ānanda-Vardhana and explained in all its implications by Abhinavagupta. Kuntaka could not convert the later critics to Vakrokti being the soul of poetry as it was identified with one of the Alankāras however much he tried to make its definition very pervasive.

I may say a few words about the great emphasis laid on Pratibhā by various writers. No doubt a poet's Pratibhā is of great importance in any composition. But modern psycho-

अलङ्कारस्वरूपविवेचनम्

डा० ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा

अलमुपपदपूर्वके कृधातो घञप्रत्यययोगादलङ्कारसदृशस्य व्युत्पत्तिः । घञ्-प्रत्ययस्य भावकरणयो रित्यलङ्कारणमलङ्कृतिर्वैयर्थ्यं प्रथमोऽर्थः, "अलङ्कृत्येनेत्यलङ्कारः" इति करणप्रत्ययनिबलाच्च अलङ्कारणमाधनमित्यस्य द्वितीयोऽर्थः । अलङ्कारणमिति प्रथमोऽर्थः शोभाघानापरपर्याय एव । स च मूलतः कर्मरूपः (अत्र कर्मणा वैशेषिकगत कर्मानभिप्रेत न तु व्याकरणगत कर्मकारकः) गमन-पठनश्रेयनादिवदस्यापि कर्मरूपत्वात् । कर्म चेद मुख्यतः कविमम्बद्धम्, तस्यैव एतदवलम्बनेन काव्यप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । सहृदयस्य तु काव्यगतस्यास्य शोभाघानस्य प्रतीतिर्न हि कर्मरूपत्वेन अपि तु गुणात्मकधर्मरूपत्वेन पूर्ववदिदमात्ररूपेण शोभा-घानश्रेयाघानस्य सम्पन्नत्वेन प्रतीतिः ।^१ सा चैषा प्रतीतिः शोभारूपैव ।

अलङ्कारणमाधनमित्यलङ्कारसदृशस्य द्वितीयोऽर्थः साधनरूपोऽस्ति । साधनञ्चेद न हि बाह्ययोगेन काव्यशोभाप्रायकः किमपि तद्विहन्ति तत्त्वमपि तु दान्तरिकयोगेन तच्छोभाप्रायकः तदन्तर्वन्ति तत्त्वम् । तदन्तर्वन्तित्वाच्च तस्य काव्यधर्मत्वमेव । एवमत्राप्यलङ्कारस्य काव्यशोभाप्रायकत्वरूपधर्मत्वत्वमिदम् । तच्छालङ्कारस्य शोभात्मकत्वेनैव श्लाघुपपन्नमित्युपनयथाप्यलङ्कारः सहृदयदृष्ट्या शोभारूपः मौन्दर्यरूपो वेति पर्यवसितम् ।

इदं मौन्दर्यं शब्दार्थगतत्वेन द्विविधं सत् शब्दालङ्कारोऽर्थालङ्कारश्चेत्यलङ्कारद्विविध्यं प्रयोजकमित्यालङ्कारविशेषा मनम् । तच्च शब्दार्थयोर्भेदग्रहाभावेऽसम्भवमित्यत्र वदन्त भेदेतुम्^२ । स च शब्दस्य सामान्यार्थग्रहणेन न सम्भवति, उच्चारणामेव नह्यर्थतत्त्वस्यापि तत्रानभिवात् । अतः शब्द उच्चारणस्य इत्यस्माभि स्वीकार्यम् । तथात्वे कर्णविषयभूतस्य उच्चारणस्य शब्दस्य बुद्धिविषयभूतादर्थान्तरार्थकयोपपत्तेः । अतः शब्दालङ्कार उच्चारण-सौन्दर्यमर्थालङ्कारश्चायसौन्दर्यमित्याधानम् । परं केवलस्योच्चारणसौन्दर्यस्य समीतविषयत्वेन काव्यागत्याभावान् काव्ये च शब्देन नह्यर्थस्य निपतसम्बन्ध-दर्शनान् शब्दालङ्कारे उच्चारण-सौन्दर्यस्य अर्थसम्बन्धित्वमनापत्त्याऽपतित्वमित्यर्थसम्बद्धमेवोच्चारणसौन्दर्यं शब्दालङ्कारस्य स्वरूपमिति पर्यवसितम् ।

१. यजि च भावकरणयो—अष्टाध्यायी ६-४-२७

२. अत्र शोभाया विवेचन विषयगत रूपमादाय कृतं न तु आत्मगत रूपमादाय ।

विकल्प बाह्यार्थोत्पत्तिकारकत्वेन प्रतीतेर्ह्यविवक्षितमत्र रस्यबाह्यार्थोत्पत्तिपर-
पर्यायमिति तत्रैवाग्राह्यलङ्कारतात्पर्यमन्वये ।

अथ वृत्तकोत्या ध्वन्यालोनामलङ्काररूपवन्नोक्तमन्वयेऽपि द्रव्ये-
र्ध्वन्यवमत्कारित्यादयन्वावाद्यम्यवाह्यार्थस्यैवाग्राह्यलङ्कारत्वं युक्तम् ।

बललङ्कारस्यैतत्त्वरूप ध्वनिवादिता सम्मत न वेति आनन्दादिद्वये-
लङ्कारलक्षणोऽप्योद्घोषेति—

‘जगाश्रितान्बललङ्कारा मन्वया कटप्रादिवन् ।

—ध्वन्यालोकः

‘उपकुर्वन्ति न मन्व येऽङ्गद्वारेण जातुचित् ।

हारादिवदलङ्कारान्तेऽनुप्राणोपनादयः ॥

—काव्यप्रकाशः

अलङ्कारस्यागाश्रितवादस्य च बाह्यवाचकत्वात्पत्त्याद्वाह्यवाचक-
चारत्वस्यैव त्रयेण शब्दार्थगतालङ्कारत्वम् । तथात्वेऽपि बाह्यवाचकमार्ति-
प्रागशब्दस्य द्युभाषणं तत्र रसध्वन्यनुसृतीभावेनैव बाह्यतत्त्वविचारो हेतुः ।
रसध्वनी बाह्यादीनामगन्तान् तदात्मकत्वाभिधानं तेषां युक्तम् । परममन्वये
रसध्वन्यभावेऽपि बललङ्कारमद्भावेन विज्ञेय शब्दचित्त बाह्यचित्तमन्यमनवर-
स्मृतम्’ इति ध्वनिवादिना सम्मतेनापि तथात्वस्वीकारेण स्वतन्त्रतया बल-
काराणां प्रतिपादनोपपत्तेर्न हि सर्वत्रात्वाभिधानं तेषां युक्तम् ।

अभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्यान्तु ‘तथा हि अचेतन शवगरीरं कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि
न भाति बललङ्कारसंज्ञानावाद्’ इति रसध्वन्यभावे न हि बललङ्काररूपं विनयि
मौन्दर्यं मन्वन्त इत्येतेषां मतं विचारणीयम् । अत्र तथा हि अचेतन शवगरीरं
कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि न भातीत्यत्र प्रथमं विचार्यते । अत्र रसस्य प्राप्तानुसृत्येन
रसरहितयोः शब्दार्थयोः शवगरीरानुसृत्यत्वमभिनवनमन्तम्, परं पूर्वविद्यमान-
प्राग्विगमे इव गरीरस्य पूर्वविद्यमानरमापहारे एव शब्दार्थयोः शवगरीरत्व-
मग्नवान् प्रकृते च रमामोगमावश्येनेन तथात्वानावात् न हि रसरहितयोः
शब्दार्थयोः शवगरीरानुसृत्यत्वं युक्तम् । एवमिति ‘रसः प्राप्ता एव’ इति यदि श्रव-
तामाग्रह्णाहि नीरसशब्दार्थयोर्मूर्त्यादिवदेव निष्प्रागगरीरत्वं स्यात् । नृत्त्या-
दपञ्चाललङ्कारयोगेन किमपि चारुत्वं भजन्त इत्यनुभवसम्मतम् । अतो नाग्न-
शब्दार्थयोरपञ्चाललङ्कारयोगेन मौन्दर्ययोग इति ज्ञेयम् ।

वस्तुतः शवगरीरेऽलङ्कारागनाधाने नत्रापि तदभावेन वा तत्र चारुत्वागदे
प्राग्विगमनप्रतीतिरन्या तदर्थेऽर्तुव हेतुः । अन्याश्च प्रतीतिः सर्वशरीरेदिव
प्रकृतेऽपि नष्टप्राग्विगमोऽपि नमप्रति च तत्र तददर्शनात् अनुमानतः निश्चिः । न
तथा नीरसशब्दार्थयोः शब्दार्थयोः रसस्य निवृत्तयोगाभावेन तत्र तद्विगमन-
प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा उपनेत्र तु भिन्नमेव । किन्तु मुखे यत्सौन्दर्यं कुरूपता वा विद्यते
तस्य तस्या वा किं स्वरूपम् ।

रे प्र द्विवेदो मुखमेव तत्सौन्दर्यम् ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा मुखमेव तत् ।

वैकटाचलम् योऽयं काव्यशास्त्रे प्रत्यं पन्था विद्यते तस्मिन् किं नामानोचितं
भवद्भिरालोचितं येन नूतनस्य कस्यापि पथं प्रदर्शनं भवतामभि-
रुचितम् ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा पूर्ववर्तिनामभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्यादीनां मते या वापि सगति-
विद्यते सा तु मया कथितैव यदगत्वाभिधानमेवोचितम् । अस्माकं
मते तु वाच्यार्यरूप एवालंकारः स्यात् । ते तु पुनरगत्वेन तस्य
निर्देशं कुर्वन्ति ।

वैकटाचलम् अगत्वे का हानि ?

रे प्र द्विवेदो काव्यशास्त्रे तूच्यते यद् 'ब्राह्मणधर्मणन्यायेनालंकाराणां-
मलकार्यता' । ये इदानीं बाह्यावस्थायामलंकाराः सन्ति ते एव
यदा अन्तर्भूता भवन्ति, ध्वनिभूता भवन्ति, तदा 'अलंकार्या'
उच्यन्ते । एवम् अलंकारालंकार्ययोर्भेदो ध्वनिवादिनामपि सम्मतः ।
"प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महावतीनाम् । यत्तत्
प्रसिद्धावयवातिरिव विभाति लावण्यमिवागनाम्" अत्र यत्
प्रसिद्धपदं वर्तते तस्य व्याख्यानम् आनन्दवर्द्धनेन कृतं यत्
प्रभिद्वेभ्यः अलंकृत्येभ्यः प्रतीतेभ्यश्च अग्रेभ्यः । एवमानन्दवर्द्धने-
नापि अलंकारालंकार्ययोर्भेदः स्वीक्रियते । भवद्भिस्त्वभाभेद-
प्रतिपाद्यते भूतमेव सौन्दर्यमिति वत् । अनेन किं नूतनत्वं मिदं
काव्यशास्त्रे इत्यस्माकं जिज्ञासा ।

रामचन्द्र द्विवेदो . अलंकारविषये प्राचा मते व्यवस्थाद्वयो विद्यते, एका अन्वय-
व्यतिरेकगर्भा अपरा आश्रयाश्रयिभावगर्भा । प्रथमा प्राधान्येन
सम्मतं द्वितीया च स्वपितुरनुवर्तिना रय्यकेण प्रतिपादिता ।
सम्मतस्य मतेऽयं एवभूतशब्दस्य अन्वयात् एवभूतशब्दस्य च
व्यतिरेकादत्र शब्दालंकार अर्थालंकारो वा । अयं शब्दः अत्र
चाह विद्यते अयमयं अत्र चार विद्यते इति निश्चितं रय्यकेण
स्याप्यते अयं शब्दालंकार अर्थालंकारो वा । यदि शब्दार्थयो-
श्च शब्दार्थालंकारयोश्चाभेदः स्वीक्रियते तर्हि शब्दन्वावत् शब्दा-
लंकार अर्थस्तावद् अर्थालंकारः । तर्हि किमाश्रित्य, किं स्वमे-
वान्वयीकृत्य एवमयं तस्यैवालंकारस्य शब्दालंकारता अर्थ-
लंकारता वा स्यात् ? अभेदे च आश्रयस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वम् आश्रितस्य

व्यवहार न भवति । चारुशब्दार्थता तु पूर्वभाविनी स्वीकार्या ।
 रमणदर्थे पूर्वत्र चारुशब्दार्थसंदर्भो न भविष्यतीति तु अचिन्त-
 नीयम् । आत्मनः सर्वत्र विद्यमानतायामपि यथा 'जीवात्मा' इति
 शब्दन्य मनुष्ये एव व्यवहारो भवति तथैव इय रत्नदेवता तत्रैव
 निष्ठति यत्र मन्दिरं सुन्दरं भवति । तत्र कोऽपि अलङ्कारदिशेष-
 स्यान्न वा एतत्स्वन्यम् । किन्तु चारुशब्दार्थता तु भविष्यत्येव ।
 ना वनोन्मिहपातिशयाख्यादिरूपा वा स्यात् । अलङ्कारविशेष-
 स्तु प्रयोजनम् । * भवता मतेन तु रम्यार्थस्य काव्ये सर्वत्र
 सद्भावादर्थोऽकारत्वं निरवतयाऽऽपत्तिः । प्राचा मते तु बहुत्र
 दोषाभावरूपमेव स्यात् ।

बोध, भाव-बोध, मृत्यु-बोध आदि स्पष्टतया पाश्चात्य प्रभाव के सूचक हैं।

हिंदी-आलोचना के इतिहास का आयाम लगभग सवा चार सौ वर्षों का है। उसके दो स्पष्ट अवस्थान हैं। पहला अवस्थान लगभग सवा तीन सौ वर्षों का है जो हिंदी-साहित्य का मध्यकाल कहलाता है, और दूसरा पिछली एक सताब्दी का है जिसे हम आधुनिक काल कहते हैं।

मध्ययुगीन समीक्षा प्रायेण सैद्धांतिक है। उसका क्षेत्र काव्य तक सीमित है। उसके प्रणेता आचार्य-कवि हैं। उन्हें कवि-आचार्य कहना भी समीचीन नहीं प्रतीत होना, क्योंकि वे प्रकृत्वा कवि हैं, उनके साहित्य में आचार्यत्व की अपेक्षा कवित्व का स्वर ही मुखर है। कुछेक अपवादों को छोड़कर प्रायः सारी-जी-सारी समीक्षा पद्यबद्ध है। इस काल की समीक्षा पर मस्कृत-समीक्षानास्त्र का एकाधिपत्य पाया जाता है।

आधुनिक काल में सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा की अपेक्षा व्यावहारिक समीक्षा कहीं अधिक लिखी गयी है। आधुनिक आलोचना का क्षेत्र बहुत व्यापक है। उसकी परिधि में कवितेतर साहित्य-रूप (उपन्यास, कहानी, निबंध, रेखाचित्र, रिपोर्ताज आदि) भी समाहित हैं। ये गद्य-रूप पश्चिम की देन हैं। अतएव इनकी आलोचना भी पाश्चात्य समीक्षानास्त्र के मानदंडों द्वारा निर्धारित है। परंतु, काव्यनाम्न और काव्य-समीक्षा के क्षेत्र में मस्कृत का प्रभाव अप्रामाण्य रहा है।

आलोचना-पद्धतियाँ

मस्कृत-आलोचना-पद्धति के प्रभाव का आकलन करने के पूर्व एक स्पष्टीकरण अवश्यक्त है। कुछ लोग रसवादी आलोचना-पद्धति, मार्कंडेयवादी आलोचना-पद्धति आदि का व्यवहार कर दिया करते हैं। यह व्यवहार भ्रान्ति-जनित है। रसवाद या मार्कंडेयवाद आलोचना के मानदंड हैं उन्हें आलोचना-पद्धति कहना गलत है। उन मानदंडों के प्रयोग की सीली ही आलोचना-पद्धति है। यदि कोई आलोचक रस की वाक्य की बसोटी मानकर रस का शास्त्रीय विवेचन करते हुए उदाहरण-रूप में किसी रचना का उल्लेख करता है तो हम कहेंगे कि वह आलोचना की आचार्य-पद्धति का अनुसरण करता है। यदि वह आलोच्य रचना की व्याख्या करता हुआ उसमें निहित रस-सौन्दर्य का उद्घाटन करता है तो कहना चाहिए कि वह आलोचना की व्याख्यात्मक पद्धति है। इसी प्रकार केवल प्रशंसात्मक कथन या विवेचना आलोचना की भक्ति-पद्धति या प्रशंसी-पद्धति या 'सन्तुषाभ्यवहारी' पद्धति है। दूसरी ओर, केवल दोष-दर्शन आलोचना की आरोपकी-पद्धति या सडन-पद्धति है। तात्पर्य यह है कि रसवाद की दृष्टि से ही आलोचना की विभिन्न पद्धतियों का अवलोकन किया जा सकता है और किया गया है।

“रामचरितमानस” ‘गीतावली’ और ‘वरवैरामायण’ में ही उदाहरण दिये गये हैं ।^१

धार्मिक काल में आचार-पद्धति पर कई प्रकार के दृष्ट लिखे गये हैं (१) जिनमें गद्य में लक्षण-निरूपण करके उदाहरण-रूप में सम्युक्त-आचार्यों द्वारा उद्धृत पद्यों के हिंदी-अनुवाद अथवा हिंदी-मध्य दिये गये हैं, जैसे—‘भारती-नूपन’ (अर्जुनदाम केडिया), ‘काव्य-कल्पद्रुम’ (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार) आदि, (२) जिनमें हिंदी-गोवि-परंपरा का पालन किया गया है, जैसे—‘रस-कल्प’ (हरिजीव), (३) जिनमें गद्यवद्ध विस्तृत सैद्धांतिक विवेचन-विवर्तन किया गया है और आदर्शकथानुसार पुग्ने या नये उदाहरण भी दे दिये गये हैं, जैसे—‘रस-सिद्धान्त स्वल्प-विवर्तन’ (आनंदप्रकाश दीक्षित), ‘ध्वनि-संप्रदाय और उसके सिद्धान्त’ (भोलाशंकर व्यास) आदि ।

सिद्धान्त-प्रतिपादन की दृष्टि में एक अन्य प्रभाव भी दृष्टव्य है । जिन प्रकार सम्युक्त के महाकवियों ने यत्र-तत्र अपने काव्यमयों की संक्षिप्त निबधना की है उसी प्रकार हिंदी के कवियों ने भी ।^२

सम्युक्त में टीका-पद्धति या व्यावहारिक समीक्षा का निदर्शन काव्य-कृतियों पर लिखित टीकाओं में उपलब्ध होता है, जैसे मजीवनी (मल्लिनाथ), अर्थ-द्योतिका (राघवभट्ट) आदि टीकाकारों की आलोचना-शैली आचार-पद्धति में भिन्न है । उनकी दृष्टि लक्ष्य रचना पर केंद्रित है, सिद्धान्त-मस गौण है । अपनी मांग्यता के समर्थन अथवा स्पष्टीकरण के लिए उन्होंने आवश्यकता-नुसार सैद्धांतिक विचार-वर्षा भी की है । इस प्रसंग में मल्लिनाथ की प्रतिज्ञा ध्यान देने योग्य है “नामूलं लिख्यते विचिन्तानवेक्षितमुच्यते ।” ‘अमूल’ का अप्रामाण्य आह्वय अर्थ है—अप्रामाणिक । इसमें एव दूसरा अर्थ भी द्योतित होता है—टीकाकार या काव्यालोचक के लिए काव्य ही मूल वस्तु है, उन्हें छोड़कर इधर-उधर की गण होकर अवाञ्छनीय है । “अवेक्षित” की व्यंजना यह है कि सहृदय-प्रबुद्ध पाठक को काव्य का मर्म समझाने के लिए विस्तृत

१ जोरन के लच्छन लिए रामायण के लच्छ ।

तुलसीनूपण ग्रंथ को या विधि कियो प्रतच्छ ॥

—तुलसीनूपण (अप्रकाशित), पृ० १

२. वाग्यार्थिव सपुनो वाग्यप्रतिपत्तये ।

—वालिदान

गिरा वरय जल चौवि सम कहिअत भिन्न न भिन्न । —तुलसीदान
मुमापित हारि विगत्ययो गद्यल्ल दुर्जनम्यावर्ण्योतिवामृतम् ।

तदेव घने हृदयेन मज्जनो हरिमंहाग्निमिवानिनिर्मलम् ॥ —बाण
कविविश्रान्त रस क आधूरी । दृग्नि निजर निजर ना दूरी ॥ —जायसी

मिलता है।^१ सृक्ति-पद्धति का जयुनायक विष्णुमित्र रूप हिंदी-विद्वानों द्वारा लिखवायी गयी सूक्तिकाओं, आकाशवाणी की बातोंओं, अपनी कृति पर लिखवाने या छद्म नाम से स्वयं लिखे गये लेखों और प्रीतिवित् साहित्यकारों पर प्रणीत गोप-प्रबंधों में भी देखने को मिलता है।

इनके विनोद, ऐसी मनोभाषाएँ भी पायी जाती हैं जिनका प्रयोजन आलोच्य विषय का खंडनमात्र है। 'व्यक्तिविवेक' और 'चित्रनीमामाखटन' इनो पद्धति की आलोचनाएँ हैं। यह बात ध्यान देने योग्य है कि मन्हृत में सूक्तियों कवियों को लक्ष्य करके चली और नवी-मूल्य शब्दावली में निर्माणात्मक मनोभाषा का निबोड-मा प्रस्तुत किया गया, खंडनात्मक मनोभाषा मंडातिर और पूर्वोक्त-युक्त गयी। हिंदी में भी आधुनिक युग में दोषदर्शनपरक आलोचनाएँ लिखी गयीं, किंतु वे मंडातिक न होकर व्यावहारिक हैं। 'कालिदास की निरवुगता' में महावीरप्रसाद द्विवेदी ने, और 'प्रसाद जी के दो नाटक' में कृष्णानंद गुप्त ने आलोच्य साहित्यकारों के केवल दोषों का उद्घाटन किया है। पहली कृति को तत्त्वानिनिवेशी और दूसरी को मन्त्ररी आलोचना का उदाहरण माना जा सकता है।

राजगोवर ने भावक के जो चार प्रकार (१. लोचनी, २. मत्सरी, ३. मनुष्याभ्यवहारी, ४. तत्त्वानिनिवेशी) वर्णित हैं उनमें से प्रथम दो खंडन-पद्धति के आलोचक हैं, और तीसरा सृक्ति-पद्धति का। चौथे को प्रीतिवित्नाम आकाशवाणी-पद्धति जपवा टीका-पद्धति के मनोभक्त-वर्ग में रखा जा सकता है।

मन्हृत-मनोभाषात्मक में आलोचना के छह भागों में प्रसिद्ध हैं। नम, अन्धकार, ध्वनि, रीति, वक्रोक्ति और औचित्य। हिंदी के प्राचीन एवं अर्वाचीन आलोचनामाम्नी प्रायः अलंकारवादी या रसवादी हैं। किसी-किसी ने अतं-द-

१. उपमा कालिदासस्य भावेत्यर्पणौगवम् ।

दण्डित. पदालालित्वं भावे मन्त्रि त्रयो गुणः ॥

मुद्रन्ध्रार्णभृद्व कविराज इति त्रयः ।

वक्रोक्तिमार्गानि नृपास्वतुषो दिदते न वा ॥ —राघवदासशेष

कविता करता तीन हैं तुलसी केनव नूर ।

कविता खेती इन लुनी काबर बिलत मजूर ॥

मूर मूर तुलसी मरी उदुगल केनवदास ।

२. काव्यमीमांसा (भाष्यकवाड संस्करण), पृ० १५

कि रस-सिद्धांत व्यापकतम है और उसकी सर्वाधिक चर्चा हुई है। वे रस को व्यंग्यरूप मानते हुए भी यह भूल जाते हैं कि वस्तुरूप, अलंकाररूप और रसरूप त्रिविध ध्वनि की केवल एक विधा रस है। ध्वनि व्यापक है, रस व्याप्य है। रसनिरूपक ग्रंथों की तुलना में अलंकार-निरूपक ग्रंथों की संख्या बड़ी अधिक है। रस-सिद्धांत-गोपक "काव्यप्रकाश", "साहित्यदर्पण", "रसगंगाधर" आदि में भी अलंकार को रस की अपेक्षा कई गुना अधिक स्थान दिया गया है। व्यावहारिक समीक्षा में तो टीकाकारों ने प्रायशः अलंकारों का ही निर्देश किया है, यदा-वदा ही रस की चर्चा की है। नाट्यशास्त्रीय रचनाओं के रस-प्रकरण को समिलित कर लेने पर भी संस्कृत-समीक्षा में रस की चर्चा अलंकार की अपेक्षा ग्यून है।

हिंदी में भी अलंकार पर मनुष्य अधिक लिखा गया है। मात्रा की दृष्टि से रस का स्थान उसके बाद आता है। पचास से अधिक केवल अलंकार-ग्रंथ लिखे गये हैं।^१ रसनिरूपक ग्रंथों के दो वर्ग हैं। सामान्य^२, और शृंगारपरक।^३ शृंगार के सदर्भ में नायक-नायिका-भेद-वर्णन रीति-परंपरा के आचार्यों का प्रिय विषय रहा है। किन्तु ही ग्रंथ केवल नायिका-भेद पर लिखे गये हैं।^४ शृंगार-वर्णन में उनका मन विशेष रमा है, अन्य रसों की चर्चा केवल काम-चलाऊ है। उनकी प्रतिभा का चमत्कार नायिका-भेद-निरूपण में अवलंबनीय है। आधुनिक काल में रस-सिद्धांत पर कई महत्वपूर्ण स्वतंत्र ग्रंथ और शोधप्रबंध लिखे गये हैं।

हिंदी में समीक्षाशास्त्र का आरंभ तत्र हुआ जब संस्कृत में समीक्षानाम्नीष मौलिक चिंतन का युग अवसित हो चुका था। भरत, भामह, वामन, आनन्दवर्धन, कुतक आदि मौलिक विचारक थे। टीकाकार होने हुए भी अभिनवगुप्त की मौलिकता अमरिग्न है। १२ वीं शती ई० से ही संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र में

१. ललितललाम (मतिराम, १७वीं शती ई० का उत्तरार्ध), भाषाभरण (बैरीमाल, १७४८ ई०), पद्मभरण (पद्माकर, लगभग १८१० ई०), अलंकार-भूषण (भगवानदीन, १९१८ ई०), अलंकार-मीमांसा ("रसाल", १९२९ ई०), भारतीय-भूषण (अर्जुनदास केडिया, १९३० ई०), अलंकार-भजरी (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३६ ई०) आदि।

२. रसिकप्रिया (केशवदास, १५९१ ई०), रससारंग (भिवारीदास, १७४ ई०), नवरसतरंग (वेणीप्रवीन, १८२१ ई०), रसकलस (हरिऔध, १९३१ ई०), रसमजरी (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३४ ई०) आदि।

३. हितउरगिणी (कृष्णाराम, १५४१ ई०), रसराज (मतिराम, लगभग १६४३ ई०), शृंगारनिर्णय (भिवारीदास, १७५० ई०) आदि।

४. रामनाथ मुलुकी (१६५० ई०), कुंदन (१६९५ ई०), केशवराय (१६९७ ई०), लङ्गराम (१७०८ ई०) आदि के द्वारा लिखित 'नायिकाभेद'।

की पूर्ति आधुनिक युग में हो रही है।^१ इस पीढ़ी के अनेक आलोचकों ने संस्कृत के मूल-ग्रन्थों का गंभीर अनुशीलन करके काव्यशास्त्र के विभिन्न पक्षों की प्रौढ़ समीक्षा की है। यह संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र की महिमा का चमत्कार है कि हिंदी के अनेक आलोचक मूल-ग्रन्थों से संबंध बनामिल होने पर भी आचार्यप्रवर के उच्चासन पर विराजमान हैं।

विचारणीय प्रश्न

क्या संस्कृत के समीक्षाशास्त्र में प्रतिष्ठित काव्य के मानदंड आज पुराने पड़ गये हैं? क्या संस्कृत का कोई काव्य-सिद्धान्त ऐसा है जिसके निष्पन्न परस्म पुरानी और नयी कविता को समान रूप में परख सकते हैं? नयी पीढ़ी के अनेक आलोचकों का उत्तर है—नहीं। उनकी दृष्टि में काव्य के पुराने प्रतिमान काल-कवलित हो गये हैं। नये प्रतिमानों के निर्धारण में वे ईमानदारी, वर्तमान की सही पहचान, प्रामाणिक अनुभूति, अनुभूति की जटिलता, तनाव, विषटन, विमर्श, विडवना आदि शब्दों के नूतन अर्थबोध आदि की बात करते हैं।

उनकी आलोचनाओं में निष्पष्ट यह तात्पर्य अवश्यमेव मान्य है कि पुराने सिद्धान्तों को आँख मूँद कर नहीं स्वीकारना चाहिए, उनमें युगधर्मानुसार संशोधन अपेक्षित है। लेकिन, जो कुछ भी पुराना है उसे कँचुल की तरह छोड़ देना चाहिए—यह अतिवाद है।

नया कवि कोई सिद्धान्त निश्चित करके चलने के लिए बाध्य नहीं है। परंतु, आलोचक को इतना स्वच्छंद होने का अधिकार नहीं है। उसे यह निश्चित करके चलना पड़ेगा कि कविता और कवितेतर वाटमय में क्या तात्त्विक भेद है, कविता के वे कौन-से अश्वर्तक धर्म हैं जिनके आधार पर उसकी समीक्षा करणीय है। बहुत-से नये समीक्षकों के सवध में कटिनाई यह है कि वे सामान्य रूप में समीक्षा-सिद्धान्त के उपस्थापन को, और विशेष रूप में नयी कविता के मूल्यांकन में समर्थन-युक्त काव्यशास्त्र के निर्माण को भी हटिवादिता या दबियानूमी समझते हैं।

दूसरी ओर, संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र के समर्थक आलोचक हैं। कुछ आलोचकों का आप्रह है कि रस ही काव्य की एवमात्र बमोटी है और नयी कविता भी उसी बमोटी पर परची जानी चाहिए। वे रस की व्यापकता की बात तो करते हैं किन्तु उसे मिट्ट करके दिना नहीं सकते। उनका रस-सिद्धान्त अभिनवगुप्त

१. रस-सिद्धान्त : स्वरूप-विवरण (आनंदप्रकाश दीक्षित), रस-विमर्श (राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी), ध्वनि-नपराय और उसके सिद्धान्त (भोगराजकर व्यास), रीतिरालीन अलंकार-साहित्य का शास्त्रीय विवेचन (ओम्प्रकाश शर्मा), लक्षणा और उसका हिंदी-काव्य में प्रसार (राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी) आदि।

गीत बेचता हूँ,
मैं सभी किसिम के गीत
बेचता हूँ ।

जी माल देखिये दाम बढाऊंगा,
बेकाम नहीं है, काम बढाऊंगा,
कुछ गीत लिखे हैं मस्ती में मंने,
कुछ गीत लिखे हैं पस्ती में मंने,
यह गीत सख्त सरदर भुलायेगा,
यह गीत पिया को णस बुलायेगा ।
जी, पहले कुछ दिन गर्म लगी मुझको
पर पीछे-पीछे बकल जगी मृत्तको,
जी, लोगों ने तो बेच दिये ईमान ।
जी आप न हों मुन कर ज्यादा हैरान ।
मैं सोच-समझ कर बासिर
अपने गीत बेचता हूँ,
जी हाँ, हज़ूर मैं गीत बेचना हूँ ।

इस रचना से किम रस की प्रतीति होती है ? यदि कोई हास्य रस की अनुभूति करता है तो उसे हृदयहीन समझना चाहिए । यदि करुण रस माना जाए तो फिर 'करुण' की नयी परिभाषा बनानी पड़ेगी । एक प्रयोगवादी कवि-ममालोचक का कथन है कि इसकी सबसे बड़ी विशेषता यह है कि इसमें गंभीर बात हल्के पुरके ढग में कही गयी है । लेकिन हल्के-फुल्के ढग को कविता का लक्षण नहीं माना जा सकता । वास्तविकता यह है कि इस कविता में ध्वनि का ही चमत्कार है । आज के पाठक और ममालोचक की रुचि और मृत्पावधारणा चिह्नित हो गयी है । कवि ने यह बात बड़ी शक्तिमत्ता और चित्रात्मकता में कही है । उस प्रत्येक वाक्य से ध्वनित प्रदग् चमत्कार को उत्कर्ष प्रदान करते हैं ।

तीमरा उदाहरण धर्मवीर भारती की 'कविता की मौन' से लीजिए ।

मृत ने उसकी जवानी तोड़ दी
धो बड़ी ही नेक थी कविता
मगर धनहीन थी, कमजोर थी,
और बेचारी गरीबन मर गयी ।

इसमें शोक या करुणा नहीं है, क्योंकि कविता का उपमहार है :
लो तुम्हें मैं फिर नया विश्वास देती हूँ
नया इतिहास देती हूँ,
कौन कहता है कि कविता मर गयी ?

जाने वाली प्रत्येक वस्तु पर लागू हो सके। नायक के साथ तादात्म्य वाला सिद्धान्त व्यापक नहीं है। वस्तुतः भावक का समस्त भाव-वस्तु के साथ तादात्म्य होना है।

वैकटाचलम् यह ठीक है कि प्रेक्षक अथवा सहृदय का सभी नाटकीय पात्रों से तादात्म्य होने में कुछ वैयक्तिक कठिनाइयाँ हैं। किन्तु कवि का— जिसका मैंने जाने निवन्ध में सहृदय से अभेद स्थापित करने का यत्न किया था—काव्यमर्जन के समय अपने पात्रों से तादात्म्य स्वीकार करना ही पड़ेगा। यदि कवि अपने पात्रों से तादात्म्य स्थापित नहीं कर सकता तो वह उनका स्वाभाविक चित्रण, उनके मानसिक भावों का यथार्थ विवेचन और उनके अनुरूप भाषा का प्रयोग करने में सफ़ल नहीं हो सकता। यह मानना ही पड़ेगा कि कवि अपने पात्रों के साथ तन्मयीभाव करता है।

उ. भा. सिंह यह ठीक है कि कवि तन्मयता के बिना नहीं लिख सकता, अभिनेता भी तन्मयता के बिना अभिनय नहीं कर सकता। प्रेक्षक को भी अपनी एक तन्मयता होनी है। पर प्रश्न यह है कि ये तीनों स्वस्मय एक ही हैं या इनमें कुछ साम्य-वैषम्य है। मनुमुदत सरस्वती के मत को स्वीकार करते हुए मैं यह मानता हूँ कि इनमें 'तारतम्य' है अर्थात् साधारणीकरण में मात्रा का भेद है, गुण या स्वरूप का नहीं। जिस प्रकार आप कवि और सहृदय को मूलतः एक मानते हुए उनकी अनुभूतियों में मात्रा का भेद करते हैं उन्हीं प्रकार से मैं भी प्रेक्षक और कवि के तादात्म्य में मात्रा-भेद को स्वीकार करता हूँ।

वैकटाचलम् : अनुभूति या भावना में तो मात्राभेद हो सकता है पर तादात्म्य के साथ ऐसा संभव नहीं है। या तो पूरा तादात्म्य होगा या बिल्कुल नहीं होगा—आधा तादात्म्य हो, आधा न हो ऐसा नहीं हो सकता।

उ. भा. सिंह : काव्य तीन प्रकार के हो सकते हैं—एक तो कवि किसी प्रस्थान कथावस्तु पर लिखे, दूसरे अपने जीवन में आये और निकट में अनुभव किये गये किसी व्यक्ति के विषय में लिखे और तीसरे स्वयं अपनी अनुभूतियों पर लिखे। इन तीनों में प्रथम तो मुनी-मुनायों या कल्पित वस्तु है, दूसरी कवि द्वारा देखी गयी और परिचित, तीसरी में कवि स्वयं उसका अनुभव करने वाला है। तीनों ही प्रकार के काव्य में साधारणीकरण होता है पर उसमें अन्तर स्वीकार करना होगा। हम जो प्रेक्षक के

रा गो शर्मा 'दिनेश' : आपने अभी जो यह कहा कि बिजने जवाहरलाल नेहरू को देना है वह उनके विषय में अच्छी कविता लिख सकता है। मेरे समझता हूँ कि प्रत्यक्ष अनुभूति से अच्छी कविता नहीं लिखी जाती है, परोक्ष अनुभूति से लिखी जाती है। यदि किसी को माँ मर गई है तो वह बैठ कर रोवेगा, कविता नहीं लिखेगा। सुन्दर दृश्य को देख कर व्यक्ति प्रसन्न होगा उस पर कविता नहीं करेगा। कविता करने की प्रक्रिया पूर्णतः परोक्षानुभूति की प्रक्रिया है। जवाहरलाल नेहरू को देखे या न देखे, यदि कवि की परोक्षानुभूति प्रबल है तो वह अच्छी कविता कर सकता है।

वसन्त जेठली : परोक्षानुभूति से आपका क्या तात्पर्य है ? क्या 'अनुभूति' जैसी वस्तु भी परोक्ष हो सकती है ? मेरे समझता हूँ 'परोक्ष' और 'अनुभूति' ये शब्द अपने में विरोधी हैं।

रा गो शर्मा 'दिनेश' : यह बेही लोग कह सकते हैं जिन्होंने कविता नहीं लिखी।

लेखकों और कवियों ने भी पाश्चात्य काव्य-पद्धतियों से प्रभावित होकर स्वतंत्र लेखों के रूप में 'विम्ब' या 'विम्बवाद' की चर्चा और स्थापना का प्रयत्न किया है। इन नए चर्चाकारों में कुछ व्यक्ति तो ऐसे हैं जिनका दृष्टिकोण यह रहा है कि पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्तों को भारतीय सिद्धान्तों के साथ रख कर समझा जाए; किन्तु अधिकांश नए लेखक परिचय के लारेन्स, इरिण्डट, एडगर पाउण्ड आदि साहित्यकारों एवं विभिन्न मनोविज्ञानवेत्ताओं के चिन्तन से आश्रित होकर भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र को अंगुली मानने की अपनी कुटा का घोषणा करने लगे हैं। अद्यावधि आधुनिक भारतीय आचार्यों में केवल डा० नगेन्द्र ही ऐसे विन्मूढ़ हैं, जिन्होंने प्राच्य और पाश्चात्य काव्य-सिद्धान्तों का गभीर मध्यन करके अपनी स्थापना निष्पक्षता से देते हुए स्वतंत्र पुस्तक के रूप में इसी पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्त 'काव्य-विम्ब' का निरूपण दृष्टि से विगड़ बिदलेपन किया है। हम विभिन्न परिभाषाओं पर विचार करने हुए यहाँ हिन्दी के इन मनीषी आचार्यों द्वारा प्रस्तुत विम्ब की व्याख्या या आख्याय प्रस्तुत करेंगे।

'विम्ब' शब्द अंग्रेजी 'इमेज' शब्द का पर्याय है। इस ('इमेज') शब्द की व्याख्या को स्पष्ट करने के लिए गार्टर वाक्चमोर्ड टिक्वन्तरी, 'चेम्बर्स ट्वेंटीएथ सेन्चुरी टिक्वन्तरी', 'थर्ड न्यू इण्टर नेशनल टिक्वन्तरी', 'एन्साइक्लोपीडिया ब्रिटैनिका' आदि में लेकर बड़े महत्त्वपूर्ण कवियों और लेखकों की इतिवृत्तों तक को सम्मिलित किया जा सकता है। यथा—गार्टर वाक्चमोर्ड टिक्वन्तरी की परिभाषा इस प्रकार है। विम्ब : 'किन्ती पदार्थ का मनचित्र या मानस प्रतिरूप'।

इन परिभाषा से यह निश्च होता है कि विम्ब पदार्थ का एक ऐसा चित्र है, जो मानस पर या मानस के द्वारा निर्मित होता है।

चेम्बर्स ट्वेंटीएथ सेन्चुरी टिक्वन्तरी में निम्नांकित परिभाषा मिलती है।

"बन्धना लपटा स्मृति में उपस्थित चित्र अथवा प्रतिरूप, जिसका होना अनिवार्य नहीं है।"

इस परिभाषा में बलन्ता और 'स्मृति' के साथ-साथ चमुरद्विष का भी उल्लेख किया गया है। यहाँ विम्ब को माना तो चित्र ही बना है, किन्तु उसे मन से हटा कर मन के घनो तक विस्तृत कर दिया गया है। सामुदायिक अनिवार्यता अन्वीकार करके उसकी व्यापकता बढ़ा दी गई है। 'न्यू इण्टरनेशनल टिक्वन्तरी' में प्राप्त परिभाषाएँ इस प्रकार हैं—

विम्ब पदार्थों के आन्तरिक नादृश्य की अभिव्यक्ति है।”

स्वयं डा० नगेन्द्र ने भी अपनी परिभाषा देते हुए यही तथ्य सिद्ध किया है। वे लिखते हैं कि ‘काव्य-विम्ब शब्दार्थ के माध्यम से कल्पना द्वारा निमित्त एवं ऐसी मानन-छवि है, जिनके मूल में भाव की प्रेरणा रहती है।” इस परिभाषा में पूर्वोक्त सभी परिभाषाओं में अधिक व्यापकता है। डा० नगेन्द्र ने काव्य-विम्ब को मानन-छवि माना है, उनके लिए शब्दार्थ का माध्यम बतलाया है, कल्पना को उनकी निर्मात्री शक्ति घोषित किया है तथा भाव को प्रेरक कहा है। स्पष्ट है कि काव्य के मर्म में विम्ब एक ऐसी अभिव्यक्ति है, जो भाव की प्रेरणा से, कल्पना की रचना से एवं शब्दार्थ के माध्यम से मानन में बनकर बाहर आती है। यदि ध्यान से देखा जाए तो डा० नगेन्द्र ने इस तथ्य को बहुत जल्दी तरह से स्पष्ट कर दिया है कि विम्ब काव्य का रूप है, काव्य की आत्मा नहीं, एक माधन है, सिद्धि नहीं। वे मानते हैं कि ‘कला की सर्जना बन्तुर्विम्ब-रचना का ही नाम है।” यहाँ विम्ब-रचना को कला की सर्जना बताने में उनका यही उद्देश्य प्रतीत होता है कि विम्ब कला का सज्जित स्वरूप है। यदि कला सर्जना को ही, जो कि किसी अन्य माध्यम का माधन है, माध्यम मान लिया जाए, कला-कर्म के लिए का नारा मत्त स्वीकार कर लिया जाए, तो बात दूसरी है, अल्पथा इन परिभाषाओं के अनुसार विम्ब काव्य के माधन पक्ष का ही सिद्धान्त ठहरता है, माध्यम पक्ष का सिद्धान्त नहीं। और इस दृष्टि ने यह सिद्धान्त भारतीय वाच्यशास्त्र के अलंकार, रीति, वरोक्ति आदि सिद्धान्तों के समान काव्य के अभिव्यक्ति-पक्ष तक ही सीमित रह जाता है उनकी आत्मा का मूल्य नहीं बन पाता। मत्त बात यह है कि विम्ब मूलतः अनुभूति के सम्प्रेषण में महायत्न होता है। काव्य में यह सम्प्रेषण-प्रक्रिया शब्द के द्वारा ही पूर्ण हो सकती है। यही वाच्य है कि हर शब्द विन्नी न विन्नी अनुभूति के विम्ब को प्रेषित करता है। शब्द की स्वतंत्र रूप में एक सीमा है, इसीलिए हमारा विम्ब एक जड़ है। जबकि इस जड़ता को तोड़ कर जब शब्द को अपनी अनुभूति की अभिव्यक्ति का माध्यम बनाता है, तब प्रतीक जन्म लेते हैं और प्रतीकों के माध्यम से ही उन शब्दों में वह शक्ति आ जाती है, जिसमें केवल बन्तुओं के ही नहीं, गुणों के भी विम्ब पुनरुत्पादित हो उठते हैं। इस प्रकार विम्ब शब्द की वह शक्ति बन जाती है, जिसके माध्यम से बन्तु-जगत्, जो भाव-जगत् में परिवर्तित हो चुका होता है या गुणयत्न जो मूल से हटकर मानस

१. वाच्य-विम्ब, पृष्ठ ५

२. वही पृष्ठ १

भाग को उस सीमा तक बटा दिया है, जिस सीमा में पत्रकारिता, इतिहास आदि की पहुँच होनी चाहिए।

वस्तुन विम्ब-मिदालन के मूल में यह भाव छिपा है कि काव्य जो प्रस्तुत करता है, वह सब उस वस्तु या गुणजगत् का मूल रूप नहीं होता है, जिसकी प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष अनुभूति कवि को होती है, अपितु उस वस्तु या गुणजगत् का प्रतिरूप होता है। इस तथ्य को हम सहज में समझ सकते हैं कि विम्ब-मिदालन के अनुसार काव्य-सर्जना में यथार्थ का नहीं, यथार्थ की प्रतिवृत्ति का ज्वन होता है। और प्रतिवृत्ति जहाँ है, वहाँ बहुत-कुछ प्रतिभा, रचि एवं कल्पना है—वह यथार्थ में भिन्न एक नई सृष्टि है। जिस प्रकार दर्पण में हमारी जो छवि बनती है, वह हमारा शरीर नहीं होती और प्रायः ठीक वंशी भी नहीं होती जैसा हमारा रूप है। निश्चय ही दर्पण का उस छवि के निर्माण में अद्भुत योग रहता है। एक दर्पण में हम अपनी छवि देख कर आने ही सौन्दर्य पर मुग्ध हो जाते हैं, तो दूसरे दर्पण में अपने उसी रूप को बदला हुआ देखकर उस दर्पण को ही फोड़ देना चाहते हैं। फिर भी हम यह नहीं कह सकते कि हमारा कौन-सा रूप यथार्थ है। काव्य में विम्ब-निर्माण की प्रक्रिया तो जड़ दर्पण में भिन्न चेतन मानस द्वारा पूर्ण होती है और उस पर बुद्धि तथा आत्मा का भी अनुशासन रहता है। इसीलिए वह लोकोत्तर भूमि पर ले जाती है। यह वह लोक नहीं होता जिनकी छवियाँ जड़ता पर आधारित होती हैं, और जिनमें हमारी इन्द्रियाँ प्रत्यक्षतः प्रभावित रहती हैं, अपितु वह ऐसा जगत् होता है, जहाँ हमें लौकिक अभाव की पूर्ति का अवसर मिलता है। अब विम्ब केवल 'जो है' की ही प्रतिक्रिया नहीं होता या 'जो था' के अंगों में ही नहीं बनना अपितु 'जो नहीं है' या जो 'नहीं था' उसमें भी वह समान की सापेक्षता के आधार पर अवलम्बित होता है। पारश्चात्य विचारक 'बोचे' ने अपने सौन्दर्य-दर्शन के मूलाधार में जिस सहजानुभूति को स्वीकार किया है, वह कवि की प्रतिभा, रचि और कल्पना के संयोग से अनेक रूपों में परिवर्तित होती हुई विम्ब बनती है। और तभी उसमें सौन्दर्य-भावना जाग्रत होती है।

विम्ब और सम्मृत काव्यशास्त्र

जैसा कि हम आरम्भ में संकेत कर चुके हैं, भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र में 'विम्ब' की एक मिदालन के रूप में तो स्वीकृति नहीं है, किन्तु सम्मृत के आचार्य 'विम्ब' शब्द और काव्य में उसकी स्थिति में परिचित अवश्य थे। विम्ब हमारे विभिन्न काव्य-मिदालनों में सहचारी मात्र है, रचना का नेतृत्व नहीं करता। इस तथ्य को कुछ अधिक विस्तार में समझने के लिए अब मैं पहले रम-मिदालन को लिया

लक्षणा और व्यञ्जना के प्रायः समस्त व्यापार विम्बात्मक ही होते हैं। अन्तर है तो इतना ही कि विम्ब जिस रूप या गुण का मूर्तन करता है, उनकी सीमा रहती है, जब कि लक्षणा और व्यञ्जना उस सीमा को लांघ कर अपनी शक्ति का आगे भी प्रसार करती हैं। 'निराला' की कविता 'जूही की बली' को नए समीक्षक विम्ब-रचना का अच्छा उदाहरण मानते हैं। इस कविता में, पवन और काली दोनों प्रतीक भी हैं। किन्तु, विम्ब और प्रतीक का समस्त अस्तित्व उसमें लक्षणा एवं व्यञ्जना पर ही निर्भर है। जहाँ प्रतीक और विम्ब-विधान का कार्य समाप्त हुआ है, वहाँ व्यञ्जना का महत्वपूर्ण कार्य शेष भी रह गया है। और, जब उस व्यापार का विस्लेषण किया जाता है, तब वे विम्ब उभरते हैं, जो शब्दार्थ में नहीं, व्यंग्यार्थ में निहित थे। वे निहित विम्ब अचाक्षुष तो हैं, पर अगोचर नहीं।

अलंकार-विधान तो समग्रतः विम्बात्मक ही होता है। सादृश्यमूलक सभी अलंकारों में विम्ब का चमत्कार निहित रहता है। आचार्य डॉ० नगेन्द्र ने इन सम्बन्ध में दृष्टान्त और निदर्शना अलंकारों के साहित्य-दर्पण और वाक्य-दर्पण ग्रन्थों में दिए गए लक्षण उद्धृत किए हैं, जिनमें 'प्रतिविम्ब' एवं 'विम्बानु-विम्ब' शब्दों का प्रयोग भी हुआ है। ये दोनों अलंकार ही नहीं, उपमा, उत्प्रेक्षा, रूपक, सदेह, आदि अनेक अलंकारों की स्थापना विम्ब के आधार पर ही हुई है। सस्कृत के आचार्यों ने विम्ब को गौण मानकर उससे उत्पन्न होने वाले शब्दार्थ-चमत्कार ही को प्रधानता दी है। अलंकार-सिद्धान्त का समस्त प्रस्तुत और अप्रस्तुत विधान विम्ब-रचना करता हुआ ही आगे बढ़ता है। वास्तविकता यह है कि अलंकार-विधान में विम्ब का ही नहीं विम्ब के भी विम्ब का ग्रहण होता है। यही कारण है कि अलंकार-ग्रन्थ चमत्कार केवल विम्ब के प्रस्तुत पक्ष तक ही सीमित नहीं रहता, न वस्तु या गुण की यथार्थता एवं काव्य का सौन्दर्य बँध पाता है। हरिजीव जब लिखते हैं—

दिवस का अवमान समीप या
मगन या कुछ लोहित हो चला,
तरु-शिखा पर थी अब राजती
कमलिनी-कुल-वल्लभ की प्रना।

तब वस्तु-जगत् का 'फोटो' ही सामने आता है, मानस-साक्षात्कृत विम्ब का विस्तार उसके भी विम्ब-प्रतिविम्ब तक नहीं होता। अब विम्ब-सिद्धान्त के लिए जहाँ यह छंद विशेष कवित्व-पूर्ण है, वहाँ अलंकार-सिद्धान्त के लिए इस का स्थान काव्य की सामान्य श्रेणी में ही है। विशेष श्रेणी का कवित्व

ही नहीं, उनके द्वारा होने वाली अभिव्यक्ति और अभिव्यग्य के औचित्य को भी सम्मिलित किया गया है। अलंकार, रस, आदि सबके लिए औचित्य की मर्यादा स्थापित की गई है। उस मर्यादा में विम्ब-योजना भी लाजाती है। विम्ब-सिद्धान्त का अगर कोई जरा उपेक्षित रह जाता है, तो मात्र वह अंग जो खण्डित बिम्बों में जुड़ा हुआ है, क्योंकि उनमें औचित्य का पूर्ण निर्वाह नहीं हो पाता।

वक्रोक्ति में वर्ण में प्रवण्य तक की जो वक्रता स्वीकृत है, वह स्वतः बिम्बों का निर्माण ही नहीं करती बिम्बों के माध्यम से ही काव्य की निद्रि तक पहुँचती है। जब प्रसाद जी निम्नांकित पंक्तियों में वाक्य-वक्रता स्थापित करते हैं, तब उनसे महज रूप में विम्ब-विधान सामने आजाता है—

घिर रहे थे घुँघराले बाल
अस अवलज्जित मुख के पास ।
नील घन शायक में मुकुमार
मुषा भरने को विधु के पास ॥

अतः स्पष्ट है कि वक्रोक्ति-सिद्धान्त भी विम्ब-प्रक्रिया की उपेक्षा नहीं करता, किन्तु वह बिम्ब को अपना लक्ष्य भी नहीं बनाता है।

विम्ब-सिद्धान्त की अपूर्णता

सम्पूर्ण काव्यशास्त्र के प्रमुख-सिद्धान्तों में विम्ब की स्थिति को समझ लेने पर यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि यह सिद्धान्त काव्य की समीक्षा का पूर्ण सिद्धान्त नहीं कहा जा सकता। रचना-प्रक्रिया के मानसिक आध्यात्मिक तो इस सिद्धान्त की अच्छी पहुँच है। काव्य की व्याख्या भी इस सिद्धान्त के द्वारा संकल्पना-पूर्वक की जा सकती है, किन्तु काव्य की निद्रि का मूल्यांकन इस सिद्धान्त के द्वारा सम्भव नहीं है। विम्ब-विधान के द्वारा हम काव्य में विभिन्न मानसी छवियों को तो देख सकते हैं, किन्तु उन छवियों की योजना का लक्ष्य खोजने नहीं जा सकते। अतः विम्ब-सिद्धान्त रूप-गुण-मण्डन द्वारा मौन्दर्य-भावना की स्थिति एवं खण्डित-संक्षिप्त बिम्बों के माध्यम से जिज्ञासा-चिन्ता की बौद्धिक स्थितियों तक ही हमें सीमित रखता है। वह काव्य को एक माभिप्राय मज्जना नहीं बनने देता। इन सिद्धान्त में स्मृति और वक्त्रता का जितना महत्व है, उतना भाव की परिणति का नहीं है। इसीलिए आजकल हिन्दी की विचार-प्रधान नई कविता में यह सिद्धान्त पश्चिमी साहित्य से भी अधिक सम्मानित हो रहा है। विम्ब सिद्धान्त की अपूर्णता का मुख्य कारण यह है कि विम्ब काव्य-भाषा की धामा है, काव्य की नहीं, काव्य का तो वह उत्तरण

है, उसने प्रभावित होता है या अनुभूति प्राप्त करता है तो वह अनुभूति उनके अन्दर भावात्मक होती है। भाव से मेरा तात्पर्य काव्यशास्त्रीय भाव नहीं अपितु सूक्ष्मता है। किसी भी वस्तु या दृश्य को अपने मानन पर बनी हुई भावात्मक सत्ता को हम जब संप्रेषित करना चाहते हैं तो यथावत् प्रेषित न करके हम सबसे हमारे मानन पर बने हुए रूप या छवि को हम प्रेषित करते हैं। जो प्रेषित किया जाता है वह हमारी दृष्टि में बिम्ब है। यह बिम्ब वस्तु का यथार्थ रूप नहीं होता क्योंकि उसके पीछे व्यक्तिगत अनुभूति भी होती है। बिम्ब के माध्यम से हम किसी अनुभूति को जगाना चाहते हैं। इस प्रकार बिम्ब माध्यम है—माध्यम न होने के कारण वह काव्य की जाना नहीं हो सकता, जैसा आपने द्वितीय प्रश्न में कहा है। जहाँ तक एक प्रतीक का संबंध है, यह किसी भाव को व्यक्त करने के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है जैसे मैंने उल्लू वाला उदाहरण दिया है। मत्स्य के लिए 'नीली झील' भी एक प्रतीक है। इन प्रतीकों को कवि ने किसी अनुभूति में गड़ा है—अनुभूति की भावात्मक सत्ता तो यहाँ भी है किन्तु नीली झील प्रतीक बिम्ब नहीं हो सकता, बिम्ब वस्तुतः प्रतीक में आगे की वस्तु है।

डा. कल्याणलाल शर्मा सम्भवतः आपको यह रोचक प्रतीत होगा कि हिन्दी तथा अन्य भारतीय भाषाओं में जो बिम्बमिद्धान्त अंग्रेजी के प्रभाव से आया है वह वस्तुतः अंग्रेजी की चीन और जापान की देन है। भारतीय तथा रोमन आदि लिपियाँ वर्णों या अक्षरों सूचित करती हैं किन्तु चीनी लिपि वस्तुतः एक चित्र लिपि है जहाँ प्रत्येक चित्र एक वस्तु या विचार का चोत्कर्ष है (idiogram)। पचास वर्ष पूर्व जब इजरा पाउण्ट ने सर्व प्रथम इस मिद्धान्त को जन्म दिया तो उसके मन में यही धारणा थी कि एक पूरे विचार के लिये एक शब्द-चित्र ही क्यों न प्रस्तुत किया जाए। अपने १५-२० वर्षों के जीवन काल में यह इम्प्रेण्ट में अधिक प्रसिद्ध नहीं हो सका। हिन्दी में यह सम्भवतः इस शताब्दी के तीसरे दशक में आया किन्तु चौथे दशक के प्रारम्भ होने तक यह बहुत अधिक प्रसिद्ध नहीं रहा। कारण यह है कि इस प्रकार की कविता लिखना बहुत कठिन है। (अनु.)

रतेरुत्पत्ते, कटाशादिभिरनुभावं तस्या प्रतीते, लज्जादिभिः सञ्चारि-
भिरच तस्या परिपोषस्य स्वीकारात् । तथापि उत्पत्तिमन्तरा प्रतीते परि-
पोषस्य च अभावात् उत्पत्ते प्राधान्यमादाय उत्पाद्योत्पादकभावसम्बन्ध एव
प्राधान्यात्तदभिमत । अत एव तन्मतम् उत्पत्तिवादनाम्ना व्यपदिश्यते । विभा-
वादिभिः उत्पत्त्यादिप्रमणेन परिपोषमुपयात रत्यादिस्थितिभाव एव रसः ।
एष च रस मुख्यतया रामादावनुकार्ये एव वर्तते, किन्तु सात्त्विकवाचिवा-
ङ्गिकाहार्यरूपैरभिनयै रामाद्यनुवर्त्तरि नटेऽपि रामत्वाद्यनुसन्धानबलात् स
वर्तते । रामत्वाद्यनुसन्धानबलात् नटे गोप्या वृत्त्या, आरोपेण वा विद्यमानस्य
रसस्य साक्षात्कारात्मकं ज्ञान सामाजिकं विधीयते । तज्ज्ञानाच्च सामाजिक-
नामानन्दानुभूतिरूपिते, रते स्वभावमुन्दरत्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्य आनन्दप्रदत्वात् ।
तदुक्तं पण्डितराजेन—“मुर्यतया दुष्यन्तादिगत एव रसो रत्यादि कमनीय-
विभावोद्यमिनयप्रदसनकोविदे दुष्यन्ताद्यनुवर्त्तरि नटे समारोप्य साक्षात्त्रियते ।
मतेऽस्मिन् साक्षात्कार धर्म्यं लौकिक आरोप्यासौ त्वलौकिकः” । इति ।

श्रीशबुक्स्तु—चित्रतुरगादिन्यायेन रामत्वेन ज्ञाते नटे नटेनोच्चास्ति-
काव्यबलानुसन्धेयं विभावार्यं वारणं शिक्षाभ्याससमधिगतपाठवप्रदर्शितं
अनुभावाख्यं कार्यं, कृत्रिमनिजानुभवाजंनबलात् प्रकाशितं सञ्चार्याख्यं
सहकारिभिरच रामविपरिण्या रतेरनुमिति विधीयते सामाजिकं । यद्यपि नटे-
नाभिनीता विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिण कृत्रिमा, न पारमाधिका, तथापि
नटेन शिक्षाभ्याससमधिगतापूर्वकौशलेन ते विभावादयस्तथाभिनीयन्ते यथा
सामाजिकानां तत्र कृत्रिमताज्ञानं न भवति । अतो भवति तेभ्यो रतेरनुमिति
सामाजिकानाम् । ना च अनुमितिसिद्धादि रति स्वभावमुन्दरत्वात् आनन्द-
प्रदा इति सामाजिकानां वागनया चर्च्यमाणा सामाजिकेभ्य आनन्दं ददाति,
आनन्दरूपरमजनयत्वाच्च रसनान्ना व्यपदिश्यते । अत्र मते रसमूत्रस्यसयोग-
पदस्य गम्यगमकभावः सम्यन्धः, निष्पत्तिपदस्य चानुमितिरर्थः । रतेरनुमानादेव-
तन्मतं नैयायिकमतानुसारि व्यपदिश्यते ।

अत्रोभयत्रापि मते अनुवर्त्तन्निष्ठा रत्यादिभावार्था रतिरेव रसिमाना
रसजनिका । एकत्र सा धनुवर्त्तरि रामरूपनानुसन्धानात् ज्ञानलक्षणालौकिक-
मन्त्रिवर्षेण साक्षात्त्रियते । अपरत्र च अनुमित्या ज्ञायते रगिके इति ब्रह्म भेदः ।
परन्तु अस्मिन्मतेऽपि रति सामाजिके नैव वर्तते । अपि च या रति रस-
तामेति सा लौकिकी एव न तु ततो विलक्षणा । तस्या ज्ञानाच्च य आनन्द उप-
जायते स सामाजिकेषु तिष्ठतीति रसानन्दयोर्वैयधिवरण्यं न तु सामानाधि-
करण्यम् ।

भट्टनायकस्तु अन्येभ्यो लौकिकेभ्य सास्त्रीयेभ्यश्च सत्वेभ्य वाच्यशब्दानां
बलशयात् तेषु अभिधाय्यापाराद् भिन्न व्यापारद्वयं स्वीकरोति—भाववत्त्व

केवलानां भावकत्वम् अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात्, न च केवलानामर्थानां शब्दान्तरेणार्थमापत्वे तदभावात्, द्वयोस्तु भावकत्वमस्माभिरवेक्ष्यते" इत्यादि-
भिल्लोचनवचने स्पष्टमेव काव्यस्य अर्थात् शब्दार्थयोर्भावकत्वमुक्तं न तु
विभावादीनाम् । अतो विभावादिभि सह रतेन भाव्यभावकत्वम् ।
तुष्यदुर्जनन्यायेन यदि विभावादेर्भावकत्वमङ्गीर्यते, तदापि भावकत्व नाम
साधारणत्वापादनम् । न च रत्नादे स्थायिभावस्य साधारणत्वापादनेनैव
रमणिष्यति मन्त्रनि यावत् सामाजिकानां तस्य भोगो न स्यात् । अतो
हेतोरपि नात्र विभावादीनां स्थायित्वा सह भाव्यभावकत्वम् सघटते । अत्र
एव पण्डितराजैरुक्तम्—“एव साधारणीकृतेषु दुष्टान्तमनुत्तरादेशकालवयो-
वस्थादिषु पद्मौ पूर्वव्यापारमहिमनि तृतीयस्य भोगवृत्त्वव्यापारस्य महिम्ना
निर्गीर्णयो रजस्ममसांश्चित्रकसत्त्वजनितेन निजचित्त्वभावनिवृत्तिविश्रान्ति-
लक्षणेन साक्षात्कारेण विपर्ययितो भावनोपनीत साधारणात्मा रत्नादि स्थायी
रम । तत्र भुञ्जमानो रत्नादि, रत्नादिभोगो वेत्युभयमेव रम ” इति ।

अत्र मते रामादिरनि भावकत्वव्यापारेण रामादिव्यक्तिविशेषसम्बन्ध
परिहृत्य साधारणीकृतेन सामाजिकानां तस्या भोगे न काचिदपि बाधा,
तथापि ना रति न सामाजिकानाम् अपि तु रामादेरेवेति वस्तुगत्या सामाजि-
कानां साक्षात्कारात्मको भोगो नोपपद्यते । स्वस्या एव रते स्वेन मनसा
मह मयोगेन साक्षात्कारमन्वद्वान् पररत्या मह साधारणीकरणेऽपि मनस
मनिकर्षाभावात्, मनस मन्निवर्षमन्तरा च रत्नादीनां साक्षात्कारानुपपत्तेः ।
तस्मादभिनवगुण एतामनुपपत्तिं परिहृतुं रसनूत्रमन्यथा व्याचक्ष्यते ।

तथा हि य स्थायिभाव साधारण्यभावाच्च सामाजिकैः चक्ष्यमाणं च
रमत्वमधिगच्छति, न न परकीय — अनुकायंगताऽनुबर्तुं शक्नो वा, अपि तु सामा-
जिकनिष्ठ एव । न सामाजिकानां हृदये वामनारूपेण पूर्वमेव वर्तते । किन्तु
तदानीं नोजनिभ्यक्तदशाया वर्तते । यदा तु काव्ये शोभाभावगुणालकारसंस्मृत-
शब्दं नाट्ये च आगिकादिभिश्चतुर्विधैरभिनयैः तस्य स्थायिभावस्य
कारणकार्यमहत्कारीणि समुपस्थाप्यन्ते, तदा सांभिव्यक्तिमुपयाति । यद्यपि
रत्नादे स्थायितो भावस्य नीतादीनि कारणानि, वटाश्वविशेषादीनि कार्याणि,
लज्जोन्मुखरनिर्वदादीनि महत्कारिण्यारणानि च व्यक्तिविशेषसम्बद्धानि इति
तैर्न सामाजिकजनस्य स्थायितो रत्नादे समुद्वोधनमभिव्यक्तिर्वा सम्भवति,
तथापि काव्ये तेषां कारणकार्यमहत्कारिणां शोभाभावगुणालकारसंस्मृतं सुन्दरैः
शब्दैः नाट्ये च चतुर्विधैरभिनयैः समुपस्थापितवान् तानि सहृदयहृदये
स्थानं लभन्ते । चित्तगतद्वेषे विभावाद्य चमत्कारित्वात् सहृदयेन भाव्यन्ते

भिनवभारत्यामभिनवगुप्तेन—“तत्र लोकाव्यवहारे कार्यकारणमहकारात्मव-
लिङ्गदर्शने स्थाव्यात्मपरिचितवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यासपाटवाद्यप्युक्तं तैरेवोद्यमानवटाक्ष-
वीक्षादिभिर्लोकोक्तिको कारणत्वादिभुवभतिप्रान्तैर्विभावानानुभावनाममुपरञ्ज-
कन्वमात्रप्राणं, अन एवालौकिकविभावादिव्यपदेशभाभि प्राच्यकारणादिस्फ-
सम्कारोपजीवनरव्यापनाय विभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेश्ये” रित्यादिना सम्प्रभण ।

पूर्व काव्ये नाट्ये च विभावादीना देशकालसम्बन्धपूर्वक विशेषधर्मपुरुष्वारेण
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वित्वेनैवोपस्थिति, पश्चात् मानससाक्षात्कारापन्यर्थापया
भावनाया तेषा देशकालसम्बन्धपरिहारपूर्वक व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वराहित्येनो-
पस्थितिर्भवतीति प्रतिपादित स्वयमभिनवगुप्तेनाभिनवभारत्याम्—“श्रीवा-
भङ्गाभिरामम्” इत्यादिवाक्यात् “वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तेरनन्तर मानसी साक्षात्कारा-
त्मिकाग्रहमितनन्तद्वाक्योपात्तकालादिविभागा तावन्प्रतीतिरपजायते”
इत्यादिना ।

व्यक्तिविशेष-देशकालादिमन्वन्वर्गहर्तृस्त एव साधारणीकृतविभावादिभि
सामाजिकचेतनि वासनारूपेण विद्यमाना साम्प्रतमभिव्यज्यमाना रतिरपि
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वरहिता मनी साधारण्येनैवाभिव्यज्यते । अर्थात् सामाजिके
साधारणीकृतविभावादिभिरभिव्यज्यमाना सा रति न सामाजिकनिष्ठत्वेनानि-
व्यज्यते, अपि तु रतित्वेन रूपेणाभिव्यज्यते । अभिव्यञ्जकाना विभावानुभाव-
व्यभिचारिणा साधारण्यात् । अन एव तत्र सकलहृदयानाम् एकधनतयैव प्रतीति
संशयो वा जायते । अर्थान् सकलहृदयाना समानवानुभूतिस्तस्मा । अन्यथा
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वित्वेन तदभिव्यक्तौ तु व्यक्तिविशेषसम्बन्धस्यापि तत्र
सत्त्वात् व्यक्तीना च परस्परमत्यन्त वैपम्यात् रतेरनुभूतिर्न सकलहृदयेषु ऐक-
रूप्य भजेत, न च तेषा महदयाना परस्पर मवादोऽपि उपपद्येत । अत
एवोक्तमभिनवभारत्याम्—“वयमेव पर देशकालाद्यनालिङ्गितम् । तथाविधे
हि नात्माऽत्यन्त निरङ्कुलो न वा विशेषत उल्लिखितः । एव परोऽपि ।” इति ।
तथा साधारण्यानाभिव्यक्त्या रतिरपि सामाजिकेन लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेभ्यः,
तादृश्यावबोधगालियोगिज्ञानान् अस्मिमात्रविश्रान्तयुक्तयोगिज्ञानात् च
भिन्नेन अनुभूत्यपरपयिण अलौकिकेन मानमेन ज्ञानेन साक्षात्प्रियते तदा रमो
भवति । न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापार । किन्तुलौकिकविभावादि-
मयोगादयोपनर्नवैय चरणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिकप्रमाण
अतिवृत्त्याद्यवबोधन तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजनितादृश्यापरमवित्तिज्ञानात्मकल-

१. भिनवभारत्या पृ २८४ ।

२. भिनवभारत्या पृ २७९ ।

३. तत्रैव ।

विज्ञा, यथा च तेषां विभावानुभावश्चभिचारिमज्ञा अलौकिक, यथा वा तस्या रमणप्रकारः प्रत्यक्षादिमवविद्यलौकिकप्रमाणाविषयत्वात् अलौकिक, तथा अस्या साधारण्येनोपस्थिताया तात्कालिक्या रते कारणात् विभावादीनां हेतुत्वमपि अलौकिकम् । तथा हि लोके द्विविधो निमित्तहेतुर्भवति—कारकं ज्ञापकश्च । विभावादयश्च रमस्य न कारकहेतवः । यतो हि दण्डादीनां कारकहेतूनामभावेऽपि घटादे स्तिनिर्द्ध्यते । न च विभावादिवोधाभावे रस-
म्यिति केनाप्यनुभूयते, अपि तु विभावादिवोधनत्वे एव । अत एव रमस्य विभावादिविज्ञावचित्वं प्रोक्तम् । न वापि विभावादय रसस्य ज्ञापका हेतवः । दीपादिभ्यः प्राक् घटादेरिव, ज्ञापकहेतुभ्यः प्रागपि ज्ञापकस्य सत्त्वदर्शनात् । न च विभावादिस्य प्राक् रसः केनाप्यनुभूयते, साधारणीकृताया रतेरेव रम्यमानत्वे रमत्वात्, तस्याश्च विभावादिवर्धनात् प्रागनत्वात् । प्रतो न लौकिक्या रते रमत्वम् अपि तु तद्विलक्षणया अलौकिक्या एव । अत एव आचार्येण भग्नेन रसमुक्ते विभावादीनामुपादानेऽपि स्यादपिद नोपातम् । तथा मति पक्षीनां चित्तवृत्ति रस इत्यन्युपगम्येत न चेदमनीष्टम् । यथोक्तमभिनवगुप्तेनाभिनवभारत्याम्—“अत एव मूत्रे स्यादिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तन् प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात् । केवलमौचित्यादेवमुच्यते स्यायी रस इति । औचित्यन्तु तत्स्यादिगतत्वेन कारणादितया प्रसिद्धानाम् अधुना चर्चणोपयोगितया विभावादित्वावलम्बनान्” इति ।

लोचनेऽप्येतदेव तेन उक्तम् । यथा—“अत एव न परकीया चित्तवृत्तिर्गम्यते इत्यभिप्रायेण ‘विभावानुभावश्चभिचारिमयोगात् रसनिपत्तिः’ इति मूत्रे स्यादिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तन् प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात् । स्यादिनस्तु रसीभाव औचित्यादुच्यते । तद् विभावानुभावोचितचित्तवृत्तिमस्कारमुन्दरचर्चणोदयात्, हृदयमवादोपयोगिलौकचित्तवृत्तिपरिज्ञानावस्थायाम् उद्यानपुलकादिभिः स्याद्विभूत-
रत्पादवगमाच्च ।”

न चोभयविधप्रकारभिन्नः कोऽपि हेतु लोके उपलभ्यते इति वर्यं विभावादीनां हेतुत्वम् इति शक्यम् । उभयप्रकारभिनस्य हेतो लोके अदर्शनेन तदभिज्ञाना विभावादित्तेनानालौकिकत्वनिन्दे । विभावादीनामलौकिकत्वमिद्विधं रमस्य अलौकिकत्वमाधिकेति भूषणमेव न दूषणम् । तदुक्तमभिनवभारत्याम्—“अत एव विभावादयो न निपत्तिहेतवो रमस्य तद् बोधागमेऽपि रसमवप्रमगात् । नापि जप्तिहेतवः केन प्रमाणमप्ये पनेयः । सिद्धस्य वस्यचित् प्रमयेनूतस्य रमस्याभावात् । किन्ति एतद्धि विभावादन इति ।

१. अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८४

२. लोचने पृ. १५६

यथा—

‘उध्वोच्चंमारुह्य यदधेतत्त्व,
 धीं परमंनि श्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती ।
 फलं तदाद्यैः परित्विष्यजाना,
 विवेकनोदानपरम्पराशाम् ॥
 तस्मात्स्वामत्र न दूषितानि,
 मतानि नान्येव न शोधितानि ।
 पूर्वप्रतिष्ठापितयोजनाम्,
 मूलप्रतिष्ठाफलमामनन्ति ॥

परमत्र एतद्वैश्यं ध्येयं यद् रसास्वादतः निर्विघ्नतः समन्वारनिर्वोगमना-
 स्वादनयोगसमापतिलक्षविश्रान्तादिभ्यश्चैरभिधीयमानतया सकलविघ्ननिर्मुक्ततया
 स्वानुभूत्यपरपर्यायतया सवित्त्यैव भवति । तस्मात् रसास्वादनार्थं सविधिं रस-
 प्रतीतिप्रतिबन्धकानां सकलविघ्नानामभावो आवश्यकः । ते च विघ्नाः—
 प्रतिपन्नावयोर्यता, समावृताविरहः, स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वनिरासेन देशकालविशेषा-
 वेशः, निजानुवादिविवर्तीभावः, प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्यम्, स्फुटत्वाभावः, अप्रधानता,
 मग्नमोहादिव ।

तत्र प्रथमस्य विघ्नस्य परिहारार्थं लोकसामान्यवस्तुविषयो हृदयमवादः,
 अलोकसामान्येषु तु चेष्टितेषु प्रस्ताव्यमादिनामधेयपरिग्रहः विद्यते । स्व-
 गतत्वपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेशरूपविघ्नापन्नारणार्थं च ‘नटी
 विदूषको वाग्धि’ इत्यादि-प्रस्तावनालोचनेन नटस्वनाधिगमः तन्मुखस्वरः,
 अलौकिकभाषादिभेदगम्याङ्गरङ्गपीठमण्डपगनकक्षादिपरिग्रहनाट्यधर्मिसहितः,
 प्रतिगीर्षवादिना तत्प्रच्छादनसंशोभ्युपायस्य समर्थीयते ।

निजानुवादिविवर्तीभावस्य तृतीयविघ्नस्य व्यपोहनार्थं तु प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठं
 साधारण्यमहिन्ना सकलभोग्यत्वमहिष्णुमि शब्दादिविषयस्यैवातोलगान-
 विविधमण्डपपदविदग्गतिगादिभिरपरगन्जनं समर्थीयते । प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्य-
 रणस्य चतुर्थस्य विघ्नस्य स्फुटत्वाभावरूपस्य पञ्चमस्य विघ्नस्य साधारण्यार्थं
 लोकसामान्यप्रवृत्तपुष्ट्युत्तमा शब्दगिह्वापागविमदृशा प्रत्यक्षव्यापारवत्त्वा
 अभिनया समर्थीयते ।

अप्रधानतास्य पष्ठस्य प्रत्यूहस्य व्यपोहनार्थं अप्रधानविभावानुभाव-
 व्यभिचारित्वनिमित्तं स्यादेव चत्वारोऽवस्थाभिरधीरते । अत एव ‘स्वादि-
 नावान् रसवन्मात्राभ्याम्’ इत्यादिना तुल्यवर्णाया एव रसवन्मुदत्तम्, न तु
 विनावादिचर्वापाया ।

परिचर्चा

- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - भट्टनायकनतस्यापने भवद्विरेकत यन् स अनुकार्यनिष्ठा रतिर्मेव भवति । अस्त्यत्र किञ्चिदप्रमाणम् ? दन्तुत विभावस्य साधारणीकरणमेव उक्तम् । तत्त्वविवारेणैवान्येषा नानादि-कादीना तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्धटते । काव्यप्रमाणमादौ वृत्तापि रतिः साधारणीकृता भवतीत्यत्र प्रमाणं नास्ति । अस्ति चेद्दीपकम् ।
- सु. दा. स्वामी - काव्यप्रवासे रसगङ्गाधरे चैतत्संश्लेषे त्रिविधं वर्तते 'साधारणीकृता रतिः' । अन्ये रते साधारणीकरणं न जातम् ?
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - परनिष्ठाया रते साधारणीकरणं भवतीति वृत्तापि काव्यप्रकाशे भट्टनायकनते नास्ति अद्धि नत दा. रत्नवन्द-द्विवेदिमहोदयेनाश्रया अनुपस्थापितम् ।
- सु. दा. स्वामी - एतत्पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितं यद्विभावादयः पूर्वं विशेषरूपेण अनु-पस्थाप्यन्ते । रतिरपि विशेषरूपेण उन्मेषापिज्ञा भवति वा न वा ?
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - वामनेन परनिष्ठाया रतेराम्बाद्यन्व प्रतिपादितं अन्यैरपि किन्तु भट्टनायकनतेऽपि सदेव वर्तत इत्यत्र हि प्रमाणम् ?
- सु. दा. स्वामी - वर्तते । रती वो नाम साधारणीकरणपूर्वं विशेषो वर्तते । शत्रुन्तलातिष्ठत्वमेव विशेषः । किन्तु ना रतिः शत्रुन्तलाया एव वर्तते वा साधारणीकृते, न तु नानादिवानाम् ।
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - सर्वेऽपि भावा विभावयन्ता एव वर्तन्ते । विभावस्यैव च साधारणीकरणम् । 'साधारणात्मा रत्यादि रित्यत्र नानादिवनिष्ठा एव रतिर्न पुनरनुकार्यनिष्ठा रतिरतिप्रेता ।
- रा. च. द्विवेदी - 'भावनाभाव एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादिनामो नत' अत्रकार्त्तिकमिश-र्युद्धतस्य भट्टनायकनतस्यास्य कोऽभिप्रायः ?
- सु. दा. स्वामी - अतिविवेकमयस्य पदानामर्थो वर्तते—भावनाद्वारा भाव-साधारणीकरणेन रसस्य भोगो भवति ।

दर्पणदृष्टं विरक्तताय साहित्यदर्पणेऽमुमेव क्रममनुसरति । रुटिप्रयोजनाभ्या द्विविध्यं चोपप्रेक्ष्यमानेव भेदान् पोटनमभ्याकृता नयति ।

२ काव्यप्रदीपकारादयः क्रममिम—

“रुटिप्रयोजनाभ्या भेदे संभवत्यपि न ते विभाजरुत्वेनोक्ते, किन्तु हेतुत्वेनेति न तत्कृतो भेदो गणितः । अत एव च पश्चाद् “ध्यंयेन रतिना रुडा”-वित्यादिना तत्कृत भेद दर्शयिष्यति, अन्यथा पुनरस्तिप्रमगान् । एवं च यद्येकव्याख्यानानेन षड्विधत्वे निष्पृष्टे यन् “षड्विधेति रुटिप्रयोजनोपादान-लक्षणारोपाध्यवमानरूपं षड्भिरसाधिति” कल्पिता विधा प्रकाशयत्वा-मिति षड्विधेति चण्डीदासव्याख्यानं तन् “शुद्धं सा द्विधा, सारोपाभ्या तु” इति “एव, ल” शब्दमोरनालोचनविजृम्भितत्वाद्भावेन” इत्येवम् “अनह्मना शूढाभेदचतुष्टयस्य स्वानन्तर्यम् अमवा आरोगाध्यवमानभूतयो भेदशेषा-दानलक्षणमतभेदपटकतामुद्भाव्य—

“लक्षणा तावद् द्विविधा—(१) शुद्धा, (२) गौणी च । तत्राद्या द्विविधा (१) उपादानलक्षणा (२) लक्षणलक्षणा च । ते अपि प्रत्येकं (१) सारोपा (२) साध्यवमाना चेति द्विविधे इति शुद्धान्भेदादधत्वात् । गौणी तु द्वेधा (१) सारोपा (२) साध्यवमाना चेति षड्विधत्वं लक्षणाया”-^१ इत्येव षड्विधत्वमन्या आपादयन्ति । मुषासागरव्याख्ये श्रीमत्तेनदीक्षित, म०म० दुर्गाप्रसादद्विवेदी, व्यासदृष्ट श्रीनन्दविश्वरामाभ्यां, डा० नन्दब्रह्मसिंहः, श्रीनिवानाभ्यां चैतमेव क्रममनुयावन्ति ।

३. म० म० गोकुलनाथोपाध्यायप्रभृतयः पुन प्रागुक्तयोर्भेदजनयोः अन्तिमदर्शनान्तोर्ग्रन्थि भिन्नेनैवाध्वना प्रवर्तन्ते । ते हि ‘आरोगाध्यवमान’मूलयोः शुद्धान्भेदयो ‘उपादानलक्षण’मूलान्या तान्या विविक्ततामेव गणयन्ति ।

१ “स्वमिद्ध—”इति का० प्र० आश्रित्याः प्रदीपेऽवतरणिका ।

२. मुषासागरे काव्यप्रदीपनैवोपशुद्धता “लक्षणा—तावद् षड्विधत्वं लक्षणाया” इमा एव पक्षयो लभ्यन्ते । प्रक्षिप्ता वर्धमाना समवन्ति ।

३. साहित्यदर्पणस्य निगमनागरेषु सम्बरणे पृ० ५६ ।

४ चन्द्राक्षरश्रीनामी मय० ९, का० १३ ।

५ श्रीवमाविद्याभवन्त प्रकाशित काव्यप्रकाशस्य हिन्दीभाषानुवादः ।

६ मेरुत्वं प्रकाशित काव्यप्रकाशहिन्दीभाषानुवाद । अत्रानुवादको सम्मतस्य लक्षणभेदान्तर्ज्ञानिकानपि वदन्ति ।

७ वागवतैरभ्युदयविश्वविद्यायन प्रकाशिते म०म०गौ०ना०दृष्टे काव्यप्रकाशविवरणे ।

प्रकरणमिदं नमापयितुं कामं अनयो लक्ष्यलक्षकयोः भेदाभेदायामपि “अनयो-
लक्ष्यस्य लक्षकस्य च गगातटे लक्षणायाः को भेदः” इत्यनेन वृत्तिप्रत्येनोप-
स्थापयति । तदेव प्रकरणमिदं “शुद्धे”ति कारिकात्म्येन “एव”कार-
साचिव्येन व्यवच्छेद्य प्रकरणान्तराद्य “मारोपान्या तु” इत्येव कारिकापलम्बे
व्यवच्छेदमात्रपरे ‘अन्य-तु’-भेदे अवधानो वृत्तिकृत् स्वातन्त्र्यमेव प्रथमते ।
चातुर्विध्यं प्रतिपाद्य च पूर्वोक्तयोः उपादानलक्षणयोः काव्यप्रकाश इव शब्द-
व्यापारविचारेऽपि मङ्गलनाय “लक्षणा तेन पङ्क्ति”तिवाक्योत्तरम् “आद्य-
भेदाभ्यां सहे”ति कृते । इत्य यथा “एव-तु”-शब्दसाचिव्येन प्रदीप-
कारं चण्डीदामभत प्रत्यादेष्टु तथैव “अन्य”शब्दसाचिव्यां ताभ्यां प्रदीप-
कारमतमपि प्रत्यादेष्टुं शक्यते ।

२. काव्यप्रकाश-शब्दव्यापारविचारयोर्मम्मटेन लक्षणायां यान्मुदाहरणा-
न्युपस्थापितानि, ये च तेषु तस्या भेदाः सम्भवन्ति तदुभयमध्यवोदत्तया तालिकया
स्पष्टम्—

उदाहरणानि	लक्षणाभेदाः
१ कुन्ता प्रविशन्ति	उपादानलक्षणा
२ गगाया घोष	लक्षणलक्षणा
३ गौर्वाहीक	मारोपा गौणी
४ गौर्यम्	साध्यवसाना गौणी
४ आयुर्धृतम्	सारोपा शुद्धा
६ आयुरिदम्	साध्यवसाना शुद्धा

प्रकारान्तराभ्यामपि जगमिषायां पुन “कुन्तां पुरषा प्रविशन्ती”ति “गगायाः
तटे क्षीप” इति, अन्त्यानि चैव विधानि साहित्यदर्पणकृत्यभूतिनि. प्रतिपादितानि
स्थलान्यमौ समग्रहोप्यत् । न चानौ संगृह्णाति । एतच्चात्र विन्मयावह यत्
प्रदीपेऽपि स्थलानीमानि न लम्बन्ते, काव्यप्रकाशवृद्धाहृतानामभेदाभ्यामुक्तानामेव
स्थलानां तत्रोपलम्भात् ।

३. येषु काव्येषु लक्षणायां उपयोगो दृश्यते तेषामप्यनुशीलनेन तथ्यमिदं
द्रष्टुमानमनुते यदुपधुक्ता एव पङ्क्तिभेदा व्यवहारोपयोगिनो भवन्ति नान्ये ।
एतदपि च निम्नप्रदत्तया तालिकया स्पष्टभूयिष्ठम् :—

लक्षणाभेद	काव्यभेद	उदाहरणम्
१. उपादानलक्षणा	अर्थान्तरनमित्रवाच्यध्वनि	“त्वामस्मि”, “वदली वदली” ।

कल्प्य च दोषो द्रव्यम उल्लङ्घन एव परिवर्तान् पूर्वं काव्यलिङ्गानुपनिबध्नतोऽपि हेत्व-
लङ्कार विस्मरत । एतेन "परिवर्तान् परतपि मन्मदभट्ट एव निरन्तरास्यत्वेद्
वैचित्र्यस्यात्पदानादप्रतिपत्तिरिति मन्मदभट्टे" इति श्रद्धा लूनमूला ।
यद्युच्यते—'आयुधं नमि'त्यादौ वैचित्र्यम्, तथापि नैतदलङ्कारात् नृगति,
वैचित्र्यलङ्कारात्कारत्वं जनकानाम्युपपत्त्याद्, तथा नति "गतोऽन्तमव"
इत्यादावपि अलङ्कारत्वमन्युपेयते, वैचित्र्यलङ्कारादपि मत्त्वान् । वाक्यो-
पयोगित्वं चैषा व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रत्यायनमात्रत एव चरितार्थमि'ति, तर्हि "गौर्वो-
होकि गौरेवे"त्यादावप्युपनिषत्तामलङ्कारत्वाभावः, न्यायमास्यात् । न च
"विच्छित्तेरतिभूमिगन्तानुभूयते इति नास्त्यत्र न्यायमान्यमि"ति वाच्यम्,
पक्षान्तरेपि विच्छित्तिविशेषस्य स्वीकृतुं शक्यत्वात् । स्वीकृत्यते चापि "आयु-
धं नमि"त्यादौ शुद्धारोपभूतो यो हेतुहेतुनतोरभेदोऽनूयते तमेवैवमाश्रित्य
निमित्तेषु—"अविरलकमलविश्राम" उल्लङ्घनं शुद्धपदेरहपदलपनमन-
पुण्यपानाम्", "नारदस्य विग्रहः" इत्यादिषु स्थलेषु रद्वदङ्गनाय-
विश्वनाथ-विच्छित्ति । विद्याभूषणाच्युतरायाण्यद्वैतशक्तिरपि च मन्यते
एवात्र विच्छित्ते मत्त्वम् । न केवलमेभिरेव, काव्यप्रकाशटीकितृषु मुष्ण-
हृद् भीमनेन, विवरणहृद् गोकुलनाथश्च स्थलेष्वपि विच्छित्तिविशेष-
नमोदते साधयेते च तत्र शुद्धारोपाध्यवसानयो नार्थवत्ताम् । अन्ति च

१ नामहोऽत्र काव्यत्वानावमेव मनुते—"गतोऽन्तमवो भारीन्दुर्गतिं
वाक्ताप पक्षिण । इत्येवमादि किं काव्य वार्तामेता प्रचक्षते ॥-२।८३॥

२ अत एव स्वयं काव्यप्रकाशहृत्तैव काव्यभ्रंशयो बोद्धुमस्याभेदा-
वतेनैव वाक्येन प्रतिपाद्यते । द्रष्टव्यम उल्लङ्घनम् । अत एव च पण्डितराजोऽपि
रत्नागाधरकाव्यलक्षणनिर्धारणग्रन्थाद्वेऽत्र काव्यत्वं शक्यमिति ।

३. रद्वदकाव्याल० १।८३, काव्यप्रकाशकारणमालावृत्तिः ।

४ रत्नगगाधरे अद्वैतकाव्यनिरूपणान्ते ।

५ नाहित्यदर्पणे हेत्वलङ्कारनिरूपणग्रन्थावे ।

६ तनाहि मुनानारदशशास्त्राण्य—"शुद्धान्ता ताभ्या हेत्वलङ्कारं
निरूपयिष्यतां"ति भीमनेन, विवरण च—"हेतुत्वादिमद्वयस्य हेत्वलङ्कार-
स्वरूपत्वेन तन्मूला लक्षणा "आयुधं निमहोन्मवस्य... कलिोद्वर" इत्यादौ
स्वरूप प्रवाराण्डरम् अथवा "हेतुमता नह हेतोरनिनानमनेद्रवो हेतुं रिति
मतेन हेत्वलङ्कारमुपास्यति" इति म० म० गोकुलनाथः ।

वीकोपि^१ मम्मटः पतित एव प्रेक्षाजुषामुपालम्भगोचरे । तच्च जयरस्य्या-
लकारविमर्गिन्या काव्यलिङ्गालकारप्रकरणतः स्यात्तत्रमेव, यथासौ महता
सरम्भेणोक्तिप्रकारस्यालकारभावः प्रत्यादेष्टि^२ । एतत्प्रत्यादेशपरस्या रस-
गगाधरवन् पण्डितराजस्यापि प्रतिभा—

“काव्यलिङ्गं नालंकारः, वैचित्र्यात्मनो विच्छित्तिविशेषस्याभावाद्, हेतुहेतु-
मद्भावस्य वस्तुसिद्धत्वेन कविप्रतिभामिवत्संत्वायोगात्”

इत्येवमनुवदत्येव काव्यलिङ्गापरपर्यायस्य हेतोः भामहोपनिमित्तं खिलीकारम्,
उद्भावसत्येव च तत्र निहेतुत्वरूपशोषाभावान्तर्भूतताम् ।^३ अचति चेतन्
तत्त्वताप्रत्यामत्तिम् । तथा हि—हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य भाव्यत्वमेवात्र चमत्कृतिः प्रसूते ।
अत एव ‘भयानकत्वात् परिवर्जनीया दयाश्रितत्वादसि देव मेव’^४ इत्यत्र
काव्यलिङ्गत्वः प्रत्याक्षक्षेपः पण्डितराजो रत्नाकरवार इवैव ‘गम्यमान हेतु-
त्वकस्यैव हेतोः सुन्दरत्वेन काव्यलिङ्गते’^५ ति हेतुमुपन्यस्यति । अन्ति चतत्
काव्यप्रकाशोदाहृतेषु ‘वेषु प्रादुर्भावाद्’ इत्यादिषु काव्यलिङ्गस्थलेषु ।
तत्रापरपद्ययाऽनमनादीनां हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य शब्दतोऽवधित्वात् । न
चार्यत्वमात्रेण कुत्रचिदलकारत्वमापद्यते, कविप्रतिभाप्रभूतत्वस्यैव तन्निष्पादक-
त्वात् । यदि चापद्यते, तर्हि हेतुहेतुमद्भावोक्त्यापि तदापद्यताम्तराम्, तत्र
कविप्रतिभायां जागरूकत्वस्यानुभविकत्वात् । किं च यो हि “महोदजो मान-
घना घनाचिता” इत्यत्र भागविपक्षे घनुर्भृद् रूपकव्यक्तिगतत्वेन बहूनां विशेषणा-

१ परवर्तिष्वलकारमवस्थे—साहित्यदर्पण—कृचल्लयानन्द—कृत्यनूतन-
काव्यलिङ्गं मन्वते । नूनमनो मम्मटस्यैव प्रभावः । यद्यपि काव्यलिङ्गपदम्
इदमप्रमत्तया उद्भट एव प्रयुक्ते, किन्तु न हेत्वर्थम्, अपि त्वनुमानार्थम् ।
मम्मटोऽप्यनुमानार्थं काव्यलिङ्गमेव पदं प्रयुज्जीत, प्रयुज्जीत च काव्यलिङ्गार्थं काव्य-
हेतुपदमेव दशम उल्लासेऽपि चतुर्थं उल्लास इव चेदुचिततर स्यात् ।

२. अलकारमवस्थे जयरसकृतलकारविमर्शिनी पृ० १८१-८२, निबंध-
सागरम्—२ ।

३-४ रसगगाधरे काव्यलिङ्गालकारप्रकरणान्ते ।

५ रसगगाधरे काव्यलिङ्गप्रकरणारम्भे । अतश्च भामहस्य ‘हेतुलिङ्ग’
नाम्नोऽलकारस्योदाहरणेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः ।

६ रसगगाधरकाव्यलिङ्गप्रकरणारम्भे । रत्नाकरे शोभाकरमित्रोऽपि
पदार्थहेतुवे काव्यलिङ्गे हेतुत्वस्यार्थत्वमेव चमत्कृतिकारणं मनुते ।

भेदे । अन्नेदे ह्यभेदे एवाभियनान्तमर्माविच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितानि रूपितान्मुद्राभिज्ञा
प्रति शरण्या भवति, आरोपे च विषयः । तदस्य तन्प्रतियोगितापि विषयिता-
वच्छेदेकैर्वाच्छेद्यते । अत्र एव चारोपे विषय-विषयिणोर्मध्य उद्देश्यविषये-
भावोऽनुभूयते, अन्नेदे न । अस्मि च “धृतानां, महामंघातं विनिर्द्धानलनिर्वाति-
मनरोत्सवः” इत्यादिषु विधीयमानानां हेतुनत्तानामपरादीनामुद्देश्यभूतेषु
हेतुष्वारोपः । अत्र एव च शुद्धमारोपलक्षणापि प्रेक्षावद्भिरन्युपेयते । अतएव
विप्रतिपत्त्या विचलित आचार्यो “हेतु”रिति नाम्ने रचि न दधे । आरोपे च
निहितमतिरूपसौ निर्वाहदित न लेने, वाच्यारोपे तस्याभावात्, रूपके च मतोपि
तस्य नादृश्यं वनिगडितवान् । “वाच्यकल्पनानामनल्पम्” पदिष्टवती
वर्तमानवर्तमानेन, अत्र एव च स्वयमपि वाच्यलक्षणे “अनलकृती पुनः क्वापि”
त्यलक्षणाया स्फुटताया वैकल्पिकत्वमाधाय ताम् प्रति दत्तितौदासीन्येन
तत्रनदना नहृदयगिरिमणिना निर्वाहाय प्रयत्नोपि न कृतः ।

वस्तुनां हेतुहेतुमनोरभेदविच्छिन्नेरारोपमूले रूपके, अतिरूपमूलेऽतिरूपो-
क्तिप्रपन्नभेदे वा सप्रह कर्तुमुचित । क्रियते च परवर्तिनिः अलंकाररत्नाकर-
विज्ञानप्रमुखैरालङ्कारिकैः । अलंकाररत्नाकरकारो हि नादृश्यसद्वन्मूलकम्
आरोपमिव गव्यान्तरमूलकमप्यारोप रूपवविच्छिन्नौ हेतुं प्रतिनद्यते ।
वक्ति हि न—

(सूत्रम्—) “आरोपो रूपकम् ॥२६॥

(वृत्ति—) तद्धर्मत्वादितिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सामानाधिकरण्यानिर्देश आरोपः ।

इत्येवमारोपमात्रस्य रूपवत्वम्, उदाहरति च सादृश्यमूलकाय तन्म “तृप्त

१. मानह—“उपमानेन यत् सत्त्वमुपमेयस्य रूप्यते ।

गुणानां समता दृष्ट्वा रूपकं नाम तद् विदुः ॥” वाच्या० २।२१

दण्डो—“उपमेव तिरोभूतभेदा रूपकनिष्यते ॥” वाच्यादशम्य २।१६

उद्भट—“युत्पा मदन्यविरहाद् यत् पदेन पदान्तरम् ।

गुणवृत्तिप्रधानेन युज्यते रूपकं तु तत् ॥”—वाच्या०

१।११

अत्र यद्यपि सादृश्यं नाम्नि तथापि उदाहरणेऽप्युदत्तत्वेन

“उपोत्पन्नाम्बुने”त्यत्र ।

रदट—“यत्र गुणानां साम्ये मत्पुपमानोपमेययोरभिदा ।

अविवाक्षितनामान्वा कल्प्यत इति रूपकं प्रपन्नम् ॥”

वाच्या० ८।३८।३९ ॥

२. ध्वन्यालोचनप्रपनोद्योतात्मने ।

मनसिजवृत्ती शृंगारश्रीविमातमहो नु भो

निरवधिमुखश्रद्धादृष्टेः कृतो मृगवेतनः ॥” अत्र इन्दुरूपे वारणे वार्य-
रूपाया श्रद्धाया आरोपः । ग्रन्थकृता (अलंकारमर्बन्वकृता) उपलंकारानुना-
रिण्यामत्र “श्रद्धाहेतुत्वाद् अद्वे”त्यनिदधता जयमेव पक्षः कदाचितः^१ ॥”

मन्त्रि चालवारनवंश—तद्विमर्शिनीवारदयो मन्मदभट्टस्य प्रायेणानुत्कार
एव । अद्यापि यदिम एववादिनो दृश्यन्ते तत्रापि हेतु स्वय मन्मद एव । वाच्य-
प्रकाश एव सोऽपि मादृश्यमिव मदनान्तरमपि “अभिन्न-चमत्कार”जनकउपा-
श्रद्धिपते । अत एवानौ “हृदयमधिष्ठितमादा” विन्यादिषु, “राजन् राज-
मुना न पाठयति मानि त्यादिषु चातिशयोक्त्यप्रस्तुतप्रशस्त्याम्यलेषु
वार्यवारणभावमपि “कमलमनम्भसौ”त्यादादिव, “येनाम्यम्युदिते”-
त्यादादिव वा मादृश्यमिवैवाभिज्ञाया एवातिशयाप्रस्तुतोक्तिरूपाया विच्छि-
तेनिष्पादकमूरोकुरते । अन्यथापि च “उद्भूत वस्तुन मपन्नहता चोपलक्षणम्”
—इति, “एक कमेणानेवस्मिन् पर्यायोऽप्यन्ततोऽप्यर्थे”ति निदर्शना,
“अभवन् दन्तुमवस्थ उपमापरिक्लृप्तं, स्वम्बहेत्यन्वयस्योक्तिं त्रिवर्गं
च माररे”ति च निरुक्तिरपि विच्छित्तोरमादेकैकैवालकारे मगृह्णानो
दृश्यते । अनौ हि मदनान्तरमूलकमप्यारोप मादृश्यमूलकेन तेनैव सह
रूपमिच्छितो मगृह्णीयाच्चेत् कोऽप्यमुना विगृह्णीयान् । अत एव च
तद्विवाकारो गोकुलनाथगमोपाध्यायो रूपवत्त्वमेव “आयुर्दाननहोमदम्ये”
त्यादिनि प्रागुपस्थापिते पद्यगते पूर्वं रूपवत्त्व” प्रकाशान्तरमेवोद्भावयति,

१ कान्मीरव-महाकवि-जहलण-प्रणीत-मोमपालविलास-वाच्यस्य
तन्नाम्या सत्कृत्या टीकायाम् ।

२ अलंकारनवंशविमर्शनीरूपकप्रकरणम् । निर्णयना० न०—२ पृ० ४४ ।

३ वाच्यप्रकाशे वार्यवारणपर्यायार्थविपर्ययरूपातिशयोक्त्युदाहरणम् ।

४ वारणे प्रस्तुते वार्योक्तिरिति निष्पन्नाया अप्रस्तुतप्रशस्त्याया वाच्य-
प्रकाश उदाहरणम् ।

५ वाच्यप्रकाशे निर्गोप्यवसानातिशयोक्त्युदाहरणम् ।

६ वाच्यप्रकाशे मादृश्यमूलाया अप्रस्तुतप्रशस्त्याया उदाहरणम् ।

७-९ वाच्यप्रकाशस्य दशम उल्काभिः ।

१० ३० २६६ पृष्ठे ६ सत्पात्रमन्त्रमेव पादटिप्पणम् ।

ध्यालम्बेयाः सुरभिततयालम्बजा मानयिष्यन्^१

लोनीमूर्त्या भुवि परिणतां रन्तिदेवस्य कीर्तिम् ॥

अत्र हि कीर्तिहेतुभूतायाश्चर्मण्वत्या कीर्तिशब्दादेवोन्मेषान् कीर्तित्वेनैव प्रतीय-
मानत्वादन्त्येव कार्यद्वारा कारणस्याध्यवसानम् । एवमेव “स्वागतमविलम्बिनो
मनोरथस्येति”^२ शाकुन्तलवाक्येऽपि कार्यभूतेन मनोरथेन कारणभूतस्य
दुष्यन्तस्याध्यवसानान् नैव स्थिति, विषयिण प्रति विषयस्य तादात्म्येन
कारणताया प्रतिद्वन्द्वरत्वात् अस्ति च स्वविषयभूताय दुष्यन्ताय मनोरथो
विषयो । नास्ति च कीर्ति-चर्मण्वत्यो मनोरथदुष्यन्तयोश्चात्र किंचिदपि साम्य
येनात्राध्यवसानस्य गौणता कल्पयितुं शक्येत ।

ननु—“कार्यकारणभावस्य निद्वेऽपि विच्छित्तिमूलतयालङ्घितप्रयोजकत्वे,
सादृश्येतरयो मन्वान्तगणा तु वेतालमन्त्रवादलम्बिन, काव्यम्यलेषु तदुदा-
हरणानामनुपदर्शित्वान्^३ तेष्वलङ्कारप्रयोजकताया माघयितुं दुष्परत्वादि”^४ति
चेत् तत्रापि स्यादेव कार्यकारणभाव इवैव तादृशी प्रयोजकता, यत्रैषा दृष्ट-
प्रायता न स्यात् । अस्ति हि हृष्टप्रायता तात्पर्यादिभि जायमानयोरारोपाध्य-
वसानयो “ब्राह्मणमज्ञा” “तथा” इत्यादिषु । तत्रापि दृश्यते चेच्चमत्कार,
स्वीकृतानामालङ्घितप्रयोजकत्वम्, गवेष्यन्तान्तमा च तदुदाहरणान्यपि महति
मारस्वते व्रगति ।

एव स्थितमेतद् यद् गोकुलनायादिभिरपगत एव लक्षणाभेदगणनाप्रमो
मम्मटस्याभिमत, स्थित चैतद् यन् तत्र शुद्धयोरारोपाध्यवसानयोरपयोगाय
स्वीकर्तव्यमेव तदप्युक्तिषु वाक्येषु वाच्यत्वम्, तदर्थं चमत्कारित्वम्, तदर्थं
तज्जनकेष्वलङ्कारत्वम्, तदर्थं च हेतु-रूपकान्तिप्रयोजकत्वमन्वयत्वम् ।

१. मेघदूते ४५—तम पद्यम् ।

२. शाकुन्तलस्य तृतीयेऽङ्के “तपति तनुगात्रि कामस्त्वाम्” इतिपद्या-
न्तरस्य मणीवाक्यम् ।

३. गोकुलनायादिभि यैरपि टीकाहृद्भिर्होत्वलङ्कार उदाहृत, जगन्नाया-
दिभिरप्येव महात्मभिश्चाचार्यैस्तैः शुद्धारोपस्य बोदाहरणानि दत्तानि, न शुद्धा-
ध्यवसानस्यापि । तदुदाहरणद्वयमस्माभिरेवात्रान्प्रेष्यते पूर्वोक्तम् । कार्यकारण-
भावानिरिक्तमन्वयमूलक-शुद्धारोपाध्यवसानयोर्मूलाहरणानि प्रायेण सर्वैरेव
लक्ष्यतानीति इत्युक्तिः ।

साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति

डा० देवराज उपाध्याय

निबन्ध का विषय है साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति। अतः सर्वप्रथम अभिव्यक्ति और साहित्य इन दो शब्दों के अर्थ के बारे में निश्चय कर लेना है। प्रायः अभिव्यक्ति शब्द का प्रयोग किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति के अर्थ में किया जाता है। शुद्ध, मात्र अभिव्यक्ति के अर्थ में नहीं। पर किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति अलग बात है, शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति अलग बात है। कवि का सम्बन्ध शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति से ही होता है, किसी वस्तु से नहीं, यह बात कवि को मुक्त हृदय से स्वीकार कर लेनी चाहिए। एक युग था कि कवि का प्रभुत्व था, सब बातों में कवि की पूछ होनी थी, कोई सफट आया लोग कवि के पास समाधान के लिये जाते थे। पर विज्ञान ने कवि को सब क्षेत्रों से अपदस्य कर दिया। १६वीं शताब्दी में खगोल, भूगोल तथा शरीरशास्त्र ने कुछ भाग को कवि से छीना, १७वीं शताब्दी में रसायनिकी तथा भौतिकी ने कुछ और नूमि ले ली, १८ वीं में अर्थशास्त्र तथा राजनीति की नूती बोली, १९वीं में प्राणिशास्त्र तथा समाजशास्त्र की दुहाई फिरी और २० वीं शताब्दी मनोविज्ञान की पताका फहरा रही है। अतः कवि को मान लेना चाहिये हम किसी वस्तु के बारे में कोई भरोसे की बात नहीं कह सकते। हमारा क्षेत्र अभिव्यक्ति है, शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। अतः मैं अभिव्यक्ति को किसी वस्तु से सम्बन्ध तोड़ कर उसे उन्मुक्त करना चाहूंगा। दूसरी ओर साहित्य को थोड़ा मरुचित कहूंगा। साहित्य के दो वर्गों—ज्ञान का साहित्य (Literature of Knowledge) तथा शक्ति का साहित्य (Literature of Power) में से केवल दूसरे को ही साहित्य कहूंगा। अतः शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति और शक्ति का साहित्य दोनों को मानकर आगे बढ़ूंगा।

अतः हमने दो बातें तय कीं। प्रथमतः साहित्य का अर्थ तय किया। द्वितीयतः अभिव्यक्ति को प्रधानता दी और निश्चित किया कि साहित्य का ध्येय अभिव्यक्ति है किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति नहीं। हम कोमल से कोमल, मर्म-स्पर्शी से मर्म-स्पर्शी भावों को ले सकते हैं पर उनकी अभिव्यक्ति असाहित्यिक, हिमामक हो सकती है, ऐसी हो सकती है कि पाठक के हृदय में दान उत्पन्न हो, और वह अन्दर से प्रशुभ्य हो उठे। इतना ही नहीं। यह भी संभव है कि जिस तरह के भाव को पाठक पर उत्पन्न करने की चेष्टा की जा रही है उसके ठीक विपरीत भाव उत्पन्न हो। मैंने ऐसी रचनाएँ भी पढ़ी हैं, ऐसे भाषण भी सुने हैं जिनका उद्देश्य है पाठक तथा श्रोता में उच्च भाव उत्पन्न करना, उदाहरणार्थ

की, पाठक में भक्ति के भाव जगे, मूर के विरह-काव्य को पढ़ कर विरह के भाव जगे, भूषण ने वीरत्व के गीत गाये, पाठक में वीरत्व के भाव जगे।

पर क्या यह सही है ? मानव इतना मीठा मादा प्राणी है ? वह इतने ही मीठे तथा मस्ते ढंग से प्रतिनिधित्व करता है ? व्यावहारिक जगत तथा उत्ती की परिधि में विचरण करने वाले साधारण मनुष्य के लिये यह सम्भव मान भी लिया जाय तो क्या साहित्य के क्षेत्र तथा उनकी मीमा में प्रवेद करने वाले पाठक के लिये भी इसी मापदण्ड से काम लेना होगा ? यदि यह बात सही मान ली जाय तो ग्रामदी की समस्या कैसे हल हो, लोग दुश्चान्त नाटकों से आनन्द कैसे ग्रहण कर सकेंगे ? वह करणा जो "भवभूति" में अधिक मूल्य नहीं रखती उसका उत्तर विरह की विभूति कैसे बन जाना ? वास्तव में यदि यही सब इतने मस्ते ढंग से होता तो अग्रस्तु को विरेचन-निष्ठान्त की तथा भट्टनायक को साधारण-करण की स्थापना ही क्यों करनी पड़ती। प्लेटो तो अपने आदर्श गण-राज में कवियों को निष्क्रामित कर ही चुके थे।

अतः हो न हो काव्य का समाज एक अलग ही समाज है, वहाँ की दुनिया ही निराली, वहाँ के विधान तथा नियम ही भिन्न हैं। शायद इसी को देखकर हमारे काव्यशास्त्री ने कहा होगा।

वक्रोक्तयो यत्र विभूषणानि

वाङ्मायवाप परम प्रवर्ण ।

अयं यो बोध्येष्वभिधैव दोष

सा वाचिदन्या सरणि ववीताम् ।

प्रकृत समाज में भी असाहित्यिकता नहीं चल सकती पर वहाँ वह कुछ अवधि तक चल भी जाय पर काव्य जगत में तो एक क्षण भी वह चलने में नहीं। प्रकृति ने राम को रंदा बिचा पर वही उसे खा भी गई। नहीं, सा कहा गई, खाने जा रही थी कि कवि ने उसके फोटादी तथा रक्ताक्त पत्रों तथा दाढ़ (Red in tooth and Claws) से छीन कर अपने गालि-प्रद, कल्याण प्रद, अहिमा तथा प्रीति की गोद में लिया कि आज राम स्वयं तो अमर हो ही गये दूसरों को भी अमरत्व प्रदान कर रहे हैं। यही कारण था कि साहित्यशास्त्रियों के सामने जय काव्य के स्वरूप पर विचार करने का प्रश्न आया तो उन्होंने देखा कि काव्य-जगत तथा प्राकृतिक जगत में तो एक बात सामान्य रूप में मिलती है, दोनों कुछ-न-कुछ वक्तव्य देते हैं, कोई बात कहते हैं, कोई उपदेश देते हैं पर दोनों में एक अन्तर भी स्पष्ट है। वास्तविक जगत में उपदेश प्रभुमग्निव हो, सुदुत्सग्निव होता है, पर काव्य में "वान्ता-मग्निव" की ही प्रधानता है। जोर में प्रकृता है कि यह जो वान्ता-मग्निव है वह विनिष्ट अभिव्यक्ति के सिवा और क्या है ?

rapid Retreat और इस को पढ़कर लोगों के हृदय में निराशा के बादल छा जाते थे। इसी बात को यदि कहा जाता था—“The retirement of the French forces of the previously prepared position in the rear was accomplished briskly and efficiently” तब सारा वातावरण ही बदल जाता था।

इस उदाहरण को सामने रख कर विचार करने में कितने ही लक्ष्य उपलब्ध होते हैं। (१) यदि उक्ति का उद्देश्य प्रभविष्णुता है, पाठकों की भावमत्ता पर अधिकार करना है तो साधारण व्यवहारगत भाषा के प्रयोग में काम नहीं चलेगा, साथ ही शास्त्र इत्यादि में प्रयुक्त इतिवृत्तात्मक शब्दार्थोपनिबन्ध भी पर्याप्त नहीं होगा। मूल वस्तु से अधिक महत्त्व अभिव्यक्ति को देना होगा। इसी को कुल्क ने कहा “बन्धोक्ति काव्यस्य जीवितम्” और बन्धोक्ति को स्पष्ट करते हुए कहा “शाम्नादिप्रसिद्धशब्दार्थोपनिबन्धव्यतिरेकि, प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानव्यतिरेकि, अतिशान्तप्रसिद्धव्यवहारसरणिः।” मतलब काव्य (साहित्य) का उद्देश्य सामान्य सूचना मात्र देना ही होता तो शब्दों के सामान्य प्रयोग से काम निकल जाता है। पर साहित्य का उद्देश्य अलौकिक आह्लाद का उन्मीलन करना है। अतः उसकी अभिव्यक्ति में विशिष्टता—सम्पन्नता होगी ही।

अब अब प्रश्न यह उपस्थित होता है कि यह प्रभविष्णुता, लोकोत्तर प्रदायकता का समावेश उक्ति में किस तरह किया जाय कि वह साहित्य की श्रेणी में प्रतिष्ठित हो जाय। दूसरे शब्दों में अभिव्यक्ति साहित्यिक किस तरह हो सके। अर्थात् ऐसी हो जिसका अभीष्ट प्रभाव पड़ सके, न कम न अधिक। यदि कम प्रभाव पड़ा तो वह साहित्य है ही नहीं, और आवश्यकता में अधिक प्रभाव पड़ा तो वह साहित्य नहीं। जो साहित्य पाठक को भाव में आये बटकर त्रियातत्परत्व में प्रवृत्त कर देता है वह साहित्य नहीं। साहित्य का काम ‘वर्णनीयतन्मयीमवन-योग्यता’ उत्पन्न करना ही है, उसे प्रतिप्रियातत्पर करना नहीं। साहित्य का काम है पाठक के हृदय के वाटिक्य को गला देना। लोहा को लाल बनाकर नमनीयता ला देना है। लोहा लाल है, प्रभाव ग्रहण करने की स्थिति में है। अब शिथी आकर उसे संश्लेष मोड़ दे सकते हैं। काव्यशास्त्रियों ने भी रस-विवेचन के प्रसंग में बहुत-सी बातें कही हैं वे भी हमारे लिये प्रागमिक महत्त्व रखती हैं। अभिनव के मतानुसार “सर्वथा रसनात्मबर्धनविघ्नप्रतीतिग्राह्यो भाव एव रसः। तत्र विघ्नापमारग्य विभावप्रभूतयः।” यों तो विघ्न अनेक हैं। पर उन्होंने मात्र विघ्नों का उल्लेख किया है। ‘प्रतिपत्तावयोर्यता, सभावनाविरहो नाश’ इत्यादि। यह तो हमारे काव्यशास्त्रियों की बातें हुईं। हम सभी अपने दैनिक जीवन में भी इस बात का ध्यान रखते हैं।

संस्कृत अलंकार शास्त्र में काव्य का सर्जना-पक्ष

मूलचन्द्र पाठक

काव्य के दो पक्ष हैं—सर्जना और आम्बाद। प्रथम का मन्व्य कवि ने है और दूसरे का महदय ने। कवि की अनुभूति ही वह बीज है जो काव्य-वृक्ष के रूप में अकुरित, पल्लवित और पुष्पित होकर महदय के रमाम्बाद में फलित होता है।^१ इस प्रकार काव्य-कर्म का प्रसार अनुभूति में अभिव्यक्ति की ओर होता है। अतः काव्य-प्रक्रिया के एक छोर पर कवि की सत्ता है और दूसरे पर महदय की तथा काव्य है इन दोनों सत्ताओं का योगमूल। यद्यपि अनुभूति के घरातल पर कवि और महदय का अद्वैत अमद्वय है तथापि काव्य-विषयक, कविगत व महदयगत प्रक्रियाएँ परस्पर भिन्न ही हैं। कविगत प्रक्रिया स्वरूपतः सर्जनात्मक होती है तथा उसका अनुभूति में अभिव्यक्ति की दिशा में विवर्तन होता है जबकि महदयगत प्रक्रियाएँ ग्रहणात्मक होने के कारण काव्यरूप अभिव्यक्ति के माध्यम में उसकी मूलवर्तिनी अनुभूति की ओर अप्रसर होती है। अभिनवगुप्त ने अनुभूति और अभिव्यक्ति को ही अमश प्रस्था व उपाध्या शब्दों में अतिष्ठित करते हुए लोचन के मगल श्लोक में काव्य की अन्वष्ट प्रक्रिया के अगमून उक्त दोनों पक्षों के अविभाज्य सम्बन्ध की ओर इस प्रकार मनेन किया है—

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकला
जगद् भावप्रस्थ निजरमभरेण मारयति च ।
कमारप्रस्थोपाध्याप्रसरमुनग भानयति तत्
मरन्वन्ध्याम्नात्त्र कविमहदयान्न विजयते ॥

मस्मृत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य पर कवि और महदय दोनों ही दृष्टियों में विचार किया गया है, यद्यपि कतिपय विद्वानों को यह शिवायत रही है कि मस्मृत काव्य-चिन्तकों ने काव्य की विवेचना एवान्त अथवा प्रधानतः महदय की दृष्टि में ही की है। यह तो सच है कि मस्मृत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य की सर्जन-प्रक्रिया का उतना विस्तृत, व्यवस्थित एवं प्रौढ विवेचन नहीं किया गया

१. अभिनवभारती (गायकवाड ओरियण्टल मिरीर, बडौदा) भाग १, अध्याय ६, पृ. २९४ (द्वितीय सम्स्करण १९५६)
२. मुनीश्वरुमार दे. मस्मृत पोएटिक्स एज ए स्टडी आफ एस्पेसिज, पृ. २

प्रतिफलित होता है।^१ हेमचन्द्र के साक्ष्य^२ के अनुसार भट्ट तोन कवि के लिए ऋषि होना आवश्यक मानते हैं। किन्तु ऋषि में केवल द्रष्टृत्व का गुण होता है जबकि कवि में दर्शन के अनिरिक्त वर्णना शक्ति भी होती है। शास्त्रों में प्रयुक्त कवि शब्द केवल तत्त्वद्रष्टा अर्थ का वाचक है जब कि लोक में दर्शन और वर्णना इन दोनों को लेकर कवि शब्द प्रचलित है। इस विषय में वाल्मीकि का दृष्टान्त देते हुए भट्ट तोन ने कहा है कि आदि कवि में स्वच्छ दर्शन की सामर्थ्य तो पहले से ही विद्यमान थी किन्तु वे जब वर्णना में भी प्रवृत्त हुए तभी लोक में कविता का जन्म हुआ। इसी प्रकार अभिनवगुप्त ने भी वर्णना के योग में ही कवि-भज्ञा स्वीकार की है।^३ 'अतएव ते वचसो वर्णनायोगात् तेषाम्'। मम्मट ने काव्य को 'लोकोत्तरवर्णनानिपुण कविकर्म' कहते हुए कवि की वर्णन-धर्मिता का ही निर्देश किया है।^४ महिम भट्ट ने कवि प्रतिभा को शिव का तृतीय नेत्र मानते हुए कहा है कि उनके द्वारा कवि अलोक्यवर्ती भावों का साक्षात्कार करता है।^५ इस प्रकार यह स्पष्ट है कि मञ्जुन माहित्य और विशेषतः अठ्कार-शास्त्र में कवि को दर्शन और वर्णना की शक्तियों से सम्पन्न एक अलोकसामान्य व्यक्ति माना गया है। वह वस्तुओं के वाह्य रूप का ही अवलोकन नहीं करता, उनकी सारभूत आत्मा का भी साक्षात्कार करता है। यह साक्षात्कार वस्तु-उमका प्रतिभ-ज्ञान ही है।

सञ्चुत अलकारशास्त्र में कवि की उपमा प्रायः प्रजापति (ब्रह्मा) में दी गई है। आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार कवि ही इस अनादि-अनन्त काव्य-समर का एकमात्र प्रजापति है।^६ काव्य-भूषिण उसकी इच्छानुसार रूप-रंग बदलती रहती है। प्रजापति के समान वह भी अपूर्व निर्माण की क्षमता से सम्पन्न है। उमका काव्य-जगत् सर्वत्र उमका इच्छानुवर्ती रहता है।^७ अभिनव और मम्मट ने कवि को ब्रह्मा में भी उच्चतर पद पर प्रतिष्ठित किया है। अभिनव के मतानुसार कवि को वाणी ब्रह्मा में भी उत्कृष्ट है क्योंकि जहाँ ब्रह्मा की शक्ति परिच्छिन्न है

१ वही, अध्याय १२

२ काव्यानुशासन, अध्याय ८, सूत्र १ की वृत्ति

३ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३ पृ. ५०८ का लोचन (वालप्रिया सम्भरण, चौलम्बा १९४० ई.)

४ काव्यप्रकाश, उल्लास १, वारिका २

५ व्यक्ति-विवेक २, ११८

६ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, वारिका ४३ की वृत्ति पृ. ४९८

७ अभिनवभारती, भाग १ पृ. ४

करण के लिए कवि-स्वभाव को आधार स्वीकार कर उन्होंने काव्य के मूलवर्तों तथा उसके समस्त अंग-प्रत्यंगों को प्रभावित करने वाली कवि-मत्ता को रेखांकित किया है।^१ अलंकारगत चारुत्व में 'कवि-प्रतिभा-निर्वाणित्व' का निर्देश कर कुल्लुक, मम्मट, मय्यक व जयरय आदि ने कवि-व्यक्तित्व के महत्त्व को अङ्गीकार किया है। इस प्रकार रस-ध्वनिवादी तथा वक्त्रोक्तिवादी आचार्यों व उनके अनुयायियों के अनुसार काव्यात्मक अभिव्यक्ति का मोन्दर्य कवि की विशिष्ट अनुभूति या उसके व्यक्तित्व की ही देन है। किन्तु यहाँ यह निर्देश करना आवश्यक है कि मम्मट आलंकारिकों ने काव्य के मूल में जिस कवि-व्यक्तित्व को प्रतिष्ठा दी है वह कवि का लौकिक व्यक्तित्व नहीं है, अपितु काव्य-व्यक्तित्व है। कवि लौकिक भाव-भूमि पर अवस्थित होकर काव्य-भूजन में प्रवृत्त नहीं होता, अपितु उसका एक अलौकिक और विशिष्ट काव्य-व्यक्तित्व ही उसकी कृति में प्रकाशित होता है। जिस प्रकार सहृदय की रमानुभूति एक अलौकिक अनुभव है, उसी प्रकार कवि की मर्त्रनात्मक अनुभूति भी वस्तुतः अलौकिक ही है। अभिनव के मत में काव्य या नाट्य का मूल कविगत साधारणीभूत सचित् (अनुभूति) है।^२ यही सचित् परमार्थतः रस है। काव्य इसी रसात्मक सचित् की शब्दार्थमयी अभिव्यजना है जिसके माध्यम में सहृदय भी कविगत रस-सचित् का साक्षात्कार करने में समर्थ हो जाता है। इस दृष्टि में कवि भी सामाजिक के तुल्य ही है—'कविर्हि सामाजिकतुल्य एव'। भट्ट तोत के अनुसार नायक, कवि और श्रोता तीनों का अनुभव समान होता है।^३ भरत मुनि ने 'कवेरुत्तमं भाव भावचक्रभाव उच्यते' भाव की इस परिभाषा द्वारा इसी मूल्य की ओर इंगित किया है।^४

अभिनव के अनुसार कविगत रस ही काव्य का बीज है, काव्य वृक्ष है तथा नाट्यगत अभिनवादि पुष्पम्यानीय है एव सामाजिक का रसान्वादन फल है।^५ इस प्रकार समस्त काव्य-प्रक्रिया एक जीवन, अवण्ड व त्रिवामशील प्रक्रिया है जिसका प्रारम्भ कवि में और पर्यवसान सहृदय में होता है। इस प्रकार यह काव्य-विश्व अथ से इति तक रसमय ही है। अतः कवि काव्य में अपनी जिन अनुभूति को वाग्द्वय करता है वह उसके लौकिक व्यक्तित्व में सम्बन्ध नहीं रखती, प्रत्युत उसके अलौकिक काव्यात्मक व्यक्तित्व की अमूल्य निधि है। 'शृंगारी

१ वही १, २४

२ अभिनवभारती, भाग १, पृ. २९४

३ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत १, वारिदा ६ का लोचन

४ नाट्यशास्त्र, अध्याय ७, श्लोक २

५ अभिनवभारती, भाग १, पृ. २९४

पारम्यनिक प्रयोजन घोषित किया है।^१ उनके अनुसार कवि को प्रीति से प्रीति की ही प्राप्ति होती है। यद्यपि काव्यानुशीलकों को काव्य में प्रीति के अतिरिक्त व्युत्पत्ति का भी स्थान होता है परन्तु इन दोनों में प्रीति ही प्रधान है, अन्यथा काव्य में कान्ता-सम्मितत्व की क्या विशेषता रह जायेगी ? अतः आनन्द ही काव्य का, कवि व सहृदय दोनों की दृष्टि में, प्रमुख प्रयोजन है। धर्म, अर्थ, काम व मोक्ष की व्युत्पत्ति से भी अन्ततः आनन्द की ही उपलब्धि होती है।^२ इसी प्रकार मम्मट ने भी 'सद्यः परनिवृत्ति' को ही काव्य का मौलिकप्रयोजन स्वीकार किया है।^३

उक्त विवेचन के निष्कर्ष के रूप में कहा जा सकता है कि रस व ध्वनिवादी आचार्यों के मत में कवि अपनी काव्य-मर्जना में किसी लौकिक या व्यावहारिक प्रयोजनवशान् प्रवृत्त नहीं होता, उसका पारमार्थिक प्रयोजन आनन्द-स्थान ही है, यद्यपि व्यावहारिक स्तर पर अर्थ-प्राप्ति, धन व अमंगल-नाश आदि भी प्रयोजन कहे गये हैं। यदि रसवाद की दृष्टि में भी विचार करें तो भी प्रीति या आनन्द को काव्य का प्रयोजन मानना समीचीन प्रतीत नहीं होता, क्योंकि आनन्द या रस की अनुभूति तो काव्य-प्रक्रियागत मर्जना और आस्वादन का आवश्यक लक्षण है अतः उसे प्रयोजन कैसे कहा जा सकता है ? वह तो वस्तुतः काव्य की प्रकृति है, प्रयोजन नहीं। आनन्द या प्रीति को काव्य का चरम प्रयोजन स्वीकार करते हुए रसवादी आचार्यों ने एक प्रकार से काव्य-विषयक निष्प्रयोजनवाद की ही स्थापना की है। काव्य-विषयक इस आनन्दवाद को हम पश्चिम के 'बला बला के लिए' सिद्धान्त का भारतीय मस्वरूप कह सकते हैं।

अभिनवगुप्त ने ध्वन्यालोक के प्रथम उद्योत की पञ्चन कारिका की व्याख्या करते हुए आदि कवि वाल्मीकि के शोक की श्लोक-परिणति के सदन में काव्य-मर्जन की मूल प्रेरणा व प्रक्रिया का बड़ा गंभीर विवेचन किया है। उनके अनुसार निपाद द्वारा गरविष्ठ श्रौञ्च को देख कर शोकावृत्त श्रौञ्ची आपन्न कर उठी। वाल्मीकि का संवेदनशील हृदय महानुभूतिवशान् श्रौञ्ची के नाय प्रमत्त हृदय-संवाद व तन्मयीनवन का अनुभव करता हुआ लौकिक शोक से भिन्न अतः करण रस में परिणत अपनी ही शोकानुभूति में निमग्न हो गया। वाल्मीकि द्वारा अनुभूत यह शोक न लौकिक था और न व्यक्तिगत ही। यद्यपि उसका मूल आधार श्रौञ्ची का लौकिक शोक ही था, परन्तु श्रौञ्ची के आपन्न आदि अनुभावों की चर्चना में वाल्मीकि के हृदय में उद्बुद्ध शोक एक अलौकिक व माधारणीय अनुभव बन गया था। जिस प्रकार जल में परिपूर्ण कुंभ छलकने लग जाता है या तीव्र

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत १, कारिका १ का लोचन पृ. ४०-४१

२. वही

३. काव्यप्रवाण, उत्पत्ति १, २ की वृत्ति

सवाद एव सन्मयीभवन के द्वारा साधारणीकृत सवित् (अनुभूति) का अनुभव करता है। यही सवित् काव्य का उत्पत्ति है। अतः अभिनव के अनुसार काव्य में अभिव्यक्त अनुभूति निर्वैयक्तिक और अलौकिक होती है। यही कारण है कि उसमें महदय के चित्त में भी रमानुभूति प्राप्त की करने की सामर्थ्य रहती है। कवि का अनुभव ही अन्ततः महदय का अनुभव बनता है। अतः यह अनिवार्य है कि कवि को श्री साधारणीकृत भावों के माध्यम में रमानुभूति हो।

अभिनव ने अन्यत्र भी कवि-हृदय की महज भाव-स्फूर्ति के रूप में काव्य का निरूपण किया है। ध्वन्यालोक की एक कारिका में प्रयुक्त 'निष्पन्दमात्रा' शब्द की व्याख्या करते हुए उन्होंने कहा है—'दिव्यमानन्दस्य स्वयमेव प्रस्तुताना, इत्यर्थः' अर्थात् कवि की मरम्बनी स्वयं ही वरिगत स्वरूप दिव्य आनन्द को प्रवाहित करती है। इस सम्बन्ध में उन्होंने भट्टनायक का एक श्लोक उद्धृत किया है जिसके अनुसार काव्य-सर्जना की प्रक्रिया वन के स्नेह से द्रवित धेनु के दुग्ध-निष्पन्दन के समान सहज-स्फुरित होती है। ध्वन्यालोक की अन्तिम कारिका में ध्वनिकार ने काव्य-सर्जन को इसी अप्रयत्नप्रभृत प्रक्रिया का निर्देश करते हुए कहा है कि स्वयं भगवती मरम्बनी ही मुक्ति की काव्य-वस्तु का निर्माण कर देती है, उसके लिए कवि के अपने व्यापार की आवश्यकता नहीं होती। इस प्रकार ध्वनिकार आनन्दवर्धन तथा अभिनव दोनों के अनुसार काव्य कवि के हृदयस्थ स्वर की ही स्वतः स्फूर्त अभिव्यक्ति है।

संस्कृत काव्य-चिन्तकों ने काव्य-प्रयोजनों के समान काव्य-हेतुओं का भी विस्तृत निरूपण किया है। मुख्यतः शक्ति या प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति या निष्पुणता एवं अभ्यास को काव्य का कारण माना गया है। आचार्यों में दो बातों को लेकर मतभेद रहा है—(१) उक्त तीन हेतु सम्मिलित रूप में काव्य के कारण हैं या पृथक् पृथक् (२) काव्य-निर्माण में इनका परस्पर क्या सम्बन्ध व अनुपात है? प्रायः सभी आचार्यों ने शक्ति या प्रतिभा को काव्य-सर्जना का मुख्य हेतु स्वीकार किया है यद्यपि व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास के आपेक्षिक मूल्य व योगदान के विषय में उनका मतभेद नहीं है।

प्रतिभा तत्त्व की व्याख्या संस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र की एक महती उपलब्धि है। आचार्यों ने प्रतिभा को काव्य की मूल सर्जना-शक्ति माना है। इसमें अभाव में काव्य का प्रवर्तन ही नहीं होता और यदि हुआ तो क्या भी जाना है तो वह उपहाम का ही पात्र होता है। वैसे तो अलंकार-सौतिवादी आचार्यों ने भी प्रतिभा या शक्ति के काव्य-जीवन को जगीकार किया है किन्तु काव्य के बहिर्गम में अग्रिम रुचि रखने के कारण वे काव्य की इस मूल शक्ति का उत्तम मात्र वर्णन नहीं करते, इसके स्वरूप एवं काव्य-सृष्टि में इसके योगदान के विषय में वे प्रायः मौन ही रहे। ध्वनिकादी आचार्यों ने ही सर्वप्रथम प्रतिभा के स्वरूप व काव्य-निर्माण

जो जगत् की विरगचित्त वस्तुओं और व्यापारों की नित्य नूतन वैचित्र्य से गुम्फित कर देती है। यह दृष्टि वस्तुओं का बोध मात्र नहीं है, अपितु उस बोध का अतिक्रमण करने पर ही इसका उन्मीलन होता है। यह जम्हर है कि इन्द्रिय-ज्ञान के अन्ध्याम या आवृत्ति से यह प्रतिभा अधिक चमक उठती है।^१ अभिनव के अनुसार प्रतिभा कवि-हृदय में स्थित एव अनादि प्राक्तन सम्पत् है।^२

हेमचन्द्र ने प्रतिभा के विषय में भट्ट नील का यह मत उद्धृत किया है—

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषगान्धिनी प्रतिभा मया ।

तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ॥

अर्थात् नित्य नवीन स्फुरणाओं से शोभित प्रज्ञा को ही प्रतिभा कहते हैं। उनमें अनुप्राणित जीवन्त वर्णना में निपुण व्यक्ति का ही नाम कवि है।

राजनेश्वर के प्रतिभाविषयक विचार भी अतीव महत्त्व रखते हैं।^३ उन्होंने समाधि (चित्त की एकाग्रता) और अन्ध्याम द्वारा उद्भूत शक्ति के कमरूप में प्रतिभा का प्रतिपादन किया है। समवन के प्रतिभा को शक्ति का शिवात्मक रूप मानते हैं। उनके मत में प्रतिभा कवि के हृदय में बाह्य-सर्जना के निमित्त शब्दार्थमभूत अस्कार-भाव उक्ति-प्रणाली आदि सामग्री को प्रतिमानित करती है। इस प्रकार राजनेश्वर ने प्रतिभा को काव्यात्मक अभिव्यजना के उपकरणों का मानसिक साध्यात्मक बनाने वाली अन्तर्दृष्टि माना है। उनके अनुसार प्रतिभा-रहित व्यक्ति के लिए पदार्थमभूत प्रत्यक्ष होकर भी अप्रत्यक्ष रहता है। इसी कारण मेघाविरट तथा कुमारदाम जगन्नाथ होने पर भी सफल कवि हो सके। राजनेश्वर ने प्रतिभा के दो रूप माने हैं—(१) वारयित्री (२) भावयित्री। बाह्य-निर्माण में कवि को साहाय्य देने वाली प्रतिभा वारयित्री और भावक को काव्यान्वादन में समर्थ बनाने वाली प्रतिभा भावयित्री होती है। वारयित्री प्रतिभा के तीन रूप हैं—(१) महत्ता, (२) व्यापार्य, (३) बोधा-यित्री। इन प्रतिभाओं के धनी कवि प्रमत्त मारम्बत, आम्पामिक और औपाधिक बने जाते हैं।

राजनेश्वर ने प्रतिभा व व्युत्पत्ति दोनों को बाह्य-निर्माण के लिए येदम्बर कहा है। इन दोनों के आधार पर उन्होंने कवियों के तीन भेद माने हैं—बाह्य-कवि, साम्प्र-कवि और उभय कवि। वे इन तीनों में किसी प्रकार का तात्तम्य नहीं मानते क्योंकि धारण अपने क्षेत्र में वे सभी येष्ट हैं।^४ इस प्रकार राजनेश्वर

१ ध्वन्यालोक उच्यते ३, वारिका ४३ का श्लोक

२ अभिनवभारती, भाग १, अ ७, पृ ३४५

३. बाह्य-सौमना, अध्याय ४

४. वही अध्याय ५

यह स्पष्ट है कि सस्मृत आलंकारिकों का एक वर्ग यह मानता है कि कवि जन्मजान ही नहीं होते, उनका निर्माण भी किया जा सकता है। भामह, दण्डी, रुद्रट आदि के ग्रन्थ कवियों को काव्य-निर्माणार्थ प्रशिक्षित करने के लिए रचे गये हो, ऐसा लगता है। राजशेखर ने काव्य-मीमांसा में कवि के प्रशिक्षण-क्रम व चर्चा आदि का जो विवरण दिया है उससे प्रतीत होता है सस्मृत कवि मात्र प्रतिभा का सम्बल लेकर काव्य-निर्माण में प्रवृत्त नहीं होना था, उसे एक लंबे समय तक निश्चित शिक्षा-दीक्षा में होकर गुजरना पड़ता था। दूसरी ओर रम-ध्वनिवादों आचार्यों की मान्यता के अनुसार प्रतिभा ही काव्य-निर्माण में कवि को प्रभुत्व सहायिका है तथा व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास प्रतिभा के उपकारक माने हैं। काव्य कोरा शिल्प या रचनाकौशल नहीं है, वह एक अवण्ड, सजीव व विकासशील प्रक्रिया है जिसका आरम्भ कवि की मर्जनात्मक प्रतिभा में निहित है तथा जो शब्दायामयी अभिव्यजना में सविग्रह होकर सहृदयों के प्रति, रसास्वादन के लिए, निवेदित होता है।

अभिनवगुप्त ने काव्य-मर्जन की प्रक्रिया का अभिन्नव भारतीय में इस प्रकार वर्णन किया है—'तदेव मूल बीजम्यानीयो कविगतो रस । कविर्हि सामाजिकनुत्प एव । ततो वृक्षम्यानीय काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्पादिम्यानीयोज्जिनया-दिव्यापार । तत्र फलम्यानीय सामाजिकरसास्वाद । तेन रसमयमेव विश्वम्'' (अ भा भाग १, अ ६ पृ २९४)।

बीज से लेकर फलोत्पत्ति पर्यन्त वृक्ष के विकास की जो सहज प्रक्रिया है वही कविगत अनुभूति भी, काव्य के माध्यम से, सहृदय के रसास्वादन में परिणति की भी प्रक्रिया है। राजशेखर ने भी भाववित्री प्रतिभा के मदभ में कवि-वर्म को वृक्ष की ही उपमा दी है—तथा मलु फलित कवेर्व्यापारतरु, अन्यथा सोऽत्रकेसो स्यात् (वा भी अ ४)। वाल्मीकि के शोक की श्लोक परिणति की रसाध्या में लोचनदार ने बताया है कि आदिकवि का शोक उन्नी प्रकार श्रेय बन कर फूट पड़ा जिस प्रकार कि रसपरिपूर्ण बल्लभ छल्लक उठता है। काव्य-निर्माण कविगत रस का ही उच्छलन है। पर यहाँ यह प्रश्न मन में उठता है कि क्या रस-रसा में कवि के लिए काव्य-मर्जन संभव है? अभिनवगुप्त ने रसानुभूति का जो स्वरूप प्रतिपादित किया है उसके अनुसार तो रसावस्था में काव्य-निर्माण में कवि की प्रवृत्ति संभव प्रतीत नहीं होती। संभवतः इस दशा के दुरत पश्चान् ही जब कि कवि की चेतना रसानुभव के तीव्र मस्कार या स्मृति में धुक्न रहती है, काव्य का निर्माण होता है। इस प्रकार काव्य-मर्जन के क्षणों में वास्तविक रस-रसा में न होकर भी कवि 'रसममाहितचेता' तो रहता ही है। आनन्दवर्धन व अभिनव दोनों ने अलंकार, गुण, रीति आदि काव्यात्मक अभिव्यजना के विभिन्न तहों को रस के माध्यम से मान कर यह निरूपित किया है काव्य-

पृथक् प्रयत्न करना पड़ता है।^१ यह पृथक् प्रयत्नरूप अतिक्रम निश्चय ही रस-भग का हेतु बन जाता है। कवि को महान् आत्मलाभ तभी होता है जब वह ध्वनि की आत्मा रसरूप अमलक्ष्यरस व्यंग्य का समाहितचित्त में उपनिबन्धन करता है।^१

आनन्दवर्धन ने मघटना या रीति को रसानिबन्धजब तथा माधुर्यादि गुणों पर आश्रित माना है। इस प्रकार मघटना गुणों के माध्यम से रस श्री ही उन्मीलित करती है। वक्ता तथा वाच्य के औचित्य को मघटना का निदमहेतु मान कर उन्होंने प्रकारान्तर से काव्य में रस की जगिता का ही प्रतिपादन किया है। आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार काव्य का निबन्धन करने हुए कवि को मदव रस-मरतत्र ही रहना चाहिए। प्रबन्ध काव्य में इतिहास-मिद्ध इतिवृत्त मात्र का निर्वाह कवि का प्रयोजन नहीं है, अपितु रस-निर्पान ही उसका एक मात्र उद्देश्य होना चाहिए।^१ आनन्दवर्धन ने महाकवि के नर्जन-भ्रम के नार का निम्नलिखित वारिका में निर्देश किया है—

वाच्यान्ता वाचकान्ता च यदौचित्येन योजनम् ।

रमादिविपयेनैतत् कर्म मुख्य महाकवे ॥ (ध्वन्या ३, ३२)

अर्थात् रसाभिव्यक्ति विषयक औचित्य के साथ वाच्य (अर्थ) तथा वाचक (शब्द) की योजना ही महाकवि का प्रधान कर्म है। रमादि की विपक्षा के विना ही कवि द्वारा निबद्ध अलंकार बित्र या अरस काव्य कहा जाता है। गुणीभूतव्यंग्य या मध्यम काव्य में रमादि की अभिव्यक्ति तो रहती है परन्तु कवि उसे समुचित महत्त्व नहीं दे पाता। उसमें वाच्य-वाचक व्यंग्यार्थ के अभिव्यजक होकर भी स्वयं प्राधान्य प्राप्त कर लेते हैं, रस के प्रति गुणीभूत नहीं हो पाते।

नाट्यशास्त्र के १६वें अध्याय में लक्षणों के स्वरूप की विवेचना करते हुए अभिनवगुप्त ने किसी अज्ञाननामा विद्वान् का लक्षणविषयक मत उद्धृत किया है जिसमें काव्य-निर्माण की प्रक्रिया के तीन प्रसिद्ध मोपानों का वर्णन किया गया है।^१ इस मत के अनुसार काव्य-भर्जना में कवि का प्रथम व्यापार स्वयं उसकी प्रतिभा है। प्रतिभा-व्यापार में ही काव्य में गुणों का विन्यास होता है क्योंकि प्रतिभावाली कवि में ही रमादि की अभिव्यजता य माधुर्यादि गुणों के उप-निबन्धन की सामर्थ्य रहती है, सामान्य कवि में नहीं। 'इस शब्द में इस वन्तु

१ वही

२ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत २, वारिका १९ की वृत्ति, पृ. २३३-४

३ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, पृ. ३३६

४ अभिनवभास्त्री, भाग २, अध्याय १६, पृ. २९६ (बड़ोदा, प्रथम संस्करण)

यद्यपि काव्य-सर्जना की प्रक्रिया एक ज़ीव जटिल, अनिश्चित व बहुत-बृहत् रहस्यमय प्रक्रिया है तथापि रसवादियों की उक्त व्याख्या किसी सीमा तक, मोटे रूप में ठीक मानी जा सकती है। अलंकार-ध्वनि व वस्तुध्वनि का भी अन्तः-रस-ध्वनि में पर्यवसान मान कर अभिनवगुप्त ने ध्वनि सिद्धान्त को भी रस सिद्धान्त की परिधि में ममेट लिया है।

अब एक प्रश्न काव्य और वस्तु जगत् के सम्बन्ध का रह जाता है अर्थात् कवि अपने काव्य में जिन जगत् की मृष्टि करता है उनका वास्तव जगत् में क्या सम्बन्ध है? क्या कवि जगत् के वस्तु-व्यापारों का ज्यों का त्यों अनुकरण करता है या उन्हें किसी अन्य रूप में प्रस्तुत करता है। इस विषय में सम्स्कृत आलोचकों की मान्यता नितान्त स्पष्ट है।

संस्कृत अलंकारशास्त्र के अनुसार मोटे रूप में यह सकते हैं कि काव्य वास्तव जगत् एवं लोक जीवन पर ही आधारित है। काव्यगत अनुभूतियों का मूल उद्गम जीवन की अन्तः एव विचित्र अनुभूतियाँ ही हैं। जगत् के नाना वस्तु-व्यापार ही काव्य में प्रतिकूलित होते हैं। राजशेखर के मत में कवियों के मति-दर्पण में ममस्त विश्व प्रतिकूलित होता है—“मतिदर्पणे कवीनां विश्वं प्रतिफलति।” भरत के ‘अवस्थानुवृत्तिर्नाट्यम्’ ‘लोकवृत्तानुकरणं नाट्यम्’, भानु के ‘युक्तं लोकस्वभावेन’ ‘तत्र लोकाश्रयं काव्यम्’ आदि वचन लोक और काव्य के घनिष्ठ सम्बन्ध के सूचक हैं। परन्तु सम्स्कृत काव्य-चिन्तकों ने काव्य और लोक के सम्बन्ध को स्वीकार करते हुए भी दोनों में प्रभूत अन्तर माना है। उनके अनुसार कवि वास्तव जगत् का अनुकर्ता मात्र नहीं है, वह एक स्वतंत्र स्रष्टा और विघाता है। उनकी सृष्टि लोक पर आधारित होकर भी एक अपूर्व सृष्टि है। इसी अपूर्वता को आचार्यों ने कहीं वक्रोक्ति, कहीं अतिशयोक्ति, कहीं नवनवोन्मेष अथवा नवनवोन्मेष के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है जो कि वस्तुतः कवि-प्रतिभा की देन है। कवि की प्रतिभा उनकी नितनवीन दृष्टि का ही एक रूप है जो इस जगत् को नित्य नूतनवैचित्र्य में मृष्टि कर देती है। यह लोकवार्ता में पठित बोधमाय नहीं है, अपितु इसे हम कवि की दिव्य दृष्टि कह सकते हैं।^१ कवि-प्रतिभा केवल वस्तु-जगत् में ही अपूर्वता और वैचित्र्य की मृष्टि नहीं करती वह उसकी वाणी में भी नित्य नवीन उन्मेषों को जन्म देती है। आनन्दवर्षण के अनुसार प्रिया के हाव भावों के समान मुकवियों की वाणी की नती कोई अवधि है और न उनमें कभी पुनर्गति ही होती है।^२ कवि-वाणी, जिसके विषयों की कोई दयता नहीं है, वस्तुओं को हमारे हृदय में एक सर्वथा नूतन रूप में निवेगित करती है।^३

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ पृ. ५०८

२. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ४, कारिका ७ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत श्लोक पृ. ५३९

३. वही, उद्योत ४, कारिका ३ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत श्लोक पृ. ५२७

स तत्त्वदर्शनादेव शान्त्रेण पठितः कविः ।
 दर्शनाद् वर्णनाच्चाप्य रुडा लोके कविश्रुतिः ॥
 तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे निषेज्यादिवर्मेन ।
 मोदिता कविता लोके दावग्जाता न वर्णना ॥

(वाङ्मनूषासन, अध्याय ८ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत)

परिचर्चा

पु ला भागवत व्यक्तिगत शोक नहीं रहा जोर साधारणीकृत हो गया, उस दशा में जो वाल्मीकि को ही आनन्द की प्राप्ति होनी चाहिए थी। मैं समझता हूँ, 'मग निपाद' आदि श्लोक को पढ़कर पाठक को करण रस की प्रतीति होती है। इस प्रकार उसे आनन्द प्राप्त होता है। वाल्मीकि के विषय में यह कहना वहाँ तक उचित है?

मू च पाठक मैंने जो कुछ कहा है अग्निवशुपुत्र के साक्ष्य के आधार पर कहा है। वस्तुतः जिस शोक को वाल्मीकि ने इस श्लोक में दृढ़ किया है वह मुनि का अन्तः शोक नहीं है अपितु साधारणीकृत शोक है। इनके अनिरिक्त यदि कवि को स्वयं रसानुभूति नहीं होगी तो वह महदय पाठक को कैसे रसानुभूति करा सकता है। यद्यपि यह ठीक है कि कवि रसानुभूति की दशा में काव्यसर्जन नहीं करता। बाद में उसके सत्कार या स्मृति जो शेष रह जाती है उसी से कवि काव्यसर्जन करता है।

पु ला भागवत मैं केवल यह जानना चाहता था कि क्या इसका समर्पण कैसे कर सकते हैं?

मू च पाठक: कवि में एक विशेष प्रतिभा होती है जिसके द्वारा वह लोक के भावों को आत्ममान्तर अपने भावों के रूप में अनुभव कर सकता है या अपने भावों को साधारणीकृत करके देख सकता है।

पु दा स्वामी वाल्मीकि का व्यक्तिगत शोक काव्य में वारण नहीं हुआ अपितु साधारणीकृत शोक ही कारण बना। वस्तुतः कवि के साधारणीकृत भाव ही काव्य के रूप में प्रतिरक्षित होते हैं—न कि व्यक्तिगत रूप में अपने से सबद भाव।

पु ला भागवत: वाल्मीकि को हुआ तो व्यक्तिगत शोक ही था ..

पु दा स्वामी: वह व्यक्तिगत वहाँ रहा?

202, 204, 205, 226, 256n,
267, 268, 270n, 285, 287,
294, 298

Bhāminīvilāsa, 59, 60

Bhānumāra, 107-9

Bharata, 2, 3, 10-14, 18-23,
26, 32, 53, 57, 58, 62, 68,
69, 73, 101-6, 157, 159,
160, 164, 165, 178, 179,
182n, 190, 195-97, 205,
206, 210, 226, 247, 249,
254, 255, 286, 298

Bharatasamgraha, 62

भारतीभूषण, 222, 226

Bhāravi, 180, 268

Bhartṛhari, 74, 76-8, 114,
123

Bhāsa, 25, 129, 138

भाषामरण, 226n

Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa (or Lollāṭa),
73, 94, 96, 129, 132, 182,
247, 253, 255

Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, 205

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, 69, 94, 96, 97,
140, 141, 162, 166, 182,
208, 233, 248, 249, 251,
258, 278, 289, 290

Bhaṭṭa Tauta (or Tota), 80,
153, 154, 284, 286, 292,
297

Bhaṭṭi (kīya), 98-101, 301

Bhavabhūti, 27, 123, 278

भवानुप्रसाद मिश्र, 229

भिवारोदान, 226n, 227

Bhoja, 10, 69, 70, 73, 81, 105,
106, 109, 195

भोलागकर व्यास, 223, 228

भूषण, 278

Bible, 163

बिहारीलाल, 223

Blackmur, R.P. 167

Bradley, 4, 28

Bṛahmaṇṣa, 30, 283

ब्रह्मण्य, 223

C

Caṇṭhya, 5,

Caṇṭhāraṇḍī, 192

Candrāloka, 227n, 260 (c), 261n

Cassirer, E. 177

Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 170

Charles Darwin, 64

चिन्तानि, 227n

Citra-vīmāṇśa-khaṇḍana, 224

Coleridge, 121

Comparative Aesthetics, 17

Croce, 48, 240

D

Dandin, 6, 7, 35, 67, 70, 100,
101, 116, 118, 120, 148-50,
154n, 159, 193, 211, 267,
273, 293, 294

Dante, 169

Dāśarīpa (-rūpa), 18, 19,
23n, 45, 58n, 104, 162

Dhanañjaya, 18, 43, 45, 58,
104, 111, 162, 197

Dhanika, 104

धर्मदान, 223

धर्मवीर नास्ती, 230

धर्मदुग्ध, 46

Dhāvaka, 138

D H Lawrence, 4

धनिसंप्रदाय और उसके सिद्धान्त
222, 228

Dharmyāloka, 43, 76, 145, 146,
147n, 154n, 161, 162, 175n,
183-85, 187, 189, 207, 214,
221, 227, 270, 283-288n,
290, 291n, 292n, 295-96,
298n

Dharmyāloka and its Critics, 173,
177n

Dinnāga, 158

काव्यचिन्म, 236, 237, 238n
 काव्यदर्पण, 227n, 242
Kāvyādarśa, 148, 150, 154n, 267, 270n, 273n
 काव्यरूपद्रुम, 222, 227n
Kāvyālankāra (Bhāmaha), 32, 84, 98, 153, 158, 159n, 179n, 213, 267, 270n, 285, 287n
Kāvyālankāra (Rudraṭa), 103, 266n, 267n, 269-70n, 287n
Kāvyālankārasūtracrtti, 33, 79, 80, 146n, 149n, 150, 154, 181n
Kāyamīmāṃsā, 43, 104, 154, 155n, 162n, 220n, 221, 224n, 283n, 285n, 292n, 299n
 काव्यदर्पण, 227n
Kāvyānuśāṣaṇa, 28, 58, 155n, 283n, 284n, 287n, 293n, 300
Kāvyaprakāśa, 4, 13, 56, 94, 95n, 96, 97, 107n, 154, 155n, 214, 221, 226, 227, 258-75 (also commentaries frequently), 284n, 285n, 287n, 288n
 K C Pandey, 68, 79
 Keats, 124
 Keith, 19
 केसवदाम, 225, 226n, 227
 Keśava Mīra, 191
 केसवदाम, 226n
 Kohala, 10
 Krishnamoorthy, K. 173
 कृशराम, 226n
 Kṛṣṇakavi, 109
 कृष्णानन्द गुप्त, 224
 Ksemendra, 191, 193
 Kṣīrasāmin, 206
 कुलपति, 221, 225, 227
Kumārādāsa, 292
Kumārāsambhava, 53, 55, 61
 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, 76

कुन्दन, 226n
Kuntaka, 67, 81, 84-91, 125, 149, 150, 156, 193, 210, 226, 280, 285, 286, 293
 Kuppaswami Shastri, 45
Kuralayānanda, 227, 260n

L

Laghuvrtti, 161

लक्षणा और उसका हिन्दी काव्य में प्रसार, 228

लक्ष्मीनारायण सुधाशु, 235

ललितललाम, 226n

Langer, 237

Lawrence, 121, 236

Lion and the Honey Comb, 167

Locana, 43, 44, 145n, 147n, 154, 161, 162, 183, 219, 221, 247n, 249n, 250, 251n, 254, 285-88n, 291, 292n,

Lucy Poems, 119

M

Macaulay, 2

Madhusūdana, 5, 197, 227, 232, 233,

Madhyamavyāyoga, 25

Mahābhārata, 2, 168, 187, 205

महावीरप्रसाद द्विवेदी, 224

Mahima Bhaṭṭa, 15, 67, 105, 153, 160, 163, 208, 284, 293

मंथलीगरण, 243

Mālarikāgrasūtra, 205

Mallinātha, 222

Mammata, 4, 6, 7, 13, 67, 78, 94-7, 107-9, 115-18, 120-22, 125, 160, 176, 181, 190, 191, 195-97, 214, 216, 227, 258-75 (commentators also; frequently), 284-88, 293, 299

- Rasapradīpa*, 192
 रसरहस्य, 221, 225, 227
 रसराज, 226n
Rasārnava-sudhākara, 107
 रसरूप, 221, 227
 रससारश, 226n
 रससिद्धान्त : स्वरूपविरलेषण
 222, 227
Rasataranginī 107, 227
 रसविमर्श, 228
 रसिकप्रिया, 226n
Ratnāvalī, 138
Ratnesvara, 81
R C Divedi, 157n
Rgveda 21, 29-31, 67
 रीतिकालीन अलंकार साहित्य का
 शास्त्रीय विवेचन 228
Robert Browning, 169
Robert Louis Stevenson 211
Ross (W. D.), 23
Rudrata 70, 103, 116, 155n
 159, 197, 266, 267, 270n,
 287, 294
Rūpagosaṃhita, 5, 6, 57, 65
 191, 195, 196, 199, 227n
Ruyyaka, 151, 156, 157, 191,
 216, 286

 S
Śabdavyākhyāṇicāra 259, 261,
 265n
Śākhyaśāstra, 18, 58n, 108,
 149n, 154n, 195n, 226,
 227n, 242, 260, 262, 264,
 266n, 268n
 साकेत, 239
Śāfurala, 3, 123, 223, 274
Samarāṅgaśāstradhāra, 69, 71-
 73
Sāmaśāstra, 21
Saṃkṣipta, 155n
Saṃjīva, 157, 222
Śākhara 74, 283
Sanskrit Drama, 19
*Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of
 Aesthetics*, 282n
Śāradātanaṣa, 191
Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābhāṣya, 10, 70,
 81, 105, 105
Sartarakaśā, 223n
Shakespeare, 2, 3, 26-28, 124,
 169
 शम्भुनाथ मन्त्र, 226n
Shelley (P. B.), 124, 169
 स्वामनन्ददान, 235
Śiṣyābhāṣya, 223
S K De, 169, 180, 201, 282
Stylark, 122
Sobhākaramitra, 268n
 मोक्षनाथ, 225, 227n
Somapālāvalī, 272n
Someśvara, 82
*Some Thoughts on Indian Aesthetics
 and Literary Criticism*,
 201
Sphoṭāyana, 78
Srīkṛṣṇa 92, 93, 96, 97
Srīkṛṣṇa (-ka), 69, 73, 94,
 96, 97, 132, 137, 182,
 248, 253, 255
 मृगारनिर्णय, 226n
Śrīngārābhāṣya, 48, 70, 106,
 107n
Subandhu, 33, 98, 150, 204
Subhāṣitāvalī, 42
 मूर, 223, 278
Sūryasāstra, 138
Śāsterīya Śāstrā, 17
Symbolic Imagination, 168

 T
Taittiriya Upaniṣad, 98, 198n
Tale, Allen, 168
Tarīṇīśa (T.A.), 155n
Tantravārtika, 264n
T.E. Hume, 237, 245

**PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY
CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT**

Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit

P. G. SECTION

Papers of a Seminar (sponsored by the University Grants Commission, New Delhi) held in December, 1968 under the auspices of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur.

Edited by
Dr. R.C. Dwivedi

1969

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
DELHI · VARANASI · PATNA

CONTENTS

Preface	xi
Excerpta	xv

1	<p style="text-align: center;">SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM (Inaugural Address)</p> <p>Dr G S Mahajani, M A , PH D. <i>Vice-chancellor, University of Udaipur</i></p>	1
2	<p style="text-align: center;">SANSKRIT CRITICISM AND CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE (An Extract from the Welcome speech)</p> <p>Dr R C. Dwivedi, M.A , PH D. <i>Sāhityācārya, Darśanācārya, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur</i></p>	5
3	<p style="text-align: center;">SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM (General President's Address)</p> <p>Dr K C Pandey, M A. M O.L , PH D , D LITT. <i>Hony. Director, Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics and Śaiva Philosophy, Lucknow University, Lucknow</i></p>	8
4	<p style="text-align: center;">A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SANSKRIT AND THE GREEK DRAMATIC THEORY</p> <p>Dr. P L. Bhargava, M A , PH D <i>Professor & Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Rajasthan University, Jaipur</i></p>	18
5	<p style="text-align: center;">AN ETYMOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE WORD ALAṆKĀRA</p> <p>Dr. G C Tripathi, M A , PH D , D PHIL <i>Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Udaipur.</i></p>	29

- 14 COMMON TRENDS IN INDIAN AND GRECO-ROMAN
AESTHETICS
Dr. K C. Pandey M A , M O L , P H D , D. LITT.
*Hony. Director, Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics
and Saiva Philosophy, Lucknow University, Lucknow* 129
- 15 SOME THING OF ARISTOTLE
Shri Bhum Sen, M A
*Director, School of Basic Sciences and Humanities,
University of Udaipur* 142
- 16 THE CONTRIBUTION OF RĪTI TO THE
EXCELLENCE OF POETIC COMPOSITION
Dr A P Mishra, M A , D PHIL
*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit,
University of Allahabad* 145
- 17 PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INDEPEN-
DENCE OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN
SANSKRIT
Dr. R.C Dwivedi, M A , P H D ,
*Sāhityācārya, Darśanācārya, Head of the Department
of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur* 153
- 18 SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION AND DHVANI
Shri B B Paliwal, M.A.
Lecturer in English, University of Udaipur. 167
- 19 PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM OF THE
DHVANI SCHOOL A REVIEW
Dr Biswanath Bhattacharya. M A , P H D.
*Reader in Sanskrit, Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi.* 178
- 20 JAGANNĀTHA'S RAMANIYATĀ
Dr (Kumar) Suman Pande, M.A , P H D.
Hamidia College of Arts and Commerce, Bhopal. 190

- 28 मम्मटामिमते लक्षणायाः षड्विधत्वं हेत्वलंकारश्च
डा रेवाप्रसाद द्विवेदी, आचार्य, एम ए., पीएच डी,
असिम्प्टेण्ट प्रोफेसर, संस्कृत विभाग, शासकीय महाविद्यालय, इन्दौर 259
- 29 साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति
डा. देवराज उपाध्याय, एम ए (हिन्दी, संस्कृत), पीएच डी
अध्यक्ष, हिन्दी विभाग, उदयपुर विश्वविद्यालय 276
- 30 संस्कृत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य का सर्जना-पक्ष
श्री मूलचन्द्र पाठक, एम ए (हिन्दी, संस्कृत),
व्याख्याता, संस्कृत विभाग, उदयपुर विश्वविद्यालय 282

Index
Works and Authors 303 .

PREFACE

Principles of literary criticism is a fascinating subject and a help to understand, evaluate and appreciate a work of imagination. Critics of Sanskrit set on to explore these from the 5th century A.D. onward and their search, now more through modern languages of India including English, knows no end. Present work, which offers original formulations of new ideas and fresh insight into topics of literary criticism and aesthetics, is a co-operative venture of nearly thirty scholars. Ideas and principles explained and enunciated here may not be found absolute and commanding universal validity. Yet we hope, these refreshing reflections will help better understanding of the subject. World is coming closer day by day and one may fondly hope that the 'twins shall meet' and give birth to better informed Comparative Criticism which will be significant addition to departments of comparative learning like comparative religion and philosophy.

It was on the recommendation of our distinguished Vice-chancellor, Dr. G S Mahajan, who later very kindly inaugurated the Seminar, that the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, accepted my proposal to sponsor a seminar on "Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit". I am deeply and thankfully indebted to him and the Commission. The seminar was held from 26th to 28th December, 1968 under the auspices of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur. This publication, which bears the same title, is an outcome of deliberations at the above seminar and constitutes substantially its proceedings.

The papers presented to the seminar have been edited with a view to achieve some kind of uniformity (where none seemed possible due to variety of styles). Absolute uniformity has never been my aim here (perhaps that could not be realised either, due to lack of time and resources at my disposal). Discussion on the papers¹, which has been considerably

¹ Some of the papers could not be taken up for discussion primarily because the authors were not present and secondarily for lack of time at our disposal

his staff for printing the work in good time. However, some mistakes have crept in for which I am apologetic to the readers

The seminar has been a wholly exciting experience for us, the participants. May I now invite *Sahridayas* to share our experience and request the learned critics to evaluate our co-operative performance ?

Department of Sanskrit
University of Udaipur
7th June, 1969

R. C. Dwivedi

EXCERPTA

नियतिकृतनियमरहितां ह्यविक्रमयीमनन्यपरतन्त्राम् ।

नवरसरविरां निर्मितनादधनीं भारतो कवेर्ज्ञपति ॥

(Benedictory verse in the *Kāvya prakāśa* of
Mammata)

Supreme is the poet's speech which projects a creation, free from the laws of *niyati* (destiny), constituted by pure delight, independent of anything else and charming on account of nine (or novel) sentiments.

समष्टिः सर्वशास्त्राणां साहित्यमिति गीयते ।

Criticism is the sum of all Sciences.

पञ्चमो साहित्यविद्या

[Rājaśekhara in the *Kāvya mīmāṃsā*]

Literary Criticism in the fifth *Veda*.

द्वे वल्लभो गिरां देव्याः शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रतोपतं तयोराद्यं प्रनिभोद्भवमन्तिमम् ॥

[Bhaṭṭa Tauta quoted by Bhaṭṭa Gopāla
in his commentary on the *Kāvya prakāśa*]

Two are the paths of Goddess of Learning, one, Science, the result of intellect; and two, Poetry, the product of imagination.

अपूर्वं यदस्तु प्रययनि विना कारणकलां

अगद्व्यावृत्त्यं निजस्वमेवान् सारयनि च ।

कमात्प्रत्योपास्याप्रसरसुमये भासयनि त-

त्सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कवित्तद्द्वयाह्यं विजयने ॥

[Abhinavagupta in the *Locana*]

SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM

(Inaugural Address)

Dr G S Mahajan

1 I cordially welcome you to this historic City and also to the University which has yet to make history. The City is blessed by nature and hallowed by history.

But the University has yet to develop its physical facilities. It is therefore not in the usually formal sense but quite sincerely I request you to overlook our shortcomings in making your stay as comfortable as we should have liked.

2 Sanskrit literature is so vast, rich and ancient that it was wise to limit the scope of your discussion—as apparently you intend to do. It is trite to state that as language only precedes its grammar, literature must first exist before the principles of criticism are formulated. All languages are expressions to thought and we see two broad streams—Science and Literature. There was a time when even scientific subjects like mathematics and medicine were treated through verse. We have now reached a stage when while prose has free access to both, poetry is largely confined to humanities—literature. Can you formulate a rule that the subject-matter of poetry must be non-scientific?

The more fundamental question to my mind is to investigate which of the now recognised principles of literary criticism are absolute, all pervading and common to all languages and which of these are only relative? Human mind is cast in the same mould, but since nurture affects nature and environment influences heredity, it is an interesting exercise to discern what is absolutely native and immutable.

Again we observe that humour is peculiar to certain languages, not so to others. The scope of humour and wit is, to my knowledge, limited in Sanskrit. But English language is particularly suitable for subtle humour. Why?

3 Times affect the very nature of literary output. You

world in which the *law of cause and effect* ruled with only the minimum of delay even with major opposition. Today literature aims at keeping close to the contemporary society and takes upon itself to depict its problems and deals with them. But life in its short-term duration is full of injustices, triumphant vice and unrequited virtue. And therefore literature turns to tragedies. *One of the dramaturgic prescriptions of Bharata is thus thrown overboard*

6 Take again the doctrine of the *three Unities*. Here at any rate, one thought, there is something which is absolute. But experience reveals that the success of a play is quite independent of this doctrine. In fact, it will be found that all dramatists of note have discarded the unities-doctrine. Shakespeare, for example, is no slave to Unity of Time which he violates conspicuously in the *Winter's Tale* by introducing an interval of 16 years between the 3rd and the 4th Act. Kālidāsa, too, in his *Śakuntalā*, introduces an interval of at least 5 years between the 7th Act and the earlier ones. Of course, other things being equal a dramatist should prefer a short to a long duration for the action, so as to make the spectacle for the play as close an imitation of real life as possible. A well-constructed drama makes us feel for the time as if the events represented were really taking place. The effect of a play upon the audience largely depends upon the success with which this illusion is kept up, and long intervals of time tend to destroy this illusion, because they remind the spectators that they are looking not at real events, but at a scenic representation. Then again if the times of action are shortened the retribution for vice and reward for virtue are rendered more impressive. If they are delayed, the effect is lost.

7 Next, what about the subject-matter or, if you like, the plot? Does Bharata have any dramaturgic principle for this? Should a plot be original or can it be borrowed? Detective stories and thrillers mostly depend on the originality of the plot. Agatha Christie has written over fifty books but each has a new plot, never used before or by any one! Shakespeare and Kālidāsa on the other hand often freely borrowed material from history and mythology. This fact, however, does not detract from the piece of art, because merit lies in their handling of the material.

SANSKRIT CRITICISM AND CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

(An extract from the Welcome Speech)

Dr R C Divedi

The renowned scholars of Sanskrit Criticism have shown great favour to this young University Department of Sanskrit by accepting all hardships of journey in winter to attend the Seminar in this city of lakes, not so well connected by trains. Your affection and generosity shall be sole refuge of our inability in making befitting arrangements for the scholars of your age and fame. My awareness of organisational limitations does not belittle my sense of pride and joy at your distinguished visit. It rather waxes to find that not only pre-eminently the scholars of Sanskrit but also of Hindi and English have found it interesting to actively associate themselves with the Seminar. This reminds me of the famous line काव्यशास्त्रविनोदेन कालो गच्छति धीमताम्. Your participation, I am sure, will inaugurate comparative studies of the Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit in depth. In the past ages Sanskrit was the national and composite vehicle of literary and cultural consciousness of the country. It systematised, conserved and transmitted the intellectual movements of the country. The literary tradition, which originated with the languages of the masses—Pāli, Prākṛta or Apabhraṃśa—was critically evaluated by the Sanskrit ālankārikas. It is not surprising therefore that many original works on poetics are full of illustrations from the Prakrit. The movement of Bhakti was similarly popular in its origin. But its philosophy was constructed in Sanskrit by Rāmānuja and Caitany, his followers Rūpagosvāmin, Jīvagosvāmin, and by Madhusūdana who expounded the principle and philosophy of Bhakti Rāsa. Jainism and Buddhism originated as popular movements expressing their faith in local languages. But it was not very long after their origin that the religion, philosophy

past the Sanskrit Acharyas never failed in appreciating and judging the literary mood of the people who expressed themselves in the idiom of the day. The scholars of Sanskrit criticism will no doubt revive the old tradition of understanding and evaluating the modern Prakrits—Hindi and others, and if need be evolve new canons of literary criticism. Dandin, Mammaṭa, and many other ācāryas did not ignore the literature in the people's languages, nor will the distinguished critics participating in the seminar. This may open up new horizons and lay the foundations of new canons of literary criticism. I have ventured to make some observations, it was but irresistible in the enlightened presence of so distinguished ācāryas here.

letter as a unit of such sound is the smallest constituent that the objective analysis of a poetical work reveals. It shows (i) that the letters are distinguishable from one another because of the distinctive sounds and different effects, pleasant or otherwise, which they produce on the sense of hearing, (ii) that they enhance the excellence of poetry because of their harmony with the suggested emotion, (iii) that recurrence of the same or similar sounds in a composition, constitutes various figures of speech, such as alliteration, and, therefore, has ornamental value in beautifying the piece where they occur, (iv) that their distinct sounds have exciting, softening, or neutral value (Dīpta, Māsna, Madhyama) to the mind or heart of the hearer, (v) that the use of words containing letters of a particular sound-quality helps in the arousal of a particular aesthetic emotion; (vi) that even a letter can suggest an emotion, (vii) that often a skilful choice and arrangement of words, made up of letters which have a particular visual form in writing, makes a written verse look like a sword, a drum, a lotus, and so on, because of the visual shape of letters and thus gives rise to pictorial poetry (Citrakāvya)

THE DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF POETRY

Poetry is a set of well-connected meaningful words which constitute, as it were, its body. But such a set is also used for the ordinary communication of ideas in daily transactions, as well as in scientific and philosophical works. Metrical form cannot be looked upon as the distinguishing mark of poetry, for in India even the works on technical subjects are written in that form. A question, therefore, arises - what is it that distinguishes poetry from common speech? If it is said to be the beauty or attractiveness of words a further question arises - what is it that makes them attractive? It cannot be said that attractiveness is due to the presentation of an attractive set of events or of a complete aesthetic configuration, technically called *Rasa*, for a detached stanza, presenting a single idea, is also called poetry. The reply is that it is the presence of six essentials, which are called principles from the point of view of the critic, and the absence of defects, counted under the fourth, that distinguishes poetry from common speech.

refers to the view about the externality of embellishments as that of "others" (Pare) and discusses forty-three embellishments, maintaining them to be characteristic marks of poetry and including in his list most of those, mentioned by Bharata. He did so because he took the word *Alankāra*, not in the sense, signified by the English expression 'figure of speech', as it is usually translated, but in its literal derivative sense, meaning "that which gives sufficiency" (*Alam karoti*). In the context of poetry, therefore, according to him, it means "that which gives sufficiency to a composition to be classed as poetry." Taking the word in this sense, he identified characteristics (*Laksana*) with embellishments (*Alankāra*) and asserted the general characteristic of all types of poetry to be a turn or twist (*Vakratva*) that a poetic genus gives to words and meanings. He held this turn to be the characteristic of all embellishments.

Bacon seems to echo this very idea when he says that the poet distorts nature. As an empiricist he means by nature the material world, the sum total of all that is perceptible. He, therefore, finds that works of poetic art present the objects of nature, not in the form in which they are directly perceptible through the senses, but in such a form as is different from what exists in nature, though similar to it, so that it cannot be thought to be simply a copy of what is already there in nature. Accordingly he does not agree with the naturalistic view that poetry is characterized by close adherence to nature, by faithful presentation of nature as it is. On the contrary, he holds that poetry is distorted nature.

THE WIDER MEANING OF ALANKĀRA

Subsequently, however, the particular derivative meaning of the word *Alankāra* was ignored, and it was used in the popular conventional sense of ornament or figure of speech. Consequently the number of *Alankāras* continued to increase from the forty-three recognized by *Bhāmaha*, who amalgamated the characteristics, embellishments, and some of the qualities, to one hundred twenty-four, in the hands of *Appayya Dikṣita* (sixteenth century, A.D.), and gave rise to excessively ornamented poetry.

position, the former belong to the whole, like the beauty of a girl, whereas the latter pertain to a part only, like a bracelet to an arm, and accepted only the three qualities which Bhāmaha had recognized

IV DEFECT Defect (Dosa) is that which diminishes the excellence, attractiveness, or value of a work of art According to Bharata, poetic defects are ten circumlocution, superfluous expression, irrelevancy, want of significance, unrefined expression, tautology, want of synthesis, illogicality, hiatus, slang Mammata (11th century, A D) in his Kāvya-Prakāśa, Ch VII, deals with poetic defects in very great detail

In regard to defects it may be pointed out that defects are not necessarily always defects This view was elaborately propounded by Abhinavagupta in his important work, the Purūṣaravicāra, which is now known from references only, but which is referred to and quoted in the Ghatakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti, written by him

There are very few poems which present so many problems as does the Ghatakarpara Kulaka Its authorship is one of the most disputed points Some regard it as a work of poet Ghatakarpara But Abhinavagupta holds on the basis of a persistent tradition, current among his teachers in Kashmir, that it is a work of Kālidāsa and that it is an excellent poem, without the least blemish, that the use of Yama in it does not diminish but enhances its poetic value.

किंच अत्र कर्ता महाकवि कालिदास इति अनुभूतमस्माभि । न चास्य काव्ये
तृणमात्रमपि कलकपात्रमुत्प्रेक्षितवन्तो मनोरयेऽपि सुप्तेऽपि सहृदया । इति ।

अथ च

न वै दोषः दोषः न च खलु गुणः एव च गुणः

निबद्धः स्वातन्त्र्यं सपदि गुणदोषान् विभजते ।

एव सा वैदग्ध्यं प्रकृतिमधुरा तस्य सुकवे

रोलादादप्यतिमुग्धभावं परिणतः ॥ इति

V. Style (Rīti). Style is the mode of arranging words, according to their sound and meaning values, so as to present the poet's ideas effectively in harmony with the central theme—something like arranging different parts of the human organism in a picture. There are four recognized styles, based on the study of poetry of different regions Berar, Bengal, Uttar

VI. SUGGESTION (DHVANI) Suggestion, i.e., the suggested meaning, is called Dhvanī because it is connected with the symbolic or conventional meaning just as the echo is with the original sound of a bell, tolled in a temple. Just as the rise of the echo depends on acoustic conditions, which are due to the construction of the temple, so the rise of the suggested does on the subjective elements which constitute the personality of the aesthetic individual. Dhvanī is also used for conventional symbol and conventional meaning from which the suggested meaning arises, for the power of word that is responsible for the arousal, and for the composition that contains such a meaning.

Discussion on the various problems connected with suggestion, such as distinction of Dhvanī as a power of word from other powers, primary, secondary and implicative, and of Dhvanī as a meaning, different from other types of meaning, recognised in the learned circle, presentation of the psychological conditions, necessary for the rise of the suggested meaning and refutation of the arguments against the acceptance of Dhvanī, such as those advanced by Maṇumma Bhaṭṭa and other opponents, need more space than can be given in the course of this address. Suffice it to say that it is one of the most essential elements of poetry and a literary critic has to satisfy himself that the literary work under criticism, has got this element before he judges it to be of the highest type.

VII RASA : The word signifies aesthetic configuration. It is used for the aesthetic object as well as for the aesthetic experience, got from it, because the constituents of both are the same. As found in a drama, they may be classified as follows :

(i) The situation with a focal point which the central figure, the hero of the piece, faces, (ii) the basic emotion that it arouses in the hero and that which the personality of the hero arouses in the human focus of the situation, (iii) transient emotions which arise from the basic emotion, like waves from the sea, and merge back into it, (iv) physical changes, which are consequent on the rise of an emotion, both involuntary, such as horripilation, the blush, and voluntary, like the movements of hands and feet.

The aesthetic object is not a mere juxtaposition of these

and is free from all defects, with the soul, which is their enlivening principle and in the absence of which the body of poetry with all its ornaments etc. is like a dead body. But Dhvani, in the sense of that which can be only suggested and can never be presented in conventional terms, is identical with Rasa. For Rasa is admitted to be suggestible only. Thus, there is complete agreement between the two statements which seem to contradict each other. *Kāvyaśātmā dhvaniḥ and Vākyaṃ rasātmakam Kāvyaṃ*

(iv) Conclusion

Looking at aesthetics as philosophy of independent arts, I have referred to the aforesaid seven principles as *aesthetic categories*, in some of my writings. Here, however, I call them principles, because I am dealing with them, not from the point of view of a philosopher, but from that of a critic, who looks at a work of poetic art from the objective point of view, to find out if it has got the recognised essentials in order to pass a judgement on it, on the basis of the experience that they jointly arouse in him. Those principles compare well with those, discussed by I.A. Richards, the title of one of whose books is the same as of the subject of the present Seminar, i.e. Principles of literary Criticism; as well as with those propounded by F. P. Scott, who talks of five approaches to literature (1) *historical* (2) *sociological* (3) *moralistic (theological)* (4) *anthropological or archetypal* (5) *formal or structural*; T. S. Eliot, Matthew Arnold etc. They are being discussed in my Comparative Aesthetics Vol. III, Aesthetics Indian and Western. A detailed treatment of these seven principles in a different manner is to be found in Comparative Aesthetics Vol. I, Indian Aesthetics and in the Svatantra Kalā Śāstra Part I, Bhāratiya. Learned friends, desirous of knowing more of them may refer to them.

actions (krtānukaranam) The Daśarūpaka (I, 7) defines this imitation in a slightly different way by calling drama an imitation of a state or condition (avasthā) which led Dr Keith to make the inaccurate remark that "in the sāstra it is a state or condition, in Aristotle it is action, a distinction absolutely in accord with the different genuses of the two peoples"¹ The fact is that in the sāstra action is as much the object of imitation as in Aristotle Again the statement of Aristotle that tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery², agrees in substance with the statement of Bharata (N S Ch I) that when human nature with its joys and sorrows is depicted by means of representation through gestures and the like it is called drama

A very important rule observed by the Greek tragedian consists of the three unities The most important of these unities is the unity of action According to Aristotle the unity of plot i.e. action does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its subject An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action The truth is that just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing so in poetry the story as an imitation of action must represent *one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents* so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle and end A well-constructed plot therefore cannot either begin or end at any point one likes³ The unity of action is of no less importance in the Indian drama Whereas Aristotle divides the action into three stages, Bharata divides it into five stages, viz. ārambha or beginning, prayatna or effort, prāpti or possibility of attainment of the object, niyatāpti or certainty of attainment and finally the phalāgama or fruition There are besides five elements of the plot viz. the bija or germ, the bindu or drop, the patākā or episode, the prakarī or incident and the kārya or denouement. Based on these parallel sets is a third division

1 The Sanskrit Drama, p. 355

2 Aristotle, p. 37.

3 Aristotle, pp. 40-42

element is spectacle which according to Aristotle is the least artistic of all the parts because the tragic effect is quite possible [without a public performance and actors and besides the getting up of the spectacle is more a matter for the costumer than the poet¹

These elements are mentioned by Bharata also. According to Bharata, the plot or *itivṛtta* is the *body of the drama* and is of two kinds—the principal or *ādhikārika* and the subsidiary or *prāsaṅgika* (N S Chapter, XXI) These two are, however, not exclusive. The principal plot is essential in every drama, while the subsidiary plot may or may not be present in a drama. The characters are divided by Bharata, like Aristotle, into three categories according to their nature or *śīla* i.e. *Duttama* or high, *Madhyama* or middle and *Adhama* or low. Bharata unlike Aristotle also postulates *heroes of four types*. They must all be dhīra or self-controlled but they can be distinguished as udāta or exalted, sānta or calm, lalita, or light-hearted and uddhata or haughty (N S Chapter XXXIV). The element of thought by which Aristotle no doubt means dialogue is called pāṭhya by Bharata and is traced to the holy Rgveda itself (N. S. I, 17). Corresponding to the element of diction mentioned by Aristotle we have in the twenty-second chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra mention of the four styles which a poet may adopt in a dramatic composition. They are the *Kausiki* or graceful, *Sāttvati* or grand, *Ārabhaṭi* or violent and *Bhāratī* or verbal. Like Aristotle Bharata also regards song as the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of drama derived from the holy Sāmaveda itself (N. S. I, 17). Bharata adds dance and instrumental music to song as pleasurable accessories of a drama (N. S. Chapter XXVIII). The fundamental difference between Aristotle and Bharata, however, is with regard to the element of spectacle. While Aristotle regards it as the least artistic of all the parts and strangely enough connects it with the costumer alone, Bharata regards it a most important dramatic element which he traces to the holy Yajurveda (N S. I, 17). In fact the very designation of drama in Sanskrit as *drśyakāvya* or a poem to be seen shows the importance of spectacle. Moreover, spectacle is not connected with

in separately in the parts of the work, in a dramatic not in a narrative form, with incidents arousing pity and fear wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.¹ Thus catharsis is no doubt very much the same as rasa. Aristotle clearly says : "Though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representation of them in art."² According to Indian writers also a poem or a drama gives a spiritual joy to the reader and even when a person is shedding tears on reading or witnessing a pathetic scene he is nevertheless enjoying a spiritual pleasure. To quote Bharata "Just as well-disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spice enjoy its taste and attain pleasure and satisfaction so the cultured people taste the durable psychological states while they see them represented with words, gestures and involuntary states and derive pleasure and satisfaction" (N. S. Ch. VI).

The question arises whether pity is the only sentiment according to Aristotle which a drama arouses. The answer is that so far as tragedy is concerned pity is certainly the predominant sentiment. Unfortunately the second part of Aristotle's Poetics in which the nature of comedy seems to have been discussed is missing. But we can presume as Ross has rightly observed that comedy was probably described as effecting a purgation of the tendency to laughter as tragedy does of pity and fear.³ The bhayanāka and raudra rasas of Indian writers on poetics are also hunted at by Aristotle when he mentions fear and anger along with pity as being aroused by the element of thought in a drama.⁴ What is, however, surprising is that Aristotle does not make any mention of what Bharata and his followers regard and what really are two of the most important of sentiments viz the erotic and the heroic. Surely if a tragedy causes pity and a comedy causes laughter, an erotic play causes the blooming or vilāsa and a heroic play the exaltation or vistāra of the heart as the Indian writers on poetics say.⁵

We would now take up for discussion two elements of

1 Aristotle, p. 35

2 Aristotle, p. 29

3 W. D. Ross—Aristotle p. 290

4 Aristotle p. 66

5 Dīśarūpaka, IV p. 43-44

back) " Judging from what Aristotle says, are not the most famous Sanskrit Nātakas, prakaranas, vyāyogas, and Ankas the best examples of Tragedy ? Let us take the greatest of Sanskrit Prakaranas, the Mṛcchakatika. The machinations of Samsthānaka, against whom Cārudatta cherishes no animosity have succeeded in the sentence of death being passed on the innocent Cārudatta for the murder of Vasantasenā. This misfortune is partly due to Cārudatta's inability to defend himself. However, the discovery of the fact that Vasantasenā is alive is made in time to save Cārudatta from execution. One of the most famous of the Sanskrit Nātakas is the Mudrārāksasa. We meet with a similar situation in this drama. The noble Candanadāsa is being taken to the place of execution because he has incurred the wrath of Cānakya for giving shelter to the family of his friend Rāksasa. Just then Rāksasa arrives and accepts all the terms of Cānakya so that his friend's life may be saved. Another famous Sanskrit Nātika is the Venīsaṃhāra. Here we find the actual situation of a brother intending to kill his brother but withdrawing in time. In the sixth and the last act of this drama Bhīmasena after killing Duryodhana goes to meet his brother Yudhiṣṭhira. As he is besmeared with blood from head to foot he is not recognized by Yudhiṣṭhira who mistaking him for Duryodhana wishes to crush him to death. Just then Bhīma speaks and is recognized and everything ends happily. Among the Vyāyoga type of dramas the most famous is the Madhyamavyāyoga of Bhāsa. Here we have the situation of a son trying to kill his father unknowingly and prevented from doing so by his mother who arrives in time to tell her son that the man whom he wanted to kill was his own father. Another of Bhāsa's drama the Urubhanga belongs to the type called utrstipikāṅka. Here we find the actual depiction of the death of the hero Duryodhana.

Aristotle unfortunately has said very little about the comedy. But from what he has said it is clear that the Sanskrit Nātakas and Prakaranas cannot be called comedies. The characters of the comedy are thus described by Aristotle: "As for comedy it is an imitation of men worse than the average;

it is discovered only in the last moment that he is innocent.

Pandey : You have put forward in your paper that 'Catharsis' is no doubt very much the same as 'Rāsa'. Now the word catharsis simply means 'purification'—i.e. purification of sentiments which implies that they should be brought to the mean—not too much, not too little, whereas Rāsa is a harmonious union of *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* etc like a nicely blended syrup (*pānakarasa*). There seems to be, therefore, almost no similarity between the two.

Bhargava : Yes, they are not exactly the same. But I see the similarity in the fact that both of these elements, the purification of the sentiments (catharsis) as well as Rāsa lead to spiritual joy.

Pandey : But Aristotle nowhere talks of spiritual joy.

Bhargava : Catharsis is simply a physical process of purification.

Duxcedi : According to Aristotle *Pathos* is the main sentiment of the drama whereas you said we admit nine chief sentiments reducible to four. But *Bhavabhūti*, just, too like Aristotle, admits the *Pathos* to be the only sentiment. (tr.)

Bhargava : This statement of *Bhavabhūti* is true of *Uttara-rāmacarita* only. Even his other dramas do not follow this maxim. This may not be valid in respect of all literary creation.

S. Mahajani : According to our definition, Comedy is a drama which ends well. And as such when a person contemplates a deed of violence but draws back in time and the untoward incident is averted it is Comedy and not tragedy.

L. Bhargava : From Aristotelian point of view this is not a Comedy but a tragedy pure and simple.

S. Mahajani : Well, that is a question of definition, that way many of our Comedies will be tragedies.

ant Jaitly : If only that is tragedy where the assailant "draws back in time" then no Shakespearean Tragedy could be a real tragedy.

AN ETYMOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE WORD ALĀNKĀRA

Dr G C Tripathi

According to the famous lexicographer Amarasimha, the word *alam* has three different shades of meaning. It can denote (a) *bhūṣana* i.e. to adorn—in this sense it is always associated as a nominal suffix with the verb *kr*—(b) *vāraṇa* i.e. to forbid—used as an adverb with instrumental case and (c) *paryāpta* i.e. to be sufficient—Pier also used as an adverb in which case the use of dative is prescribed by the grammarians.

As is well known, the word *alankāra* in Sanskrit means ornament and in poetry it is used as a terminus technicus for those factors which enhance the beauty of the poetry namely the figures of speech. But if we go back to the beginnings of Sanskrit Poetics we find that the word *alankāra-sāstra* is used to denote the science of the Poetics itself of which the figures of speech form but a small part. The word *ālankārika* is used for a person who is well versed in Poetics, besides, of course, the comparatively recent meaning of a person, who attaches foremost importance to the figures of speech in Poetry.

It is a common belief that the original meaning of the word *alankāra* is ornament and also in such expressions as *alankāra-Śāstra* or *kāvyaalankāra* the same meaning is reflected with a slightly different shade, meaning "the science of that particular element which *adorns* the poetry in some way or the other" and as such the word *alankāra* in its broader sense comprises everything which forms part of the poetry.

But in my humble opinion the word *alankāra* in the older expressions like *kāvyaalankāra* or *alankāra-Śāstra* has a considerably different shade of meaning and it should not be confused with the word *alankāra* meaning ornament or the figure of speech.

To understand it let us look at the etymology of the word. Coming to *Rgveda*, the very first thing that we observe is that the sound *l* in *alam* is a later variation of the original *r*. Hence we have the word *aram* instead of *alam* and though we

appropriate, proper, apt (e.g. in the sentences like—it does not fit you, it is not fit for a gentleman etc.) exactly in the same way the adjective 'āra' in Rgveda comes to mean fit, sufficient, appropriate, proper, apt, suitable etc. The word arāmatī simply means 'proper thinking', arāmanas=proper or becoming of thought i.e. according to thoughts.

The nominal prefix aram which is added in Rgveda not only to the root kr as is the case in classical Sanskrit but also to gam, and bhū is in fact an adverb which has developed itself from the accusative singular of the adjective 'āra'. It is no more declinable since it has got suffixed like so many other adjectives as e.g. Varam (Varameko guṇi putrah) which are used in their accusative singular form as adverbs.

The combination of aram with root kr occurs at five places in Rgveda and almost everywhere it means 'to do the fit or the right thing', to treat in an appropriate manner, i.e. to worship or even to serve. I am giving here all the passages with Geldner's translation.

- 1 yah svayam vahate so aram karat. RV 5/44/8
"He who carries (her) by himself does the right thing ..."
- 2 yathā vidvāṃ aram karat viśvebhyaḥ yajatebhyah 2/5/8
"So that the wise one (Agni) may do the right thing to all worthy of sacrifice"
- 3 aram kṛvantu vedīm samaganīm indhatām purah 1/170/4
"They should prepare the veda rightly"
- 4 chi manur devayur yajñakāmo aram kṛtyā
"Come O Agni, Manu wants to sacrifice to gods, having set everything right"
5. aram dāso na mīlhuse karānt
aham devāya bhūrnaye anāgāh 7/86/7
"I as sinless would serve (or worship) the angry god as a slave serves his master"

Besides these verbal forms the word aramkṛt—a root noun with aram—appears four times in Rgveda (1.14.5, 8.1.10, 8.5.10, 8.67.3) in the sense of the "one who makes proper, appropriate, sets right" etc.

The word aramkṛt is used but once in Rgveda i.e. in 7/29/3 Vasistha says to Indra : "kā te asti aramkṛtḥ

In view of the above discussion the development of the meaning Bhūšana or ornament hardly needs an explanation. The word kāra is to be taken in an instrumental sense—"through which is done". The objects through which the appropriateness (of form or appearance) is achieved is alankāra. And as Beauty is only another name for *Perfection* born of appropriateness, an alankāra is a means to perfection or in other words to beauty.

DISCUSSION

V Venkatachalam I just want to point out that our Rhetoricians have not missed the meaning suggested by Dr. Tripathi in his paper. The suffix *ghaṇi* can be used in *bhāva* as well as in *karana* घञ् च भावकरणयोः

In *bhāva-ryutpatti* the meaning of the word *alankāra* would be 'beauty' and not "instrument of beauty". The first Sūtra of *Vāmana* is कान्व्य ग्राह्यम् अलङ्कारात् and just after that he says : मोन्दर्यमलङ्कारः

It shows clearly that *Vāmana* had all the principles which beautify a poetic work in view when he gave his book the title of the *Kāvyaalankāra* (-sūtravṛtti) and he has given due treatment to all of them.

R C Daxvedi : Besides the shade of meaning suggested by Dr. Tripathi in the paper the word is found to be used in other senses also. For example in the *Kausītaki Upaniṣad* the word *Alankāra* has been used in the sense of competent or elaborate language. It seems that in Buddhist circles the word came to be established in this very sense as is evident from a reference by Subandhu in his *Vāsavadattā* : बौद्धमार्गीतिमित्रालङ्कारमूपनिषत्, where *Alankāra* occurs in the sense of 'graceful approach', or 'Art of persuasion'. This compares well with the concept of the Greek rhetorics. May I suggest it to Dr. Tripathi to probe further this use of the word *Alankāra* to find out its connection with the *Rgvedic aram* etc.

THE INTER-RELATION OF THE KAVI AND THE SAHRDAYA IN SANSKRIT LITERARY CRITICISM

V Venkatachalam

The question of what makes a poet has been discussed by Sanskrit critics from Dandin onwards. The three factors that together go to make a poet as enumerated by Dandin have been repeated in more or less the same form by subsequent writers, though some of them have singled out *Pratibhā* as the factor, *par excellence*. But when we look up to these very sources for their views about what makes a *sahrdaya*, we are disappointed. We find that no writer has ever attempted a scientific treatment of the equipment of a *sahrdaya*. Beyond random references to the *sahrdaya* and his pre-eminent place as a determinant factor of the various facets of good poetry, no clear statement of the nature of the *sahrdaya* is to be found in the earlier writings, let alone any discussion of सद्दयत्वबीज on the lines of कवित्वबीज.

As against this, Sanskrit literary criticism has dealt *in extenso* with the question of the aesthetic experience of the *sahrdaya*, in a manner that has almost no parallel in any other language. Whereas on the plane of experience, the *sahrdaya* has received such preferential treatment from the critics, the poet appears to have been relatively ignored. The creative mental process of the poet, which expresses itself in the form of poetry has not been similarly analysed.

These deficiencies apart, no integrated or comprehensive study of the inter-relation of these two concepts of *kavita* and *sahrdaya* has been made by writers of Sanskrit criticism or by modern exponents of their theories. The present paper is an attempt to bring together at least the more important ones of the scattered statements of the critics on the nature of the *kavi* and the *sahrdaya* with a view to review this question of the inter-relation of the artist and the art-critic from the standpoint of Sanskrit literary criticism.

I first take up the famous *soka-sloka* equation which throws a flood of light on the psychological state of the poet when he is in the creative mood. This equation hinted at by Vālmiki

noisseur's appreciative mood. It is *hrdayasamvāda*—parity or community of hearts leading to its total merger (*tanmayibhāva*) with the object before him—that is the real governing principle of *sahridayatva* and Abhinava expressly affirms that the poet shares this *hrdayasamvāda* during his creative moments. This leads us to the logical conclusion that the kavi is a *sahridaya* first, before he becomes a kavi.

Two questions arise here. First, whether the poet's *rasānubhava* and his *kāvyaśrī* are co-eval or the latter follows the former. It is difficult both ways. If we were to say that he creates when he is actually in his emotional ecstasy it will strike at the root of *rasānubhava* itself, which consists in an experience of sheer delight, which banishes all else from the province of his experience. If we say that the *ślokaśrī* clearly follows the *śokānubhūti*, this will amount to saying that the poet does not create when he is in the creative mood, but *after* it. This again will be self-contradictory.

The correct position is : the poetic creation comes after his *rasānubhava*. As for the apparent contradiction involved in this it may be resolved by an explanation analogous to that usually given to explain the sequence between वाच्यार्थबोध and रसानुभव. The sequence though present is not felt and the creation and the creative mood, therefore, appear to be simultaneous (वाच्येन तु वस्तु सदैव प्रदीपितः । and विद्यमानोऽपि क्रमो न मलङ्घ्यते).

The second objection is of greater consequence. If the mental state of the kavi in his creative mood and of the *sahridaya* in his appreciative mood are both identical ; both being the same *rasānubhava*, there can be no rational explanation for the fact that the poet creates whereas the *sahridaya* does not. In other words, if the transmutation of *śoka* into *Karunarasa* in the heart of Vālmiki burst forth in the form of poetry, why should not the identical transmutation of *śoka* into *Karunarasa* in the hearts of the numerous *sahridayas* not find similar expression? It is, therefore, essential to differentiate between the aesthetic attitudes of the kavi and the *sahridaya*. There are, in fact, Sanskrit critics, who have drawn such distinction. Rājasekhara, for instance, speaks of two different kinds of *pratiśhā*, the creative, with which the poet is endowed and the ecstatic which is the gift to the *sahridaya*. Though he refers

definitely cannot subscribe to this view, which divests the poet of the essentially-emotional stuff of which he is made.

Apparently, Abhinavagupta seems to hold that though there is no qualitative difference between the creative and appreciative *rasānubhava* of the poet and the sahrdaya, there is a quantitative difference. When in the creative mood, the poet's "fine frenzy" is considerably more intense than what usually characterises the aesthetic experience of the sahrdaya. The metaphorical image of a jar filled with a fluid incapable of holding any more and resulting in an overflow, which he has employed in the context to describe the poet's heart, suggests precisely this fundamental difference between the *rasānubhava* of the creative mood and that of the normal appreciative moods. The words of *Hṛdayadarpana* quoted by him in this context that unless and until the heart is full with rasa it does not let it out, make Abhinava's mind still more clear. That Abhinava subscribed to grades in the *rasānubhava* is evident from his statements in other contexts too. Thus, the ultimate position according to this view is that the kavi and sahrdaya share the identical *rasānubhava* in their creative and ecstatic moments and are quite at par in this respect, except that the poet's experience is a whit superior, quantitatively, to that of the sahrdaya. When this subtle distinction is made, the conclusion previously reached that the kavi is at bottom a sahrdaya and that there is no basic distinction in their mental attitude becomes quite secure. Putting the same conclusion in terms of mathematical terminology, we may say that the kavi-sahridaya equation follows from the *śloka-śloka* equation of Ānandavardhana as its inevitable corollary. Thus the *śloka-śloka* equation, properly analysed and interpreted, provides a very interesting peep-hole to study the views of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta about the inter-relation between the kavi and the sahrdaya.

So far, I have tried to show that the kavi is a sahrdaya. Now looking at it from the opposite angle, can we likewise say that every sahrdaya is basically a kavi and that *sahridayatva* implies fundamentally *kavitva*? My answer to this question is—though it may appear somewhat unusual, and even a bit revolutionary—that we can equate the sahrdaya too with the

Let us take the example of another fine art, Music. In this case, a vocal singer who weaves the fabric of melodies of a particular *rāga* is the creator, corresponding to the poet, who weaves his fabric of words. The sahrdaya in the case of Music is the connoisseur who has a trained ear for music and who with his *hrdaya, amrāda*, shares the ecstasy of the melodious music along with the vocalist. The sahrdaya, in this case, has a thorough knowledge of the nuances of the *rāga*, its notes and cadences and can, in fact, survey the whole scheme of the *rāga* within his mind and recognise the most minute lapses in its reproduction by the singer. While hearing the *rāga* being rendered, he anticipates the musician and creates the whole fabric of the *rāga* within his own mind. That the connoisseur of music mentally creates or recreates the entire scheme of the *rāga* more or less simultaneously with the singer is too patent to need any argument. But if he is asked to render vocally the *rāga* by himself, he would plead inability. It would not be inappropriate if we say that he sings in his own mind, which amounts to saying—absurd or self-contradictory as it might seem—that he is a “mute” singer! This mental creation of musical melodies will become more evident if we take the case of an Instrumentalist, who is not a vocalist. The Instrumentalist reproduces the *rāga* through the cords of his instrument, what his vocal cords dare not attempt. In this case, it is crystal clear that he creates the entire scheme of the *rāga* in his mind before transferring them to the instrument. These instances from Music should suffice to show that the sahrdaya in the case of poetry too creates the poet’s world in his own mind and it is this re-creation that is the real source of his delight. If the sahrdaya in Music is a “mute” singer, the sahrdaya in *sāhitya* is a “mute” poet—a मूक कवि.

It is interesting to note that the well known poetess Vijayā of Karnāṭaka, while paying a tribute to the sahrdaya refers to his silent expression of the poet’s ideas, which practically amounts to saying just what I have said, namely, that the sahrdaya is a “mute” poet. Vijayā says that the vision of the poet is beyond the pale of words and the sahrdaya does not make the futile effort of trying to express it by words, but instead expresses the thrill through the horripilation of his limbs, being all the while dumb. This beautiful verse of

mation for the *kavi-sahridaya* equation, envisaged by Sanskrit literary critics

Here, I may add a word of caution about the use of mathematical terminology in this discussion. If I have done so, it is only because the *śloka-śloka* relationship propounded by Ānandavardhana has often been spoken of as an equation. It is quite obvious that this is not intended to imply absolute identity of the *śloka* and *śloka* for, after all, the *sthāyibhāva* itself is not the poem. Likewise, when I speak of *kavi-sahridaya* equation or *sahridaya-kavi* equation, on the same lines, I do not in the least, propose any identity of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*. What I mean to convey by the equation is that the one is a necessary concomitant of the other, in other words, that *kavitva* and *sahridayatva* are नित्यसम्बन्ध. It is indeed interesting to note that even as *rāk* and *artha* are नित्यसम्बन्ध the *kavi* who deals with *rāk* and the *sahridaya* who deals with *artha* are also नित्यसम्बन्ध.

The total upshot of all that I have said about the inter-relation of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya* may be conveniently put down as follows. The *kavi* is a *sahridaya* with a difference and likewise the *sahridaya* too is a *kavi* with a difference. Each performs the distinctive function of the other in a slightly attenuated form. Employing the language of verse extracted in the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, we may say that the *kavi* is also a मावक only, the *kavi* is वाग्मावक whereas the *sahridaya* is हृदयमावक; on the same analogy I wish to add that the *sahridaya* too is a स्रष्टा; only the *kavi* is वाक्स्रष्टा, whereas the *sahridaya* is हृदयस्रष्टा.

This conclusion of नित्यसम्बन्धत्व of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*, which I have sought to establish here is not my independent idea of the inter-relation of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*. On the other hand, I have deduced this only from the description of the process of aesthetic relish given by the Sanskrit critics. Though the basic idea behind the *kavi-sahridaya* equation may not have been stated explicitly in so many words by any of our writers, I still feel that there are subtle indications of the same in the writings of our critics. Adopting the language of Ānandavardhana, used in a similar context, I may say that the idea of the underlying identity of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya* is चन्द्रान्नोक्तबोचनप्रभृतिनि लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहार

या व्यापारवती रसान् रमयितुं काचित्कवीना नवा
दृष्टिर्वा परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयो मेवा च वैपश्चित्ता ।
ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिश निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं
श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमग्निरस्यत त्वद्भक्तिनून्य सुखम् ॥

Though Abhinava has taken the second line as referring to शास्त्रदृष्टि, the line can be interpreted with equal felicity as pointing to सहृदयदृष्टि. The verse would then mean that the combined vision of the kavi and the sahrdaya comprehends the entire universe

Likewise the expression कवि-मात्रक in Dhanañjaya's verse in the concluding part of the Daśarūpa should also be explained, in my opinion, on the same lines as Karmadhārāya in preference to the Dvandva

Though I am unable to find any other writer directly supporting my interpretation of कविसहृदयाख्य the late M M Kuppuswami Shastri's cryptic and tantalising statement in the opening of his commentary appears to lend some support to me. He writes :—अथ 'सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्व कविसहृदयाख्य' इति लोचने. अत्र छन्द्यमाना अर्थविशेषा आम्वाद्यन्ताम् "परस्परममास्वाद" इत्यादिपक्षे उपलोचनस्योपक्रमे ।

The verse referred to here is his own benedictory verse which runs as follows —

परस्परममास्वादप्रथमानुमनत्त्वयो ।
कविताद्वययोगो नमामि शिष्योऽयं ॥

I leave it now for the readers to judge

Before concluding, I seek your indulgence for striking a purely personal note to say a word about the genesis of this paper. The paper owes its origin to a strange dream I had in the small hours of the morning of the 4th December. I had been cogitating for well over a week about themes for the paper to be presented by me in this seminar.

I had been vacillating and vacillating for quite some time, when this dream furnished the nucleus for the present theme and decided the issue. In the dream-vision, I saw myself engaged in a rather animated discussion with a highly respected scholar-critic of Madras well known in the intellectual

exactly the world of the poet. Just as an elephant created in an individual dream is in its nature exactly the same as the real one with the only difference that the latter is created by God and can be perceived by all of us but we create our own 'elephants' in our dreams so also the poet is the author of a world whereas the *sahṛdaya* creates a world of his own on the basis of the world of the poet. The only difference is, that whereas the poet's world can be enjoyed by every body, (just as the real elephant), the world of a *sahṛdaya* is a personal experience, although the world is the same, just as the *gaja tatva* is the same.

R. C. Dwivedi : Can it be called *gajatatva* ?

Venkatachalam : Yes, Yes, why not ? Say it *gajatva* if you please. This *gajatva* is the *pāramārthika sat*; *gaja* of the world is the *vyāśahārika* and that of the dream is the *prātibhāsika* one.

R. C. Dwivedi : *Gajatva* is never a *pāramārthika* reality. I am afraid, you have missed my point. That there is a difference between the world of practical reality (*vyāśahārika*) and the world of dreams or illusion (*prātibhāsika*) is well understood by all of us and is very well explained by Abhinava in his commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*. My point is whether the world re-created by the *sahṛdaya* is exactly the same as the world of the poet or is it different from it ? If they are exactly the same both of these can either be *vyāśahārika* (practically real) or *prātibhāsika* (apparently real).

P. L. Bhargava : He says that they are the same with a difference.

Venkatachalam : Yes, they are the same so far as the *tatva* is concerned. But the experience is comprehensive in one and limited in the other.

K. G. Pandey : You have got to make a difference between the medium i.e. a set of words and the idea aroused by it. Poet's work is to provide a medium which is capable of giving rise to identical ideas in a *Sahṛdaya* provided certain subjective condi-

—for the comparative importance of the poet and the *sahrdaya*

B *Brahmā*—You have compared the frenzy of the poet in the mood of creation with that of the *sahrdaya*. How would you compare poet's frenzy with that of the *sahrdaya* when the poet is not creating and simply experiencing ?

The distinction between the poet and the *Sahrdaya* (critic) is admitted in Sanskrit poetics, the former experiences and communicates whereas the latter is only capable of experiencing. The poet creates a work of art without any end in view. It is purely an aesthetic or poetic delight in creation whereas the critic has definitely some end in view—be it simply elucidation or analysis. Would you accept that there is an end in view with the poet also ?

Venkatachalam According to Ānanda-vardhana and his followers both the poet and the *Sahrdaya* experience *rasa*. Yet it is the intensity of the experience which makes a person poet. Whereas the attenuated form of the experience makes it difficult for a critic to communicate. This is of course, a deduction which, I feel, can be made on the basis of what our own critics have stated. Abhinavagupta compares a poet with a jar full of *rasa* which, unless it is full, can't overflow. To differentiate between the mental state of the two would not be advisable. The quality of the experience is the same but the quantity is different.

Surjan Das Suami : You have placed the poet and the critic on the same level and do not accept any qualitative difference between the two. But I think that even a qualitative difference can be drawn between the two. A poet has both kinds of *pratibhā*—the *kārayitṛī* as well as the *bhāgayitṛī*. But the critic has only the second kind of *Pratibhā* in himself and hence it is not proper to hold them both as identical.

Secondly, the state of apparent reality which

BLUSHING A MISSING LINK IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE AND POETICS

Dr R S Jaisly

Emotions influence profoundly, and in countless ways, the lives of men. Students of human behaviour are familiar with the major physiological changes which accompany emotions. These changes include blushing or pallor of the face, excessive sweating, cardiovascular changes, disturbances in respiration, muscular changes, which determine facial expression, vocalization, involuntary movements, postures and gestures, and many vague visceral sensations. Who has not noted the ready flow of tears, inhibition of salivary flow, erection of hair, dilation of pupils, wide opening and protrusion of the eyes, acceleration of the heart-beats and such changes in the activity of glands under the stress of emotions ? These changes which are fully expressive of internal states of men can be observed at the surface of the body. An understanding, therefore, of the various emotions and their manifestations—voluntary or involuntary—is a matter of practical importance for the students of literature. This paper endeavours to study blushing and its various causes with particular reference to Sanskrit literature and Poetics.

Blushing is the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions. It is an involuntary reddening, specially of the face associated with the feeling of embarrassment and confusion due to shyness, shame or modesty.

Shyness is one of the chief causes which induces blushing. In this state the face is reddened, eyes are either averted or cast down and awkward nervous movements of the body are also witnessed. It depends on the sensitiveness of the person concerned. Conceited persons are never shy, because they value themselves so high that they do not expect depreciation and so are not at all afraid of it. Shy persons are very sensitive to the opinion—whether good or bad—of others. Their disapprobation or ridicule and, sometimes, approbation also make them blush.

cause and effect link is nowhere noticed. The movements and gestures which accompany blushing are profusely mentioned, but not blushing. It seems really surprizing that no term was ever evolved in Sanskrit literature for blushing.

The matter does not end here. According to the technical terminology of Poetics blushing should come under the category of involuntary expressions called '*Sātvikabhāvas*'. Their peculiar characteristic is that these expressions can never be caused by any external action on the body. This is the reason that these are involuntary. Laughing can be caused by tickling the skin, weeping or frowning by a blow, but *Sātvikas* cannot be caused by any physical means. It is the mind which must be affected first. They emerge only when the mind is stirred. That is why in the words of Bharata they are '*Manahprabhava*' (arising directly from the movement of mind) and '*Na Sakyate anya-manasā Kārtum*' (cannot be induced by the action of another mind on oneself). According to the above characteristic blushing is one of the best *Sātvikabhāvas*, but the crux of the point is that it has not been enumerated by any Acharya in the list of *Sātvikas*.

There is no point in holding a novel view, unless that is substantiated by apt examples and valid proofs. Here is an attempt to demonstrate from the poetic pieces of renowned Sanskrit poets that the context and the contents of the poems discussed below are best suited for the expression of blushing. The standard translators in rendering those poems in English consciously use the word blushing in order to complete the desired poetic effect, though in original no term that gives the sense of blushing, is found. This is one of the problems that has no solution.

The other problem, namely not enumerating blushing in the list of *Sātvikabhāvas*, will be dealt with later on.

Here are some of the examples from Kālidāsa's "*Kumāra-sambhavam*" to illustrate the point. At Śiva's command the Seven bright Saints approach Himālaya to seek Umā—the mountain-maiden as his bride. At the time of proposal the presence of Umā makes her position quite embarrassing and her modesty and shyness become apparent on her cheeks. It would be in the fitness of things if the original and its translation are critically examined. The verse runs thus:—

the accompanying acts and motions of blushing are given by the poet, but he does not say that Umā blushed' The translator from the description of acts and motions, concludes that she blushed and introduces the word in his rendering.

When the rite of marriage had ended and the wedded pair was left alone, Śiva took Umā's hand within his own to lead his darling to the bridal bower—*Kautukāgāra*. Her maidens there looked with arch smiles and glances at the pair. Such an occasion and situation would normally make a maiden blush. But our Sanskrit poet says '*Navaparimāṣa-lajjābhūṣanām*' (feeling bashful on account of being a new bride), '*Tatkrīṭākṣepam Vadanamapaharamlīm*'—(turning the face away when Śiva tried to attract her eyes towards him), '*Kathāñcit sayanasakhībhyo dattavācam*'—(attending the queries of her bed-fellows with modest reluctance) (1) Only these accessories of blushing are there and it is for readers to infer blushing on these accounts.

Another example from the same source may be taken. When the first love-sport of Śiva and Umā was over, Umā taking a mirror in her hand was viewing with pride the traces of past enjoyment on her body in solitude. She was not aware of Śiva's presence there. The moment she saw the reflection of Śiva in the mirror, she reacted by doing so many things to hide her feelings. By implication this is a situation where blushing is normal and natural. But all this has been conveyed in these words :

*'Kānī kāmī na cakāra lajjayā'*²

The next example is from *Amaruśatakam*. The *Nāyikā* depicted in it is *Mugdha*—(a young girl attractive by her youthful simplicity). She is portrayed in a situation which indicates the originating source—cause of blushing.

The verse runs thus —

*'Śūnyam vāsagrham vilokya sayanādutthāya kñicicchanaṁ
Nidrāvyaṁjamupāgatasya sucīram nirvarṇya patyurmukham
Viśrabdham paricumbya Jātapulakāmālokyā gandasthalim*

1 Kumārasambhavam, 7/95

2 Ibid, 8/11

text suits and some of the accompanying movements and gestures are seen, it becomes clear-cut case for the expression of blushing. That is the reason why translators generally use the term blushing in rendering such passages into English.

I have stated before that blushing has the real characteristic of '*Sātrika bhāvas*' i.e. the involuntary evidences of strong emotions brought about by hormonal or endocrinal action, glandular discharges created by actions of the autonomic nervous system, and even then it has not been enumerated by our Āchāryas in the list of '*Sātrikas*'. They are eight in number viz *Stambha* (Stupification—prevention of motion by fear, joy or pain), *Sveda* (sweating), *Romāñca* (Horripilation), *Swarabhanga* (disturbance of speech), *Vepathu* (trembling) *Vaivarnya* (changes of colour), *Aśru* (tears) and *Pralaya* (fainting, loss of consciousness). But one of the kinds enumerated above has the characteristic of blushing. *Vaivarnya* might create a doubt in the minds of readers and they might like to include blushing into its fold as the liberal sense of the term is alteration of colour and that is associated with blushing. But it is very clear from the various definitions of *Vaivarnya* that this alteration of colour has not been mentioned in the context of blushing. Bharata says in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* that *Vaivarnya* occurs due to cold, anger, fear, sickness, fatigue and heat and this should be represented by alteration of colour of the face by putting pressure on the artery and this is dependant on the limbs.¹ Viśvanātha Kavirāja also explains *Vaivarnya* as an alteration of colour caused by sorrow or intoxication or anger.² The same conception of *Vaivarnya* has generally been maintained by all the Āchāryas. No doubt they mention the change of colour (*Varnānyathābhāva*), as Bharata does, but definitely in a different context. Rūpa Gosvāmin (Sixteenth Century) is the only exception as far as the various types of *Vaivarnya* with its different colour-effects are concerned. He says that in sorrow the change of colour is white, grey or black, in anger red and in fear black or white. The state of excessive happiness also causes red colour.³ This descrip-

1. Nāṭyaśāstra 7/58 and 105

2. Sāhityadarpana 3/138

3. Haribhakturasamptasandhu Dakṣaṭhāga, Lakṣaṇa 3/20, 21.

ed in a woman when a man directs attention to her personal appearance and gazes intently at her. It is also caused due to non-fulfilment of vows and defeat. It is to be represented by consequents such as change of colour, down cast face and the like.¹ Here in Jagannātha's definition of *Vridā* it seems certain, as if the writer had a fair idea of blushing, but both the verses cited as examples by him, tell a different story. The first verse runs thus :-²

“Kucakalasayugāntarmāmakinam nakhānkam
Sapulakatanu mandam mandamāloka mānā
Vinihitavadanam mām viksyā bālā gavākse
Cakitanatanatāngī sadma sadyo viveśa ”

Dr. Har Dutt Sharma translates it thus —

“The young lady, with her body all horripilated looking at the marks of my nails between her two jar-like breasts, at once entered the house, with limbs expressing fear and bent down, when she saw me with my face placed in a window (looking at her).”³

Explaining the verse Panditarāja himself says that here *Vridā* is mixed with *Trāsa* (fear) and that is why the lady at once entered the house, with limbs expressing fear and bent down. Except for the implication of fear the situation described above can make any sensitive lady normally blush. The lady in question would have blushed here, but neither the term expressive of blushing is found in the verse (which was necessary), as being *anubhāva* (consequents) all the involuntary actions must be given specific expression, nor *trāsa* mixed with *Vriṣṭi* creates proper atmosphere for blushing, as it must have induced a disturbing influence over the lady and she must have found her mind much confused. Such a frame of mind is certainly favourable for the suggestion of *Vridābhāra*, but not for the expression of blushing.

The other example suggestive of *Vridā* is an excellent one. The state indicated therein is most appropriate for blushing :—

1. Rasagāgādhara P. 97 (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay)

2. Bhāmavilāsa, Śṅgāra-vilāsa, 30, (Pub. oriental Book Agency, Poona)

3. Ibid.

(Trans. Portion)

DISCUSSION

L. L. Joshi : I can give you a very plausible reason for the absence of the description of blushing in our literature. It is simply that our complexion is normally too dark to make the crimsoning of the cheeks clearly visible ! There are, however, some excellent descriptions of the situation of blushing in Sanskrit literature, such as the following two ślokas from the Kumārasambhava

हेरस्तु किञ्चित्परिलुप्तर्घयश्चन्द्रोदयारम्भ इवाम्बुराशि ।
 उमामुले विम्बफलाधरोष्ठे व्यापारयामाम विलोचनानि ॥
 विवृण्वती शैलमुतापि मावमगै स्फुरद्वालकदम्बकल्पं ।
 साचीकृता चास्तरेण तस्यौ मुखेन पर्यन्तविलोचनेन ॥

This is fine description of blushing. But the actual word of blushing does not occur on account of the reason, I have already explained.

Venkatachalam : Dr Jantly has placed sufficient evidence before us to show that both in literature as well as in poetics there really exist situations which call for a mention of blushing and the absence of any such word is rather striking. But he himself points out that the picture is not so bleak as he painted it in the initial stages and that at least in poetics blushing is comprehended indirectly under *Vairamya* coming under *Vrīdā* (Shyness). In fact the word *vairamya* should be taken not in the sense of *Vaṇābhāsa* but in the sense of *Varnavikāra*. There are really some situations of shyness where blushing has been indicated through the word *Vairamya*. I remember of a Śloka where the speech of a person trying to speak in an assembly of the learned scholars has been compared with a newly wedded bride :

नाहवापि पुर पद रचयन्ति प्राप्तोपकथं हठान्
 पूटा न प्रविदन्ति वन्ममग्ने स्तम्भं ममाङ्गिति ।

P. L. Bhargava : The impression that I gathered from the paper of Dr Jaitly is that not only blushing has been totally ignored by our ācāryas but by our poets also and that there is no mention of the crimsoning of the cheeks due to shyness in Sanskrit literature. As far as Dr Dwivedi's contention is concerned, that blushing is more internal than external. I can say that not only blushing but every feeling is essentially internal but it has its external manifestation too. And when the external manifestations of other feelings have actually been described by the poets, it is surprising that the external manifestation of shyness is totally ignored. Shri Joshi humorously remarked in the beginning that blushing finds no mention in Sanskrit Literature because due to our dark complexion crimsoning of cheek is not visible. But it is not true, if we consider it seriously, because redness of the face in anger has actually been mentioned.

R. P. Dwivedi : You have associated blushing with shyness. But, I think it is not necessarily so. Crimsoning of the cheeks is caused by the increased blood circulation which may be due to any kind of excitement. Blushing should, therefore, be connected with excitement in general and not particularly with shyness.

To the suggestion of Mr. Venkatachalam, that blushing be included in *Vaivarnya*. I wish to point out that it is normally used derogatively in the sense of 'fainting of the natural brightness of the face', for the shadow of depression. Look at the following famous śloka of Kālidāsa :

सञ्चारिणी दीपसिखेव रात्रौ य य व्यतीयाय पतिम्बरा सा ।
नरेन्द्रमार्गद्वे इव प्रपेदे विवर्णभावः स स भूमिपालः ॥

Therefore, I think, blushing can hardly be included in *Vaivarnya*. (tr)

R. S. Jaitly : I agree with Shri Joshi and Mr. Venkatachalam that blushing was not unknown to Sanskrit

ties we would have been able to say that perhaps they included blushing in it. But obviously that is not the case. I, as such, do not object to the suggestion of blushing being included in *cauranya* but only wish that it should have some clear division to provide for crimsoning of the cheeks caused by the shyness.

That the Sanskrit ācāryas really overlooked blushing and it was not included in *Varaṃśa* is evident from the colour scheme given by Rūpa-goswamin. He describes the colour effects of various emotions on face, such as whiteness in sorrow and redness in anger on face etc. etc. but he nowhere mentions the pink colour caused by shyness. (tr)

Brahmananda Sharma In fact the word blushing in English comprises both, the shyness as well as crimsoning of the cheeks. It includes, in other words, the cause as well as its effect, whereas in Sanskrit the cause (shyness) and the effect (crimsoning) are denoted by two different terms. Synonyms from two different languages seldom have the same extent of meaning. It is, therefore, not justified to search for an exact synonym in Sanskrit for the English word, "blushing" and to declare that the absence of blushing in Sanskrit is striking and thus constitutes a missing link. (tr)

R. S. Jolly : As far as English is concerned the word blushing denotes only the effect i. e. crimsoning of the cheeks which is the external manifestation of a particular emotion. There are some ācāryas in Sanskrit who comprise in sāttvika bhāva both bhāva as well as anubhāva. Some take it to mean only the external effects, the ensuants. Following the view of the first category of ācāryas, we should not interpret the word, "blushing" as meaning shyness as well as crimsoning, since blushing is only crimsoning, the effect, pure and simple. (tr)

R. C. Daxid Dr. Sharma has pointed out that there is no

A SYNTHESIS OF THE DHVANYBHĀVA-VĀDINS AND THE DHVANI-VĀDINS

Dr D.N. Shukla

My studies of reputed poets and aestheticians of Kashmir have given me a new approach to both poetics and aesthetics. In the contemporary studies and researches, the scholars have not been able to reconcile the different schools of poetry especially the Alankāra school and the Dhvani school. It is my first approach to reconcile this seeming opposition between Dhvanyabhāvavādins and Dhvanivādins.

We are all aware that there are as many as five schools of poetics, namely,

Alankāra-school	of	Bhāmaha, Dandin etc.
Rīti-school	of	Vāmana etc.
Vakrokti-school	of	Kuntala etc.
Anumita-school	of	Mahimabhaṭṭa etc.
Dhvani-school	of	Ānanda, Vardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata etc.

Similarly, there is also a very narrow approach to aesthetics that it is only related to Rasāśvāda. The landmark amalgamation of Alankāra, Rasa and Dhvani by Ānanda-Vardhana, the great Kashmirian literary luminary, who has shed lustre, is unfortunately not fully grasped by contemporary scholars. Let me, therefore, concentrate on this theme.

The Vedas themselves are repository of Poetry and Music. The Hymns of Rgveda are earliest compositions or most appropriately revelations. Thus these suggest that the poetry is not a mere verbal jingling and jugglery. It aims at some revelations. This background was responsible for poetic insight, genius and genesis which culminated in the sphota-Theory of the Vaiyākaranas, the Nāda-Theory of the Saṅgita-Panditas, the Vāstu-Theory of the Sthapatis and the Sthāpakas and lastly—the most prominent doctrine of Dhvani of the Sāhitya Panditas. This fundamental background is enough to convince us that the poetry is the

Origin of the Drama to Bharata means the first performance of the first drama.

The aestheticity of the dramatic art has captivated the minds of a number of reputed authors, like Bhattachāyaka, Śrī-Śaṅka, Lollata and Abhinavagupta for whom the Nāṭya-śāstra's aphorism—

“विनावातुमावन्निचारितयोगादननिष्पत्तिः”

was the starting point for the Rasa-Theory. I do not think I should take this side of the dramatic development here. I am more concerned with the art of the Art rather than the philosophy of the Art. This later aspect, I hope to take while saying some thing on the art of poetry.

My own original contribution is the amalgamation of Alākāra and Dhvani both. Poetry and Drama, i.e. Śravya and Drīya Kāvyas, are the two manifestations of poetry. We all know that the main theme of the dramatic performance is Rasāhvāda. This leads us to Aesthetic Ideal of our Fine Arts.

Aesthetic Ideal of our Fine Arts

Art in India is Iconography. The Viśnudharmottara has remarkable contribution on this score and Rājā Bhoja in his celebrated treatise, the Samarāṅganasūtradhāra, has simply canonised this aspect of Indian Art which distinguishes it from the Greek Art and provides a Philosophy for Art which is its genesis and genius.

Iconography is both a science and art. For an artistic perfection of an image, it has to be accomplished in such a way as to arouse in us the aesthetic experience akin to one as we get from poetry and music. According to the Indian aestheticians, the main purpose of a poetical composition is to arouse pleasure, the Āhvāda (what is called ‘Rasāhvāda’) in the reader. And this Rasāhvāda is extolled as Brahmānanda-Sahodara. It is from this fundamental point of Indian aestheticians that we do not have tragedies in our dramatic literature. The Indian view or more appropriately the Hindu view of life is one of unbounden faith in eternity, a profound sense of optimism and sublime outlook of life, coloured by the noumenal existence and heavenly bliss, both

rational approach. We have to bring the two extremes of the Dhvanyabhāvavādins, i.e. the Ālankārikas and Dhvani-Vādins into one integrated plane to judge the art of poetry in both its aspects, the Vāc्यārtha and the Vyangyārtha. Ānandavardhana, the founder of the Dhvani school and the greatest exponent of this doctrine himself opines this very view. After defining the Dhvani, he is not neglecting the foundation of Dhvani and let me quote both his Kārikās :

योज्यैः सहृदयश्लाघ्य काव्यात्मेति व्यवस्थितः ।
वाच्यप्रतीयमानाख्यौ तस्य मेदावुभौ स्मृतौ ॥
तत्र वाच्यः प्रसिद्धो यः प्रकारैश्चमादिभिः ।
बहुधा व्याकृतः सोऽयं ततो नेह प्रत्ययते ॥

Thus it is clear that Alankāras are a bedrock or the foundation of the Dhvani-doctrine. The above-quoted two Kārikās themselves speak of the evolution and development of the Dhvani doctrine from the Vāc्यārtha to the Vyangyārtha. The Vāc्यārtha is the foundation and the Dhvani is the sublimest imposing edifice of poetry. This aesthetic ideal is really one of the major contributions of Indian canons of Art as propounded in the texts like Viṣṇudharmottara and the Samarāṅganasūtradhāra, which give a distinct and unique character to Fine Arts in India. The oft-quoted aphorism रमो वै स* is not without significance and high meaning, it aims at ennobling life. Even birds and beasts, the so-called brutes, when characterized with these different sentiments in accordance with the different situations, can go higher up; men and women, imbued with them, simply become divine. Further more this aesthetic element in Indian Art pre-supposes the ideal of beautiful not only in its real perspective but also in the inner manifestation, the sole criterion of the beautiful the 'Sundara' from the Hindu view of life. Internally beautiful, in its turn, pre-supposes the truthful, the 'Satya' both internally and externally and the art which is both Satya and Sundara, that alone becomes the Beneficent, the Śiva the supreme ideal of life. The Indian seers, especially the Kashmirian philosophers, teachers and monks, have

Thus a perusal of the sections on painting in the *Viśnudharmottara* and Bhoja's *Samarāṅgaṇa-Sūtradhāra* will show how *Citra* is based on the canons of *Nāṭya*. For them *Citra* is only one scene of *Nāṭya* and the latter is a succession of *Citra*. The *Viśnudharmottara* says that *Citra* is as much the art of imitation (*Anukarana*) as *Nāṭya*. The poses of the hand in dance called *Nṛtyahastas* and *Rasadr̥ṣṭis* are equally essential in painting. These are studied elaborately in the *Nāṭya* and this study is absolutely necessary and is fully utilised in painting.

What the hand poses implicitly express, the *rasas* and the *rasa-dr̥ṣṭis* make that explicit. Thus the images are bestowed with life movements through this symbolism of gesticulation the very essence of dramatics both put together (*Sarvābhinayadarśanāt*). Therefore, this delineation of the *rasas* and *rasa-dr̥ṣṭis* and their representation constitute the fundamental background both in the *Āṅikā* (Drama) and the *Citra* (painting) arts. The science of Aesthetics included dramatics.

The symbolism in Art is again a second landmark to illustrate the impact of philosophy on Fine Arts in India. *Mudrās*, *Lāñchanas* and *Laksanas* of the Indian images themselves speak of this fundamental impact and it is not necessary to treat this massive subject here. There is a great misconception among the contemporary writers that Hindu images have no *mudrās*.

The renowned adherents of *Rasa* theory like Bharata, the founder of the *Rasa* school in Sanskrit Aesthetics and others like Śrīṣaṅku, Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa and Abhinavagupta, all stand for *Rasāśvāda*. Ānandavardhana has epoch-making distinction to have enunciated this theory of *Rasa* on the amalgamated plane of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* thus bringing both poetry and drama as an integrated Fine Art. Abhinavagupta has a scholarly exposition to his credit to focus the attention of the later writers to adopt this everlasting and everfresh doctrine of *Dhvani*. *Dhvani*, the *Mahāviśaya*, and *Rasa*, *Alaṅkāra* and *Vastu* as its main constituents.

We have been hearing that literature is the mirror of

“परिनिर्व्विननिरपन्नतदशब्दब्रह्मणा विपरिचिता मनमाश्रित्य एव प्रवृत्तः एव ध्वनिव्यवहारः ।”

“प्रथमे हि विद्वाम् वैयाकरणा । ते च वर्गेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति । तथैव अन्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभि मूरिभि काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभि वाच्य-वाचकमस्मिन् शब्दान्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्याद् ध्वनिरिति उक्तम् ।”

Similarly the further exposition also helps us to enunciate this background

अजस्रवृत्तिर्यं शब्द मूढमत्वाच्चोपलभ्यते ।
व्यजनाद्वायुरिव स स्वनिमित्तात् प्रतीयते ।

Punyarāja, a reputed commentator on the Vākyapadiya elucidates it still higher to help us in establishing this stand (vide his commentary on the above Kārikā)

The grammarians employed the word Dhvani that manifested the sphota, similarly in the poem, words manifest suggested sense. The very first verse of Vākyapadiya enunciates this principle .

अनादिनिवन ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्व यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽयमावेन प्रक्रिया जगती यथा ॥

Similarly the following quotation of the Vākyapadiya also help us to enunciate this background .

अरणिम्या यथा ज्योतिः प्रकाशान्तरकारणम् ।
तद्वच्चक्षोर्जपि बुद्धिस्य ध्रुवीना कारण परम् ॥

Punyarāja elucidates it still higher to help us in establishing this stand

मूढमो वायुरिव सर्वभूतानामन्तर्बहिश्च ध्वनिरवस्थित, स एव कैश्चिद् आकाश इति पश्यते,
तत्र यथा मूढमस्य वायोर्ब्रह्मजनाद् अभिव्यञ्जनाद् अभिव्यक्ति-
तया मूढमो ध्वनिः स्वनिमित्तरभिव्यक्त प्रचितविक्रियास्य श्रोत्रदेशं
प्राप्त उपलभ्यते इत्ययं ।

The term like *Vyañjana*, '*Vyañjanā*' '*Vyañjaka*', '*Pratyāyana*', '*Pratyāyaka*', '*Prakāśana*', '*Prakāśaka*' used by *Ānandavardhana* in connection with his theory of *Dhvani* frequently occur in the *Vākya-pāṇini*.

Ānandavardhana's views that the relation between a significant word and its meaning is eternal are based on the similar view expressed in the *Vākya-pāṇini*.

नित्यं शब्दार्थसम्बन्धं समान्तरानो महर्षिभिः ।

सूत्राणां सानुतन्त्राणां भाष्याणां च प्रणेनुभिः ॥

The hint for *Ānandavardhana*'s recognising even a single letter as expressive of '*Rasa*' is supplied by the statement of *Bhartrhari* in which he declares even a single word to be capable of denoting the sense of the whole sentence -

सोऽयमित्यभिसम्बन्धो बुद्ध्या प्रक्रम्यते यदा ।

वाक्ये सधट्टाया च स प्रबन्धेऽपि दीप्यते ।

In order to meet an objection of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, *Ānandavardhana* divides the *Vyangya* sense into '*Nāntariyaka*' i.e. inseparably connected and '*Vivakṣita*' i.e. desired or intended; the former being not different from the '*Vācya*' or the denoted sense, the latter deserves the designation of *Dhvani*. This idea of '*Nāntariyaka*' to my mind has been borrowed from the *Vākya-pāṇini*.

The kind of *Dhvani*, called '*Asamlakṣyakrama-Vyangya*' in which no order or succession of the manifest and the manifested is perceived during the manifestation (*Rasa*), is based on a view expressed in the *Vākya-pāṇini*, regarding the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. In reply to the question 'Is the order of the manifest and manifested at the time of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* felt or not?' *Bhartrhari* gives two views - According to one, sound *sphoṭa* is perceived as indistinct just as the *sphaṭika* stone, in which the colour of the *Japā* flower is reflected, looks coloured and not distinct from flowers (vide *Puṇyarāja*'s commentary on the *Vākya-pāṇini*) while according to the second, the sound, though having its own existence independent of *sphoṭa*, is

aspect. This elucidation has been very scholarly and ably detailed by Dr K.C. Pandey

In the end I must refer to Kashmir Śaivism which had very profound impact on the writers belonging to this school. Abhinavagupta was a great Śaiva and the moorings of Kashmir Śaivism before Vasugupta were providing the germs of this all powerful movement of Kashmir Śaivism which to my mind permeated every thought of Fine Arts—Architecture, Sculpture and Painting. It is, therefore, imperative to touch this branch rather the main branch of fine Arts to bring this topic home. In my work on Śilpaśāstra I have given a new lead about how to co-ordinate Music, Dance, Drama, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Iconography and architecture and have formulated the following maxim —

पद्मेदाः । पद्मसंनानि । तयैव पद्मला ।

Aspects of Poetry in terms of Pictures :

Vāmana, among other Ālankārikas, was a keen student of pictures. With much insight, Vāmana says that the essence of poetry is style (Rīti) and compares this Rīti to the linear beauty :

एतान् विष्णु रेखाञ्चिच्चित्रं काव्यं प्रतिष्ठितम्.

As style is the soul of poetry so are lines that of a picture. On seeing this remark of Vāmana we are reminded of the Vismudharmottara which says that the masters praise the lines :

रेखां प्रशंसन्ति आचार्याः ।

Vāmana again returns to the same metaphor of which he seems to be very fond of and says in his Kāyalankārasūtra-vṛtti :

यदा विच्छिद्यते रेखा चतुर विप्रसृष्टिरे ।

तयैव वागवि प्राज्ञैः समस्तगुणगुम्फिता ॥

Another reference to the painting in Vāmana speaks of colour. The Vismudharmottara, after saying that the masters praise the lines, remarks that some others praise 'colour' :

वर्णान्प्रशंसन्ति जनाः

Vāmana briefly compares Rītuś, the essence of poetry, to lines (rekhā) which are the essence of pictures. This Sūtra is quoted and further explained by Ratneśvara in his commentary on Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharana*

यथा चित्रस्य लेखा अग्रप्रत्यगलावण्योन्मीलनक्षमा, तथा रीतिरिति
द्वितीये विस्तरः ।

Rājānaka Kuntaka, another great Ālankārika, in chapter III of his *Vakroktu-jīvita*, says thus regarding the poet's beautiful speech

मनोत्तमकोलेखवर्णच्छायाश्रियं पृथक् ।
चित्रस्येव मनोहारि कान्तुं किमपि कौशलम् ॥

The stamp of beauty on a poet's utterance is totally different from the materials of poetry, viz., the words and thoughts. It is the result purely of the great powers of the poet, constituting his genius. This is like the beauty of a picture which is born of the genius of the artist and is separate from the plank or wall on which the picture is painted or the colours employed. Kuntaka here refers to two surfaces, wall and plank, to the rules for lines, anatomy etc. given in the *Citra-sūtras*, to the colours and to the *Cāyā* or *kāntu* or *aujvalya* of which Vāmana spoke. The following is Kuntaka's *Vṛtu* on the *Kārikā* given above

फलकमालेख्यावारभूता भित्ति, उल्लेख चित्रसूत्रप्रमाणोपपन्न रेखाविन्यास-
मात्र, वर्णा रञ्जकद्रव्यविशेषा, छाया कान्ति । तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यं — यथा
चित्रस्य किमपि फलकाद्युपकरणकलापव्यतिरेकि सबलप्रकृतपदार्थजीवितायमान
चित्रकारकीरल पृथक्त्वेन मुख्यतयोद्भवाते ..

Ibid. P 154

The application of the Rasa Theory to Citra

It follows from the above mentioned fact that Citra is based on Nāṭya, that the critics of old applied the Rasa theory of Nāṭya, and Kāvya to Citra as well. As a matter of fact the Rasa theory applies to all arts. So it is that while speaking of the kinds of pictures in the section on painting in

those Rasas, this would rather constitute a flaw of poetry, called the स्वरसदवाच्यत्व. Thus the title of a picture forms a very little part of it. If one does not avoid this flaw, his poem comes to the state of that picture which can be known only by its title or that frame which has the title of the picture within.

According to Kuntaka alankāras are not separate from alankārya. Alankāras essentially exist in poetic Śabda and artha and are not added externally to the poetic composition. They are distinguished and discussed to reveal and explain their nature. Kuntaka is not a blind follower of his predecessors. He takes bold steps against them time to time to prove and justify his own theory. He criticises the earlier rhetoricians who gave a minor position to alankāras as the external means of decoration to poetry like Kaṭaka etc. to a human body. Kuntaka stresses that there can be no beautiful poetry without striking alankāras. Alankāras are meant to enhance the beauty of alankārya. He includes all the alankāras in his Vākyavakratā. Alankāras are dependent on Kavipratibhā and without the power of imagination there is no striking Alankāra. There is novelty and beauty in poetic expression, though the theme may be the old one, due to the infinite ways of figurative expressions.

At the same time, while giving such a high position to Alankāras, Kuntaka is also aware of the fact that the excess of the alankāras, sometimes, mars the delicacy and beauty of alankārya. There should be propriety in using the alankāras so as not to harm the beauty of the delicate Vastu-Varnana and the development of Rāsa. For example in the following stanza,

"घोताञ्जने च नयने स्फटिकाच्छकान्ति-
गण्डस्थली बिगतकृत्रिमरत्नमोष्ठम् ।
अगानि दन्तिशिखरन्तविनिर्मलानि
किं यन् सुन्दरमभूत् तरुणीजनस्य ॥"

There is Upamā Alankāra when the fair complexion of the bathing ladies is compared with the tender teeth of young elephants. The beauty of the delicate theme, i.e. the description of the natural beauty of the bathing ladies, is doubled by this Upamā Alankāra. Thus the use of Alankāra should be proper according to the Kāvya-Vastu. The Vastu which is to be decorated also should be equally striking as the Alankāras, otherwise the composition will be like a ghost without having soul though decorated with alankāras, and such a poetry will not please the critics.

composition by its striking beauty. Such a rasavat alankāra enhances the beauty of alankārya, for example,

“उपोद्वारागेन विलोलतारक
तथा गृहीत शशिना निशामुखम् ।
यथा समस्त तिमिराद्युक्तं तथा
पुरोऽपि रागाद् गलितं न लक्षितम् ॥”

The nāyaka-nāyikā-bhāva is attributed to the Moon and the Night. So it is a beautiful Rūpaka with a touch of Śleṣa enhancing the beauty of the Śrngāra rasa depicted in the stanza. Though it is a Nature-description it is *sarasa* and pleasing due to this striking rūpaka alankāra which can be called rasavat.

Similarly, like rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa, bhāvaśānti etc also are alankārya according to Kuntaka. So he does not accept preyas, ūṇasvin, udātta and Samāhita as the alankāras.

Kuntaka, like Ānandavardhana, is aware of the great importance of rasa in poetry, but like all other poetic concepts he includes rasa also in the varieties of Vakratā, mainly in Vākhyavakratā, Prakāranavakratā and prabandhavakratā. He criticises Udbhaṭa's Svāśabdavācya theory of rasa. As in alankāra, Kuntaka admits the importance of aucitya also in rasa. Kuntaka admits the view of Ānandavardhana that if rasavat is not admitted in inanimate objects, the vast portion of good poetry will be included in nirasakāvya:

He divides rasa into three categories:-

1. Mūlhyacetanaviśaya, like gods, human beings etc.

2. Amukhyacetanaviśaya, like animals, birds etc.

and 3. Acetanaviśaya or relating to inanimate objects.

The uddīpana vibhāvas, by their minute description, become subordinate to rasas according to Kuntaka. Thus he admits the importance of rasa in poetry but treats it objectively as a Vastu, unlike Ānandavardhana who treats it subjectively as the soul of poetry.

Kuntaka criticises the Ritu concept of the earlier rhetoricians who name them after particular countries like Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī etc, and accept one of them as the

mārgas, but their nature is different in each mārga. In Sukumāra mārga Mādhurya guna stands for the use of the pleasant words having no compounds. Prasāda is clarity of meaning. Lāvanya is the beauty of arranging the poetic composition and ābhijātya is the use of sweet and pleasing sounds in the Sukumāra mārga. In vicitra mārga, Mādhurya stands for the lack of loose composition (Śaithilyābhāva) and prasāda is meant for uncompounded words with a touch of ojas. Lāvanya is skill in arranging letters strikingly and ābhijātya is meant to avoid the too harsh or the too soft letters in a composition. In madhyama mārga a beautiful combination of both the groups of gunas is found.

Kuntaka justifies his two novel gunas lāvanya and ābhijātya. They are the qualities residing in an extraordinarily beautiful lady but by upacāra are attributed to poetry, as Mādhurya and prasāda gunas are attributed, though they are the qualities of sweet meats and water respectively. Kuntaka gives two more general gunas. aucitya and saubhāgya as belonging to all the mārgas. Aucitya is a clear description of things with propriety and Saubhāgya is a charm found in a composition as a whole. Kuntaka takes the idea of aucitya from Ānandavardhana and relates it to all the poetic concepts. Saubhāgya Guna is his own addition of a novel Guna decorating the entire composition.

Thus Kuntaka shows novelty and originality in the treatment of all the poetic concepts discussed by the earlier rhetoricians, and his treatment is very close to the modern literary criticism which can be applied to any literature. He practically points out the drawbacks of earlier rhetoricians and tries to correct them in his own way. The broad treatment of his Vakrokti theory supported by the practical illustrations with his own critical commentary shows his great genius as the best critic as well as the best poet.

Kuntaka's classification of Vakratā is based on the classification of Ānandavardhana's Dhvani. He is greatly influenced by Ānandavardhana and many times he quotes him in his work with great respect. He classifies Vakratā into six parts :—

appreciate the existing poetry Kuntaka is vastuniṣṭha and his select illustrations in the *Vakroktujīvita* show his highest taste. Thus his book is meant for both the critics and the poets. Though being most broad, systematic and modern, Kuntaka's theory of *Vakrokti* did not become as popular as the *Dhvani* theory of Ānandavardhana due to the lack of eminent followers. And hence the importance of Kuntaka's contribution to Sanskrit Poetics remained sorely neglected.

The sixth chapter, which consists of five stanzas only and which is named as praśamsādhyaṃya, serves as a small bridge leading over to the second half

In the first verse¹ of the seventh chapter Śrīkanṭha argues out the case of treating rasas in his work on the ground that they enhance the beauty of drama and dance.

In the second stanza², instead of confining the scope of rasas merely to the field of drama and poetry, he rightly extends it further to that of music, and describes as to how

1. cf. वस्यते सप्तमेऽध्याये रसमन्दोद्दक्षणम् ।

तेऽपि सर्वे स्वयं यस्मान्नाट्यसौभाग्यदीपका ॥ ७ २

(Here नाट्य=drama as well as dance)

2. ॥ तत्र रसस्वरूपमाह ॥

उद्याने प्रेयनीनिर्मलजपवनं कोविलाद्यैर्विभावं-

श्रीवाम्बूवस्तिष्ठनेशाम्बुजमुजलनिकाऽऽन्दोलनाद्यानुभावं ।

व्यक्तीभूतो विवृद्ध मुच्चिरमुखचितो भूरि निर्वेदनाद्यै-

र्नाट्ये गीते च काव्ये त्रिषु वनति रसः शुद्धबुद्धस्वभावः ॥२॥

उत्सादितो यौवनरम्यरामाऽऽरामादिभिस्तैर्बहुभिर्विभावं ।

सर्वचितो भूलतिवाविमग्नैर्भंगैरपागस्य करक्रियामि ॥३॥

निर्वेदमुख्यैः सहकारिभिस्तैः सर्वचितं पल्लवितं क्रमेण ।

रामादिहृदये पटुतनैकेऽपि प्रतीयमानो रसशब्दवाच्यः ॥४॥

भोगेन भुज्यत इति प्रवदन्ति केचित्

सान्नायिकप्रकरसादरचर्चमाणः ।

कार्यो न कारणकलाविभावनाशे

यस्मान्न तिष्ठति रसो रसनीयरूपी ॥५॥

वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शविहीनचेतना

सान्नायिकादां किल दामनाम्बरा ।

एवोऽप्यनेकैरनुभूयते रसो

न स्वात्ततो लौकिकभोगमन्निभः ॥६॥

Varial Lectioes

1b रसम् (for रस), 1cd यस्मान्नाट्य, 2 a मन्दजप

2c विवृद्धं (for विवृद्ध) 2d गीतेय (for गीते च)

5b सान्नायिक, चर्चमाणः 5d रसो (for रसो)

After this the seventh verse gives the number of rasas as nine by the inclusion of sānta, as against Mammata who mentions here (IV. 29) only eight, though he speaks of sānta as the ninth rase in 4.35

After this follows the exposition of these rasas as follows

Śṛṅgāra and its varieties and sub-varieties (8-10)¹ after Mammata²

हृदयमिव प्रविशन् सर्वा गीणमिवालिगन् अन्यत् सर्वमिव तिरोदधत् ब्रह्मास्वाद-
मिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी शृंगारादिको रसः । स च न कार्यः ।
विभावादिविनाशेऽपि तस्य सम्भवप्रमगात् । नापि ज्ञाप्य सिद्धस्य तस्या-
सम्भवात् । अपि तु विभावादिभिर्यज्जितद्वयवर्णीय । कारकज्ञापकाम्यामन्यत्
क्व दृष्टमिति चेत् न क्वचिद्दृष्टमित्यलौकिकसिद्धेर्भूषणमेतन्न दूषणम् ।
चर्वणानिष्पत्त्या तस्य निष्पत्तिरूपचरितेति कार्योप्युच्यताम् । लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादि-
प्रमाणतादृश्यावबोधशालिमितयोगिज्ञानवेद्यान्तरस्पर्शरहितस्वात्ममाश्रयवसित-
परिमितेतरयोगिनत्रेदनविलक्षणलोकोत्तरस्वमवेदनगोचर इति प्रत्येयोऽप्यभि-
धीयताम् । तद्ग्राहक च न निविकल्पक विभावादिपराशरप्रधानत्वात् । नापि
सविकल्प चर्व्यमाणस्यालौकिकानन्दमयस्य स्वसवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । उभयाभाव-
स्वरूपस्य चोभयात्मकस्वमपि पूर्ववल्लोकोत्तरतामेव गमयति न तु विरोधमिति
श्रीमदाचार्याभिनवगुप्तपादा ।

काव्यप्रकाश (ed. by सलकीकर, 1950, pp 91.95)

1. ॥ तत्र शृंगारः ॥

शृंगारो द्विविधः प्रोक्तः सम्भोगो विप्रलम्भकः ।

आयस्तत्राऽपरिच्छेद्यो गाढालिगनचुम्बनं ॥

पुष्पावचयनज्योस्नासेवासलिलवेलिभिः ।

परिलोकनपानार्थरित्येव परिगण्यते ॥

द्विनोयस्त्वभिलाषेऽप्यभिवासघापहेतुश्च ।

विरहानलसम्भूतस्तत्र पञ्चविधः स्मृतः ॥ (७.८-१०)

2 अत्र शृंगारस्य द्वौ भेदो । सम्भोगो विप्रलम्भश्च । तत्राद्यः

परस्परवल्लोकनालिगनाधारपानपरिचुम्बनाद्यनन्तत्वादपरिच्छेद्यः एकः एव गण्यते ।

Kāvyaaprakāśa, p 100

and

अपरस्म्यु अभिलाषविरहेऽप्यभिवासघापहेतुश्च इति पञ्चविधः ।

Ibid, p. 102

we look up again to the lines 5b and further 5c it will be obvious that the expression *cāryamānaḥ* etc appears in the Kāvya-Prakāśa in context of the theory of Abhinavagupta (चध्यमाणनैकप्राण etc) and not in that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka or Śankuka. The words *kāryo na* etc in 5c have been culled from the description of the theory of Abhinavagupta. I, therefore, think that the summary of of the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka ends with 5a, and in 5b-6d the theory of Abhinavagupta has been propounded

R P Dandekar: It is true that some of the expressions in 5b to 6d are reverberations of the view of Abhinavagupta as quoted by Mammaṭa, but an examination of the last sentence (6d) of these lines shows that Śrīkanṭha again ends with *bhuktiwāda* (see लौकिकभोगसन्निभ) of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. We can therefore assert that Śrīkanṭha has described only the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka with the mixed terminology of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta (tr.)

R.C Dandekar: I can hardly agree with your view. In the last line वेदान्तरस्पर्शविहीनचेतसा सामाजिकानां किल वासनारमक, एकाग्र्यनेकेरनुभूयते रस etc the *bhuktiwāda* has not been expanded but rather refuted by the author. Thus, in my opinion, typically and exclusively elucidates the view of Abhinavagupta

Bhaṭṭi also did not remain behind the race. Therefore, he introduced a new style in poetry.

Moreover, from the study of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya, it appears that Bhaṭṭi was a follower of the Alankāra and Guna school. He illustrated as many as thirtyeight Alankāras, including Śabdāṅkārā and their categories. The whole of the eleventh canto is said to be an example of Mādhurya guna. Evidently, later rhetoricians accepted Mādhurya as a guna. Also, most of the verses of this canto can be said to be good examples of Śṛṅgāra Rasa. Bhaṭṭi could name the canto Śṛṅgārakānda, but he named it deliberately as Mādhurya Kānda. It shows that Alankāras and Gunas were more agreeable to Bhaṭṭi than Rasa. It again indicates that Bhaṭṭi thinks that Alankāra and Guna are more important in a poem than Rasa which betrays his contemporary trends in the treatment of Rasa in practice.

To illustrate the above tendency it can safely be stated that like Bhāmaha, Bhaṭṭi also incorporated Rasa in an Alankāra called Rasavat. The example given by Bhaṭṭi¹ is one applicable to Śṛṅgāra (of inanimate objects). But since he has not referred to any Rasa there, it shows that he tries to incorporate this Rasa in an Alankāra. This omission of Rasa by Bhaṭṭi evidently shows that he was not a follower of the Rasa School.

Moreover, as Bhaṭṭi was writing Lakṣyagrantha, he could have illustrated various Rasas like Alankāras. But he has not done so because, perhaps, he did not think it to be an essential element of poetry.

Thus, various elements used by the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya show that in fact, the time of Bhaṭṭi did not give any distinct importance to Rasa. That is why, it is ignored by the poet.

Though theoretical references to Rasa are completely wanting, however, in practice Bhaṭṭi has followed the conven-

¹ Bhaṭṭi Kāvya, X. 48

बहून्निर्गन्तव्यं दिवो निरुन्ध्वं त्रिभुवनतलव्यकान्तियोगम् ।

- न्युत्पन्नवदन मनोभिरामं निवृत्तकरमंदनादिव स्तुतम् ॥ -

It is supported both by Bhāmaha and Dandin. It further shows that the seed of the explanation of the procedure of Rasa which was put by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra was suppressed by the poets who cared almost exclusively for Alankāra and Guna. The Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya proves the same both in theory and practice.

(a) Bhāva is the meaning born of Vibhāvas and conveyed by Anubhāvas i.e. three types of acting known as Vācika, Āngika and Sāttvika. Here Bhāva is used for the meaning of poetry.¹

(b) The second verse is nothing but the repetition of the first. Kaverantargata Bhāva cannot be anything else except the meaning of poetry. But the point worth noticing here is that Bharata has made an attempt to explain the word Bhāva from the spectator's view, as he always keeps him in mind. The question, what is Bhāva for the spectator, demands thorough consideration. Bharata ponders over the problem and talking in terms of transference says that which communicates the emotional experience of the poet to the spectator through the acting of Vak (conversation) Anga (body) Mukha-rāga (anointing of the face) and Sattva (the quality of purity) is called Bhāva.²

(c) That which brings Rasa or sentiment into being which pervades, intensely affects the spectator is known as Bhāva.³

Rudrata does not talk about the Bhāva as such, but his stand may be made clear from the twelfth chapter of his Kāvya-lankāra. He says that the ācāryas are of the opinion that Bhāvas are Rasas like madhura, amla etc. because they may be relished. He further argues and stresses that Nīrveda etc. i.e. all the Vyabhicārins, Sthāyins and Sāttvikas are also Rasa because they too have the quality of Rasas.⁴ The question before Rudrata is how the Bhāvas are culminated into Rasa unless they possess this particular quality. This is the line of his analysis and he has rightly concluded that they are Rasa because they have the quality of Rasas. The statement of Rudrata is to be regarded of importance because he has pointed out an important quality of Bhāvas which though hinted at by Bharata but was not so forcefully put forward.

Rājasekhara has not written anything about Bhāva independently. Only a brief outline on his stand may be formed

1. The same, 7. p. 407, Ibid.

2. The same, 7. p. 407, Ibid.

3. The same, 7. p. 408, Ibid.

4. Kāvya-lankāra, 4. verse 12.

the Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas, probably because they are external and absolute in nature. This interpretation of Abhinava seems to provide equal footing to the Bhāvas of poetry and the Bhāvas which are worldly. But the difference is there. In the world as such Bhāvas merely remain or happen, but in poetry or drama they pervade and do cause something to be. Later Ācāryas on poetics have more or less repeated Abhinava by accepting Bhāva as *Cittavṛtti* or disposition.

Anyhow it should not be taken as the end. The importance of the contribution of Abhinava lies in his theory of *Prāktana Samskāra*. He, like many other philosophers, believes that the *samskāra* of our pre-birth accompany us and remain with in the present life¹. For instance, when a new born child faces an unknown or distorted figure, he feels frightened. This fear, in fact, is caused by his congenital instinct or *samskāra* of fear. These impressions and instincts actually emerge in the shape of Bhāva. As a matter of fact we don't need to say that the stand of Abhinava is peculiarly original and the modern psychology seems to support his view with its analysis of the congenital instincts.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has added nothing new to the conception of Bhāva. He flatly says that in the world specific situations like *Rati* etc. remain in a static state in *Rāmādī*. They are known as Bhāva in poetry or drama. Poets and actors impose them on their own selves for the description or acting of a particular type and with the help of this medium they provide *Rasa*, as it has been said (by Bharata) that these situations which provide *Rasa* due to the various types of acting are known as Bhāva.²

The question before the *Sarasvatikanṭhābharana* of Bhoja is, whether Bhāvas are caused by the *Rasas* or *Rasas* are the root cause of the Bhāvas? The question was first of all posed by Bharata. He came to the conclusion that *Rasas* are the root cause of the Bhāvas and the case is vice versa also i.e. the Bhāvas are caused by the *Rasas*³. Abhinava later on justified that stand of Bharata. He held, as a seed produces

1. The same, p 345, Ibid

2. *Vyākṛtivr̥kka*, p 71. Chowkhamba Ed.

3. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, 6. verse 38, Gaeckwad's Ed

born of Ahankāra, therefore, all of them are Sthāyins, all are Vyabhicārins according to circumstances and all of them are Sāttvikas as they are mind-born (manah-prabhavatvāt), Sattva meaning nothing more than mind¹

Mammata includes two factors in his definition. Firstly, Rati concerning gods, sages, teacher, son etc. but by no way Kāntāvisayaka as it becomes Śrngāra. Secondly, the suggested stage of the Sañcārins². The question automatically arises, in which way Kāntāvisayaka Rati is to be treated if it is not perfectly evoked by Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas etc.³ The answer to the question is, it should be treated as Bhāva. The answer puts forward one more fact that the Sthāyin not properly evoked is also Bhāva. It is here for the first time that the Apuṣṭa Sthāyin has been included in the definition together with other factors. The analysis of Mammata thus provides a broader sphere to Bhāva as such and his success lies in the fact that the word Bhāva has frequently been used, by the later followers, in the same technical sense which was indeed provided by him.

Bhānumisra defines Bhāva as Rasānukūla Vikāra.⁴ Rasānukūla is a new term which has been used for the first time in Rasataranginī. It implies, that agitation only is Bhāva which obviously produces Rasa. This agitation or Vikāra is of two types i.e. external and internal. Internal too is of two types viz. Sthāyin and Vyabhicārīn, Sāttvikas etc. are external because they pertain to the body⁴. This is worth considering. All the Ācāryas are of the opinion that Sāttvikas possess dual nature. They are Bhāvas as well as Anubhāvas. If we look at the problem from a broader angle, all the Bhāvas appear to be Sāttvikas because they are born of the Sattva. This interpretation gives birth to a new problem that why only Stambha, Sveda etc. have been named Sāttvikas? The solution of Rasānavasudhākara is that Sāttvikas are called so because they are born of mind which is being overwhelmed by Sattva or the quality of purity. Sattva is the quality of mind therefore Sāttvikas

1 Śrngāraprakāśa, p. 354-355, by Raghavan

2 Kāvya-prakāśa, 4-48

3 Rasataranginī, 1. Page 6, Vēdāntesvara Press Ed

4 The same, 1. p. 8-9, Ibid

ensuant (Anubhāva) being Kāryarūpa on one hand and expresses Rasa on the other. Because of this Ativyāpti blemish this definition also cannot be accepted.¹

After preparing grounds through the discussion, out of which two main arguments are given above, he introduces his definition. According to his *Rasagangādhara*, Bhāva is the Vyabhicārīn suggested with the help of Vibhāvas as it has been said previously by Mammata.² It is beyond any doubt that the definition is liberal enough to include both suggestive of sentiment and suggested Bhāvas in its circumference. But when we look at it with a critical sight we feel that the soul of the broadness which was visible in his discussion is missing in his definition. He has completely failed in crossing the limit of the thirtyfour Vyabhicārīns mentioned by him. It may be deduced that he kept the definition of Mammata in his mind and therefore failed to include Sthāyīns and Sāttvikas in it. Moreover he was too much conscious about his analysis where bhāva is associated with the Bhāvadhvani only.

The date of Kṛṣṇa Kavi, the author of *Mandāramaraṇḍacampū* is not known to us. Any how Dr S K De considers him to be later than Appayya Dixit. His analysis of Bhāva is similar to that of Bhānumiśra.³ The only difference is that he has accepted two kinds of Śarīra i.e. Sāttvikas and Anubhāvas. Further he accepts the emergence of Sattva in mind in connection with the Sāttvikas but surprisingly calls them Dehadharma like Bhānumiśra.⁴ It has been pointed out before that the Sāttvikas have dual nature, therefore, it will be simply worthless to discuss it again here.

Murāridāna in his *Yāśavantayāśobbhūṣana* 'considers the questions about the root cause of the Bhāvas etc. For him Bhāva is merely an agitation or perturbation in mind.⁵ It automatically implies here that he has accepted Bharata's first etymology of the word i.e. Bhavatīti Bhāvḥ, one that happens is Bhāvā. Proceeding further, unlike most of the aesthe-

1. The same, 1 p 282-83, Ibid

2. The same, 1 p 283, Ibid

3. *Mandāramaraṇḍacampū*, 9 p 91, Pardurang Javji Ed

4. The same, 9 P. 97, Ibid

5. *Yāśavantayāśobbhūṣana*, 2 verse 2.

and feelings etc. are not necessarily related to the impressions of previous lives. Secondly to look upon *bhāva* as *Vāsanā*, as Abhinavagupta does, is to give it a very narrow definition which will be not applicable, and to call *bhāva* as *rasānukūla rikāra* is giving it too wide a definition.

Basanta Jaitly Would you kindly explain a little more, how these definitions are characterised by (non-applicability, *avyāpti*) and *atīvyāpti* (over-applicability)?

V C Shrivastava Well, *vāsanā* is limited only to *sthāyibhāvas* and it does not include other *bhāvas*, and in the second case *rasānukūla rikāra* will comprise not only *bhāvas* but physical conditions as well.

Basanta Jaitly As far as the first question is concerned, I think that there is not much of a difference between the theory of latent impressions of Abhinava and what I have said about congenital stage.

V Venkatachalam Latent impressions are related to previous births, but not the congenital instincts.

Basanta Jaitly: Congenital instincts are also related to something which was there prior to our birth, you may call it heredity or something else. In fact, our congenital instincts are governed by long chain of the development of human race, preceding our birth.

R P. Dattedi: With regard to *Sāttvika Bhāvas* you have said that all the *Ācāryas* accept two aspects of them—internal (feeling) as well as external (manifestation i.e. *kriyārūpa*). Abhinava and Dhanañjaya put forward the view that the *Sāttvika-bhāvas* are *sāttvika* only when they are reflected or manifested in the *citta* of a *Sahridaya*. Otherwise objectively speaking, they are abstract and internal. Thus one and the same thing can have two aspects or manifestations according to its different bases. Do you think that these two aspects are possible in one and the same substratum? (tr.)

Basanta Jaitly: As far as I think—and the modern psychology seems to corroborate my view—*Sāttvikas*, when they are caused and so long as they are internal,

R.S. Jaitly. I think that instead of the above classification of the Anubhāvas referred to by you, if we classify them as voluntary and involuntary, that would be more convenient and we could then include the *sāttvikas* in involuntary *anubhāvas* (tr)

Surjan Das Suami. In my opinion it is useless to classify the *anubhāvas* on the model of western psychology as voluntary and involuntary in order to incorporate the *sāttvikas*. In fact the word *anubhāva* denotes that every type of *bhāva* can have its *anubhāvas*. Why restrict it and say that only *sthāyī* and *sañcārībhāvas* can have their *bhāvas* in their latent internal state ? (tr)

Venkatachalam. I think that the original question of Dr R.P. Dwivedi remains still unanswered. His main contention was that if you assume an internal state of the *sāttvikas* it can either exist as a *sthāyībhāva* or as *sañcārībhāva* in the heart. There is, of course, no other possibility. If I have understood Dr. R S Jaitly correctly, I venture to answer this question on his behalf, making his view more clear. He perhaps means that though *sthāyī* and *sañcārī* are ultimately the root causes of all the *anubhāvas* including *sāttvika bhāvas* it is so with the *Sāttvikabhāvas* that before they are externally visible they are internally created by *sthāyī* or *sañcārī*, e.g. internal *ārdratā* in the case of fall of tears etc. This internal state is, in fact, a link between *sthāyī* and *sañcārī* on the one hand and the *sāttvikas* on the other. There is no term in our Rasa theory for this state. Therefore he prefers to call it simply the *bhāva* state of the *sāttvika bhāvas*.

P.L. Bhargava: Association of the term *Bhāva* with the *Sāttvika* has been in a way responsible for the confusion that these are internal, while, in fact, these are not different from the *anubhāvas*.

all the more difficult by the severe expectations of the Naiyāyikas, the absence of the three faults of *atyāpti*, over-extension, *atyāpti* non-extension and *asambhāva*, impossibility. In a sense, these three appear to be very natural expectations of a good definition, but it is these that have created innumerable difficulties for the rhetoricians. A look at the works of Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha Pandita and others will show how much ingenuity is spent on these problems. Arguments and counter-arguments and refutations and improvements characterise these works. It must not be supposed that it is the severe logical expectations and tests that have made these problems so difficult, for in their very nature the problems are difficult to be solved, and admit of different explanations, since what is being discussed is essentially a subjective problem: what do I understand by poetry and why do I like it. Here is an attempt to define what is that affects me, its nature and its constituent factors and also how I have been affected by these factors. In other words, here is an attempt to study the object that excites the mind and also the excitement experienced by the mind. Accordingly, the approach in the definitions attempted is seen either to be 'objective' or 'subjective.' In the former is made an attempt to understand the nature of the object, the cause, while in the latter is made an effort to understand the experience, the effect. This often confuses the issues and this confusion is again made worse by the fact that the cause has many constituents and the importance of these is differently understood while the effect is also conditioned by the receptivity and culture of the mind involved and so admitting a variety of responses. The word *śāhitya* itself would need clarification and one would be not satisfied with mere '*śāhitya-bhāvanā-yogyatā*.' If all these points and difficulties related to them are properly appreciated, it will be clear why the Sanskrit rhetoricians are often seen to indulge in a battle royal on this issue.

These definitions appear unsatisfactory on account of another additional reason, namely the expectations in a definition. What should it define and include—only the best specimen or even that which deserves the name only by courtesy? The word *kāvya* would be seen to include all this, the best as well as the most trash, and so must the definition

the medium. Poetry is word no doubt but also has something more. The lullabies and the nursery rhymes that attract us in our infancy and at times linger in our memory and seem to harass us occasionally are not poetry. One therefore agrees with Mammata when he points out that compositions, where attention is paid to *śabda-camatkṛti*, do not deserve to be regarded as poetry and if so regarded should be put down in the lowest class, *adhama* variety. The illustration that he has given,

Svaccandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbucchatā-
mūrechanmohamaharsiharsavilutasnānānhikāhvāya vah
bhundyādudyadudāradarduradarīdirghādarīdradruma-
drohodrekamahormimeduramadā mandākīnī mandatām

at once carries his point and one is likely to observe that this verse may express devotion but is certainly not poetry. Sound has to play an important part here no doubt but poetry is not all sounds and nothing more. As soon as it is said that here *Śabda* has importance as medium, one might think of music, *sargīta*, but a little thought would indicate that music seeks to appeal through pure and simple sound alone while poetry that appeals through the charming meaning ought to be regarded as different from it. The *śara* in music is *śabda* but not a *śabda* in the sense in which it is to be understood in poetry, *kāya*. It would be proper to say that *śabda*, the medium, separates music and poetry from the other arts while it is the meaning that separates, distinguishes poetry from music. Poetry may be enriched and heightened by its internal music but it is not all music, and here music is always subordinate to its meaning. It is because of this great importance of meaning in *kāya* that almost all the definitions as a rule, one might say, observe that *kāya* is *śabdārtha*.

The words *śabdārtha* bring us to language but poetry is not merely the language that we use in our daily life. In our life too *śabdārtha* are used and sentence is the unit. This unit satisfies the three expectations of *ākāṅkṣā*, *jogyatā* and *samīdhi*, but in a sentence, *rāya*, that seeks claim to poetry, something more is very necessary. Capacity to convey something, grammatical correctness and a logical consistency characterise a sentence used in day to day life

A point to be noted here is that in these discussions Vāmana when he discusses the concept of Rītu appears to take the objective point of view, discusses the Kāvya as and how created by the poet, in other words he has the poet in his mind while Ānandavardhana and Viśvanātha appear to have the *rasika*, the reader, before them and therefore appear to discuss the matter from the subjective point of view Vāmana is seen discussing the constituents of the 'cause' while Viśvanātha and Ānandavardhana appear to discuss the 'effect.'

As a matter of fact, one feels that a good definition of poetry should make a reference to all these aspects of its capacity to give highest delight, appeal to emotion and conveying of a charming meaning and yet instead of attempting any co-ordination and harmonization of these various aspects, critics are seen to lay special emphasis on this or that aspect according to the tradition to which they belong. What we call 'beautiful' has so many diverse constituents and these again have appeals in varying degrees to different minds so much so that unanimity in these matters seems very difficult. Can we really accept Jagannātha's contention that there is no *rasa* in the descriptions of children and animals, '*kaṭibālaviṣṭa*'. How do we respond to the description of the child's pranks as described by Tārāpīda in the *Kādambarī* of Bānabhaṭṭa? What is our response to the Lucy Poems of Wordsworth? One may accept Jagannātha's view that there is no poetry in '*mrgāḥ dhāvanti*' but can this mean that there is no poetry in a running deer? What is then our reaction to the Kālidāśian poem :

“Grīvābhgaṅgābhirāmam muhuraṇupatati syandane
 baddhadrstīḥ
 paścārdhena pravistah śarapatanabhayāt bhūyasā pūrvakāyam
 darbhaiḥ ardhāvalidhaiḥ śramavivrtamukhabhramasibhiḥ
 kīrnavartmā
 paśyodagraplutatvād vīyati bahutaram stokamurvyām prayāti”

Do we not regard this piece as a very fine composition? Again one may concede that *ramanīyārthapra'ṇāḍakatā* is more extensive, *vyāpaka*, than *sarasatā* and '*sa-hṛdaya-hṛdayālāhāḍi sabdārthamangalāni*' but then can these be ignored altogether

'upadeśa' has very remote similarity to what is contemplated by the term of Mathew Arnold, 'criticism of life'. In a way this is as it should be if we take into consideration the attitude towards poetry that is to be seen in these Sanskrit critics. According to them the main purpose of poetry is to give highest delight and therefore with reference to those who seek 'criticism of life' in poetry and those who do not like poetry, they observe '*tasmai namah svādu-parānmuḥhāya*' and '*arasikeṣu kaṣṭha-nivedanam*' etc.

What is the view of these critics so far as 'language of poetry' is concerned? Coleridge and Wordsworth had to start a movement in this respect over the issue which could be perhaps stated as whether the language of poetry must be the 'artificial and ornate' or it could be the 'simple one used in our daily life'. This movement could be understood as a reaction against the 'Ornate School.' The same is reflected in Sanskrit rhetorics in the controversies between the Ālankārikas on the one hand and the protagonists of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* on the other. Bhāmaha would represent the former attitude while Ānandavardhana and Viśvanātha would represent the other. These latter are conscious of the great power that simplicity of language often possesses. Mammata seems to concede this point when he adds '*anālankṛtī puṇah kṛāpī*' in his definition of *kāvya*.

It would be worth our while if we consider the illustrations of *kāvya* as given by these writers, for it is these illustrations that are expected to make the definitions clear by supplying, clarifying or explaining whatever has been expressed or implied in the definition. It is therefore that in such works, the illustrations also should be given the same importance as the definitions themselves. Mammata gives the verse:

'Nīśeṣacyutacandanam stanatataṁ nṛmr̥tarāgo dhara
netre dūramanañjane pulakītā tanvī taveyam tanuḥ |
mithyāvādīm, dūti bāndhavajanasy ājñātapīdāgame
vāpīm snātum ito gatāsi na puṇah tasyādhmasyāntikam''

as an illustration of '*uttama kāvya*' since it has *dhvani* in it. When one studies this concept of 'highest' type of poetry as revealed in the choice of this verse, one, might feel that as to why these critics should have rarely looked beyond

tive in itself of that eternal longing that human mind is always seen possessing for the past joys. To be in that familiar atmosphere where every thing has a story to tell, is to be fully intoxicated and to feel intensely to 're-live' the whole episode. There is something finer and deeper about this *ālankāṣi* so that it does not remain only a banal longing for the physical pleasure. The personal experience has something much more human about it, and so has risen far above the mere experience of an individual.

One can refer to another fine verse, again familiar to us:
 "Utkampini bhayaparāṅkhalitāmsukāntā
 te locane pratidīṣam vidhuram kṣipanti
 krurena dārunatayā sahasarva dagdhā
 dbhūmāñcitena dahanena na vikṣitāsi"

It would need an Udayana to fully bring out the world of beauty and significance of the phrase '*te locane*' in this exquisite description of Vāsavadattā. How could one do justice to the celebrated words of Rāma in the Uttararāmacarita '*te hṛnāḥ dīpasāḥ gatāḥ*' which again have not remained at the level of personal expression of Rāma but have come to symbolize the eternal cry of the whole humanity, the pang felt at the loss of the happy world which has gone for ever, never to return. It is with these thoughts and similar to these in mind one thinks that it would have been more appropriate if the '*attama*' poetry were illustrated with pieces like these or one of the type of

"nāham jānāmi keyūre nāham jānāmi kundale
 nūpure tvabhijānāmi nitvam pādābhivandanāt"

rather than the pieces of the type of '*riksa-cyuta-candanam*', etc. It is indeed difficult to understand as to why these rhetoricians, when there are so many fine passages in Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bhartrhari that could be taken as brilliant poetry anywhere in the world, passages that have something valuable directly from life, ignored as if all of them and went about such '*śṛṅgāric*' pieces. Tradition honours the Śākuntala as a very good piece and the verses in it as the best, at the least the four traditionally enumerated, but the rhetoricians even do not refer to these also. If poetry is '*suggestive*', *cyāṁjaka*, then the suggestion so conveyed should have something really deeper about it, which

come of all these efforts to define poetry one is reminded of the fact that defining poetry is like catching a butterfly, that wantonly flies from one flower to another in a garden. For a pretty long time one is not able to catch it at all. And when after a long exhausting chase one is able to catch it, one finds that all the best colours on its wings have fallen off, it has completely faded and lustreless, indeed what one finds in one's hand is the dead body of the butterfly. How true is this !!

The more and more one thinks of this problem, the more is one convinced that it is beset with really insurmountable difficulties and defies any solution. The perception and appreciation of beauty in literature is as a matter of fact a very subjective fact and an attempt to have any generalizations based on that or about that are bound to be unsatisfactory as well as extremely difficult. The intensity as well as the nature of an experience of an individual is difficult to be measured nor can the constituents and reasons of appeal can be correctly understood. The nature as well as the intensity of perception and appreciation depends on an 'inner necessity' felt by the individual as well as on the previous impressions of that individual mind. In the absence of these two things all discussion about literary beauty and its experience remains nothing but a talk meaning nothing. This is the reason why at different times by so many different persons were put forth different views rather vehemently in this field. Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, Vāmana, Mammata, Jaggannātha all these differ between themselves and it is the appreciation of these differences that is likely to lead to a proper appreciation of their views. No seminars are likely to bring about a unanimity amongst rhetoricians in this respect. For in the ultimate analysis, a discussion that is philosophical or intellectual presentation is not likely to grasp correctly an experience. If such a discussion strikes the cord of assent in us then only we are in a mood to accept or otherwise there is an urge to disagree violently. The core of an individual is something that cannot be thoroughly grasped, some of its elements come from social environment, some from heredity, but the individual being is not mere the sum-

meaning is understood only by minds that are capable of establishing 'harmony and a concord' This may be 'mood' generated in us, may be beyond the capacity of words to convey, but then there is no doubt that there is something that is felt keenly as captivating, enchanting, expanding This expansion is many times felt by the poet himself too, and the images reveal an ascending expansion of content I shall illustrate Take Kālidāsa at the end of his Raghuvamśa XIX 51 He observes about the tragic end of the illustrious dynasty of the Raghus

Vyoma paścimakalāsthitudu vā pankasasamiva gharma-
apalvalam

rājñi tatkulamabhūt ksayāture vāmanārciriva dipabhāja-
nam XIX 51.

Kālidāsa thought of the great dynasty as the vast Vyoma and the dying King the fading digit of the moon and then coming to the earth, our world, he thinks of the 'dried up lake, a pathetic awful sight' and finally he comes to the 'Lamp' 'with its dying flame' The poignancy, ascending order of subtlety and purity and sublimity is something that can be felt and hence these Kālidāsan images coming one after another mean so much to us The number of the images is immaterial, for it is the natural blooming of the poet's mind into these images and the suggestive quality of these images that captivate us Poetry need not always discuss philosophy, need not discuss truth of life It fills us with a mood and we seem to overhear the poet It is well said that 'greatest poetry is that which is overheard' How finely do we overhear Kālidāsa here as well as elsewhere, in the Meghadūta too The poet writes for himself undoubtedly, to express himself but this expression invades the empires of minds of the *sahrdajas* A living expanding mind overwhelms another mind that seeks to be so influenced This dialogue of two minds is the aim and fulfilment of all poetry and literature, the *vigalita-vedyāntara*

Through this dialogue between human minds, the quality of the mind has improved and all the classical literature is nothing but such dialogues These dialogues have enriched our philosophy, understanding of life, of human problems and human conflicts. The powerful minds

COMMON TRENDS IN INDIAN AND GRECO-ROMAN AESTHETICS*

Dr K C Pandey

Casting a glance at the history of Greco-Roman aesthetics we find the following main currents —

(1) Sophist Gorgias, speaking from the point of view of the artist, asserted that imitation is the principle of artistic production, and insisted that imitation should be so thorough as to create an illusion. Accordingly, speaking from the point of view of the spectator, he said “Tragic representation is a deception, which turns out to the honour of both, of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is shameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be deceived.”

‘Imitation’ is recognised to be the principle of artistic production in the earliest period of the history of art everywhere. And imitation, when it is most successful, produces illusion.

Such a theory of art, namely, that a work of art creates illusion, that it deceives the connoisseur to take the product of art to be the product of nature and arouses the same psycho-physical responses in him, is attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollata. Accordingly it is said that he maintained that just as at the time of illusory knowledge of silver at the sight of brilliance of mother of pearl, there is the same experience for a moment as at the sight of the real silver ; so, on the objective perception of the stage-representation of the heroic, there is for a moment an extremely pleasant experience, very much the same as at the sight of real For, the spectator is aware of the presence of an emotive state in the focus of the situation, the hero, though it is really not there.

We find a reference to imitative sculpture in the *Pratimā Nāṭaka* of Bhāsa. The scene may be presented as follows:—

* General lecture delivered by Dr Pandey during the Seminar
Remarks of Shri Bham Sen who presided follow

"Kamsa was killed long ago. How can the use of the present tense be grammatically justifiable in reference to the action presented on the stage?" And the reply is that "It is justifiable, because in the imaginative grasp of the stage-presentation, the actors shine as the original historical characters."

The fact that Patañjali admitted dramatic presentation to be such an imitation as made the actors shine as original characters in the imagination of the spectator is referred to by Helārāja in his commentary on the *Vākyapadīyam* (Kānda III P 177) as follows —

In witnessing a drama, in which the past deeds of historical characters such as Kamsa and Kṛṣṇa are imitatively presented, the represented shine as original in the imagination of the spectator because of similarity.

Criticism of the Theory of Imitation

But imitation as the principle of production of works of art in any artistic medium, may it be clay, stone, paint, musical sound, language or human body, has been condemned both in East and West. It has been recognised as a principle of production of works of arts for preserving the memory of great persons, but not of such works as have independent value. Imitative art is domineered by hedonism. It is capable of giving sensuous satisfaction only. It does not lead the mind beyond the particular to the Universal. It may have educative value. It may enable us to get an idea of the imitated through imitative representation, but it has no aesthetic value.

Plato in the West was the first to condemn imitative art. And he knew of no other art than imitative. In the context of his metaphysics and ethics, he formulates the problem of aesthetics as follows :—

"Is art, mimesis, a rational or irrational fact? Does it belong to the noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found, or does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude passionality?"

In summarising the solution we may say that (1) since matter and the world of phenomena, which is but matter

the awareness of what is mental, such as feeling and emotion, which are essentially mental states, though they find expression in the physical changes"

The exponent of the imitation-inference theory, therefore, maintains that the basic mental state is known from the imitative presentation, through inference of it from the situation, the cause of emotion, from the mimetic changes, the effects of emotion, and the invariable concomitants of emotion, the transient emotion.

He guards against the criticism, levelled against the imitation-illusion theory, namely, that if art creates illusion and arouses the same kind of reaction as does the real, it has no independent value and the tragic presentations should not be enlivening but depressing. He asserts that the emotion that is inferred from the imitative presentation is not the real but imitated and therefore, it does not arouse that commotion in the heart, which the awareness of a real emotion does. For, when we see an angry lion in a picture and are aware of its being only an imitation, the emotion of fear does not arise in us.

But this justification of the imitative art is illogical. The inconsistencies of the imitation-inference theory are apparent.

For, if the spectator takes the reasons, which are realistically presented on the stage, to be real, how can the basic mental state, inferred from them, be spoken of as imitation? But if he takes them to be the products of art, the inference of the basic mental state from them is out of the question.

From Imitation to Idealisation

In the history of Aesthetics, both in the East and the West, the criticism and consequent rejection of the theory of imitation in art, because of its sensuousness, deceptiveness and hedonism, has led to the substitution of "imitation", as a principle of artistic production, by Idealisation and of hedonism by Pedagogism. In the West, for instance, we find Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, propounding idealistic and the pedagogic views of art.

Aristotle's teacher, Plato meant by imitation the production of an imitation, a false representation of the real.

poetical muse, we have to keep two points in our minds (I) his conception of soul and (II) distinction between virtue and philosophy. Tragedy is not presentation of pure abstract idea. For, such an idea is to be realised only in philosophic contemplation. Tragedy is not philosophy. It is imitation of worthy or illustrious and perfect action. It is, therefore, not concerned with the pure intellectual aspect of the human soul. Its aim is to present the appetitive aspect, to which all passions and emotions belong and which is the spring of all action. It presents human soul, not in its blind pursuit of the objects of sensuous satisfaction, but in its effort to strike the *mean* between two extremes under the guidance and control of reason; or rather a soul which, because of long and continuous obedience to the dictates of reason, has got into the habit of always following the middle course between two extremes, a soul, which is virtuous, worthy or illustrious and exhibits its worthiness in all actions.

But tragedy is not the only product of the poetical Muse. Epic and comedy are also her productions. The meaning of imitation, as has just been stated, is the particular meaning in the context of tragedy. In general, however, imitation means presentation of action of worthy and virtuous persons no less than that of the depraved and vicious. Men are of three kinds. (i) better or (ii) worse than we are and (iii) like ourselves. Epic, such as that of Homer, imitates better men than we are. Tragedy and comedy differ from each other, because of the difference in their objects of imitation. The former imitates better and the latter worse men. The former is the presentation of the beautiful and the latter is that of the ugly.

The Comedy

The full meaning of comedy, we can understand, only if we remember Aristotle's conception of the ugly. According to him, as we have already stated, there are two principles, idea and matter. And although they are always together, yet matter does not always submit to the directing force and control of idea. It resists the force of idea. Thus, when matter refuses to submit to idea and asserts itself in disobedience to the dictates of reason, we have the ugly and de-

found in the external world. It is the presentation of an advance on a given reality. It is not confined to the perceptible. It extends to the mental. Voices and figures are to be imitated no less than the passions and feelings.

Recognition and Inference Admitted by Aristotle

It is interesting to find that Aristotle, like Śrīśankuka, admits —

(1) That aesthetic experience is a cognitive experience in so far as the spectator recognises the natural or historical in the artistic representation, and

(2) that there is a kind of inference and, therefore, some exercise of the intelligence is involved in such recognition.

Thus, Aristotle in speaking of "some kind of inference" seems to have realised that the inference of the emotive state of the presented is not the ordinary inference (a) of effect from cause or (b) of cause from effect or (c) of one invariable concomitant from another. He seems to realise that empirical inference of the emotive state, presented in a work of art, is not possible. He seems to admit a different means of knowledge to account for the awareness of emotion from a work of art. The criticism, therefore, that has been levelled against Śrīśankuka's theory of inference of emotive state from a representation in a work of art, does not apply to Aristotle's theory of imitation in the context of aesthetics. Aristotle seems to present an advance on the imitation theory of Śrīśankuka.

Pedagogic view of art

Plato condemned art, refused it a place in the ideal republic, because of its sensuality and hedonism. Aristotle differs from his teacher, Plato, and asserts that the end of art is not simply to please the senses but to improve its lover morally. His theory is technically called 'pedagogism'. This theory is, however, propounded in the context of tragedy. And tragedy, he holds, brings about the moral improvement of the spectator, not through sermons, put in mouths of important characters, but through Katharsis of emotions,

the ethical value of effecting the moral improvement of lovers of art. But it is pointed out that the ethical value of works of the poetic or dramatic art, is different from that of the categorical imperatives of the sacred scriptures, and also from that of persuasive reasoning of a friend who tries to lead to the path of virtue. For, art does not command nor does it reason. And the moral improvement of the lovers of art is not the sole aim of art, because such an admission would mean denial of independent value to art.

Indian Aesthetician, therefore, holds that the ethical value of work of higher art is only a dependent, secondary or implied value. The true, primary or independent value of higher art is aesthetical only. Art primarily aims at arousing aesthetic experience only. And because aesthetic experience is possible from the presentation of the ideal, and not of the real, of things as they should be and not as they are, and because the ideal, if it is 'human', must necessarily be ethically also ideal and, must necessarily act and talk in strict accordance with the highest ethical principles, therefore, art is attractive. It draws the spectator very much as the object of love draws the lover to herself. It addresses itself to the aesthetic senses, the eye and the ear. It pleases. It suggests to the mind all that it cannot present to the senses. It builds up a world of imagination before the mind's eye of the spectator, with the presented and the suggested material. It lifts the aesthete from the empirical world to the world of imagination and makes him willingly live in it. He identifies himself with the hero of the piece, experiences ethical satisfaction in performing the onerous duty in difficult situation and realizes the goodness of the path of virtue and badness that of vice.

And the characteristic of humanity is to strive to realise in practical life all that healthy imagination presents to be good, true and beautiful. The spectator, therefore, automatically follows the path of morality after he has imaginatively grasped what is "Good". Art therefore serves ethical end without aiming at it. Art is "purposive without purpose".

Art presents morality as an essential element of beauty and immorality as a dominant aspect of ugly to offset beauty by contrast. It mixes up the moral principle, that it presents,

expounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is very great indeed. For, both Plotinus and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka use almost the same language to present the essential nature of aesthetic experience. The former says "It is akin to the experience of "the one", and the latter says "Brahmānanda sahodarah" (It is akin to the transcendental Bliss)

"The true difference between the historian and the poet is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry therefore is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history, for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." The first distinguishing mark then of poetry is that though it deals with the individual, it shows the universal truth, it seeks to represent the permanent possibilities of human nature. It is an idealized treatment of life.

It will thus be seen that though Aristotle also uses the word *imitation* and considers it as the essential in a fine art, it has for him a far more comprehensive meaning than with Plato. With him it is an aesthetic term, and implies not a literal transcript of the world of reality as perhaps with Plato, but an imaginative reconstruction of life. It implies on the part of the poet a selection, elimination, organisation, and intensification with a view to represent a higher reality. There is no question of art being twice removed from reality. If the poet necessarily gives us some thing less than reality, if he cannot in his verses give us the physical warmth of flesh and blood, he gives us in compensation some thing more, evoking so much of spirit and heightened feeling as life itself can only yield to the choicest minds in their happier moments.

Again tragedy as he defines it seeks through pity and fear to effect the proper catharsis of these emotions. Whatever be the meaning or significance of the word *catharsis* it is plain that its appeal is to the emotions of pity and fear—~~There is no awareness whatsoever—as in Plato of~~ the emotions being the worthless part of our being. There is no sense of any essential antagonism between emotions and reason.

It will thus be seen that Aristotle stated for once and all that art is an idealized imitation of life, that it aims at universal truth, that it is its essential attribute to be beautiful, that its end is pleasure and that its appeal is through the emotions.

I shall now briefly say how I understand 'tragic catharsis.' Catharsis seems to have been used as a medical metaphor. Tragedy does stir and evoke the emotions of

THE CONTRIBUTION OF RĪTI TO THE EXCELLENCE OF POETIC COMPOSITION

Dr A P Mishra

A survey of the history of Sanskrit Poetics reveals the incontrovertible fact that before the doctrine of Dhvani was discovered, Rīti and Vṛtti, like Gunas and Alankāras, were considered to be very important factors in creating an excellent poetic composition. It was only in later days that its tradition was mostly interrupted. With the establishment of the element of Dhvani, i.e. suggestion in poetry, began the process of inclusion of Rīti and Vṛtti in it (Dhvani)¹. The question to be considered here is whether this inclusion was really proper or justified, and whether there was no strong basis behind the doctrine of Rīti and Vṛtti which could justify their separate existence. In other words, is the inclusion of Rīti and Vṛtti in Dhvani possible? Before we take up this question for consideration, it could be only proper to make certain observations about Rīti and Vṛtti.

With the rise of the Doctrine of Rīti in Sanskrit Poetics, a new line or direction of the appreciation of beauty or excellence of poetic composition comes to light. Even Ānandavardhana is quite appreciative of the originality of Vāmana's doctrine of Rīti. He says that the element of Dhvani must have flashed even though indistinctly into the mind of the propounder of the doctrine of Rīti as the soul of poetry, only he could not explain it as one which brought about charm in poetic compositions, and for this reason

1. (i) Vide Locana on the Dhvanyāloka, Kāṅkī 3/46 —

रीतिर्हि गुणेषु सर्ववसिता • गुणारच रमयंवसायिन एव ।

(ii) Vide Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti o. Kā 3/47 and Locana on it —

या काश्चिन् प्रमिद्धा उन्नागरिकाद्या. शब्दतत्त्वाश्रया वृत्तयो
यास्त्वार्यन्तस्त्वमम्बुद्वा कङ्कितपादयम्ना मम्यग्रीतिपदवीमवतरन्ति ।
रीतिपदवीमिति । तद्वदेव (रीतिवदेव) रमयंवसायित्वान् ।

as *gunātmaka*. Thus according to *Vāmana*, the excellence or beauty of *Kāvya* is due to the inherence of *gunas* in it. The word '*padaracanā*' points towards the body and the word '*viśiṣṭa*' towards the element which can be called the soul of poetry. It is really the proper use of *gunas* which brings about beauty in poetic composition. *Abhinavagupta* also explained '*vācya*' and '*vyangya*' in poetry as '*sāmānyā*' and '*viśeṣa*'. This *viśeṣa* of *Abhinava*¹ can be foreseen in the word '*viśeṣa*' in the definition of *Rīti*. It is to be clearly understood here that the propounder of *Rīti* distinguishes one from the other². The collective state of *gunas* is different from their non-collective or the individual state. Generally speaking, each *guna* produces beauty in a poetic composition³, but the assemblage of *gunas* produces a different type of excellence. Thus the excellence brought about by *Rīti* as an assemblage or collection of *gunas* is different from the one produced by the individual *gunas*. But *Abhinavagupta*, in his impatience or haste to include the beauty produced by *Rīti* in the one produced by the individual *gunas*, could not evaluate or estimate it correctly and properly.

On the one hand, *Abhinava* draws similarity or parity between the assemblage of *gunas* in *Rīti* and the combination or the blending of *guda*, *marica* etc., in the drink called *Pānaka*; and on the other hand, he does not consider the assemblage as different from the individual constituents⁴.

1. Vide *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* : 2 —

तुल्यैर्यैरुपवे किमिति वन्मैविदेव सहृदयाः इत्याद्यन्ते तद् भवितव्यं
तद् केनचिद् विशेषेण । यो विशेषः सः प्रतीयमानभागे विवेकि-
मिविशेषहेतुत्वादात्मेति व्यकन्याप्यते ।

2. वाच्यगोनायाः कर्तारो यर्मा गुणाः । तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलकाराः ।

3. Vide *Locana* —

तेषां (गुणानां) समुचितवृत्त्यपेक्षे यदन्योन्यमैकतन्मन्त्रेण पानक इव
गुडमरिचादिस्नाना मधुप्रातुरुत्तागमनं दीप्तलम्बित-मध्यम-वर्गनोद-
विषयं गोडोरन्वैरमं पाञ्चाल-हेवाकप्राचुर्यदृशा, तदेव त्रिविध
रोजिस्तिष्ठतम् ।

4. वाच्यवैविध्यतो नास्या, समुदायस्य समुदायिनो नास्य इति वृत्तिरीदृशो
न मुनालकारव्यतिरिक्ता ।

Vāmana accepted ten *gunas* each of the word and the meaning. He is the first rhetorician to have divided *gunas* in this way. He defined *Śabda-gunas* as the *gunas* of the composition or the construction of words¹. The two types of *gunas* fully explain the excellence of both, the word-construction and the meaning. The scope of *Artha-gunas* is so wide as to include within it almost all the means of creating or producing poetic excellence, so much so that all the charms of *Rasa* are included in the *Artha-guna* called 'Kānti', all the shades of meaning in 'Samādhi', and all the forms of striking expressions (*Uktavācitra*) in the 'Mādhurya' *guna* of Vāmana². Thus we see that Vāmana has tried to visualise or envisage through the means of *Rīti* the beauty, charm or excellence of poetic composition in its wide perspective. Since the time the principle of the three *gunas* viz *Prasāda*, *Ojas* and *Mādhurya* was propounded in the *Dhvani* School and all the twenty *gunas* of Vāmana were included in them, the roots of the *Rīti*-School loosened and gave way, and its importance declined. Consequently, it ceased to be the soul of poetry in due course and began to be regarded or considered merely as an element or a factor of poetic excellence.³

Although *Rīti* was soon declining in importance ever afterwards with the ever widening sphere of *Dhvani*, still it continued to hold ground with a change of course in its form and name. Ācārya Kuntaka re-established the three-fold *Rīti* of Vāmana under new names in *Sukumāra*, *Vicitra* and *Madhyama*. Kuntaka has put forward an altogether new and original analysis of the two *Mārgas* propounded by Dandin, and the three *Rīti*s and ten *gunas* propounded by Vāmana. In all, he propounds six *gunas* i.e. *Prasāda*, *Mādhurya*, *Lāvanya*, *Ābhijātya*, *Aucitya* and *Saubhāgya*.

1 Vide *Kāvya-lankārasūtravṛtti*, Guna Section —

ओज प्रसादश्लेषमतासमाधिमाद्युयंमौकुमार्योदारतायंब्यक्तिकान्तयो
बन्धुगुणा । वन्द्य पदरचना । . . त एवायं गुणाः ।

2 Vide *Kāvya-lankārasūtra* III 2 10 —

दीप्तरसत्वं कान्ति । उक्तिवैचित्र्यं माद्युयंम् ।

3 Vide *Sihityadarpana* —

उत्कृष्टहेतवः प्रोक्ता गुणालंकाररीतिर ।

DISCUSSION

P.L. Bhargava: What is your opinion regarding the view of some later Rhetoricians that the *gūṇas* of Vāmana can actually be included in the three main *gūṇas* viz. *mādhurya*, *ojas*, and *prasāda*?

A.P. Mishra: I think that these Rhetoricians have not done justice to Vāmana and his excellent principle of ten *gūṇas*. It is not possible to reduce all the *gūṇas* to only three. The devices of the *ācāryas* are no doubt ingenious but they are far from being satisfactory.

V Venkateshram: Now that you have presented a paper underlining the importance of the Rīti-School, I would like to know how far it is justified and scientific to include all types of Rasas in only one *gūṇa* viz. *Kānti* and all kinds of *Ukti-Vaicitrya* in one particular *gūṇa*, *mādhurya*?

A.P. Mishra: Yes, perhaps not. But what I wanted to point out is that these *ācāryas* also who pursue an analytical approach to poetry and apparently take care of only its *Vācya* aspect, were not oblivious of the finer side of the poetry, i.e. *rasa* and the subtle shades of meaning (*Uktivaicitrya*) etc. and their contribution to Sanskrit Poetics should also be properly appreciated.

R.C. Duttā: Ruyyaka in his *Alankāra-Sarvasva* makes a very pointed reference. बामनेन तु कश्चिद्वनिभेदो-
ल्लकारनयदोक्तः and there he sums up Vāmana's view. With the expression *alankāratā* he is reproducing the *alankāra* concept of Vāmana. काव्यं ग्राह्य-
यमञ्जरीतम्. Jayaratha in his commentary explains this sentence of Ruyyaka to show how the view of Vāmana is incorporated in *Dhātari* and that he was also first to conceive the idea of soul of poetry. ...A question that I have in mind is whether one could correlate his principle of the three *gūṇas* with the three primordial *gūṇas* of the Sāmkhya

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

Dr R.C. Datta

In this paper I propose (1) to state the obvious impact of Indian philosophical thought on Sanskrit Criticism and (2) to assert that the criticism, though informed and influenced by philosophical thought, is yet by and large independent of philosophical considerations and that these are incidental to it and do not constitute the essence of critical judgment of literature

The idea of poetry and its objectives, the description of the poet and aesthete (*akāṣya*), the poetic word and its meaning and their relation, the varieties of poetic figures (*alankāras*), the role of imagination (*pratibhā*) in the conception and creation of literature, the triad of poetic excellence (*gāṇa*), the theories of *rasa* and *dharma* and Mahima-Bhaṭṭa's theory of inferential nature of poetic sense are some of the major topics that come readily to one's mind when one seeks to trace the influence of Indian philosophical thought in general and orthodox systems in particular. I propose to deal with some of these excluding *rasa* in particular which would require separate treatment. That the literary critic in India worked under the impact of philosophy and other Śāstras, which are not pertinent for our consideration here, is no wonder to us. Western Criticism has also been informed and influenced and even at times swept off its feet by the onslaught of psychology and philosophy. This is natural when both philosopher and poet are engaged in 'seeing' the word, the philosopher may 'see' it better but it is only the poet who describes better what he sees. The title of a poet is accorded not merely to one who is endowed with a vision of world but to one who possesses both vision and expression. The famous stanzas by Bhaṭṭa Tota bear quotation on this point —

नानुकिः कविरितुक्तानुपिद्व किं दशनात् ।

विचित्रभावनां सत्त्वग्रहणं च दर्शनम् ॥

one deserves the title of 'poet', of one, who is skillful in expression"¹ :

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ॥

The doctrine of Pratibhā in Sanskrit Criticism is very comprehensive. It includes (i) creative inspiration, imagination, genius, (ii) competent poetic expression², (iii) aesthetic sensibility, and (iv) poetic beauty³.

The literary critics had conceived this doctrine independently until Abhinavagupta, in his philosophical analysis of the Pratibhā, identified it with the ultimate consciousness, the Self, and admitted that in a poet it burns with a purified light⁴.

Pratibhā in Saiva metaphysics is identified with consciousness as creative emission (Visarga)⁵. However, what one notices is that prior to Abhinavagupta the literary critics did not consider its metaphysical overtones and were happy to explore it as a concept of poetic creation, expression and appreciation. Even Ānandavardhana, who was himself a great philosopher, treated Pratibhā in its literary context only. According to him it is a unique gift which is manifested through the Muse of great poets,⁶ attains endless forms on its journey through the *dhāni*⁷ and so long as it

1 Quoted by Hemacandra, Kāvyaśūtrasāra, p 3. Mānikyachandra in Samketa on KP p 7

2 On this point see also Rudrata, I 15, Rājasekhara, KM pp 12-14, Jagannātha, R. G. (Kāvyaśāstrānukūla Śabdārthopasthit h) Vāgbohataśāstrā, I. 4

3 प्रतिभाऽनूवंदन्तुनिर्भासिता प्रज्ञा, तस्या विशेषो रसाद्वैश्वैश्व-
मोन्दयं काव्यशमत्वम् ।

4 See T.A., V. p 432, and XI, pp 60-62; M V V, VV 1031 onwards

5 T.A. V. p 432

6 श्रुत्वा तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवीनाम् ।
अनूकामानन्दमभिधनक्ति परिस्फुरन् प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥ I.6

7 ध्वनेयं गुणानुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवीनाम् ।

अनेनानन्दमाप्नोति कवीना प्रतिभा-गुणः ॥ IV. 6

dependent upon the creative instinct of the poet on the one hand and its aesthetic meaningfulness on the other, the difference of an *alankāra* from another is based on a distinct consciousness that each should arouse¹. Thus, for example, *uṣṭrekṣā* and *Aśīṣayukti* are distinguished on the basis of *adhyavasāya*², and *bhāṭika*, *rasakat*³, *śabbhāvokti* on the basis of consciousness of identity, universality and so on. Ruyyaka is never tired of repeating in essence that poetic figure being a potent media of effecting consciousness, should bloom forth from the poetic *pratibhā*, and never regrets to discard cumbersome varieties of the figures which hurt the aesthetic sensibility (the second aspect of *pratibhā*). His commentator Javaratha, who was himself a great thinker of Śaivism, has further underlined these aspects, namely the figure must be effected by *pratibhā*⁴ and that it should produce a distinct consciousness. It is such a figure that becomes synonymous with poetic beauty and Śrīvidyācakravartin in his *Saṅjivini* a commentary on the *Alankārasarvasva* often repeats that 'an *alankāra* is nothing but beauty'

अलङ्कारो हि विच्छित्ति ।

Another important entity for our consideration is the concept of poetic flaws. Among the ten types of flaws enumerated by Bharata⁵, *nyāyādaṭṭa* (defined as *pramāṇa-paricaryā*), *Viśamāhī* and *Śabdacyuta* are clearly Śāstric. *Gūdhārtha*, (*parayāyabaddhabhīṭa*), *arthāntarā* (*acarya-Varnana*) *arthahīna*, *bhāṇārtha*, *ekārtha*, *abhyūptārtha* referring to impendments created in comprehension of the meaning, were also partly influenced by grammatical and logical considerations, the *Vijṇāna* (metrically uneven) relates to prosody. Bharata believed that these flaws mar poetic beauty of a literary composition. Bhāmaha followed Bharata in the treatment of

1. प्रतीतिभेदबालकारभेदनिमित्तमित्यविवाद ।

2. Vide Dr. R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), *Alankārasarvasva-Saṅjivini*, pp. 82-3; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1963.

3. Ibid. pp. 329-335.

4. Ruyyaka and Javaratha have given a full philosophical treatment to *Bhāṭika* and other figures. For this see R. C. Dwivedi, 'Percept like experience in *Bhāṭika*' included in *Essays on Indian Poetics*, Delhi 1963.

5. See Javaratha, *Vimarśini* on A. S. (N. S. ed.) pp. 44, 58, 71-163.

6. N. S. XVI, 82-91.

The words and meanings both must be out of turn¹ and should emerge from one's own experience of them². It was to probe this uncommon use of word and meaning by the poet that Bhāmaha propounded the principle of Vakrokti³ which, according to him, pervades entire poetic composition, constitutes essence of all poetic expression⁴ and is media of effecting aesthetic sense in poetry *anayārtho vibhāṅyate*. Dandin further asserted the empirical nature of literature and its criticism by admitting equal importance of the *svabhāvokti* and had even questioned the grafting of *hetu* and *nyāya* (हेतुन्यायलवोच्चय) on literary judgement.

विचार कर्कशप्रायस्तेनालीडेन किं फलम् ।

Bhāmaha had observed that flaws of logic and grammar sometimes become gunas. Dandin takes this principle further by illustrating every defect and showing how each turns into a virtue. Vāmana deals with the dosas systematically in the III *adhikarana*. Contradicting the opinion of Bharata he maintains that dosas are not positive entities but merely opposite to gunas and these are treated by him under the categories of *padā*, *padārtha*, *vākya* and *vākyaārtha*. Rudrata, who follows Bharata in his conception of the poetic blemish as positive entity, treats dosas under the broad classes of verbal and material. Bhāmaha had recognised seven *doṣas* of *upamā* which is exclusive to poetry. Dandin and Rudrata also treated these with varying numbers. Ānandavardhana by expounding the universal and ephemeral character of the blemishes makes them subservient to the aesthetic meaning of *dhvani*. It is from their relation to sentiments that the blemishes derive their *raison d'être* in literary criticism. This is significant because critical judgment of literature

1. Vide KA I 36, V 66

2. नान्यत्रत्यसन्दरा वाणीविभाति मुदे सताम् ।
परेण घृतमुक्तेव सरसा कुसुमावली ॥

3. KA II 84-5

4. To state the independence of poetic expression and free it a bit from the chain of grammar Bhāmaha said that even a faulty expression or a bad word does not matter so long as the pattern and object of description has some charm. Vide Kāvyaṅkāra I 54

loka, Ānandavardhana makes following observations which deserve our attention:

- (i) वृत्तं काव्यतत्त्वविद्भि Vṛttaṁ kārikā I I
- (ii) यतो लक्षणकृतामेव स न प्रमिदः । Ibid
- (iii) तथैवान्वन्मन्मानुषारिभि मूरिभि काव्यतत्त्वाचंदसिभि वाच्य-
वाचकमिथ्य शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यो व्यञ्जकत्वमाभ्याद्
ध्वनिरित्युक्त. Ibid

Mukul Bhaṭṭa and his pupil Prathārendurāja in their observations make it clear that the Sahridayas (aesthetes) were responsible for conceiving the novel doctrine of Dhvani.

- (i) लक्ष्यमागर्षावगाहित्व तु ध्वने महदयेनूनतनयोपवर्णितस्य
Abhidhāvṛttumātrkā, N.S. ed. p. 21
- (ii) तथा हि तत्र विवक्षितान्वयस्ता सहृदयैः काव्यवर्मनि निरूपिता
Ibid. p. 19
- (iii) कंदितमहदरं ध्वनिनाम व्यञ्जकत्वमेवात्मा काव्यधर्मोऽभिहितः ।
Laghuvṛttu, B.S.S. ed. p. 85

The continuous tradition of *dhvani* in the learned circles and Sahridayas is alluded to by Ānandavardhana who refers to them as of mature minds in the concluding verse of the Dhvanvāloka and Abhinavagupta who further states that though the principle of *dhvani* was not reduced to writing nevertheless it was continuously in vogue:

अविच्छिन्नेन प्रवाहेन तैरेतदुक्तं विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकविनिवेशान् ।
(Locana, p. 32 (KSR 9 ed.)

In fact Ānandavardhana has given an independent foundation to the poetic meaning and the best that we can say about grammatical impact is that it served as a prelude to or preliminary stage in the evolution of *Dhvani* as a comprehensive doctrine of Literary Criticism. This is the real significance of the concluding verse of the Dhvanvāloka.

I would now like to conclude by further bringing to your notice the denunciation of the Śāstric polemics by ācāryas

In the near past when creative criticism ceased and what remained was simply re-assertion of old principles in new language of the Naiyāyikas, the ultra-logical spirit seems to have run riot. One may now fondly hope that this sin of *arasika* polemics will not be inflicted upon new ventures of evolving or re-interpreting the principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit and a sincere effort will be made to seek new pastures in modern context of literary consciousness.

DISCUSSION

- L. L. Joshi:** I have always thought that Indians are falsely accused of being too philosophical. Your paper shows very clearly that they are most worldly and practical people and thus confirms my view.
- S. D. Swami:** Pratibhā is essential not only for Kāvyaśāstra but for other Śāstras also. Mahimabhaṭṭa has referred to the importance of it in various branches of knowledge (tr.)
- R. C. D. vedī:** Should I assume that you are not raising any objection against what I have said? Because I pre-suppose that Pratibhā is indispensable for the creation of Poetry. That it plays an important role in other sciences also, is obvious. I do not contradict it. I have endeavoured to show how the concept of Pratibhā, based on the long tradition of poets (cf. मरुस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु निष्पन्दिमाना महता कवीना etc.) was later on explained more and more on the basis of philosophy. Abhinavagupta is the first to explain the significance of Pratibhā in poetry and to establish it on sound philosophical foundations. It is a fact that prior to Abhinavagupta no poetist cared to explain this term in all philosophical detail. I have also tried to show how the concepts of *Pratibhā*, *alankāra*, *doṣa* etc. remained primarily, and prior to Abhinavagupta invariably, unaffected by the philosophical overtones. Even after Abhinava his followers, for example Jayaratha

ācāryas have tailored a sūtra to suit their philosophical predisposition and design.

R. S. Jaitly At the time of Bharata, I think, the layer of the paint of philosophy on the Rasa-theory was not very thick. The layer became thicker and the paint darker with the later ācāryas. In this process completely new ideas were introduced in Rasa with regard to its theoretical aspect, but as far as its practical aspect, the aspect of relishing, rasana, was concerned, no worthwhile progress could be made. I would like to know your opinion about it.

R. C. Divedi You are right in saying that the theoretical knowledge and the discussion about the actual process of rasānubhūti does not help a spectator or a reader to relish a piece of art. It is rather a hindrance than an asset. We all here have become somewhat jaḍa to enjoy rasa properly but there are many more outside this room who are fortunately not interested to know the process of relishing but would rather relish it to the brim of their heart.

S. D. Swami The elaboration of the Rasa theory has not taken place purely on the philosophical background. The various names, śrngāra, karuna etc., the conception of different types of bhāvas, the process of sādharanīkaraṇa etc., all these things are originally contributed by the poetics itself (tr.)

Venkatchalam . I do not say that in the Rasa-theory there is nothing but philosophy, what I mean to say is simple that the process of rasānubhūti has not been able to separate itself from philosophy.

R. C. Divedi : Recall to your mind the two famous lines :

शोक इत्येकत्वमागत and इत्येकत्वमावदत यस्य शोक,
which prove that both a great poet (Kālidāsa) as well as a great critic (Ānandavardhana) agree to the effect that *śoka* becomes *śloka*. In which school of philosophy would you find this

SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION AND DHVANI

B. B. Palitlal

Imagination and memory, along with intelligence and reason, are essentially the characteristics of *Homo Sapiens*. If memory assists man in establishing and maintaining connection with the past, imagination carries him forward and enables him to project himself into future. Intelligence and reason, the knowing and ordering faculties of human consciousness, distinguish creation both in practical and imaginative fields. In literary, aesthetic and philosophical worlds, imagination plays a distinct, inevitable role. It functions as the cognitive, comprehending, transforming and re-creative agent. The world of imagination is infinite and eternal because it is creative and symbolic. Imagination means creation, and this creation is on many levels such as cognition, transformation and re-creation. An imaginatively created thing is essentially created for the second time, through formal means. This creative or re-creative activity of imagination is on both the lines of the scale—of space and time. The extent of space and time, which can be brought into knowability and consciousness, is the limit of imagination. This limit forces the artist to create his world within this defined scope and this forms the spatial and temporal limit of his imagination. This limit refers to its body, scope or its extent and yet, in this very form, it defines its nature also. Imaginative realisation may indulge in pointing, naming, elaborating, formulating, or in symbolising. What imagination does not or cannot grasp in its entirety or that for which it does not find adequate, analogous figures, it transmutes into symbols, often abstract but occasionally concrete also. This function of imagination, this raid on the intractable and unknowable is the symbolic imagination.¹ The symbolic imagination not only brings the various meanings together at a single moment

¹ Blackmur, R. P. *The Lion and the Honey-comb* (London, 1956), pp 176-73

unlimited knowledge, and as clear and precise an understanding of the nature of the ultimate reality as possible. In the *Vedas* this cosmos is described as *Brahmāṇḍa*. This is a very apt instance of the symbolic imagination. Here the entire cosmos is imagined as *andā* (or egg) of *Brahmā*, the celebrated god of creation. Besides, the mode of expression is also symbolic. The whole created universe is visualised as analogous to an egg. *Hiranyagarbha* or the golden egg of the creator of this universe, *Brahmā*, gives the idea of what this creation is like. Thus the supreme egg becomes the 'objective correlative' for the spatial concept of the universe. In the west, in the *Bible* and in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, the earth is described as a ball suspended with a golden chain by God. The old testament of the *Bible* contains a detailed account of various, created things—trees, forests, animals, mountains, rivers, birds etc. These provide excellent illustrations of how, and within what limits, human imagination has tried to work for itself a structure and history of his surroundings.

The literature of nearly all languages in the world entertains some of the followings concepts which are symbolically and imaginatively formulated. The world is a stage and human beings are actors who from infancy to old age and death play the appointed roles according to their age. Shakespeare conceived of man variously, sometimes as flies in the hands of wanton boys i.e. gods who kill us for their sport. To Milton and Dante human destiny is essentially in accepting the will of God. That is why the aim of his *Paradise Lost* is 'to justify the ways of God to man'. The culmination of Dante's experience of lifetime is in the ejaculation: 'In His will lies our peace.' According to Robert Browning, a just, watchful and charitable God sat in heaven and everything was right with the world. P.B. Shelley, a poet of rare lyric beauty and a thinker, too, of equal sensitiveness and depth, considered life a stain on the radiance of eternity, and death a release and re-union of the spark with ever-lasting, divine effulgence. He said 'Life like a dome of many coloured glass Stains the white radiance of eternity Till death tramples it to fragments.' Eternal or the *One* remains and only the people, the many change and pass. To Thomas Hardy, a

mortal life. The concept of *Nirvāṇa* as the emptying of desires and finally thought also from the consciousness and self,—a successful attempt at denaturing the human psyche—is a symbol of possible, achievable perfection. Life is another miracle, one more baffling phenomenon. Biologically a protein cell multiplied to millions, psychically a consciousness or the thinking principle, life remains inscrutable even when explained either as an end of a 'thing that was', or a continuum of a spirit understood according to the theory of *Karma* or the transmigration of soul. Besides, one has to die constantly in order to live. Sleep, rest, and the fixed, dead position of a foot giving fixity and energy to the other or to step forth are the opposite of life needed for life. Again, any complex and comprehensive expression of this phenomenon can be only symbolic. Equally mysterious and perplexing is the principle of death. Inscrutable, puzzling, death has lured some of the best of humanity in her pursuit. To know by experience means not to live. To know it without dying would only be knowing it only partly or falsely. Only symbolically, by focussing many points of view together, can one reach near a somewhat real (—real as it is knowable in life —) nature of death.

The symbolic phenomenon which enables man to look at things from the nearest perspective, and yet in the widest stretch, needs some elaboration with regard to its functioning. Symbolic method is not literal or connective. It is springing and projective. Even when analogies, parallels, suggestions, hints, evocations and provocations work, the symbolic imagination projects reality or experience which is independent of such concessions. The symbolic procedure is non-analytical, nondiscursive, non-elaborative, and a-rationalistic. It is more instinctive, intuitive and formula-like. The person using symbolic imagination intuitively apprehends it as if by his sixth sense. In Sanskrit poetics this symbolic, imaginative activity has been analogised to the third eye of *Śiṣya*, which can see through present past and future. The whole process is synthetic, converging and concentric. Looked at philosophically or from the standpoint of thought, the symbolic imagination presents an integrated, synthesised attitude, an inference coming from

Similarly myth-making, the creation of a tale, a narrative, and personification are also illustrating and exemplifying devices, used in an integrated form, to body forth, to present in concrete terms some abstract or obscure phenomena which have been symbolically apprehended. Needless to note here, that all of these four devices—simile, metaphor, myth and personification—either employ or imply analogy which, in its functional or operational aspect, is an inherent trait of the symbolic imagination.

The *Dhvani* system or the concept of suggestion in Sanskrit poetics provides an interesting parallel with the concept of imagination in the western aesthetics. The *Dhvani* theory starts with the following three fundamental postulates¹ (i) *Dhvani* exists apart from the primary and secondary sense of the world, (ii) *Dhvani* is most intrinsic to poetry, (iii) *Dhvani* cannot be explained in terms of Denotation (*Abhidhā*) or Indication (*Lakṣanā*), hence the necessity of coming a new term, Suggestion (*Vyañjanā*). Ānandavardhana, the principal architect of the *Dhvani* theory in Sanskrit, was confronted with a three faceted question: what is the essence of literature? How is the poet's genius, *Pratibhā*, and skill related with it? And, finally, how can the proper response of the critic be ensured? The essence of literature, he declared, was *Rasa*. *Rasa* was the creation of an aesthetic mood by the poet with the assistance of his imagination or *Pratibhā*. Ānandavardhana did not condemn or run down *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti*, *Vakrokti*, and other principles of explaining the spirit of literature, but he found them inadequate. Most of those approaches related to the externals, the devices used for embellishment in literature or tried to define the poetic effect based on the pattern of arrangement of words and meaning. The real spirit of literature was not captured, and not expressed by canons. The principle of *Dhvani*, on the other hand, Ānandavardhana said, estimated the significance of *Alaṅkāras*, *Gunas* and other elements of poetry, assimilated and incorporated them into poetic effect and created the marvel of aesthetic delight. *Dhvani* was the suggested, the echoed meaning. The world, in its denotative

1. Kṛṣṇanamurthy K. *Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics* (Mysore, 1968) p. 111.

beauty and power¹ The three kinds of *Dhvani*, *Vastu-Dhvani*, *Alankāra-Dhvani*, and *Rasa-Dhvani*, are like the three stages of the poetic imagination in ascending order, finally leading to the symbolic imagination. The object in the *Vastu-Dhvani* offers the first, concrete and tangible parallel to the poet to develop his suggested meaning. Then in the *Alankāra-Dhvani*, second stage, he passes on to the next ascending order, where the parallel offered is an *Alankāra*, an integral beautifying device, an objective correlative which yet provides some grip over *Dhvani*,—a grip of an edifying mechanism. In the *Rasa-Dhvani*, the last kind and the final stage of the suggested meaning, both the poet and the reader are left facing a phenomenon of aesthetic delight which is infectious and moving in its impression and yet so elusive. There is not single unit of language which can be attributed to possess or contain this effect when it has once been produced. As acknowledged in the Sanskrit poetics, so also in English, the symbolic or the suggested meaning is independent of the objects (including words) that led to it. It transcends the words and sentences with the help of which it was created. So many focuses of interpretation and so many levels of meaning are fused together in this multi-dimensional effect that a complex, rich and bewildering symbol is created. Here it should be noted that a continuous creation of *Rasas*, a co-mingling of many directional poetic effects, a centering of many visual images and rhythm patterns, may finally develop in the poet a vision,—a view, an interpretation of life and the world,—which, earlier in the present essay, has been given as the prime purpose of the symbolic imagination. Symbol as remarked earlier, may work through a word or a group of words, through a sound or a pattern of sounds, through a poetic stanza or as the structure of the entire poem, gradually leads a poet to adopt an attitude towards the whole reality—life and the world, and since this journey is made through imagination, it ends in a symbolic imagination serving as a world-view with a poet.

Imagination is a big furnace in which experiences, observations and impressions of various kinds are absorbed,

1 Anandavardhana, *D.śaṅgīka*, IV, 15

language something like a symbolic graph. This seems rather an extreme view like the one which considers man living in a symbolic universe with language, myth, art and religion as a part of it.¹ Besides, such an attitude toward language does not facilitate the differentiation and criticism aimed at in literature. This view is shared by Ānandavardhana also. Answering the objections and arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas, he held that the symbolism of a word was conditioned with reference to the speaker, occasion, time, place and the context at the time of speaking.² Even when a few words serve as symbols, all do not. Word is, primarily, a sign of an object or a phenomenon which it denotes. Symbol, as differentiated from sign, represents the concept, goes to deeper levels of perceptual knowledge, and attempts at coming individually closer to experience. Sign is the commonly shared, the semantic meaning of the word, while symbol usually forces a particular, individual and deeper meaning. Thus language, this series of phonetic and visual curves, operates on both symbolic and non-symbolic planes of meaning, and the artist employing the symbolic imagination uses words that serve his purpose.

DISCUSSION

Venkatachalam: Do you really take language as a phonetic and visual curve?

B B. Paliwal: Yes, I consider both visual and phonetic contents as basic for language.

R.P. Daxvedi: How do you distinguish between imagination and symbolic imagination?

B B. Paliwal: Imagination is generally and pervasively creative faculty in a poet. Symbolic imagination is a special analogical faculty, a characteristic of symptomatically, summarizingly and religiously harmonising power.

1. Cassirer, E. *An Essay On Man*, (New Haven 1944) p. 26

2. *Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics*, p. 115

of proficiency in Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Mokṣa and the Arts, as well as attainment of fame and pleasure"¹ as the purpose of good poetry. He defined poetry saying "words together with a definite sense constitute poetry"². But assigning of equal importance to word and meaning alone was not sufficient to differentiate poetry from ordinary expressions. So the figures of speech were considered essential for Poetic expression, which alone gave a special charm to Kāvya. Thus to the first literary critic, figures of speech appeared to be the essential feature of poetry. Bharata had the dramatic diction which was to be embellished in order to evoke Rasa, but Bhāmaha had nothing more than the Poetic diction which could be embellished by the figures of speech. Consequently, the poetic figures became all important, and thus what was an *alamkāra*, a means of embellishment to Bharata, became an end *alamkārya*, in the hands of Bhāmaha.

In addition to the figures of speech, however, the treatise of Bhāmaha includes discussion of other factors of poetry as well, such as, the purpose of poetry, the qualifications of a poet, the definition and classification of it, the blemishes, the Ganas and the logical and grammatical correctness. These topics save his treatise from being a mere handbook of advice for the practical working out of poetry. Still it cannot be denied that Bhāmaha did not visualise aesthetic pleasure as the ultimate end of Poetry.

Thus, the principles by which Bhāmaha would judge poetry may be enumerated thus.— Poetry must be embellished by figures of speech; the expression should be correct both logically and grammatically and should avoid Dosas and be attended with Gunas.

(2)

We have dilated on Bhāmaha to show that at his time the charm of poetry was recognised but the search into its essentials led only to the external factors. Word, meaning and the figures of speech—these were the factors which drew the attention, and efforts were made to formulate a theory

1. Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, I 2.

Dharmārthakāma-mokṣeṣu Vairakṣyaṇyam Kalisu ca |

Kṛoti Kṛit m prām ca Sādhukīrtyanīvanam ||

2. *Ibid* I, 16. *Śabdārthau Sahitau Kāvyaṁ.*

wing schools. The Riti school, for example, does not hold that *Alamkāras* are useless in the *Kāvya*, but says that it is the Style (*Rīti*) that is the essential element. Similarly, the *Rasa* school does not deny the usefulness of either the *Alamkāra* or the *Rīti* but holds the *Rasa* to be essential. The *Dhvani* School, in its turn establishes the supremacy of *Dhvani* and declares all the other factors to be subordinate to it.

After the advent and establishment of the *Dhvani* theory, an assimilation of all the factors is reached at and these are assigned their relative importance. A kind of organic arrangement of all these factors is ultimately accepted and the *Kāvya* comes to be viewed as a composite whole—for example, “the Word and Meaning constitute the body, *Rasa* is the soul, the *Gunas* are like the qualities of courage etc., the *Dosas* are like the physical drawbacks, the *Rītis* are like the special combination of the limbs, and the *Figures* of speech are like the ornaments of hands, ears etc.”

Although it would perhaps be wrong to hold that all the earlier schools automatically accepted the synthesis made by the following schools, it is true that in spite of sporadic opposition from the orthodox adherents of individual schools, this order of priority of the factors of *Kāvya* became standardised by *Ānandavardhana*, and universally accepted after *Mammaṭa*. The *Dhvanikāra* is thus the first literary critic who founded a school in which proper assimilation of all earlier concepts was effected.

Let us here, once again, consider the principles of literary criticism devised till the advent of the *Dhvani* School. The view point of the *Alamkāra* school has already been referred to. The *Rīti* school, in its turn formulated the following principles. The *Rīti* or the style is the essence of poetry; the style however means the special use of words, and this speciality consists in the *Gunas*; the *Gunas*, ten in number, pertaining to both sound and sense, add charm to the poetry; the figures of speech enhance that charm. Thus

1. *Vimāna, Kāvyalankārasūtravṛtta*, I, 2 6-8; III 1 1-2.
Rūp ā mī Kāvyaṣya. Viśiṣṭā padarācanā rītiḥ.
Vīṣṭo guṇātma. Kāvya-obbhāvāḥ Karttāro dharmā
guṇib Tadanūyabhetavai cālamkārah.

theoretical precision the profound concept of Dhvani as the soul of poetry. The treatise Dhvanyāloka is the best flower of Sanskrit Poetics, and although enough has been written after it, it will not be wrong to hold that since then the study of poetics has not made any significant advance.

With the treatise, Dhvanyāloka, the names of three extra-ordinary critics are associated. One is the anonymous writer of the Kārikās, known as the Dhvanikāra, the second is Ānandavardhana, the writer of the *Vṛtti* and the third is Abhinavagupta, the writer of the commentary, *Locana*. The writer of the Kārikās has been completely shadowed by his own work but that he was different from Ānandavardhana was admitted by Abhinavagupta himself. In Sanskrit Poetics, these three are like the *muniraja* of the Sanskrit Grammar. If the Dhvanikāra supplied the outline of a new approach to creative literature, Ānandavardhana developed it into a full-fledged theory by adding his *vṛtti* to it and lastly Abhinavagupta rendered it proof against all possible attacks and established the theory on the highest pedestal. I think that the name of the treatise bears reference to both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana. Dhvani may be said to refer to the Kārikās written by the Dhvanikāra and Āloka, to the *Vṛtti* written by Ānandavardhana. Perhaps this is hinted at by Abhinavagupta when he says—“Can the vision please without the eye, even if there be moonlight?”¹

(4)

It has been observed that the Dhvanyāloka marks a departure from the old approach to poetry and in it the study assumes the grandeur of an aesthetic approach. Let us see to what extent the Dhvani School achieved success in providing a new and higher standard of judgement.

The treatise itself is remarkable. It does not start with a technical definition of Kāvya and other allied topics. On the contrary, it refers to the very genesis of poetry and thereby gives a supramundane grandeur to the art of Poetry. Secondly, the treatise totally avoids detailed discussion of the figures

¹. Abhinavagupta, *Locana*, colophon of chapter I (chowkhamba Edn.)

Kam locanam viniloko bhātu candrikayāpi hi

It is not necessary to dwell on the arguments advanced by the Dhvani School in support of the validity of the Suggested sense and its postulation of the function of suggestion, as these are quite well known to the students of literature. It will, however, suffice to say that theory depends not only on logical argument, which is nevertheless fully competent, but has its sanction from the employments by great poets of words having power of suggestion. The approach of Dhvanyāloka is remarkable in this respect as well. The theorists do not assume the role of an irrefutable Śāstrakāra but argue their case in the light of the practice of the poets like Valmīki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa. The theory, thus presented, came to be accepted, in course of time, by the entire literary world. Of course, one or two discordant notes were heard but the main objection against the theory was not regarding the validity of such a special sense but about the process of reaching at it.

The Dhvani School holds that this Suggested sense can be of three kinds—the Matter (*vastu*), Figure of speech (*alamkāra*) and the Sentiment (*Rasa*). Since both the matter and the figure of speech can be either Expressed or Indicated but the Sentiment can never be Expressed or Indicated so the Suggestion of Sentiments is given the pride of place in the Kāvya. The excellent Kāvya is that in which the sentiment is suggested, and so the Kāvya itself is called Dhvani-Kāvya. The Dhvani School holds that the suggested sense should always predominate in the Dhvani Kāvya. In the case of its being subordinated to the Expressed sense, the Kāvya is to be treated as a second-rate one. The third and the lowest variety of Kāvya is that in which there is no suggestion at all. Ānandavardhana takes great pains to prove his contention that all great poetry owes its greatness to their power of suggestion.

If Dhvani is thus accepted to be the soul of poetry, the other factors so long severally accepted to be essential by different schools must be rejected as non-essential. The Alamkāra, Riti, Dosa and Gunas are not important *per se*, but may be so or otherwise only in the context of Dhvani, the soul of poetry.

a thing to be tasted by the connoisseurs (*sahṛdaya*) The Kāvya may and does have a particular message which may be related to any of the four ends of human efforts—Dharma, Artha, Kāma or even Mokṣa. But the judgement of literature is not based on this message. It is the sentiment, the proper suggestion of which decides the success or otherwise of the Kāvya. Ānandavardhana refers to the Mahābhārata and says that as far as the message is concerned, it conveys greatness of the path of renunciation (*mokṣa*) as the most important end of human life but as a Kāvya it suggests the Quietistic Sentiment (*Śānta rasa*). Similarly, the Rāmāyana, although upholding the ideal life of Rāma, suggests the Pathetic (*Karuṇā*) as a whole. Herein we find that unlike his predecessors, Ānandavardhana is clear about the distinction between the 'literature of power' and that of 'knowledge'. As a principle of judgement, then, it is appropriateness or propriety that has to be judged in relation to the suggestion of Sentiment. The memorable verse—"Save impropriety, there is no other cause of interruption of the Rasa, the great secret of Rasa consists in the observance of celebrated propriety"—of Ānandavardhan supplies the clue to the over-all evaluation of the Kāvya.

The Dhvani School, thus, ushered in a newer and deeper insight into the essentials of poetry. The contributions of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, in this respect, have been unique. Although not directly related to the principles of criticism, I would like to refer to the psychology of Rasa-realisation put forward by the third great exponent of the school, Ācārya Abhinavagupta. In the field of Sanskrit literature Abhinavagupta stands as the great master with unparalleled insight. Though his contribution to Poetics consists in the two comments he wrote on the Nāṭyaśāstra and the Dhvanyāloka, these two works, all scholars agree, are more original than many, and are held in the highest regard.

The theory propounded by Abhinavagupta proceeds from the premise that the Rasa is suggested, and the *Vibhāva*

6 Ānandavardhana, Dhvanyāloka, III, p. 330 (Chowkhamba Edn.)
 Anacūṭyād ite nānvad rasabhangasya kāraṇam |
 Praudhaucityabandhasu rasasopaniṣat parā ||

over language. It is upto the modern critic to prove that suggestion is the soul of poetry, holds true even today

I would conclude by saying that like the work of Aristotle, the *Dhvanyāloka* is the first treatise on Sanskrit Poetics, in which the approach is from Poetry to Poetics, not the other way round. Like it again, it recognises the unique importance of a poet's imagination and sense of propriety. It also distinguishes Poetry from history and maintains the comparative greatness of the former. It is neither necessary nor possible that literary theories of two different countries would follow the same lines but what affords great surprise is the universality of the fundamental principles of the poetic art. The *Dhvani* School supplies certain such principles that are valid even in different climes and times.

Jagannātha thus comes last in the last stage. After him the race of critics practically extinguished. Even at the time of Jagannātha, the scheme of poetics was ultimately standardised. The theory of Dhvani was finally established by Mammata. Then in the post-Dhvanī period what was that which inspired Jagannātha for a fresh contemplation and renewed investigation? The span of 550 years between Mammata and Jagannātha is marked by important authors like Ruyvaka, Vāvanātha, Hemacandra, Vidvādhara Vidvānātha, Appayya, Vāgbhata, Kesava Mīra, Śāradātanaya, Rūpa-Goswamin, Rājasekhara and Ksemendra. Even important thoughts like the कव्याद्भुतवाद of नागार्जुन, the मुक्तावाद of रामचन्द्रभुगवत्, स्वप्रकिया of नन्दनानन्दनाथ and चमत्कारवाद of ब्रह्मर were current. In this age of prolific literary output what was that which Jagannātha originally contributed to the literary field?

It is his concept of रसगोपनी on the foundation of which he looks to the Kāvya as 'रसगोपनीप्रतिपादकः शब्दः'. What is this रसगोपनी? He explains it as :

“रसगोपनी च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकज्ञानगोचरता” In this definition of poetic *ramayana* Jagannātha uses the word ज्ञान which he later replaces by the word भावना. The three ways in which he presents his general definition, where the word भावना is used instead of ज्ञान, become more important from the point of clarity and precision, the two points which are most dear to Jagannātha.

The three ways in which Jagannātha presents his general definition are :—

- (1) चमत्कारजनकभावनाविप्रसार्यप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम्,
- (2) न्यप्रतिपादितार्थविरचनभावनात्वं चमत्कारजनकभावच्छेदक तत्त्वम्,
- (3) स्वविशिष्टजनकभावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतावनात्वं चमत्कारवत्त्वमेव वा कान्यत्वं ।

In the first the process starts with चमत्कार and ends with शब्द.

In the second the process starts with शब्द and ends with चमत्कार.

“समुचितमलिनसन्निवेशचारुणा काव्येन समर्पितं ”

These words clearly bring to notice the importance he attaches to the सन्निवेशचारुत्व through औचित्य and लालित्य. Though he accepts the व्यवहार of 'दुष्ट काव्यम्' and does not incorporate निर्दोषत्व in the definition of his Kāvya he is very particular about the precision and accuracy in the use of words. For this only he deals with the शाब्दबोध and elaborately discusses even small things like the use of पुर or पुरतः. Thus the सौशब्द is not lost sight of. In his view the words must be accurate, appropriate and appealing. Then only they can give the delight which he calls a transcendental delight. Even the words like 'A son is born to you' can give delight but it is not लोकोत्तर काव्याह्लाद is thus शब्दाश्रित शब्दः are thus important. He defines प्रतिभा as “काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दाद्योपस्थितिः ।”

His particular भावना is पुनः पुनरनुसंधानात्मा and it generates the अलौकिकाह्लाद. Thus blissful state of mind is the supreme element among the three. It is not only the Rasadhvani that causes this अलौकिकाह्लाद but वस्तुध्वनि and अङ्कारध्वनि as well. State of mind is so much important to him that not only Gunas but Bhāvas are defined in the form of *Guṇavrttis* by him. It is important to note in this connection his definitions of *nīdrā* and *marana*—

(i) “श्रमादिप्रयोग्य चेन समीलन निद्रा”

(ii) “रोगादिजन्या मूर्च्छारूपा मरणप्रागवस्था मरणम्”

Thus गन्ध, भावना and अलौकिकाह्लाद stand for सन्निवेश-सौन्दर्य, आम्बाद and आनन्द respectively. These are the three elements which his concept of रमणीयता involves. Jagannātha's रमणीयता is thus not only the इष्टार्थ of दण्डिन्, not only the सौन्दर्यम् of वामन, it is the सहृदयश्लाघ्यता of ध्वनिकार, the स्वस्वन्दमन्दरता of Kuntaka, the औचित्य of दोमेन्द्र and रसात्मकता of Viśvanātha as well.

All these find a beautiful synthesis in the रमणीयता of

CONTRIBUTION OF THE VAISNAVA RASA-ŚĀSTRA TO SANSKRIT POETICS

Raghnath Sharma

The Vaisnava *Rasa-śāstra* has infused into the Sanskrit Poetics the most bewitching and maddening essence, that has immediately sublimated it from a mundane literary discussion to a sublime eulogy of the Supreme Bliss. Touched by the magic wand of the great master of the devotional sentiment Śrī Caitanya, the literary giants in the form of Śrī Rūpa Gosvāmin, Śrī Jīva Gosvāmin, Kavi Kṛṣṇapūra, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja and others were transformed, as if, into the supreme apostles of the *Bhakti-rasa*, where the rugged dry faggots and the hardest stones (saphires) started oozing the nectarine juice, whereby the life-less pulsated into life and the active living got benumbed, as if, into static inanimate.¹

True to the tradition of the master of poetics, Bharata these Vaisnava rhetoricians poured forth the juice of Bhakti through its veins so as to render all the primary² as well as petty³ emotions as contributory ingredients of an exquisite display of the great king of the *rasas*, *Bhakti—the Rasa-rāt*.⁴

The great traditional literary critics, right from Abhinavagupta through Bhoja, Mammata, Viśvanātha and others, have attached varied importance to *rasa* in the field of poetry. The *Vaiṣṇava* rhetoricians have also pronounced *rasa* as the very soul of poetry⁵ and have joined in line with some of the important traditional rhetoricians like Viśvanātha⁶ in attaching supreme importance to *Rasa* as a manifestation of the supreme bliss of Brahman and as translated into eight, nine or twelve currents (*Rasas*) as interpreted in poetics at a later stage.

1. Śrīmadbhāgavatam

**spandanam gamatām palakasta ūrām* *

2. Haribhakti-Rasimṛta sūdhā, Kābi, Vikram Era 1983, p. 309

3. Ibid., p. 309

4. Ujjvalanilāmṛta Kāvya-mālā Ed., 03, p. 4

5. Alankāra-kaustubha, Ed. Varendra Research Society, Benares 1926 p. 5

6. Sāhityadarpaṇa, Ed. Motilal Banaridas 1936, p. 48.

expresses his inability in classifying *Bhakti* as a *rāsa*.¹ This is a clear blot on the traditional literary system. Thus Panditarāja holds : "The counting of the nine-hood of the *rāsas* in adherence to the words of the Muni (Bharata) will break asunder and hence the lack of liberty in recognition of *rāsa*-hood of *Bhakti*—the traditional *śāstra*, therefore, carries more weight."² Rudraṇa, Udbhaṭa, Dhanañjaya, Hemacandra and others have practically endorsed the *Bhāṣa*-hood of *Bhakti* on the lines of Mammata, mostly in obedience to the tradition.

It was the proud privilege of the Vaiṣṇavaite rhetoricians to have pronounced the sole seat of *rāsa* in the Supreme Brahman³ alone and its expression in the sublimest bliss in the form of *Bhakti*. It is generally maintained that the literary tradition prior to the Bengal Vaiṣṇavism conceived of *Bhakti* mostly in terms of human love as between a man and a woman and then applied it to the sphere of gods. What the followers of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavism did was simply to reverse the order of this application. That is to say the former extended the human sentiment to the divine plane whereas the latter interpreted the divine-sentiment in human terms. But there is still a third view singular by itself, in so far as it recognizes not merely sublimation of human sentiments, but takes the sentiment of love in its highest perspective of the archetypal form of Platonic love that is ideally true and sincere between an ideal hero and the ideal heroine in its ideal fervour and fidelity.⁴ It is, therefore, clear that there was

1. Ibid., p. 48

2. Ibid., p. 46

3. *Haribhakti-rasāmṛta-saṁdhya*, Kāṣhī, Vikram Era 1920, p. 123
(The Reality of the Vedānta is Brahman but the Vaiṣṇavas regard their Lord Kṛṣṇa as Supreme Brahman).

A devotional attachment towards gods in general may, if at all, be regarded as a mere emotion because of the presence of the individualistic aspect of Absolute consciousness in them. But the similar treatment to an attachment towards God (Paramātmā)—the absolute seat of the Supreme bliss cannot be justified. Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī remarks in his *Bhakti-rasāmṛta*—

Rāsurvīdānāṁ vā vyabhikāra tathorjitāḥ,
Bhāvāḥ prekṣyāḥ rāso nūnyaduktam rasatovidaḥ.
Devāntareṣu jivatvāt paripandaprahīṇāt,
Tadyogyam Paramānandarūpe nā paramātmā

4. Gould Thomas, *Platonic Love*, London 1963, p. 141 :

"The just man, unlike the unjust, loves himself. This was a Greek commonplace, but it followed, Plato thought from the peace and har-

The excruciating pangs of separation carry with them the nectarine hallucinations drawing the self and the environment into the all-engulfing love, both the lover and the beloved. This is the *Mahābhāva*,¹ the most majestic trance pulsating with *Mohana* (bewitching) and *Mādana* (intoxicating) life-currents where the separation itself melts into the ecstasy of the intimate union and is the sublimest limit of the unlimited joy. The ideal taster of the rarest *rasas*, the crest-jewel of all the *rasikas* casts asunder His own ecstatic forces of himself as of others (*Parakīyās*) to over-reach them in spite of all hindrances, hardships and limitations of ethics, sociology and religion, so as to enable them to cross them all for an intimate taste of the supreme super-sensuous enjoyment of Supreme Bliss.

Let there be no bar to a recognition of the king of the sentiments *rasa-rāt* on the ground of uncommon experience. Devotion as also love are common in human mind, literature as well as religion. If the unique beauty, ecstatic separation and ecstasy of union in a *Śakuntalā* or a *Yakṣiṇī* can be regarded as objects of common taste, why should the highest ecstasy in union and separation between *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* and *Śrī Rādhā* be precluded from the taste of the *rasikas*? The rareness of quality is required at both the places and the tasteful capacity is a pre-requisite for both the enjoyments.

The apostle of *Bhakti* as also a master of poetic criticism *Śrī Rūpa* and his companions scatter the pearls of the highest literary water at the lotus-feet of the absolute Master of the absolute bliss. And this contribution has crowned the literature with the supersensuous bliss capable of touch by the minute poetic sense of a true poet. All other poetry, centred in the fading objects of earthly beauty, are rejected as mere trash, playing only with a semblance of *rasa* (*rasābhāsa*).²

1. Ibid, p. 463

2. *Nīrīyana Līlā*, *Bhaktucandrikā* (Quoted in the *Kalyāṇa Bhakti* *āṅka*, p. 347)

“Iṣham ca laukikārase śrīnglāṭīcau viśayāvacchinnasyaiva
cidānandīnīyasya sphuranānandānandīnīyasya nyūnatvam.
Bhagavadikīrokṣa cetovṛttilakṣane bhaktirase tu
anāvachchinnacidānandānandīnīyasya bhagavataḥ sphura-
nānandīnīyasya A'o bhagavadbhaktirase eva
laukikarāsaupakīyā paramarāsaḥ sevyaḥ.

DHVANI AS THE MEETING-POINT OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORY

Dr K Krishnamoorthy

I

Besides *Dhvani*, the major principles of Sanskrit criticism are *Alankāra*, *Guna-Doṣa*, *Rīti*, *Rasa*, *Aucitya* and *Vakrokti*. In historical surveys of these by scholars like S K De, P V Kane and V Raghavan we are made to feel that there is a progress in thought from theorist to theories and a kind of evolution in the concepts themselves. We are asked to believe that, by turns, each principle provided the master-key to unlock the secret of poetic essence. Theorists are classed as belonging to the *Alankāra* School or *Guna-cum-Rīti* school or *Dhvani* School or *Vakrokti* School or *Aucitya* School. I have been struggling in my recent writings (viz, (1) *Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1963; (2) *Some Thoughts on Indian Aesthetics and Literary Criticism*, University of Mysore, Mysore, 1968) to show that this procedure of scholars is not conducive to any clarification of the most fundamental facts of literary theory which are shared in common by most of our Sanskrit writers. I shall try in this paper to present some of the difficulties facing an enquirer into the nature of poetry as envisaged by our ancients and to indicate a line of approach which would make confusion less.

II

The basic analysis of *Kāvya* or poetry in which every Sanskrit theorist is agreed is the distinction of *śabda* and *artha*. There is no writer on *Alankārasāstra*, from Bhāmaha to Jagannātha, who does not allude to them or who does not rear all his conceptual superstructure on the foundation of this distinction. Let us simply ask ourselves whether we understand the significance or realise the importance of this foundational fact. So long as *śabda* and *artha* mean no more

though they are factually unrelated and it is the imagination which endows personal feelings to inanimate objects too. These are the various *alankāras* like Simile and Metaphor. The poet's function consists in recording an experience which is different from the worldly or the logical or intellectual experience of facts; and the means he adopts consciously or unconsciously as dictated by his imagination are the *alankāras*. In other words, the recognition of an *alankāra* as such demands literary sensibility and a poet-like imagination (*Bhāvayitrī pratibhī* in the words of Rājasekhara) on the part of the reader too. All good *alankāras* are lost upon the mere grammarians, just as *Rasas* or *gunas* are missed by them. The outer characteristics of an *alankāra* which everyone can grasp, whether a *śahīdāya* or not, do not explain its poetic essence. *Gaurāṅga gaurāṅg* is no *upā-lankāra*. Much of the cant in our books on the *Alankāraśāstra* can be traced to a deliberate disregard of this primary consideration. I should like to stress therefore that all *alankāras* are expressions of the imagination and are deliberate departures from the matter-of-fact or logical uses of language. Their beauty is their success; and absence of beauty in a *kāvyā-lankāra* is a contradiction in terms. A mechanical figure of speech is *a-kāvyā* (unpoetic) and hence no *alankāra*, just as a doll is no baby, but an imitation of a baby. Thus we are, willingly or unwillingly, led to a consideration of the *śul* of poetry, the *ātman*. It is always something *felt* by the man of taste and does not admit of intellectual dialectics.

The use of language, then, with a view exclusively to beauty is the only true explanation of all *alankāras* and hence it is nothing but *dhvani*. Thus the true *alankāra-āśīn* has perforce to be a *dhvani-āśīn*, if he has literary sensibility.

Usually, the *alankāras* are held to beautify the part and not the whole. Again, a misnomer! They would not be adornments at all if they did not indirectly beautify the whole though attaching themselves to the parts (*aṅga-dāreṇa jīvit*) as Ānandavardhana would say. Again, it is wrong to think that a poet's task lies in taking an unpoetic idea, and adding to it an *alankāra* to make it poetic. He is a poet only in so far as his imagination seizes facts and relations poetically. In a true poet, *alankāras* are *integral* and

literary judgement; and again we are facing what is technically called the *ātman* or soul of poetry. Its manifestation may take different forms and these are the *gunas* or excellences, grounded again in *śabda* and *artha*. Corresponding to the two primary *Rūps*, we must at least admit *Mādhurya* and *Ojas* and lucidity or *prasāda* as a third to explain general poetic appeal in all instances. In the epics like the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata* we have only *Prasāda*, but *Mādhurya* *Ojas* can be best felt in the refined poems of classical Sanskrit. *Gunas*, then, condition the poetic personality itself and are inseparable from any poet's work. Kālidāsa is mostly *Mādhura*; Bhatta Nārāyaṇa is fired by *Ojas*. But the theme may demand change of *gunas* as when Kālidāsa describes a fight in *Mālavikāgnimitra* or Bhatta-nārāyaṇa describes the soft passion in the *Vetisaṁhāra*.

This consideration brings us to the realisation that particularly in drama, the psychological content has a great bearing on *rasa-cum-rūpi* concepts. This is the famous principle of *rasa* perfected by Bharata in his *Nāṭya-śāstra*. In classical Sanskrit *mahākāvya*, which is primarily concerned with *Varṇanā* or imaginative description, and not *abhinaya* or representation of psycho-physical events, only that broad principle of *rasa* may be generally admitted, the detailed elaboration of its varieties being held to be confined to particular portions only. This is exactly what Bhāmaha and the ancients did in their concept of *Rasaratavalīkāra*. The *Rasaratavalīkāras* refer only to such passages in classical Sanskrit literature where the different *rasas* rise to a pitch. But the general principle of *rasa* is admitted by them in their definition of *mahākāvya* itself. *Rasas* also contribute to the reader's *prīti* or *ānanda* in their own way as *śloka-rasas*, *gunas* and *rūps*. They can all be called *śloka-rasas* in a broad sense or *rasa* in a broad sense, in the sense of aesthetic factors revealed in poetry.

But the general practice of writers is to narrow down the meanings of these terms to suit their own ideas and to indulge in rating one literary theorist as against another. I think this is a mistake of modern critical scholarship which deserves to be halted.

What exactly is the stuff of poetry? Is it pure emotion, sentiment, feeling, mere *citta-vrtti-viśeṣa* and nothing more?

is the *sthāyibhāva*? If the answer is *vismaya*, or anything else, questions regarding its *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* will remain unanswered. In fact a general *vismaya* or wonder can be affirmed in all *varnanā* since *atīṣaya* is an essential element of all poetry. In other words, my simple submission is that the *rasa* theory, when pressed literally to apply to all poetry, can do more harm than good.

In the widest sense of *rasa*, as meaning the aesthetic delight of the reader, there is no poetry or fine art, whether music or painting, sculpture or architecture, without *rasa*. But this is not what is usually meant when the theorists talk of a poem's dominant or ancillary *rasa*. In the sense of aesthetic sensibility, it cannot be denied either to the poet who works under *rasāveśa* and who reveals his *rasavattā* in his *varnanā* (to borrow the words of Rājaśekhara) or to the actor who is imbued with it during his activity of representation despite the demands made upon his attention by his art. I wonder whether it can be denied even in aesthetic perception of beauty in nature in one's own life, apart from poetry.

But *rasa* in the narrower sense cannot be affirmed either of the man in life or of the poet or of the actor, or of the reader of poetry at all times. It must needs be confined to the spectator of drama and to the reader of poetry at times when the mental states as patterned by the poet and presented by the actor ring as *rasa*.

IV

Throughout, I have dwelt on the common points of agreement or the consensus of Sanskrit literary theorists relating to the essentials of the basic concepts. I do not believe that some theorists realised these implications while others did not. I am led to feel that every theorist realised these facts quite well, though he decided to emphasise one or the other vital element, since every writer is seen relating all these different concepts in a sort of general philosophy. The general philosophy is implicit in some but becomes explicit for once in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. That is why I regard that the theory of Dhvani is the meeting-point of all theories of Sanskrit literary criticism. It clears misunderstandings about

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME ELEMENTS OF SANSKRIT CRITICISM*

I. L. Joshi

क्वचिना मातम नोमि तरन्ति प्रतिमाम्ममि
यत्र हृस्वेषाभीव भुवनानि सनुदंश ।

I admire our President, Dr K C Pandey's selection of Abhanvagupta for complete mastery. Abhinava is not only an eclectic, who takes the best and the most reasonable from all the older writers of renown, he is also a propounder of Advaita Śaivāgama which believes in the identity of the jivātman with the Paramātman. The jivātman or the individual soul is regarded by this school as being of the nature of Cidānanda or conscious bliss which finds expression in Rasa. The tenets of this school seem to eliminate the necessity of renunciation and the freedom from emotional disturbance (on which Advaita Vedānta insists) For worldly people, as most of us are, attainment of the supreme bliss through a complete identity of the knower and the known is clearly a difficult process. Advaita Śaivāgama has therefore a greater appeal to the Rasikas as their appreciative soul can hope to experience the Supreme Bliss without the renunciation of appreciation of beauty everywhere and in everything. This is our Rasa-experience which we may enjoy without going to the full extent of an *aghorāpāthīn* and exclaiming like one of them :

येन मुरा प्रियतमानुबन्धोपितन्य
ग्राह्यः स्वभावज्जिनो विहृतश्च वेप ।
येनेदमोद्गच्छन्मन मोक्षवर्ध
दीर्घांशुस्नु भगवान्मु निताकगणिः ॥

I believe that in Abhinava's view Rasa-experience emerges only in the audience, and not in the actor, who

* Remarks of Shri Joshi who presided over the concluding function held on 23.12. 1966.

logy has come to believe that creativity is not confined to a few naturally gifted people. It is inherent in human nature and can be encouraged by proper education. Old ideas in new combinations can also yield new ideas. A Sahrdaya studies good poetry deeply and his memory or rumination over the old ideas may trigger new ones. This need not be motivated by extraneous factors like fame or wealth, as these might result in excess of motivation which is fatal to a work of art. Thus Dandin seems to be correct in testifying

न विद्यते यथानि पूर्वश्रवणागुणानुबन्धि प्रतिभानमद्भुतम् ।
श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वाग्प्राप्तिना घृव करोत्येव कमप्यनुग्रहम् ॥

Many successful writers like Robert Louis Stevenson have testified efforts they had to make before they came to be recognised as great writers.

ननु शब्दायांलङ्कारयोर्भेदोपपत्तये शब्दस्यार्थतन्वविग्रहितोच्चारणरूपत्वे पुनर्यदुच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्य अर्थयोगस्तन्मात शब्दे उच्चारणार्थयोरेकभयोरेवान्तर्भावो ज्ञानमिति चेन्न उच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्यार्थयोगे शब्दे च शब्दायंयोरेकभयोरन्तर्भावो भेदावगमान् । पूर्वत्र अर्थमौन्दर्यस्य शब्दालङ्कारनियतगतत्वाभावात् सरपि च कृत्रिचिन्तदपत्ते शब्दमौन्दर्यस्य प्राधान्यात् 'प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति' इति शब्दालङ्कारत्वाभिधानं युक्तम्—यथा हेकवत्पतुप्राप्तयो व्यस्यार्थगतस्य मौन्दर्यस्य भवेदपि तथान्तर्भावाभावात् समकलाटानुप्राप्तयोश्च क्रमशः सतोऽर्थवैयर्थ्यायमाभ्यान्मकस्य मौन्दर्यस्य तत्र प्राधान्याभावात् शब्दालङ्कारत्वाभिधानं युक्तम् । परत्र तु अर्थमौन्दर्यस्य उच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्य च तत्त्ववैयर्थ्येन अलङ्कारगममौन्दर्यविशेषानुभवविरोधः शब्दायंगतालङ्कारभेदविनिगमनमविरहश्च ।

शब्दालङ्कारोऽर्थानुकूलमुच्चारणमौन्दर्यमर्थालङ्कारस्वार्थमौन्दर्यमिति निर्णयति किन्त्वरूपमेतदुच्चारणमौन्दर्यमर्थमौन्दर्यञ्चेत्यस्माद्विचारणीयम् । अशोच्ये—एतदश्वत्थमन्त्रेऽर्थोच्चारण एव क्रमेणैतयो स्वरूपे, जात्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य मौन्दर्यस्वरूपस्यानुपलब्धे आश्वत्थरूपेणैव तत्प्रतीतिश्च । समीपकदृष्टपार्श्वे बोधयतु शब्दमौन्दर्यतन्वञ्चेति तत्त्वद्वयं विद्यते । अत्र मौन्दर्यतत्त्वस्य बोधयतुविरहितप्रतीतिभावात् अर्थरूपेणैवोपन्यायनम् । एव सत्यपि मौन्दर्यमर्थगतं न स्वयंरूपमित्यस्माकं या वाचोपयुक्तिस्तत्र अर्थबोधपुरस्सरमेवार्थानुसन्धानं हेतुः । न हि अनेन अर्थरूपमेव तन्मौन्दर्यमित्यस्माकं सिद्धान्तस्य कपि शक्तिः । किञ्च लोकाग्रकमठवृत्तिमौन्दर्यस्य चाश्वत्थकमलहन्वान् 'मुल्ल कमलमिव सुन्दरम्' इति वाक्यगतस्य मादृशान्नकस्य मौन्दर्यस्य च वाच्यार्थरूपत्वाभ्योक्तवाक्यगतेनाभ्यानुभवेनाभ्यं स्पृष्टत्वेनोत्पत्तिर्भवति । एवमुच्चारणमौन्दर्यमप्युच्चारणरूपमिति ज्ञेयम् ।

एवमर्थालङ्कारो रम्यार्थरूपेण शब्दालङ्कारस्वार्थमम्बुदो रम्योच्चारणरूप इति सिद्धे किं रम्यार्थमाम्बुदोऽर्थालङ्कारता जन रम्यार्थविशेषस्येति विचारणीयम् । पूर्वत्र वाच्यव्यपदेशनामविलम्बितरम्यार्थप्रकाराणां परत्र च रम्यार्थविशेषाणामर्थालङ्कारत्वे निर्णयस्युपगमाय आदातामालङ्कारिकाणां मतमत्र प्रस्तूयते—

'वकाभिप्रेदमन्दोक्तिरिष्टा गचामलङ्कृति' ।

—काव्यालङ्कारः १-३६

'पावनो हृदनावर्जका अर्थप्रकारान्नावल्लोऽलङ्कारः ।

—काव्यालङ्कारः

अत्र पावनमात्राया हृदनावर्जकार्यप्रकाराणामर्थालङ्कारत्वाभिधानेऽपि प्रयुगहरणं वाच्यार्थस्य प्राधान्येन प्रतिमानान् कृत्रिचिन् सतोऽपि च व्यस्यार्थ-

अथ 'अलङ्कार्यस्याभावान्' इत्यग्रे विचार्यते । अत्र रसोज्ज्वलकार्यो-
ज्ज्वलकारादश्च तदलङ्करणहेतव इति तदभावेऽलङ्काराधानस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तिरित्य-
भिनवगुप्तपादानां मतम् । अत्रोच्यते शब्दार्थयो (रसस्य) नियतयोगाभावेन न
हि तस्य सर्वत्रालङ्कार्यत्वमिति तदभावेऽप्यलङ्काराधानस्योपपत्तिः । ननु तत्र
किमलङ्कार्यमिति चेत् शब्दाद्यविशेषादित्यस्माकं मतम् । ननु एवमपि
शब्दार्थावलङ्कार्यो तदार्थके च तन्मोन्दये अलङ्कारावित्यलङ्कारालङ्कार्य-
योरेकरूपत्वात्तदभेदोच्छेदापत्तिरिति चेन्न दृष्टिभेदात्तयोर्भेदसम्भवात् ।
सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या तत्रालङ्कारव्यपदेशो बोधनत्वदृष्ट्या चालङ्कार्यव्यपदेश इति
सर्वं मुख्यम् । ननु लोकेऽलङ्कारालङ्कार्ययोरेवमभावात्कथमेतदिति चेन्न
लोकगतस्य तयो रूपम्यावान्वयात् । लोके हि पृथगवस्थितस्यालङ्कारस्य
अलङ्कार्येण योगो हारम्येव कष्टेन । न तथा काव्ये । तत्र वाच्यवाचकचा-
रूपम्यालङ्कारस्य वाच्यवाचकरूपादलङ्कार्यात् पृथगवस्थानाभ्युपगमात् । किञ्च
रमस्याप्यलङ्कार्यत्वे 'रमोऽयं' 'अलङ्कारोऽयम्' इति प्रतीतिद्वयभानेऽपि उभयो
शब्दार्थाश्रितत्वात्तत्र लोकवत्पृथगवस्थानम् ।

अगो रमाभावेऽप्यलङ्कारमोन्दयमङ्गीकृत्य न हि अलङ्काराचारभूतयो
शब्दार्थयोरमत्वाभिधानं युक्तमिति रम्यवाच्यार्थोऽर्थालङ्कारो रम्योच्चारणञ्च
शब्दालङ्कार इति स्थितम् ।

परिचर्चा

रे प्र द्विवेदी शब्दार्थयोर्मन्वेनालङ्काराणां वर्णनमकृत्वा भवता शब्दार्थयो-
रभेदत्वेनालङ्काराणां वर्णनं कृतम् । किमेतन्मनः सङ्कृतकाव्यशास्त्रा-
नुमोदितं कुत्रापि च प्रतिपादितम् ?

डा. ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा - अथ तावदस्माकं दृष्टिकोणभेदः ।

रे. प्र. द्विवेदी . शब्दार्थौ तु धर्मिणो, अलङ्कारश्च धर्मः । दर्शने तु सर्वस्य
ब्रह्मात्मकत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिणो, शक्तिशक्तिमनोर्गुणगुणिनोर्वाभेदः ।
किन्तु व्यवहारे उभयोर्मध्येऽन्तरं विद्यत एव । अतः भवता
तयोर्भेदत्वेन चर्चा कर्तव्या । तर्हि अत्र भवता शब्दार्थयोरायत्तत्वेना-
लङ्कारस्याश्रितत्वेन व्यवस्था कर्तव्या न त्वभिन्नत्वेन ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा : वाम शब्दार्थावाययो अलङ्कारश्च शब्दार्थाश्रितः किन्तु
शब्दार्थयोभिन्नः न तस्य किमपि स्वरूपं विद्यते । स तु शब्दार्थ-
रूप एव ।

रे. प्र. द्विवेदी - भवता मुखे यदुपनेत्रं वर्तते तर्हि चक्षुर्भ्यां भिन्नं तद्रूपं वा ?

च तदन्वयवर्तिन् न समवति । असमवति चास्मिन् सवये
महती अव्यवस्था स्यान् शब्दार्थालंकारयोश्च भेद एव न
प्रसज्येत ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा मया न हि प्रोक्तं यत् सर्वथा तयोर्भेदः । मया केवलमेतत्
प्रोक्तं यत् बोधनन्वदृष्ट्या, ज्ञानतत्त्वदृष्ट्या वा यौ शब्दार्थौ
तावेव सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या अलंकारः । अत्र केवलं दृष्टिभेदः ।

वैकटाचलम् सौन्दर्यदृष्टिर्बोधदृष्टिश्च इति दृष्टिद्वयं भवद्भिः स्थापयितुमिच्छते
परन्तु सौन्दर्यस्यापि बोधो भवति । अतः सौन्दर्यदृष्टेर्बोधदृष्टावेव
कथं नान्तर्भावः ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा सर्वस्यापि बोधो भवति किन्तु सौन्दर्यबोधो भिन्नः अर्थबोधश्च
भिन्नः । (बोध — अर्थबोधः, न तु बोधमामान्यम्) अर्थबोधः
विचार्यं यदि [भेदं त्रियते] तर्हि तत्र तु अर्थस्यैव प्राधान्यम्
सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या [तु अलंकारस्य]

वैकटाचलम् वयं तावत् प्रथमं स्पष्टं जिज्ञासामहे कीदृशी भवता मनसि
अभेदस्य धारणा विद्यते ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा एषा धारणा यत् मुक्ते यत् कुरूपता सौन्दर्यं वा विद्यते तस्य
स्वरूपं मुखाद् भिन्नं न किमपि विद्यते । मुख्यमेव तत् । एवमेव
अलंकारोऽपि न बाह्यरूपा अपि तु शब्दार्थरूपा एव । लोके
यथा अलंकारालंकारयोर्भेदो विद्यते — यथा अलंकाराः शरीरात्
अपनेतुं शक्यन्ते न तथा वाच्ये । तत्र तु ते न “हारादिवद्”
वर्तन्ते अपि तु मुक्ते सौन्दर्यादिवत् यतो हि तेषाम् अस्तित्वं
शब्दार्थयोर्भिन्नं न सम्भवति । यथा सौन्दर्यं मूर्ध्निमेव तथैव
शब्दालंकारः रम्योच्चारणरूपः, अर्थालंकारश्च अर्थविबोध-
रूपः ।

रे प्र द्विवेदोः यदि गुणगुणिनोर्भेदो भवता न मन्यते तदा ‘गुणी’ एव
वक्ष्यताम् । कथं गुणस्य ग्रहणम् ? जलकारो भावरूपः शब्दार्थौ
तु द्रव्यरूपौ । यथा भावद्रव्ययोर्भेदः भवद्भिः स्वीक्रियते तथैव
जलकारस्य (सौन्दर्यस्य) द्रव्यरूपाद् शब्दाद् अर्थान्त्र्यं भेदो-
ज्वरमेव स्वीकार्यं । अत्र भेदो व्यावहारिकः । यदि भवता
दर्शनमाश्रित्य किञ्चिद् विचार्यते तदा त्वन्यत् । तत्र तु सर्वमेव
ब्रह्मात्मकं भवति ।

रामचन्द्र द्विवेदोः अक्षरस्य विमर्शिन्या टिप्पण्येका वर्तते यत् यद्यपि पर-
माणं न सर्वं ब्रह्मात्मकं भवति किन्तु यथा मनुष्ये एव ‘जीवः’
इत्यस्य व्यवहारः क्रियते तथैव चार्थशब्दार्थसदृशे एव रसस्य

संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र और हिन्दी-आलोचना

डा० उदयभानु मिह

हिन्दी-आलोचना के दो मुख्य उत्तमर्ग हैं (१) संस्कृत का समीक्षाशास्त्र, और (२) पाश्चात्य (प्रधानतया अंगरेजी) साहित्यालोचन। हिन्दी-आलोचना पर इन दोनों स्रोतों का प्रभाव दोहरा है (१) साहित्यिक मानदों की स्वीकृति, और (२) साहित्य-समीक्षा में उन मानदों के प्रयोग की पद्धति का अनुसरण। इन दोनों के प्रतिकलम्बरूप एक तीसरा प्रभाव भी उल्लेख्य है संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र और पाश्चात्य साहित्यालोचन की पारिभाषिक शब्दावली का अविकल, परिवर्तित अथवा अनूदित रूप में प्रयोग।

“समीक्षा” और “आलोचना” को ही लीजिए। आधुनिक हिन्दी-साहित्य में प्रचलित ये शब्द व्युत्पत्ति की दृष्टि में संस्कृत के ही शब्द हैं किन्तु स्वगुणार्थ की दृष्टि में वे अंगरेजी “क्रिटिसिज्म” के समशील हैं। इस पर मैं यह क्षिप्रानुमान नहीं कर लेना चाहिए कि वे संस्कृत की साहित्यशास्त्रीय विचारधारा से सर्वथा विलिप्त हैं। शास्त्र-भेदों का निरूपण करते हुए राजशेखर ने समीक्षा को “अन्तर्भाष्य” और “अवान्तरार्यविच्छेद” कहा था। काव्य के सद्वर्णन में ये लक्षण उनके तन्वाभिनिवेशी विवेचन का सवेन करते हैं।

दर्शन, विचारणा, विवेचन आदि अर्थों में परंपरा-प्रयुक्त “आलोचना” का मूल अभिनवगुप्त के “लोचन” से मिलाया जा सकता है। आलोचना का मुख्य उद्देश्य है भावक को वह दृष्टि प्रदान करना जिसकी सहायता से वह आलोच्य वस्तु के मर्म को भली भाँति ग्रहण कर सके। “ध्वन्यालोकलोचन” के प्रथम उद्योत के अंत में अभिनवगुप्त ने कुछ इसी प्रकार की बात कही थी :

कि लोचन विनालोको भाति चन्द्रिक्यापि हि ।

तेनाभिनवगुप्तोज्ज्वललोचनोन्मीलनव्यपात् ॥

हिन्दी-भाषा-साहित्य संस्कृतानुश्रयी है। फलतः संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र में प्रयुक्त रस, अलंकार आदि से संबद्ध शब्दावली का हिन्दी-आलोचना में तथैव व्यवहार होता आया है। यह और बात है कि मूल प्रयोक्ताओं के तात्पर्य में अनभिज्ञ होने के कारण एकाग्र आलोचकों ने कतिपय शब्दों का मनमाने ढंग से अर्थ-परिवर्तन कर दिया है, कभी-कभी अर्थ का अनर्थ भी हो गया है। “साधारणीकरण”, “तादात्म्य”, “आनन्दरस” आदि ऐसे ही शब्द हैं।

आधुनिक हिन्दी-समीक्षा में प्रचलित ग्रामरी, कामरी, अभिव्यवनावाद, प्रगतिवाद, प्रयोगवाद, नयी कविता, ठोस कविता, अ-कविता, युग-श्रेय, साहित्य-

संस्कृत-समीक्षा-शैली के विविध रूप हिन्दी-आलोचना में भी प्रतिफलित हुए हैं। संस्कृत-साहित्य में आलोचना की दो प्रमुख पद्धतियाँ दिखायी देती हैं (१) आचार्य-पद्धति, और (२) टीका-पद्धति। आधुनिक साहित्य-समीक्षा के दो स्पष्ट विभाग सर्वमान्य हैं (१) सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा, और (२) व्यावहारिक समीक्षा। आचार्य-पद्धति पर लिखित “ध्वन्यालोक”, “काव्यप्रकाश” आदि ग्रंथ सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा के उद्भूत उदाहरण हैं। “काव्यमीमांसा” में निर्दिष्ट शास्त्रभेद (वृत्ति, पद्धति, भाष्य, समीक्षा, टीका, पत्रिका, कारिका और वार्तिक) समीक्षाशास्त्र के मंदिर में, अपनी सैद्धांतिक विवेचना की विशिष्टता के कारण, आचार्य-पद्धति के ही विभिन्न रूप हैं।

संस्कृत-आचार्यों ने रस, छन्द, ध्वनि आदि के शास्त्रीय निष्पन्न के क्रम में प्रायः अन्यरचित और कभी-कभी स्वरचित उदाहरणों द्वारा अपने सिद्धान्तों का स्पष्टीकरण किया है। सिद्धान्त-प्रतिपादन ही उनका प्रधान उद्देश्य रहा है। लक्ष्य कृतियों का विवेचन गौण। लक्षण-उदाहरण के द्वारा शास्त्रीय समीक्षा की यह परीक्षा हिन्दी-आलोचना में १६वीं शती ई० में लेकर २०वीं शती ई० तक चलती रही है। १८वीं-१९वीं शती ई० में तो आचार्य-समीक्षा की कविओं ने इतने अधिक रीति-ग्रंथों का प्रणयन किया कि उन दो शतियों को हिन्दी का रीतिशास्त्र कहा जाता है। भारतीय भाषाओं के इतिहास में यह “रीतिकाल” हिन्दी की ही विशेषता है।

संस्कृत के आचार्य तत्त्वज्ञ आचार्य थे। हिन्दी के तथाकथित आचार्य मूलतः कवि थे। उन “ध्वन्यालोक”, “काव्यप्रकाश” आदि की कारिकाओं तथा वृत्तियों और “ध्वन्यालोकनोचन”, “अभितवभाग्नी” आदि टीकाओं में जो सूक्ष्म-विवेचन-शैली मिलती है वह हिन्दी के रीतिग्रंथों में दृष्टिगोचर नहीं होती। पद्यबद्ध होने के कारण इनमें विषय-विवेचन का वैशद्य नहीं है। “रसगह्वर” (कृतवृत्ति), “व्यम्बायंकौमुदी” (प्रतापनाहि) आदि कुछेक कृतियाँ ही ऐसी हैं जिनमें गद्यबद्ध वृत्ति पायी जाती है। उनमें भी तत्त्वामितिवेदी व्याख्यान नहीं है। संस्कृत-आचार्यों ने बहूना अन्यरचित उदाहरण दिये थे। अधिकतर हिन्दी-रीतिकविओं ने स्वरचित उदाहरण दिये हैं। हिन्दी के रीतिशास्त्र में विद्यमान संस्कृत के पंडितराज जगन्नाथ में भी रस-युगान्तर-प्रवृत्ति का पाया जाना आश्चर्य नहीं है। हाँ, हिन्दी में अन्तर्वास्यरूप “तुलसीमुष्ण” (रसरूप, १७५४ ई०) जैसा अल्पाक्षर-ग्रंथ भी उपलब्ध है जिसमें केवल तुलसी के

१. निम्नानुवृत्तमुदाहरणानुरूप काव्य मनान निहितं न परम्यं किञ्चित् ।

—रसगह्वर, ११६

विवेचन की आवश्यकता नहीं है। परेगितज्ञानलाहि बुद्धयः। अतः टीकाकारो ने अर्थ के व्याख्यानपूर्वक रचनागत लालित्य (रस, अलंकार, ध्वनि आदि) का यथाम्यामनक्षिप्त निदेश किया है। उदाहरणार्थ “वृत्तं न कर्णापितबन्धनं मन्वे” की टीका में राघवमट्ट ने वाच्य अथवा व्यंग्य-रूप में प्रतीत शब्दार्थालंकारों का, लक्षणा तथा व्यञ्जना के रमणीय व्यापार का, आलोकन शकुन्तला के रूप-चित्रण का, और आश्रय दुष्यत की मनोदशा का सारगर्भित निदेश किया है। टीकाकारों की दृष्टि कही-कही पर पाठालोचन की ओर भी गयी है।

हिंदी में “हरिप्रकाश”, “अमरचंद्रिका”, “मानस-मीषूय”, “विहारी-रत्नाकर” आदि टीकाएँ इसी प्रकार की रचनाएँ हैं। किसी ने व्याम-शैली अपनायी है, किसी ने ममान-शैली। टीका-पद्धति को हम आधुनिक व्याख्यानमक आलोचना का पूर्व-रूप कह सकते हैं। वस्तुतः पाठक के लिए व्याख्यानमक आलोचना जिनकी उद्देश्यो है उनकी प्रनादाभिब्यञ्जक या निर्यात्मक आलोचना नहीं, क्योंकि रचना के अर्थ-ग्रहण के बिना काव्यनिष्ठ मौख्य की प्रतीति सम्भव नहीं है। हिंदी के आलोचक-शिरोमणि रामचन्द्र शुक्ल ने मूर, तुलसी आदि के अनेक पद्यों की समीक्षा व्याख्यानमक शैली में ही की है।

पूर्वोक्त पद्धतिशो के अनिरिक्त दो एकानो समीक्षा-प्रणालियाँ भी सस्कृत-परंपरा में दृष्टिगोचर होती हैं जिन्हें हम सूक्ति-पद्धति और सदन-पद्धति कह सकते हैं। अनेक मुक्तियों में कालिदास, बाण आदि कवियों के काव्य-वैनिष्ट्य की प्रशान्तात्मक आलोचना उपलब्ध होती है। इस प्रकार की परंपरा हिंदी में भी चली रही है। कतिपय मुक्तियों में तुलनात्मक समीक्षा का आश्रय भी

१. उदाहरणार्थ . अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तल, ६।१८ पर अर्थद्योतनिका

२. सिन्धुपालवन, १।६० पर सर्वदक्षता—विलामिनीविभ्रमदन्तपत्रिका इति नायिकायां पाठः। अन्यथा विप्रहृष्टार्थप्रतीतिकत्वेन कष्टाख्यायंदोषापत्तेः।

३. निर्गतानु न वा कस्य कालिदासस्य सूक्तिषु।

प्रीतिर्नधुरसादानु मजरीध्विव जायते ॥ —बाणभट्ट

रचिरम्बरवर्षांश रसभाववती जगन्मनो हरति।

मा किं नरुते न हि न हि बाणी बाणस्य मयुरगोलस्य ॥ —यमदाम

४ (क) नामंया के दोहरे ज्यों नावक के तीर।

(ख) समुझ कविता धनप्रानंद की हिय आगिन नेह की पीर तकती।

—द्रवनाथ

(ग) भाट को देन न चहे बिदाई। पूछे केनव की कविताई ॥

वरुन की भौति ध्वनि को काव्य का प्राणतत्त्व स्वीकार किया है।^१ रीति, वक्रोक्ति या औचित्य को हिंदी-आचार्यों ने काव्य का प्रतिमान नहीं माना। कारण यह है कि उत्तरकालीन संस्कृत-समीक्षामित्रों ने इन्हें काव्यात्मा न मानकर काव्योपकारक तत्त्व में ही इनकी संक्षिप्त विचार-चर्चा की थी, हिंदी के रीति-ग्रथकार उनी मार्ग पर चले और रीति आदि के आपेक्षिक महत्त्व को और भी घटा दिया। वही विचित्र बात है कि मुद्रनिष्ठित ध्वनि-मिथ्याता को उन्होंने अनेकान गौरव नहीं दिया। केनवदाम जैसे दिग्गज पंडित ने उनकी एवदम उपेक्षा कर दी है। मभवत दग्दारी वानावरण में कठिन विषय का विवेचन मभव नहीं था।

संस्कृत-समीक्षामित्र संस्कृत (और प्राकृत) की लक्ष्य रचनाओं पर आश्रित था। हिंदी-समीक्षामित्र पौने चार सौ वर्ष तक संस्कृत-लक्षणग्रंथों पर ही अवलंबित रहा। आधुनिक शान्त्र-मपति का अधिवास या तो संस्कृत का दाय है या परिचय में आयात है। हिंदी का अपना आलोचनाशान्त्र नहीं है। बहुत वर्षों में इसकी चर्चा मुनी जा रही है, लेकिन अभी तक हिंदी के ललित साहित्य को लक्ष्य मानकर उनके आचार पर आपक आलोचना-शान्त्र का प्रणयन नहीं हुआ। कुछ आलोचक भारतीय और पाश्चात्य समीक्षा-मिथ्याता की म्विचडी पका रहे हैं बीच-बीच में हिंदी के उदाहरण भी दे देते हैं, यह ठीक है कि ग्राह्य को ग्रहण करना अनुचित नहीं है और तुलनात्मक अध्ययन की भी उपयोगिता है, परंतु अनेकवर्गान हेय है और समीक्षामित्र-निर्माण का यह रूप वैज्ञानिक नहीं है। आवश्यकता इस बात की है कि आधुनिक विधि में हिंदी-साहित्य में उपलब्ध ग्रंथों की परीक्षा करके मिथ्याता को स्थापना की जाए।

संस्कृत-समीक्षामित्र का प्रवर्तन नाट्यशास्त्र में हुआ। रस की निष्पन्नता नाट्य में ही मानी गयी, अथवा काव्य में उनकी प्रतिष्ठा बाद में हुई। उसका विशद विवेचन नाट्यशास्त्रीय ग्रंथों और उनकी टीकाओं में किया गया। हिंदी-समीक्षामित्र का आरम्भ काव्य में हुआ, क्योंकि आधुनिक काल के पूर्व का हिंदी-साहित्य कविता का ही साहित्य है। यही कारण है कि मध्ययुग में नाट्य-शास्त्रों पर ग्रंथ नहीं लिखे गये।

संस्कृत-समीक्षामित्र में अनेकवार तथा रस का अपेक्षाकृत अधिक विवेचन हुआ है, जोर तदनुसार हिंदी में भी। हिंदी के एकाग्र आलोचकों को यह मोह है

१. जग जीव ताकी कहत मन्द अर्थ है देह।

गुन गुन भूषा भूषा भूषा दूषा दूषा एह॥—रसद्वय (कृलपति), १।३४
अथ प्राण अह जग मव शब्द अर्थ पहिचानि। —रसोदयनिधि
(मोमनाय), ७।६

सग्रहकारों की परंपरा चूँ पड़ी थी। मम्मट, विश्वनाथ आदि स्वतंत्र विचारक न होकर सग्रहकर्ता ही हैं।^१ हिंदी में १६ वीं शती ई० से लेकर १९ वीं शती ई० तक मसूत के काव्यालोचन-मिद्धातों की ही उद्धरणों होती रही, उसी प्रकार काव्य के प्रयोजन, हेतु, लक्षण, गुण-दोष आदि का निरूपण किया जाता रहा। मसूत के अनुकरण पर हिंदी में भी दो प्रकार के शान्त्र-ग्रन्थ लिखे गये - "काव्य-प्रकाश" आदि की भाँति विविधाग-निरूपक,^२ और "कुवलयानन्द" आदि की भाँति एकाग-निरूपक।^३

हिंदी-रीतिग्रंथों के अध्ययन में विदित होता है कि केशवदाम, कुलपति, भिवारीदाम आदि कुछ को छोड़कर अधिकतर रीतिकवि पल्लवग्राही पंडित थे। उन्होंने मसूत के गिने-चूने ग्रंथों^४ से सामग्री ग्रहण की। उनका मुख्य उद्देश्य मसूत-काव्यशास्त्र को हिंदी में प्रस्तुत करके सबके लिए बोधगम्य बनाना था।^५ उन्होंने न तो मम्मट उपलब्ध ग्रंथों का अभिनिवेशपूर्वक अध्ययन किया और न ही विवेच्य विषय का प्राज्ञ प्रतिपादन। किसी-किसी ने नवीन अलंकारों की खोज की,^६ अलंकारों का नये ढंग से वर्गीकरण किया,^७ नयी नायिकाओं की उद्भावना की,^८ परन्तु शास्त्रीय मिद्धातों का प्रौढ़ उपस्थापन नहीं हुआ। इस अभाव

१. उत्तर-काव्य में रूपगोस्वामी, मनुमुदन सरस्वती, पंडितराज जगन्नाथ आदि ने निम्नदेह मौलिकता पायी जाती है। लक्ष्य बात यह है कि हिंदी-आचार्यों पर उनका कोई प्रभाव नहीं पड़ा।

२. कविप्रिया (केशवदाम, १६०१ ई०), कविकुलकल्पतरु (चिंतामणि, १६५० ई०), रमणीयपनिधि (मोमनाथ, १७३४ ई०), काव्यनिर्णय (भिवारीदाम, १७४६ ई०), काव्य-कल्पद्रुम (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३४-३६ ई०), काव्य-दर्पण (रामदहिन मिश्र, १९४७ ई०) आदि।

३. यथा . अन्कार, रम, नायिकाभेद आदि के पूर्वोक्त ग्रंथ।

४. काव्यप्रकाश (मम्मट), माहित्यदर्पण (विश्वनाथ), चंद्रालोक (जयदेव), कुवलयानन्द (अमरहस्य दीक्षित), रमतरंगिणी, रममञ्जरी (भानुमिश्र) आदि।

५. त्रितीया देववानी प्रमट है कविता की बात।

ते भाषा में होहि तो सब समझें रम बात ॥ —रमरहस्य, १।१४

६. स्वगुण अन्कार (भिवारीदाम), घन्टाालंकार (रमरूप) आदि।

७. मानान्य और विनिष्ट (केशवदाम), उभया आदि ग्यारह वर्ग (भिवारीदाम)

८. परिवार-प्रेमिका, देश-प्रेमिका, लोक-प्रेमिका आदि (हरिग्रोव)

आदि आचार्यों के मतों की प्रतिध्वनि-भाव है। उस परंपरा-प्रथित रस के निकष पर नयी कविता खरी नहीं उतरती। स्वयं सम्वृत के काव्यशास्त्र में रस काव्य का अकेला मानदंड नहीं रहा। रस को श्रेष्ठ मानने वालों ने भी वस्तु-अलंकार-ध्वनियों को पर्याप्त महत्त्व दिया है, और, उन आचार्यों ने जिसे अधम काव्य कहा है वह भी तो काव्य ही है। उसमें रस कहाँ है ? नयी कविता कही जाने वाली कुछ ऐसी रचनाएँ मिल जाती हैं जिनमें रसाभिव्यक्ति है, परंतु कविता मानी जाने योग्य अधिकांश रचनाएँ ऐसी हैं जिनमें अभिनवगुप्त का “रस” नहीं मिला।

अतएव हमारी मान्यता है कि ध्वनि-निदान आज भी प्राह्य है। इसका यह तात्पर्य नहीं है कि नये कवियों और जालोंचको को ध्वनि के १०४५५ भेद वठस्य कगये जाएँ। मेरा अभिप्राय मूल सिद्धांत से है। तीन छोटे-छोटे उद्धरणों द्वारा अपने इस कथन की पुष्टि करना चाहूँगा।

गजानन मुक्तिबोध का “एक आत्मवक्तव्य” उनकी श्रेष्ठ कविताओं में परिगणित है, उनकी आरम्भिक पंक्तियाँ हैं

.. और, जब
मेरा मिर बुलने लगता है,
धुँधले-धुँधले लकने में, आलोचनाशील
बनने में से उठे धुँएँ की ही चक्करदार
सीढ़ियों पर चढ़ने लगता हूँ।

इन पंक्तियों का कवित्व किस बान में है ? यदि रस में हैं तो क्या पड़ेगा कि कौन-सा रस है। क्या कारण रस है ? कहा जा सकता है कि यहाँ पर चिन्ता की व्यञ्जना की गयी है, और चिन्ता संचारी भाव है, इसलिए यह वाक्य रसात्मक होने के कारण काव्य है। परंतु चिन्ता कह देने मात्र से इसकी रस-पौष्टता की व्याख्या पूर्ण नहीं होती। अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण है आरम के तीन बिंदुओं के बाद प्रयुक्त ‘और’, ‘धुँधले’, ‘धुँएँ’, ‘चक्करदार सीढ़ियों’ आदि की व्यञ्जना जिनके द्वारा कृताग्रन्थ, निराशाच्छन्न तथा लसती जटिल अनुभूतियों में घुमड़ रहे व्यक्ति का दिव्य हमारी कल्पना की आँखों के सामने उभर जाता है। आनंदवर्धन की ‘छाया’ से ‘विव-सोचना’ या ‘मित्रविधान’ का भी अभिप्राय ग्रहण किया जा सकता है।

‘गोतकगोश’ भवानीप्रसाद मिश्र की प्रसिद्ध रचना है

जो हाँ दूबुर, मैं गीत बेचता हूँ।
मैं तरह-तरह के

इस रचना में भी ध्वनि की रमणीयता है। भूत से प्रियमाण व्यक्ति न तो कविता लिख सकता है और न कला का संरक्षण कर सकता है। विषम परिस्थितियाँ काव्य-रचना के मार्ग में बाधा न ले पहुँचा लें किंतु उसके प्रवाह को रोक नहीं सकतीं।

ध्वनि-मिथान समन्वयवादी है। उनके साथ अन्य सभी सिद्धांतों की ठीक सगति बैठ जाती है। रस भी अनलक्ष्यवमध्यय ध्वनि ही है। इसलिए नवीन परिस्थितियों की दृष्टि-पथ में रखते हुए युगवर्मानुसार उसका पुनर्व्याख्यान होना चाहिए। सम्वृत-काव्यशास्त्र का यह मिथान आज भी सर्वाधिक उपादेय है।

परिचर्चा

पु. ला. नागंबः अपना निबन्ध पढ़ते हुए बीच-बीच में मौखिक रूप से आपने साधारणीकरण के संबंध में जो अपने विचार व्यक्त किये हैं और यह प्रतिपादित करता चाहा है कि साधारणीकरण व्यक्ति (—प्रेक्षक) के अपने अन्तःकरण का होता है और उस समय मन, बुद्धि, चित्त तथा अहंकार पृथक् पृथक् कार्य न करते हुए केवल नत्ता-भात्र रह जाते हैं तथा साधारणीकरण का तात्पर्य नाटक के नायक-नायिकादि का दर्शक से तादात्म्य नहीं है—उम सम्बन्ध में मुझे एक यह शंका है कि यदि दर्शक का नायक से तादात्म्य नहीं होता तो वह उसके सुखी या दुःखी होने पर स्वयं कैसे सुख या दुःख का अनुभव करता है और नाटक अपनी जटिल परिस्थितियों से छूटने के लिये जितना व्यग्र रहता है उतनी ही व्यग्रता प्रेक्षक को भी क्यों होती है?

उ. भा. निहू : नाटक के नायक के साथ तादात्म्य होने की बात मुझे अत्यन्त भव्यचित्त लगती है। सब प्रकार के नायकों के साथ हमारा तादात्म्य कभी-कभी नहीं हो सकता। राम के साथ हो जाएगा, दुष्यन्त के साथ हो जाएगा किन्तु भाग और प्रहसन के नायकों के साथ नहीं हो सकता। महाकाव्य के नायक के साथ भले हो जाए पर मूकजक के नायक में होता सदिग्ध है। जिस मूकजक में नायक होता ही नहीं तो क्या वहाँ कवि के साथ होगा अथवा उनमें वर्णित वस्तु या भाव के साथ? निदान्त ऐसा होना चाहिये जो काव्य कही

रूप में रगमच पर देखते हैं, जिसको देख कर हमारा साधारणीकरण होता है वह उस व्यक्ति के साधारणीकरण में भिन्न है जिसने, उदाहरणार्थ, राम की वरूपता करके काव्य लिखा था, जवाहरलाल नेहरू को अपने जीवन में देखकर काव्य लिखा था या जिसने अपने जीवन के किन्हीं प्रेम-व्यापार को लेकर कविता लिख दी थी। यह भिन्नता किमर्थ में हो सकती है? यद्यपि मैं यह मानता हूँ कि स्वरूप में भी कुछ न कुछ अन्तर है फिर भी, क्योंकि इसमें यहाँ विवाद बहुत बढ़ जाएगा, इस लिए मैं केवल यही कहूँगा कि यह अन्तर मात्राजन्य अधिक है और इसका सबसे बड़ा प्रमाण यही है कि कवि को अपनी रचना पढ़ कर जो सुखानुभूति होती वह हमें नहीं होती। उसके स्वगतत्व का सर्वथा अभाव नहीं हो जाता, जब कि हमारे स्वगतत्व हो सकता है।

रा. च. द्विवेदी तब भट्टनायक के “नायकस्य कवे श्रोतु समानोजुभवस्ततः” इस कथन की आप कैसे व्याख्या करेंगे?

उ. भा. मिह इसकी पहली व्याख्या तो यह है कि मूढ़ परप्रत्ययनेयवृद्धि और दूसरी यह कि—जैसा तुलसीदास जी ने कहा है, निज कविन केहि लाग न नोका। मरन होउ अथवा अनि फीका—कवि को अपनी रसहीन रचना भी प्रायः मरस दिखाई पड़ती है। किसी साहित्यकार की एक कविता है ‘वियेना की सड़क’। रगमच पर सुनाया करते थे ‘वियेना की सड़क, वियेना की सड़क। श्यामा ठहरी, पर गई भड़क।’ लोग खूब तालिया पीटते थे। वह सोचते थे—न जाने किन्तनी रसमय कविता है मेरी। अब यहाँ यह बतनाइये कि यदि अभिनवगुप्त की बात स्वीकार कर लें तो कवि को अपनी ही वस्तु की रसानुभूति कैसे होती है, इसे कैसे समझा जाएगा?

वैकट्याचलम् : रसानुभूति में तो श्रेणियाँ मानी जा सकती हैं पर तादात्म्य अनुभूति में हम अपनी वृद्धि आदि के चिन् में विलयीकरण की श्रेणियाँ कैसे स्वीकार कर सकते हैं, यह मुझे अभी तक स्पष्ट नहीं हुआ।

उ. भा. मिह यदि किन्हीं दूसरे का ही प्रमाण लेना हो तो मैं मधुसूदन सरस्वती को उद्धृत कर सकता हूँ। उन्होंने रसानुभूति में जो तारतम्य की बात कही है वह साधारणीकरण के विषय में भी सत्य है। क्योंकि रसानुभूति और साधारणीकरण एक दूसरे से नियमतः संबद्ध हैं।

प्राच्य एवं पाश्चात्य काव्यशास्त्र में बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त

डा० रामगोपाल शर्मा 'दिनेश'

संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र समार का सर्वांगिक वैज्ञानिक एवं सूचिन्तित काव्य-शास्त्र है। त्रिकाल-दसों वाचायों ने काव्य-रचना के सभी पक्षों पर अनेक दृष्टि-कोणों ने विचार किया है। रस, बक्रोक्ति, रीति, ध्वनि, अलंकार, औचित्य आदि सिद्धान्तों का सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म सम्प्रदायों के रूप में सताब्दियों तक वास्तव्य-गुणरक्षण होता रहा है और संस्कृत-साहित्य की परम्पराओं में विकसित वाच्यनिक भारतीय भाषाओं के साहित्यों में भी अद्यावधि इन सिद्धान्तों पर चर्चा-परिचर्चा ही नहीं यत्नर विचारणा भी चलती रहती है। काव्यशास्त्रीय चिन्तन, विश्लेषण और मनुष्यात्मन की इन सुदीर्घ प्राच्य-परम्परा में 'बिम्ब' एक सिद्धान्त के रूप में अब तक प्रतिष्ठित नहीं हो सके हैं। हिन्दी के उन विद्वानों ने, जिन्होंने प्राच्य और पाश्चात्य दोनों काव्यशास्त्रों का अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण किया है, बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त को पूर्णतः एक पाश्चात्य काव्य-सिद्धान्त ही घोषित किया है। अतः यहाँ प्रस्तुत विषय पर विचार करने के लिए आरम्भ में ही यह स्पष्ट समझ लेना आवश्यक है कि बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त को भारतीय काव्य-सिद्धान्त के रूप में संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र में खोज निकालना हमारा लक्ष्य नहीं है। हम इस सिद्धान्त पर शुद्ध पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्त के रूप में ही विचार करेंगे, किन्तु हमारा लक्ष्य यह होगा कि हम संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र की मान्यताओं के मर्म में इन बातों की परीक्षा करें कि इन सिद्धान्तों की भारतीय काव्य-सिद्धान्तों के मर्म क्या स्थिति है? साथ ही हम यह भी देखने की चेष्टा करेंगे कि क्या इन सिद्धान्तों को एक पूर्ण काव्य-सिद्धान्त के रूप में स्वीकार करना उचित है? हमारे अध्ययन का यह लक्ष्य भी होगा कि हम पता लगाएँ कि आधुनिक काव्य के मूल्यमान में उनको क्या उपयोगिता है या हो सकती है?

'बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त' : व्याख्या

काव्य के मर्म में अनुभूति और अभिव्यक्ति के भिन्न-भिन्न पक्षों पर विचार करते समय हिन्दी के कई वाचायों ने 'बिम्ब' की चर्चा की है। ऐसे वाचायों में रामचन्द्र शुक्ल, डा० इयानन्दरदास, लक्ष्मीनारायण 'मुसगु', डा० हजारीप्रसाद द्विवेदी और डा० मोहन मुखर्जी हैं। नई पीढ़ी के चिन्तकश्री

- १ किसी व्यक्ति या पदार्थ की प्रतिवृत्ति ।
- २ मूर्त और दृष्ट प्रत्यक्ष ।
- ३ एक पदार्थ के लिए किसी ऐसे मूर्त-अमूर्त पदार्थ का प्रयोग जो उसके अत्यधिक समान हो अथवा उसे व्यञ्जित करता हो, जैसे मृत्यु के लिए निद्रा का प्रयोग ।

इन तीनों परिभाषाओं में प्रथम परिभाषा में कोई नया तथ्य नहीं, द्वितीय परिभाषा प्रतिवृत्ति के रूप में विम्ब को स्वीकार करती हुई भी उसकी मूर्तता और चाक्षुषता प्रतिपादित करती है तथा तीसरी परिभाषा विम्ब की अपेक्षा प्रतीक के अधिक निकट है ।

एन्साइक्लोपीडिया ब्रिटैनिका में प्रस्तुत की गई परिभाषा की शब्दावली है -

“ऐसी मूर्त स्मृति जो मूल उद्दीपन की अनुपस्थिति में किसी अतीत अनुभव का समग्र अथवा जग रूप में पुनरुत्पादन करती है ।”

इस परिभाषा में “विम्ब” शब्द ‘मूर्त स्मृति की पुनरुत्पादन क्षमता’ का पर्याय बन गया है ।

वस्तुतः ये परिभाषाएँ ‘विम्ब’ की शाब्दिक व्याख्याएँ हैं, काव्यशास्त्रीय कम । जिन विद्वानों ने विम्ब-सिद्धान्त पर विचार किया है, उनमें एजरा पाउण्ड, सी० डे० लीविम, लैंगर ह्वेजे, ह्यूम आदि के नाम उल्लेखनीय हैं । लीविम ने माना है कि ‘काव्य विम्ब एक प्रकार का भाव-भाषित शब्द-चित्र है ।’ स्पष्ट है कि शब्द-कोषों की परिभाषाओं में जो विम्ब मानन और उसकी शक्तियों तक सीमित था, वह इन परिभाषा में शब्द तक आ गया है—भाव में उत्पन्न होकर शब्दों में बँध गया है । काव्य भी शब्दों में भाव का ही तो आगम है । अब यह परिभाषा हमें विम्ब के काव्यशास्त्रीय अर्थ की ओर अग्रसर करती है ।

लैंगर लिखते हैं कि ‘विम्ब ऐन्द्रिय मात्र्यम द्वारा आध्यात्मिक अथवा बौद्धिक मन्त्रों तक पहुँचने का मार्ग है ।”

इस परिभाषा में फिर शब्द से पञ्चायन तथा मानसिकता की ओर प्रगम है । किन्तु एक तथ्य उक्त दोनों ही परिभाषाओं से सामने आता है, वह यह है कि विम्ब को इन दोनों विद्वानों ने मान्य माना है, साध्य नहीं, जैसा कि ‘शब्द-चित्र’ और ‘मार्ग’ शब्दों से प्रकट है । टी० ई० ह्यूम ने तो स्पष्ट कहा है कि

- १ काव्य-विम्ब पृष्ठ ४
- २ वही
३. वही
४. वही

मे बंविन हो चुके होने हैं, काव्य के रूप में पुनः मूर्तिन हो जाते हैं। यह शक्ति कवि की प्रतिभा के रमायन से जन्म लेती है और शब्द की जड़ता को ही समाप्त नहीं करती, उसकी प्रकृति को भी बदल देती है। अतः सङ्क्षेप में कहा जा सकता है कि काव्य-विम्ब मूलतः एक प्रकार की काव्य-भाषा है, जो उसी व्यक्ति के पास हो सकती है, जिसके पास कवि-प्रतिभा होती है। इसी कवि-प्रतिभा के फलस्वरूप शब्द-कोष या जननामान्य वा 'जगत्' शब्द साकेत' महा-काव्य की मूर्ति के लिए राजभवन और साम्राज्य के अनेक सुखद चित्र प्रस्तुत कर देता है—“इन कुटिया में ही राज-भवन मन भाया”। हम जो कुछ देखते, सुनते, सूघते, स्वाद लेते और स्पर्श करने में अनुभव करते हैं, वह सब हमारे मानस पर अपनी भिन्न-भिन्न छवियाँ डाल कर पीछे छूटता रहता है। वे छवियाँ मानस के घोल में सक्रमण करती रहती हैं। कवि-प्रतिभा उस सक्रमण से नई छवियाँ गड़ती और उन्हें शब्दों में उतार देती है। जो शब्द उन छवियों के वाहक बन जाते हैं, वे नयी अर्थवत्ता से अनुप्राणित होकर काव्य का स्वरूप धारण कर लेते हैं। काव्य-मर्जना को इस प्रक्रिया में जो काव्य-चेतना जन्म लेती है, वही समस्त मानस-छवियों के शब्दों में उतरने का फल होती है।

यहाँ एक बात और स्मरण रखने की है कि विम्ब मानस-यत्र के माध्यम में या शब्दयत्र की सहायता से की गई फोटोग्राफी नहीं है। इसीलिए विम्ब के निर्माण में सहज अनुभूति के माय-माय कल्पना भी सहायक होती है और कवि की रचि भी। यथा, कवि भिन्न-भिन्न प्रकार के फूल देखता है। वे फूल रंग, रूप, गंध आदि में अनेक अन्तर रखते हैं। उन सब की छवियाँ मानस पर अंकित होती रहती हैं, किन्तु वे छवियाँ न तो पूर्णतः अपने वास्तविक रूप में रह पाती हैं और न स्थायी ही हो सकती हैं। एक-एक क्षण में वे अपनी झलक दिखाकर मानस के घोल में घुलती मिलती रहती हैं। वे घुलनशील छवियाँ परस्पर सन्मिलित होकर कवि की रचि के अनुसार उनकी कल्पना और प्रतिभा के बल पर एक ऐसे नए फूल के रूप में शब्दों में प्रकट होती हैं, जो अनेक छवियों की एक छवि होना है, जो वस्तु-जगत् से आया होने पर भी वस्तुजगत् का न होकर समग्रतः प्रतिभा, रचि और कल्पना से प्रसूत होता है। उसमें जो रंग होता है, जो रूप वह धारण करता है और उसमें जो गन्ध अनुभव होती है, वह देने हुए किसी एक फूल की देन नहीं हो सकती। इसीलिए विम्ब की सज्जना फोटोग्राफी नहीं है। और इसी आधार पर काव्य में यथार्थ की भाग उमी रूप में नहीं की जा सकती जिस रूप में चित्रकला में की जा सकती है। विम्ब की दृष्टि में काव्य में यथार्थ का इतना ही अस्तित्व है कि कवि जो विम्ब-मर्जना करे वह उसके प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष अनुभवों पर आधारित अवश्य हो। काव्य-विम्ब के सिद्धान्त को उसके सही अर्थ में न समझने के कारण ही कुछ नए रचनाकारों ने काव्य में यथार्थ की

जाय, क्योंकि मन्वृत्त और हिन्दी के अधिकांश आचार्य इसी मिद्धान्त को काव्य की सर्वना एव मूलगन्त का पूर्ण सिद्धान्त मानते हैं। यह मिद्धान्त दो दृष्टियों से महत्वपूर्ण है। प्रथम तो यह कि राज्य-गजना की समस्त प्रक्रिया को इसकी कमौटी पर सफलतापूर्वक बना जा सकता है। शब्द के सभी व्यापार और उनके द्वारा ग्रहीत होकर अभिव्यक्त होने वाला वस्तु-जगत् ही नहीं गुण-जगत् भी किस प्रक्रिया में काव्य बनता है—यह सब समझने में यह मिद्धान्त सहायक होता है। द्वितीय बात यह कि इस मिद्धान्त की कमौटी पर सफलतापूर्वक उस मूल्य को भी समझा जा सकता है, जिसकी मिद्धि के लिए काव्य मज्जित होता है। इसीलिए रम-मिद्धान्त को आलम्बन, आश्रय एव उद्दीपन की लौकिक भूमि से आरम्भ करके रमाश्रय की लोकोत्तर मनुमनी भूमिका तक विस्तृत किया गया है। इस मिद्धान्त के विभाजन-व्यापार में विम्ब-मिद्धान्त अन्तर्भुक्त है। आलम्बन और आश्रय के रूप एव चेष्टा-गत समस्त आकर्षण काव्य में विम्ब बन कर ही प्रस्तुत होते हैं। उद्दीपन के विभिन्न चित्र भी विम्ब-रचना का ही तो विस्तार करते हैं। अनुभावों की अभिव्यक्ति विम्वात्मक होती है। रमवादी कवि निरन्तर विभिन्न प्रकार के पूर्ण, स्रष्टित और सश्लिष्ट विम्ब प्रस्तुत करके ही अपनी रचना को रमानुभूति की मधुमती भूमिका तक पहुँचाता है। अतः विम्ब-मिद्धान्त के अनुसार हम जहाँ विम्बों की रचना-भूमि पर एक जाने हैं, वहाँ रम-मिद्धान्त के अनुसार हम विम्बों को साधन मान कर उनमें आगे बढ़ जाते हैं—रचना को निष्पन्नियों की शोभ करके हैं और वह निष्पत्ति लोकोत्तर आनन्द में परिणत हो जाती है। रम-मिद्धान्त और विम्ब-मिद्धान्त को साथ रखकर समझने में यह तथ्य छिपा नहीं रहता कि जहाँ प्रथम सिद्धान्त काव्य की रचना की व्याख्या करके उसके मूलगन्त में भी प्रवृत्त होता है, वहाँ विम्ब-मिद्धान्त रचना की व्याख्या तक सीमित रह जाता है। विम्ब-प्रक्रिया काव्य-रचना या उनकी व्याख्या को कोई ऐसी प्रक्रिया नहीं है, जिसे भारतीय काव्यशास्त्री न जानते हों तथा जिसे उनकी किसी मौलिकता के आधार पर रम-प्रक्रिया से भिन्न कोई पृथक् पद्धति माना जा सकता हो। रम-मिद्धान्त में जडुभूति का निर्वैयर्थ्योक्तिग एव साधारणोक्तिग आवश्यक माना गया है और विम्ब-प्रक्रिया में भी ये दोनों बातें आवश्यक मानी गई हैं। जहाँ तक शब्दाय के मान्यता का प्रश्न है, वह दोनों के लिए चाहिए, किन्तु रम विम्ब को शब्दाय तक सीमित छोड़ कर उच्च माननी भूमिका की ओर अग्रसर हो जाता है। इस प्रकार जहाँ विम्ब-मिद्धान्त के द्वारा हम किसी काव्य की रचना के तत्त्वों और उनमें मज्जित मोन्दर्य में परिक्रित होने हैं, वहाँ रम-मिद्धान्त के द्वारा हम रचना के तत्त्वों, उनमें मज्जित मोन्दर्य और उन दोनों की सश्लिष्ट देन से लोकोत्तर आनन्द को भी उपलब्ध करते हैं।

मैयिलीशरण की निम्नांकित पक्तियों में मिलेगा, जहाँ भ्रातिमान् अलंकार लाने के लिए विम्ब-योजना हुई है—

नाक का मोनी अवर की कान्ति से
बीज दाडिम का समझ कर भ्रान्ति से
देखकर सहसा हुआ धुक मौन है
सोचना है अन्य नुक यह कौन है ।

अब यह स्पष्ट है कि सस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र का अलंकार-सिद्धान्त भी विम्ब-सिद्धान्त में अधिक व्यापक और विस्तृत सिद्धान्त है। विम्ब-सिद्धान्त को समस्त स्थितियाँ उनके प्रस्तुत और अप्रस्तुत विधान में अन्तर्भूत हैं। नए चिन्तक भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र को दूर से और ऊपर ऊपर में देखते हैं, इसलिए उन्हें विम्ब-सिद्धान्त भारत के लिए एकदम नई उपलब्धि प्रतीत होता है।

जहाँ तक रीति, औचित्य और वक्रोक्ति सिद्धान्तों का प्रश्न है, इनका क्षेत्र शब्द और अर्थ की उन सभी सीमाओं का स्पर्श करता है, जिन सीमाओं में काव्य-मर्मणा के अनिवार्य उपकरण के रूप में विम्ब-विधान किया जाता है। रीति-सिद्धान्त में गुणों को आधार-भूत तत्त्व माना गया है। शब्द और अर्थ के अलग-अलग गुण माने जाने के कारण रीति-विधान विम्ब-योजना में समर्थ होता है। उदाहरणार्थ, 'ममता' नामक अर्थ-गुण के कारण ही निम्नांकित पक्तियों में भिन्नारी के स्वरूप का विम्ब अपने पूर्ण प्रभाव के साथ प्रस्तुत हो सका है। इस विम्ब की रचना के मूल में क्रम-निर्वाह तथा सरल अर्थ-प्रतीति—दोनों ही प्रकार की समता विद्यमान है। निराला जी कहते हैं—

वह आता
दो टूक कलेजे के करता
पछताता
पय पर आता ।
पेट पीठ दोनों मिलकर हैं एक
चल रहा लड़ुटिया टेक
मुटठी भर दाने को—नूस मिटाने को
मुँह पटो पुरानी शोली को फँसाता
दो टूक कलेजे के करना पछताता पय पर आता ।

औचित्य-सिद्धान्त में शब्द, अर्थ, भाव, आदि के सभी प्रकार के औचित्य

है। हिन्दी की नई कविता पश्चिम के अनुकरण पर काव्य-वस्तु की अवहेलना करके काव्य-भाषा को महत्त्व देती जा रही है, इसलिए इस अपूर्ण काव्य-निदान के सम्मान में अभी और अधिक वृद्धि की ही सम्भावना है। आज का हिन्दी कवि और नया बालोपक भी—यह घोषणा करने लगा है कि वस्तु-मय कविता की कोई कमीटी नहीं, भाषा ही कविता की पहचान है। वह कहता है कि मनुष्य की मूल संवेदना में कमी अन्तर नहीं आना, केवल भाषा के सदर्थ बदली हैं। ऐसी परकीय मान्यता वाले चिन्तकों के लिए विम्ब-निदान एक पूर्ण कमीटी बन जाए, तो कोई आश्चर्य की बात नहीं।

परिचर्चा

बमल बेतड़ी जानने नेनिचन्द्र जैन और रामस्वरूप चतुर्वेदी के इस मत का उल्लेख करते हुए कि श्रुतिकिमी एक शब्द के द्वारा व्यापक भाव को व्यक्त करना है इसमें अपनी जगहमति व्यक्त की। यदि जैन और चतुर्वेदी जी ने इस विषय में गान्धधारणा प्रस्तुत की है तो कृपया आप ही बताएँ कि इसकी नहीं व्याख्या क्या हो सकती है।

इनके अनिश्चित आपने अपने निग्रह में स्वीकार किया है कि विम्ब भाव की प्रेरणा में बाहर आता है। भाव एक आन्तरिक वस्तु है और यदि विम्ब उसकी प्रेरणा में बाहर आता है तो निश्चित रूप में वह भाव का सम्प्रेषक होगा। ऐसा होने पर वह काव्य की आत्मा को ही सम्प्रेषित करेगा और केवल बाह्य-रूप में या शब्द रूप में उसकी स्थिति स्वीकारना भूल होगी, जैसा कि आपने किया है।

तीसरी बात में यह कहना चाहूँगा कि आपने ध्यान-ध्यान पर विभिन्न विद्वानों के मतों का उल्लेख करते हुए जो यह कहा है कि इयूम ने इस विषय पर यह लिखा है, लेविन ने यह लिखा है और डा. नगेन्द्र ने—वन्कि डा. नगेन्द्र ने ही—यह कहा है उनमें यह कहीं स्पष्ट नहीं होता कि आप विम्ब से क्या समझते हैं और इन निदानों की कौन व्याख्या करते हैं। यदि आप इस निदान में हमें अपने विचारों में परिचित करा सकते तो हमारे लिए अति लाभदायक होता।

डा. रामगोपाल शर्मा : मैं आपके अमूल्य प्रश्न का उत्तर पहले दूँगा—विम्ब से मैं क्या समझता हूँ : जब रचनाकार किसी वस्तु को देखता

अभिनवगुप्तपादप्रतिपादितं रसविवेचनम्

सुरजनदान स्वामी

रसो वै काव्यस्य जीवितमारमा वेति निर्विवादमभिमतः प्रायज्ञः सर्वपा-
मालकारिकाणाम् । अत एवोक्तमग्निपुराणे—‘वाग्वैदग्ध्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवात्र
जीवितम्’ । इति । आचार्यो भरतोऽपि—‘न हि रसादृते कश्चिदप्ययं प्रवर्तते’
इति ब्रुवाणो रसस्य इतरकाव्याङ्गापेक्षया प्राधान्यरूपमङ्गित्वं साधयति ।
ध्वन्यालोककारोऽपि—‘यत्र परिपाकवता बबौना रसादिनामप्यविरहे व्यापार
एव न शोभते’ । ‘सत्यं न तादृक् काव्यप्रकारोऽस्ति यत्र रसादीनामप्रतीतिः’ ।
“अचेतना अपि हि भावा यथायथमुपचित्ररसम्बन्धादतया चेतनवृत्तान्तयोजनया
वा न सन्त्येव ते ये यान्ति न रसाङ्गता, तस्मान् नाम्त्येव तद् वस्तु यत् सर्वात्मना
रसतान्पर्यवतः बवेन्मदिच्छया वा तदभिमतरसाङ्गता न यते” । “प्रतीयमानस्य
चान्यभेददर्शनेऽपि रसभावमुखेनैव उपलक्षणं प्राधान्यान्’ इत्यादिभिर्वचनैः
रसस्यैव प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयन् तस्य काव्यजीवितत्वमाचष्टे । अभिनवगुप्तस्तु
“रस एव वस्तुन काव्यस्यात्मा वस्त्वदकारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रसः प्रति पर्य-
वन्नेने” इति साष्टं रसस्यैव काव्यात्मकत्वं ब्रूते ।

तत्र रसम्बन्धप्रतिपादकं आचार्यभरतस्यैव सूत्रम्—“विभावानुभावव्यभि-
चारिमयोगाद् रसनिष्पत्तिः” । अन्यैव सूत्रस्य व्याख्याभेदात् रसविषये नाना
मन्त्रानि विवृण्वन्ते । यद्यप्यत्र प्राधान्येन अभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्याणामेव मतं
प्रतिपादनीयम् । तथापि तन्मन्त्रस्य वैशिष्ट्यप्रतिपादनायं सम्यक् अवगत्यमन्त्रं
अन्यान्यपि मन्त्रानि समासन् प्रतिपादनीयतामर्हन्ति ।

तत्र भट्टकल्लोटी भरतसूत्रस्यमयोगस्य उदाहोत्पादकभावसम्बन्ध-
नियतिरदस्य च उत्पत्तिमयं मनुते । यद्यपि तस्य मतं विभावं सह रते
उदाहोत्पादकभावसम्बन्धं, अनुभावं सह प्रत्याय्यप्रत्यायकभावसम्बन्धं,
अभिचारिभिरिव पौन्यस्येकभावसम्बन्धो वर्तते—मीमांसिभिर्विभावं

१. नाट्यशास्त्रे पृ. २७२ ।

२. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. ४९७ ।

३. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. ४९७ ।

४. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. १० ।

५. सोचने पृ. ८५ ।

भोजकत्वञ्चेति । अभिव्यया विशेषधर्मपुरस्सरमुपस्थापिता रामादयो विभावा
भावनापरपयिणि भावकत्वव्यापारेण रसप्रतिबन्धकान् रामत्वादिविशेषधर्मान्
परिहृत्य नायकत्वादिसामान्यधर्मपुरस्सरमुपस्थाप्यन्ते । एव कटाक्षमुजाक्षे-
पादिप्रभृतयः अनुमादा लज्जोन्मुखप्रभृतयो व्यभिचारिणश्च रामादिव्यक्ति-
विशेषधर्मपरिहाणपूर्वक कटाक्षत्वादिसामान्यधर्मपुरस्सरमुपस्थाप्यन्ते । एवमेव
साधारणीकरणात्मना भावकत्वव्यापारेण गीतादिषु सामाजिकरसप्रतीति-
प्रतिबन्धका पूज्यत्वादिवर्मा अपि निराक्रियन्ते । एवं च गीतादयो विभावा,
कटाक्षादयोऽनुभावा लज्जोन्मुखादयश्च मञ्चारिण साधारण्यमापास्ता
मन् मानाजिकरसप्रतीती प्रतिबन्धकता नोपयान्ति । यथा च विभावादयः
साधारण्यमापाद्यन्ते भावकत्वव्यापारेण, तथैव म्यायिभावो रतिरपि रामा-
दिव्यक्तिविशेषधर्मव्यवहारहित्येन साधारण्यमापाद्यते । भावकत्वव्यापारेण
साधारण्यमापाद्यमानाया स्तेष्व मानाजिक रजस्तमनी अभिभूय मत्त्वोद्वेकात्
प्रकाशानन्दमयनविद्विश्वास्तिमत्त्वेन मनसो या परिणति तद्व्यवहारेण भोज-
कत्वव्यापारेण साक्षात्कारो विधीयते । तादृशेन मनसा साक्षात्स्वभावा
सा साधारणीकृतान्ता रतिरेव रसः । अत्र मते भक्तमूत्रप्रयोगपदस्य भोज्य-
भोजकभावसम्बन्ध, निष्पत्तिपदस्य च भुक्तिरस्य । यतो हि भावकत्वव्यापारेण
साधारणीकृता विभावादयः चर्च्यमाणा मन् भोजका, साधारणीकृता च
रतिर्भोज्या । साधारणीकृतानामेव विभावादेना चर्चयया रजस्तमसी अभिभूय
मत्त्वोद्वेकेन मनसः प्रकाशानन्दमयनविद्विश्वास्तिमत्त्वरूपो भोग उपजायते
नान्यथा ।

अन्य मनस्य मान्यमतानुसारित्वात् अत्र साधारणीकृताया स्तेभोगः ।
भोगे एव मान्यमतेन अन्य रसविषयकमनस्य सादृश्य साध्यमतानुयायित्व वा ।
तथा हि यथा मान्यमते बुद्धिमतीनामेव ज्ञानमुत्पादीना बुद्धिप्रतिविधितया
चित्ति अविवेकेन पुष्पस्य साक्षात्कारात्नको भोगः तथा अत्रापि रामादिनिष्ठाया
स्तेरेव मत्त्वोद्वेकाना साधारणीकरणरूपाविवेकेन भोगः ।

डा गणेशमहोदयस्य भट्टनायकमते भक्तमूत्रस्य भोगपदस्य भाव्यभावक-
सम्बन्ध, निष्पत्तिपदस्य च भावित्वमर्थ मन्यते । परमेतत् नोचिन प्रतिभाति ।
नहि विभावादयो रसादेर्भावका भट्टनायकमते, अपि तु वाच्यशब्दा एव भावका ।
एतच्च—“तच्चैतद् भावकत्वं नाम यत् वाच्यस्य तद् विभावादीना साधा-
रणावादान नाम”, “वाच्यञ्च रसान् प्रति भावकम्”, “न च वाच्यशब्दाना

१. लोचने पृ. १८३ ।

२. लोचने पृ. १८८ ।

३. लोचने पृ. १८९ ।

(मूहुर्मूहुरनुसन्धीयन्ते) । पुन पुनरनुसन्धानात्मनो ज्ञानस्यैव भावनात्वात् । तदुक्तं जगन्नाथपण्डिते—“भावना च पुन पुनरनुसन्धानात्मा ज्ञानविशेष” इति । भाव्यमानाश्च ते साधारणीकृतरूपेण उपस्थिता भवन्ति । प्रतिपादितञ्च एतन् पण्डितराजेन “समुचितललितमनिवेशचाराणां काव्येन समर्पितं सहृदयहृदय प्रविष्टंस्तदीयसहृदयतासहृदयेन भावनाविशेषमहिम्ना विगलितदुष्यन्तरमणी-त्वादिभि” रित्यादिना सन्दर्भेण ।

भावनया सह सहृदयताया अपि विभावादीना साधारणीकरणे आवश्यकता वरीवति । यतो हि सहृदयता नाम तन्मयीभवनम् । तदुक्तमभिनवगुप्तेन—“येषां काव्यानुगोलनाभ्यामवगाढं विज्ञादीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता, तेजः सहृदया” । न च तन्मयीभवनमन्तरा केवल भावनया कस्यापि वस्तुतः साधारणीकरणं सम्भवति ।

कारणकार्यमहकारिणा साधारणीकरणञ्चाभिनवगुप्तमते भट्टनामकवत् न नामकत्वादिसाधारणग्रन्थपुरस्कारेणोपस्थितिस्तेषाम्, अपि तु ममैवेते, परस्यैवेति, तदस्यैवेते इत्येव व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धनियमस्य, न ममैवेते, न परस्यैवेते, न तदस्यैवेते इति व्यक्तिविशेषपरिहारनियमस्य च परिहारेण देशकालव्यक्ति-विशेषादिसम्बन्धराहित्येनोपस्थितिः । कारणादीना व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धपरि-हारनियमवर्जनपूर्वकमुपस्थापने सति रते कारणानि सहृदयहृदये वासनारूपेण विद्यमानस्य रत्यादेर्मित्रस्य आम्वादाङ्कुर्योग्यतापादने सम्पूर्णानि भवन्ति, अतो विभावयन्ति—वामनात्मनया अतिमूढमरूपेण अवस्थितानां रत्यादीनामा-स्वादयोग्यतामापादयन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या विभावा, कटाक्षादीनि कार्याणि अनु-भावयन्ति—वामनारूपेणावस्थितान् मामाजिकचिन्तगतान् रत्यादीन् भावान् अनुभवविषयतामापादयन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या अनुभावा, लज्जादिसहकारि-कारणानि च वामनारूपेण स्थितान् रत्यादीन् कार्ये विशेषेणाभित सञ्चार-यन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारिणो व्यपदिश्यन्ते । साधारणीभवनानन्तर रत्यादे-कारणकार्यमहकारिणि अलौकिकतामुपदान्ति । अर्थात् देशकालव्यक्तिविशेष-सम्बन्धराहित्येन उपस्थापितत्वात् तानि अलौकिकानि जायन्ते । लोके हि तानि कार्यकारणमहकारिणामजया प्रोच्यन्ते, इदानीन्तु विभावादिव्यापार-विशेषत्वान् अलौकिकविभावानुभावव्यभिचारिमज्ञा भजन्ते इति भावः । अस्या-दगाया तानि अलौकिकाभिरेव सज्ञाभिर्व्यपदेशेन लभन्ते । स्पष्टीकृतं चैतद-

१. रत्नगङ्गाधरे पृ. २ ।

२. रत्नगङ्गाधरे ।

३. ध्वन्यालोकलोचने पृ. ३७८ ।

वैषयिकोत्तरागशून्यमुद्धरप्रयोगितस्वात्मानन्दैकधनानुभवाच्च विगिष्यते ।” इति ।

अस्मिन्मने सामाजिकं रमनापरप्रयोगेण अलौकिकेन ज्ञानेन प्रतीतिविषय-
तामादाय रतिं सर्वविषयविशेषराहित्येन अभिव्यक्त्या सती न लौकिकी,
लौकिक्या रते व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धित्वान् । नापि शकुन्तलवत् मिथ्या । तथा
हि शकुन्तले नटे अनुमीयमाना स्यादित्वेन सम्भाव्यमाना या रतिः सामाजिकं
आम्बादधने, सा वस्तुतः अनुकर्त्तरि नटे न विद्यते, अपि तु अनुकर्त्तृनिष्ठत्वेन
सामाजिकं प्रतीयते इति मित्यर्थः । अभिनवगुप्तमने तु या रतिः सामाजिक-
राम्बादधने, सा वस्तुतः सामाजिकज्ञानमेव चेत्तमि वासनारूपेण विद्यते इति न
मिथ्या । नाप्येषाऽनिर्वाच्या रतित्वेन तस्या निर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् सामाजिक-
चेत्तमि वस्तुतो विद्यमानत्वाच्च । नापि सा लौकिकतुल्या सर्वविषयविशेषराहित्येन
तस्या अभिव्यक्तत्वात् । लौकिकतुल्यापि च लौकिकवत् व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धि-
त्वान् ।

न वा भट्टलोल्लटमतवद् आरोपिता एषा रतिः । तथा हि भट्टलोल्लटमते
नटे वस्तुतोऽविद्यमानापि रतिः आङ्गिकादिभिरभिनयं तत्र रमत्वानु-
मनानवलात् आरोप्य सामाजिकं साक्षाद्विद्यते । अत्र तु मते न सा नटे
वारोप्य साक्षाद्विद्यते, अपि तु सामाजिकं स्वचेतमि वासनारूपेण विद्यमानायाः
विभावादिवर्धयया मापारम्भेन अभिव्यक्त्याऽस्मिन्मया आम्बादो विधीयते ।
अतः सा नात्र मते आरोप्यतापि, अपि तु अलौकिक्येव सा रतिः । अत्र
एवोक्तमभिनवभारत्याम्—“तत्र एव विशेषान्तरानुपहितत्वात् सा रसनीया
मती न लौकिकी, नानिर्वाच्या, न लौकिकतुल्या, न तद्धारोपादिरूपा वा ।”

एषा रतिश्च वस्तुतः न स्यादिनी, व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धिन्या लौकिक्या
एव रते स्यादित्वान् । अन्यथा व्यक्तिविशेषादिमम्बन्धराहित्येन अभिव्यक्त्या
स्यापि विलक्षणत्वात् । अत्र एव ना न मिद्धवस्तुस्वभावा, अपि तु तात्कालिक्येव ।
अत्र एव रमस्य तात्कालिकत्व स्यापि विलक्षणत्वं चोक्तमभिनवगुप्तेन यथा
“अलौकिकनिविष्टमवेदनात्मकधर्माणोच्चरता नीतोर्ज्यं चर्चमाणनैकसारो न
तु मिद्धस्वभावः, तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्चणानिरिक्तकालावलम्बी, स्यापि-
विलक्षण एव रसः ।

एष च रसः सर्वथा अलौकिकः । तथा हि रम्यमानां सती रम्यवर्देश भजमाना
रतिः मापारम्भेनोपस्थितवान् यथा अलौकिकी, यथा च संतापटासमुजा-
शेषपञ्चमीमुक्तादयः वाग्यकार्यनृत्तगण्यः । हेतव मापारम्भ भजनं अलौ-

१ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८० ।

२. अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८० ।

अलौकिक एवाय चरंशोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहार । क्वान्वय इत्य दृष्टमिति चेन् भूषणमेतदस्माकम् अलौकिकत्वमिद्वी । पानकरमास्वादोऽपि किं गुड-मरीचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् ।”

विभावादीनां कारकहेतुत्वाभावेऽपि रमस्य च निष्पत्त्यभावेऽपि तद्विषयिण्या रमनाया. निष्पत्त्या रमनानिष्पत्तिं च रमे उपचर्य रसमूत्रे ‘रमनिष्पत्ति’ इति प्रयोगः कृतः । तदुक्तम् ‘नहि मूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम्, नेय रमस्य अपि तु तद्विषयरमनाया. । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकायतजीवितस्य रमस्य निष्पत्ति-रच्यते न कश्चिदत्र दोषः ।”

यद्यपि सामाजिकहृदि साधारण्येन अभिव्यक्ता अत एव तात्कालिकी अलौकिकी रतिरेव प्रत्यक्षानुमानस्मृत्यादिलौकिकप्रमाणभिन्नस्वमवेदन-सिद्ध-रमनाव्यापारविषयभूता रसः । तथापि सा रति लोकापेक्षया स्यामिभाव एव । अत एव आचार्येण भरतेन “नानाभावोपगता अपि स्यामिनो भावा रसत्वमाप्नु-वन्ति”, “नानाभावाभिनयजितान् वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् स्यामिभावानास्वाद-यन्ति मुमनसः प्रेक्षकाः” इत्यादिषु वचनेषु, “भावाभिनयसबद्धान् स्यामि-भावास्तया वृद्धाः । आस्वादयन्ति मनसा तस्मान्नाटधरमा स्मृता ॥” इत्यानुवस्यश्लोके च स्यामिभावस्य रसत्वमुक्तम् । स्पष्टीकृतञ्चैतदभिनव-गुप्तेन—‘नानाभूतैर्विभावादिभिरपि समीपं प्रत्यक्षकल्पना गता लोकापेक्षया ये ते स्यामिनो भावान्ते रसमानैकजीविनः रसत्व प्रतिपद्यन्ते । अत एतया दृष्ट्या स्यामिभावस्य रसत्ववचनमायुचिनम् ।”

रमावस्थाम साधारणोक्तया रते देगाद्यनियन्त्रणेन निर्विघ्नमुपचयात् भट्टलोल्लसन्मन उपचयवाद, भावानुगामितया करणान् शत्रुकसम्मतः अनुकरणतावादः, विज्ञानवादादलम्बनाच्च कस्यचिन् साख्यदृग् सम्मत-मुत्तदुत्पन्नजननशक्तिमुक्ता बाह्या विषयनामग्री एव रस इति वादोऽप्यत्र मते असतः स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते । अत एव अभिनवगुप्तेन रसस्वरूपविषये भट्टलोल्ल-टादीनां मतानि प्रत्याख्यानं स्वमतप्रतिपादनान् पूर्वं एतत्स्पष्टमुक्तं यन्मया न रसविषयेऽपूर्वं किञ्चिदुच्यते, अपि तु पूर्वोक्तार्थाणां मतान्येव परित्यज्यन्ते ।

१ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८५ ।

२. नाट्यसाम्प्रतये पृ. २८८ ।

३ तत्रैव पृ. २८९ ।

४ तत्रैव पृ. २९० ।

५ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८८ ।

मययोगरूपमप्यमप्रव्यूहपरिहास्य च 'विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिण्ययोगाद्
रमनिष्पन्निरिति सूत्रे मयोगपदमुपादीयते । शृंगारादिग्माङ्गानां विभावा-
दीनां प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारित्वेन मययोगे सत्यपि तेषां मयोगस्य कुत्रापि व्यभि-
चारित्वाभावेन मययोगस्यायोगात् ।

एतेषां विघ्नानां च सर्वतः प्रथममभिनवगुप्तेनैव सविन्तर निरूपण
विहितमभिनवनाटयाम् । तच्च विन्तरमयात्रेहोद्घियते ।

अस्मिन्मने रमसूत्रमध्यमश्लेषपदस्य व्यापद्वयकभावः सम्बन्ध निष्पत्ति-
पदस्य चाभिव्यक्तिरर्थः । प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनवेदान्तदर्शनानुसारिणी चैषा व्याख्या ।

अत्र रमसूत्रे रमपद 'रम्यते आम्वाद्यते' इति व्युत्पत्त्या रम्यादिस्थायि-
भावपरम् । तस्माद् विभिन्नेषु मतेषु क्रमस्य उत्पत्त्यनुमितिभूक्त्यभिव्यक्तयो
रम्यादिस्थायिभावानामेव न तु रमस्य । अनोऽभिनवगुप्तमतेऽभिव्यक्ति
लौकिकस्य वामनाख्येण मामाजिज्ञाना चेतसि विद्यमानस्य रतिस्थायिभाव-
स्यैव । रमस्य तु नाभिव्यक्तिः तस्य तात्कालिकत्वात्, स्थायिविलक्षणत्वात्,
पूर्वनिष्ठत्वाभावाच्च । तस्य तु स्वमवेदनमिद्धा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविलक्षणा
बोद्धव्या रमनैव ।

यथा पण्डितराजेनोक्तम्, रत्नाद्युपहिता चिदेव रम । अनो रमे रत्यादि-
स्थायिभावोपहितस्य चिदान्मनोजुभूतिर्भवति बोधरूपया स्वानुभूत्यपरमपर्याया
रमनया । तथा च रमोऽपि स्वमवेदनमिद्धा, रतेरिच्छात्मनश्चोभयस्यापि मनो-
मात्रविषयत्वात् । किं तु मनसो निर्विषयस्यात्मनोजुभूतिः । अत्र तु रत्यादि-
विषयनवदित्तस्यात्मन इत्येव विशेषः । अत एव रमाम्वादस्य परब्रह्माम्वादम-
विवृत्तमुच्यते न परब्रह्माम्वादवम् ।

ये तु केचिदावुक्तिकां प्राहुः—रमस्य हृदयमात्रमन्वन्वित्वात् तस्य बुद्धि-
मन्वन्विभिर्दर्शनं सह सम्बन्धस्यातन भारतीयानामावादाणां नोचितं प्रति-
भानोति ते सर्वथाजिभिज्ञा देवानां प्रिया रमनत्त्वस्य । न हि केवलायाश्चिन्त-
वृत्तेरास्वादो रम अपि तु रत्यादिवृत्तवृत्तिविशिष्टस्यात्मनः । अन्यथा सर्व-
रत्नानामानन्दव्यभिचारित्वं न स्यात् । चित्तवृत्तीनां सुखदुःखोभयरूपत्वात् ।
अपि च 'देखर सर्वभूतानां हृदयेऽर्जुन निष्ठति' इति गीतावचनेनात्मनो
रत्यादिस्थायिभावानां चोभयोरपि हृदयवर्तित्वेन अन्तर्मुखमनोवृत्त्या तन्मयी-
भवनशोभायैकाकिनो रत्यादिस्थायिभावस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । इति शम् ।

मम्मटाभिमतं लक्षणायाः षड्विधत्वं हेत्वलंकारश्च

डा० रेवाप्रसाद द्विवेदी

मम्मटाचार्यः—

“मुखायंवाधे तद्योगे हृदितोऽयं प्रयोजनात् ।

अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् सा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥ इत्येव काव्यप्रकाशे

“तद्वाधे हृदितोऽर्थाद् वा लक्षणीयस्तदन्वित” ।

इत्येव च शब्दव्यापार—

विचारे लक्षणानामान्य लक्षयित्वा द्वयोरप्यनयोर्ग्रन्थयोस्तद्भेदाश्च—

‘स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसामर्पणम् ।

उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता दृष्ट्वैव सा द्विधा ॥”

सारोपान्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयो विषयस्तथा ।

विषय्यन्तकृतेऽन्यस्मिन् सा स्यात् साध्यदसानिका ॥

भेदाविमो च सादृश्यात् संबंधान्तरतस्तथा ।

गीणौ दृष्टौ च विज्ञेयी ॥”

इत्येव प्रतिपाद्य

“लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा” इत्यन्याः षड्विधत्वं निगमयति । अत्र के नु ते षड् भेदा इति प्रश्ने काव्यप्रकाशटीकितारो नैकधा प्रतिष्ठन्ते । तेषु—

१ चण्डोदासादयः—‘शुद्धगीर्ग्योरापोपाध्यवमानयोः सादानलक्षणाभ्यां भिन्नमानतामगीकृत्याष्टविधत्वमस्या आमनन्ति ।’ मम्मटोक्ते षड्विधत्वे च (१) हृदि, (२) प्रयोजनम्, (३) उपादानम्, (४) लक्षणम्, (५) आरोप, (६) अन्यवमान चेत्येषां भेदकानां षड्विधत्वोपपत्तिरुक्ता दर्शयन्ति । काव्यप्रकाश-

१. “जाति क्रिया गुण सत्ता वाच्योऽर्थः समित्वनि”-रित्यन्य पूर्वार्द्धम् ।
ततस्तत्पदेनात्र वाच्योऽर्थः परामृश्यते ।

२ काव्यप्रदीपप्रभाषाः काव्यमालानस्करणे पृ० ३६ ।

३. उपरुद्धं काव्यप्रदीप, तत्प्रभा च ।

लक्षणाभेदः	काव्यभेद	उदाहरणम्
२. लक्षणलक्षणा	अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वनिः	“उपकृतं बहु तत्रे”- त्यादि ^१
३. सारोपा गौणी	रूपकपरिणामापह्नुतय	“रात्रिकापालिकी” ^२
४. साध्यवमाना गौणी	निगौर्याव्यवमानानिगयोक्तिः	कमलमनम्भसि कमले च कुवलये—० ^३
५. सारोपा शुद्धा		आमुर्धुतम्
६. साध्यवमाना शुद्धा ^४		आयु

१. काव्यप्र० उदा० २४ ।

२. काव्यप्र० उदा० ४२१ ।

३. काव्यप्र० उदा० ४४९ ।

४. निम्नवृत्तितार्थीकिमारोपि तालिकामिमामनुमोदन्ते—

१. मुधानागरकारो भीमतेनदीक्षितः । यदुक्तं तेन—“अत्रोपादान-
लक्षणाभ्याम् अर्थान्तिरस्मत्प्रमितात्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यो . . . ,
गौणीभ्यां सारोपनाध्यवसानाभ्यां रूपकान्तिशयोक्ती . . .
निरूपयिष्यतीति ।

२. म०म० गोकुलनाथशर्मा । यदुच्यते तेन—“प्रयोजनवती तु
यद्युपादानं यदि वा लक्षणम् । उभययापि ध्वनिविशेषो
व्यजयति, “गगाया घोष” इत्यत्र तटे लक्षणलक्षणया गगाताद्-
रूप्यस्य तेन च पावनत्वरूपस्य अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वनेर-
भिप्रेयवतात् । “कुन्ता प्रविशन्ती” इत्यत्र कुन्तधरेषूपपादान-
लक्ष्येषु कुन्ताद्वारूप्यद्वारा निर्देशप्रवृत्तत्वादेरर्थान्तिरस्मत्प्र-
मितवाच्यत्वस्य ध्वननात् सादृश्यमूला लक्षणा ।
गौर्वाहीक इत्यत्र रूपकम्, “गामिमा वारये” इत्यत्रान्ति-
शयोक्तिम्, “जडेन वाहीकगवेन दण्डमादाय गुप्ता घनिकस्य
गावः” इत्यत्र परिणामम्, “गौरय न तु वाहीक” इत्यत्रापह-
नुतिम् उत्पापयति ।”

३. नरसिंहमनीषाकारः । यदुच्यते तेन—“उपादानलक्षणार्था-
न्तरनम्रमित्तवाच्यध्वन्युपयोगिनी, लक्षणलक्षणा चात्यन्त-
तिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वन्युपयोगिनी, गौणमारोपा रूपकालकारो-
पयोगिनी गौणसाध्यवसाना च प्रथमातिशयोक्तिप्रयोजिका ।
इति । ३० वामनस्य बालवोधिनी ।

दाशैनिका' अपि तामेव मतिमृतिभनूसरन्ति । ततश्च' काव्यप्रकाश विधित्सु-
मम्मटोऽपि काव्यानुपयोगीनि लक्षणान्तराणि तितिक्षति चेद् वैज्ञानिकमेव
पन्थानमाश्रयति । ततश्च तृतीयमेव लक्षणाभेदगणनाक्रममगौ सिद्धान्ततयोररी-
करोति नान्यम् ।

ननु—“यदि काव्योपयोगिन एव लक्षणाभेदा अत्र प्रतिपादयिषितास्तर्हि
प्रथमतयाश्चत्वार एव भेदा अत्र प्रतिपादनीया, तेषामेवोपयोगस्य मम्मटोदा-
हृतेषु काव्येषूपलम्ब्यन्वात्, ततश्च ‘लक्षणा तच्चतुर्विधे त्वेव निगमनीयम्,
न तु “लक्षणा तेन षड्विधे”ति । अन्यौ शुद्धारोपाध्यवसानमूलौ तु भेदौ
परिहर्तव्यावेव मम्मटेन, तदुपयोगभाज काव्यन्यलस्य तेनादर्शितत्वात्
न परिहृतौ चेत् काव्यस्यलान्यपि तेन तदुपयोगभाजि दग्गनीयानि । न च तानि
दर्शितानि प्रगस्तमत्र ग्रन्थरत्ने अवाच्यवचनम् वाक्यावचन' व । यद्युच्यते—
“यूनायु, आयुरेवे”—न्यादीन्नेव प्रयोजन व्यञ्जयन्ति स्यलान्यत्रोदाहरणतया-
भिमतानीति नास्ति तादृशदोषद्वयभीतिरिति नह्युच्यताम् ”अन्त्यत्र वैचित्र्य
न वा, नास्ति चेत् कथमिदं काव्यत्वेन गण्यते, अस्ति चेत् कथमिदं गौणोपचार-
वदलकारकोटौ न निवेश्यते, कथं च निवेशितमपि वक्ष्यमाणहेत्वलकारकोटौ
प, “हेत्वलकारो न लक्षित, आयुषृतमित्यादिरूपो ह्येव न भूषणता कदा-
चिद्वृत्ति, वैचित्र्याभावादि” त्वेवमेतन्निराक्रियते । यद्युच्यते—“परिकरा-
लकार यावदेव काव्यप्रकाश निमग्न व्युपरते मम्मटाचार्ये शेषपूरणस्यालक-
भट्टमूलेष दोष, परिकरादुध्वमेव कारणमालाप्रकरणेऽयं वैचित्र्याभाव
प्रतिपादयती वृत्तिग्रन्थन्योपलम्भादि”—ति, तर्हि चतुर्थं उल्लासे कस्य दोष,
यत्र काव्यलिङ्गस्य वृत्ते हेत्वलकार' इति काव्यहेतुरिति' च व्यपदेशा क्रियते,

१. ३० न्यायदर्शनसूत्रम्—२२।६४, व्याकरणमहाभाष्यम् ४।१।४८—
सूत्रे, वाक्यपदीयस्य द्वितीय काण्डे च ।

२. शब्दव्यापारविचारेऽपि मम्मटो व्यवहारोपयोगिनीमेव लक्षणा
मीमांसने “इह हेतोपादेयाना हानोनादाने प्रमाणादेव, तच्च निश्चयात्मना प्रामाण्य
भवते, निश्चयश्च शब्दमाहित्वेनार्थं विपर्ययोनी' ति तेन तथैव प्रव्रान्त-
त्वात् । मुकुलभट्टोऽपि व्यवहारोपयोगिनीमेव लक्षणाममुख्यत्वाभिधातज्ञया
लक्षयति ।

३. दोषान्तरानाम्ना ३० व्यक्तिविवेक अम्मन्मन्करणे पृ ३८७ ४३६, ।

४. काव्यप्रकाशे कारणमालालकारवृत्ति ।

५. ३० वामनाचार्यस्य काव्यप्रकाशभूमिका पृ० ८, म० म० डा०
काणेहृत मम्भुतमाहित्वान्नेतिहामश्च ।

६. काव्यप्रकाशे उदा०—७१ महिलामह०, उदा० ९० पविमल्ली० ।

७. काव्यप्रकाशे उदा० ६५ केमेमु वक्षामोडिप० ।

हेतुलंकारस्य द्वैरूप्यं प्राचानभिमतम् (१) अथावमेव हेतुत्वकेन हेतुना सह हेतु-
मती यदि वा तन् तद्रूपमेकम् (२) एक च हेतुना हेतोरभिमतता यदि
वा तन् तद्रूपम् । अनयोरेव प्रथमं तत्र काव्यादशंकारो दण्डी—“हेतुश्च
सूक्ष्मदेवो च वाचानुत्तमनूपगमि”ति भूयणोत्तमता पश्यति, प्रसूतीति च
तदप्रवाचनं मार्यचतुर्विधमिति कारिकादाहृती । नामहाचार्यश्च तत्र

“हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मो लेशश्च नालंकारतया मतः ।

समुदायानिधानस्य यतोऽन्यनभिधानतः ॥”

इत्येवमतलंकारतां पश्यति, यानतोऽन्यद्वद्वदान्च तद्दर्शनं तथैवानुमोदन्ते,
हेतुनिमग्नकार्यकौ च न संलभन्ति’ इत्यपि नामहस्य दर्शनमिदं सूक्ष्म-
लेनयो कृते रद्वदस्य मतिं न विनुस्यति, पश्यत्येव स तत्रालंकारभावम् अयापि
हेतोः कृते दण्डिनः पदवी भानहृत्वित्रीकारेणानौ मोचयितुं न प्रभवति
तदर्थनयो —

हेतुना सह हेतोरनिधानमभेदमकृद् भवेद् यत्र ।

सौलंकारो हेतुः स्यादत्येव्यः पूयामृतः ॥’

इत्थं निप्रमेव पश्यान्मुनीन्त्य “अविरलकमलविक्रान् --- काल” इत्यादिना
निदर्शयति, लभनेतना चानुमोदतमुपपृक्तायाः महदस्त्वस्मगया । अतयोः
प्रथमं काव्यजिनान्ता जीवन्तिचादि विगदीकृतपग्वतिक्रिपयाचार्यपद-

१. काव्यादशं २।७३५-५९ ।

२. काव्यालंकारे २।८६, अत्र मनयंताय चात्र २६६ पृष्ठे प्रथमं पाद-
दिनतदना “पत्रोत्तुनकं” इत्यादिकाङ्गिका प्रसूतीति । समुदायानिधानं—
वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादनम् ।

३. यानतोऽन्यद्वद्वदाना काव्यालंकारेषु हेतुभेदस्यानुपलब्धनादित्य-
मुक्तिः ।

४. रद्वदः सूक्ष्मदेवो लभन्ति, पार्थकेन चानयोग्यकाङ्क्षनाकलनति ।
३० काव्याल० ३।९८-१०२ । सूक्ष्मे काव्यप्रकाशहृदि अलंकारनाम पश्यति,
दशम उज्ज्वले “कुनोति लभित” इत्यादिना लभनोक्त्यामेव तनुदाहाय्यपि ।

५. रद्वदकाव्या० ३।८२ । काव्यप्रकाशे कारानालाप्रकरणे “हेतुमता
महे”त्यादिवाक्यमन्येदं संशेत्, कालवोचिनीकारो याननाचार्यः पुनरपि उद्मदी-
मत्वं राशयति ।

नामुपन्यासे परिकरविच्छित्तमभिमतुते—

“यद्यप्यपुष्टार्थस्य दोषताभिधानात् तन्निराकरणेन पुष्टार्थस्वीकारः कृतः तयापि एकनिष्ठत्वेन बहुता विशेषणानामेवमुपन्यासे वैचित्र्यमित्यलङ्कारमन्ये गणितः” ।

इत्येव च ता दोषाभावात्तन्मात्रविपक्षेस्तायं अलङ्कारस्वरूपं गजम्बन्धमधिराम्यते तस्य “आयुर्धृतमि”त्यादिषु एकाकिहेतुहेतुमदभावम्यलेषु मा भूदलङ्कारत्ववो

“आयुर्धृतं यशस्त्यागो भयं चौरः सुखं प्रिया ।

वरं हृतं गुरुज्ञानं श्रेयो ब्राह्मणपूजनम् ॥”

इत्यादिषु, “अविरलकमले”त्यादिषु, “उल्लास” इत्यादिषु च तादृशानेकेहेतु-हेतुमदभेदभासु काव्यरत्नेषु तु मा कथं न जायत इति यत्तस्य विस्मयावहमेव । एव प्रथम हेतुभेदमलङ्कारतयागीकृत्य परत्र प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानं श्रीमम्मटाचारिणो बद्धश्रद्धश्चन्द्रमसः सिपति, मशकप्रमाणं कचि बहुमन्यमानं स्फटिकजुगुप्सते, कलहान्मानयोश्च बालि-भुग्रीवयो मुग्धोवमेव हिनमि, वालिनमेव रक्षति । किमत्र तन्त्रमिति चेदिदम्—

हेतुहेतुमदभेदेन आप्रमाणा विच्छित्तिरभेदमेवोपजीवति, न हेतुत्वम् । तत्रैव तस्या हेतुनाम्ना व्यपदेशोऽनुचिन्तितः, विच्छित्तिजनकनाम्नेवालङ्काराणां व्यपदेशस्य निरारणात् । अत्र एव सत्यामपि मामग्र्याम् अतन्वय उपमापदेन न व्यपदिश्यते, तत्र विच्छित्ते । द्वितीयमदृशव्यवच्छेदजनितत्वात्, एवमेव उपमेयोऽपि, तस्या तृतीयमदृशव्यवच्छेदाश्रितत्वात् । एव यदि विच्छित्तिनिदानम् अभेदमूलज्य अभेदानुयोगिनी हेतुनाम्ना व्यपदेशं क्रियते तर्हि तन्प्रतियोगिना हेतुमता किमपराद्धं, तन्नाम्नेव व्यपदेशं कथमत्र न क्रियते हेतुमनिति ग्राह्यमिति विवक्षितम् । नास्ति चात्र अभेदोऽपि विच्छित्तिङ्कारणम्, हेतौ हेतुमत्र आरोप्येव तत्कारणतयानुभूयमानत्वाद् । अस्ति चाभेदारोपयो-

१ परिकरालङ्कारप्रकरणे काव्यप्रकाशवृत्तिः ।

२. छट्टकाव्याल० ७।८२—कारिकायां नमिमात्रोऽविवृतिः । अत्र विपरिवृत्तिं विपरिग्रामप्यनेकेत्यान्, तेषु च प्रकृताप्रकृतोभयान्मताकल्पनायाः समवाद् दीपक-न्यूनयोगित्वात्तस्मात्कथं प्रसंगो हेतुर्कदापि विषयतीति एकनिष्ठतया अनेकेषामभेदं प्रप्नुवन्ति “अविरलकमलविक्रम” इत्यादीन्वेवोदाहरणानि उनीचीनतराणि ।

कान्ता विरक्तस्ये'त्यादि, तदितरसद्वन्वमूलकान च तस्मै

“उल्लामो लुतिकानामकालमूर्च्छा वियोगिवर्गस्य ।

प्रभवति दक्षिणवायुर्वहुजयो मदनमल्लस्य ॥” इत्येतत् पद्यरत्नम् ।

निराकरोति च सादृश्यमूल आरोपो रूपकत्वमाद्यन्त जरतगनेवम्—

इहान्ये सादृश्यनिमित्त एवारोपो रूपक, न संबन्धान्तरनिमित्तकोऽपि, तेन संबन्धान्तरपूर्वक आरोपो वैचित्र्यमात्रम्, न त्वलंकार कश्चिदिति” मन्थ्यते, पठन्ति च “उपमंव निरोद्धतभेदा रूपकमिष्यत” इत्यादि । तन्न निपुणहृदयादजंम् । तथा हि इह तावद् द्विविधा लक्षणा, प्रयोजनरहिता हृदा, तद्व्युत्ता च कार्या । तत्र हृदाया प्रयोजन-व्यंग्यार्थाभावादभिधावद वैचित्र्य-वाचनाविरहान्न रत्नपरिपोषकत्वमिति नालंकारता । कार्या पुनस्त-
द्वलसम्येन काव्यजीवितायमाना सर्वथा कविभिरादरणीयेति सर्वथा ध्वनि-
कारादीनामधिप्रतिपत्तिः । न च तस्याः सादृश्ये संबन्धान्तरे वा कश्चिद् विशेषो, येनैकालंकारता, परत्र तदभाव इति स्यात् । न च संबन्धान्तर-
निमित्त आरोपोलंकारतया लक्षितः, नापि तद् युज्यते, रूपकसाक्षात्त्वेन तदन्तर्भावस्यैवोचितत्वान् । अत एव ‘आरोपो रूपकमिति सामान्येनैव सूत्रिनम्, न च सादृश्यमिन्यनुपपन्नम् ।’

संगृह्णाति चामु नवंभेवानिदानमनया कारिकया—

“सादृश्यसंबन्धनिबन्धनाया अलंकृतित्वं यदि लक्षणाया ।

साम्येऽपि सर्वस्य परस्य हेतोः संबन्धभेदेऽपि तथैव युक्ता ॥

अलंकारविभिन्नोक्तारो राजान्त्रय्योजयर्थोऽपि रत्नाकरमिम प्रगुणवन्लकार-
माध्याऽकारानुमारिणीकृतो शुद्धारोपप्रसूनम्याप्यारोपस्य रूपकालंकृतित्वा-
यानुगुण भवमिदमेवमुपस्थापयति—

“केयाचित् संबन्धान्तरेतुर्प्यारोपो रूपकागमेवेति मतम् । यदाहलंकार-
माध्यकार—“लक्षणापरमार्थं यावन्ना रूपकम्” इत्युपक्रम्य “सारोपान्या च
सादृश्याद् वा संबन्धान्तराद् वा” इत्यादि । स तु यथा—

“अमृतकवलः शोभारातिः प्रमोदरसप्रपा

सितिमसकटं ज्योन्नावाहो तुषारपरट्टिका ।

पण्डितराजोपि च “उल्लाम” इत्यादिनि^१ पद्ये । अत एव च रत्नाकरकारो हेत्वन्काराय काव्यलिङ्गान्मक प्रथममेव हेतुभेद लक्षयति, काव्यलिङ्गमिति नाम विहाय च “हेतु”शब्देनैव त व्यपदिशति । द्वितीय चाभेदभूत हेतुभेद रूपक एव प्रागुक्तेन क्रमेण गतार्थयति । एवमेव चातिशयोक्तिप्रथमभेदेपि “आयुरेवं”त्वादिक सकलपितु तल्लक्षणे सादृश्येतरमपि सबन्वमुपादयान् । यदि च “आयुर्धृतम्” इत्याद्यावारोपापेक्षयातिशये चमत्काराधिक्यमनुभूयेत तर्हि “कार्यकारणयोर्पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययतो” जायमानायामतिशयोक्तौ भेदमसौ सकलयेन, तदर्थं च तल्लक्षण “कार्यकारणयोर्भेदक्रमयोर्पौ विपर्यय” इत्येव मगोचरेत् । अस्मि चात्र हेतुहेतुभद्भावाश्रित एवातिशय, अत एव दण्डिना हेतुनाम्नैव व्यपदिश्यते भेद एषोतिशयोक्ते काव्यादसौ^२ । अत एव च काव्यप्रकाशे नरसिंहमनीषा रचितवान् नरसिंहकृरोपि शुद्धमारोपाया अतिशयोक्तेरस्मिन् भेदे चातिशय्यं^३ पश्यति, यद्यपि पूर्वोक्तेन क्रमेण लक्षणमशोधयित्वा तेन स्वयं तत्र चातिशय्यं न लभ्येत, पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययमात्रेण कार्यकारणयोरभेदारोपयो प्रतिषेद्धमन्यत्वात् ।

ननु—“शक्यतेतरा शुद्धस्य आगेपस्य रूपके, अतिशयोक्तेश्चतुर्थे भेदे वा मग्रह कर्तुम्, तद्विनिश्चयानाम् “अविरल-कमलविक्रम” इत्यादीना काव्यानामुपलभ्यमानत्वात्, शुद्धाव्यवनानस्य तु वा गति, तद्व्यतिरस्य काव्यस्योदाहरणतया अनुपम्यान्त्वादिति चेद्, अस्मि तस्यापि तादृशमेव भवत पुर एव स्कूत्रेमानमुदाहरणम् । किं तदिति चेदिदम्—

“आराध्यं शरवणभवं देवमुल्लसिनाच्चा
मिद-दृष्टं-जलकणमपाद् दीणिनिर्मुक्तमार्गः ।

१. “उल्लाम” इत्यादे श्लोकस्य विवरणे “अत्र वृत्त्यनुप्रास-प्राचुर्यादोजोगुणप्रकाशकत्वाच्च शब्दस्य, प्रसादगुणयोगादनन्तरमेवाधिगतस्य रूपकस्य हेत्वन्कारस्य वा वाच्यस्य चमत्कृत्योन्तुत्यम्कन्यत्वात् मममेव प्राधान्यमिति रमणगारे काव्यस्यायमभेदनिरूपयान्ते पण्डितराजो रूपकत्वमत्र प्रतिपद्यते ।

२. “परप्रत्यायक लिङ हेतु” । (सू० ७९ अल० रत्ना०) । “लिङेन परप्रत्यायनं परार्थानुमानरूप काव्यलिङ्गनर्थायो हेतु” इति (वृत्तिस्तत्रैव) ।

३. काव्यादसौ २।२५३, २५७ ।

४. नरसिंहमनीषाया वात्रवोचिन्यामुद्धृता इय पक्ति—“शुद्धमारोपा तु चतुर्थातिशयोक्तिरलक्षिके”ति । ४० वात्रवोचिनी “लक्षणा तेन पङ्क्तिरे”ति प्रकरणान्ते ।

परिचर्चा

पु ला मार्गव मम्मने तु 'स्वमिद्वये पराक्षेप परार्थे स्वमपेक्षम् । उपादान लक्षण चेत्युक्ता शुद्धं न द्विधा' इति कथयता मम्मटेन स्पष्टं कृतं यदत्र तृतीयं मतमेव मम्मटाभिसम्मतं वर्तते । अस्मिन् विषये विवादस्य अवसर एव नास्ति ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी वस्तुतो नास्ति विवादः । प्रदीपवृत्तायमेव हेतुर्दत्तः — "रुटि प्रयोजनाभ्या भेदे सभवत्यपि 'एव — 'तु' — शब्दयोरनालोचनाविजृम्भितत्वादिनादेयम्" इति तु मया तस्य वाक्यानि उद्धृतानि । अतः स एव भेदोऽस्माभिः स्वीक्रियते । अत्र एक एव हेतुरस्माभिः प्रतिपादितः, उपादेयतारूपः । अन्येऽपि तावद् हेतवः सन्ति तेऽत्र नोपस्थापिताः । तेषु अस्याप्यन्तर्भावः ।

अ न जानी इयमपि मान्यतैका वर्तते पण्डितेषु यत् काव्यप्रकाशे मम्मटेनाल्लटमूरिणा चोभाभ्यां लिखितं — "कृतं धीमम्मटाचार्यवर्यं परिकरावधि । प्रवन्व पूरितं शेषो विद्यायाल्लटमूरिणा" । अत्र प्रष्टुमना अस्मि — अप्ययं भागः अल्लटमूरिविरचिते भागे प्राप्यते उताहो मम्मटेन रचिते ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी अल्लटमूरिविरचितभागे ।

अ न जानी तदा तु मतद्वयं वर्तते ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी परिकरालंकारान् परम् अल्लटमूरिविरचिते भागे वर्तते कारण-मालालंकारस्य वर्णनम् । कारणमालालंकारस्य वृत्तौ एव वर्तते एतस्य हेत्वलंकारस्य खण्डनम् । किन्तु चतुर्थे उल्लासे मम्मट-कृतान् प्रयोगानेव दृष्ट्वा अल्लटमूरिणा हेत्वलंकारे चमत्कार-भावः स्वीक्रियते । मम्मटेनामकृत् चतुर्थे उल्लासे कथ्यते यत् अत्र काव्यलिङ्गमिति यद् वक्तव्यं तन् कैश्चिद् उच्यतेऽत्र हेत्व-लंकार इति । अत्र काव्यहेतुः अत्र काव्यलिङ्गालंकारो वर्तते । हेतुहेतुमनोर्यत्राभेदो वर्तते ईदृशः न किमप्युदाहरणमधिकृत्य तेनोक्तम् अत्र हेत्वलंकार इति । वस्तुतः कुत्रचनापि उदाहरणेषु मम्मटेन हेत्वलंकारस्य नामोल्लेखो न क्रियते । इदमेव मनसि कृत्वा अल्लटमूरिणा अग्रे उच्यते यदत्र एवविधेषु हेत्वलंकारस्यलेषु चमत्कारो नास्ति । सर्वेऽपि एतादृशा प्रयोगा अस्माभिः समु-पस्थापिताः ।

कामिनी और कचन की आमक्ति से दूर करना पर अभिव्यक्ति में कुछ ऐसी त्वरा होती है, वह ऐसी लजीज और अजीज हो जाती है कि आमक्ति दूर तो क्या होगी वह और भी बढ़ने लगती है। हिन्दी में उग्रजी का साहित्य इसका उदाहरण है। उग्रजी की पुस्तकें “चंद हमीनों के खनूत”, “बुधुजा की बेटी”, “चाक्लेट” का यौम कोई बुरा नहीं, सब में नवयुवकों की चरित्रगुणता को दूर कर उनके पवित्राचरण की ही बकालन की गई है। पर उनकी शैली में कुछ ऐसी उग्रता है कि वह अपने आधार पर ही कुठाराघात करने लगती है, जिस चीज का विरोध करना चाहती है उसी के प्रति आसक्ति, आकर्षण उत्पन्न करने लगती है।

दूसरी ओर यह भी संभव है कि कवि या कथाकार युद्ध पर या अन्य किसी दुर्घट विषय पर रचना कर रहा है पर फिर भी उसकी अभिव्यक्ति इतनी सौम्य हो, मनुलिन हो कि उसे पढ़ कर या सुन कर हृदय में शान्ति के ही भाव उत्पन्न हों। गांधी जी कहा करते थे कि यदि अहिंसा-दर्शन एक व्यापक दर्शन है तो उसमें युद्धों को भी मना करने की शक्ति होनी चाहिये। उसी तरह कहा जा सकता है कि साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति सबको ही मना कर सकती है। जयवर्द्धन नामक उपन्यास का एक पात्र कहता है “मे मान नहीं सकता कि आधी का चित्र शान्त नहीं हो सकता”। साहित्य में या दर्शन में युद्ध और विग्रह हो, पर साहित्य-दर्शन को स्वयं कभी विग्रहात्मक होने को नहीं कहा जा सकता। जिन्दगी जो दीखती है वही तक दर्शन का लाभ नहीं है। उसकी एक भूमिका, एक परिपाटी देकर प्रस्तुत करना पड़ता है। वही साहित्यदर्शन की विशेषता है। कुरश्रेष्ठ में सहस्र लक्ष व्यक्ति मारे गए लेकिन इस आख्यान पर रचे गए महापुराण ने इतिहास को और ममृति को और धर्म को जीवित रखा। वह युद्ध को भी, हिंसा को भी, हत्या को भी, गृह्य-चार को भी इस तरह वर्णित कर सकता है, इस तरह अभिव्यक्ति दे सकता है कि वह भी साहित्य हो जाय, ‘सहस्र माव’ को जामृत करने लगे। और वास्तव में देखा जाय तो साहित्य यही करता भी आया है। वहाँ शृंगार रस है, तो करुण रस भी है, वीर्य रस भी है, वीर भी है, हास्य भी है। सभी का मूल रूप भिन्न-भिन्न है पर सभी साहित्य में आकर रम ही हो गए हैं, सब पारम्परिक भेदभाव को भूल कर एक साथ बैठे हैं। साहित्य के ‘दीरघ दाघ निदाघ’ ने जगत् को तपोवन बना दिया जहाँ कहिलाने में अहि, मयूर, मृग, वाघ एकत्र रहने लगे हैं। यही काम साहित्य करता आ रहा है, आज भी उसे यही करना चाहिये।

जब मे लोगों के बीच वैज्ञानिक दृष्टि का विकास हुआ और व्यक्ति पर भी मात्रिक दृष्टि से विचार करने की प्रवृत्ति जगी तब से यह सोचा जाने लगा कि जिस तरह का कर्म विषय होगा उसी तरह की प्रतिक्रिया पाठक में भी जगेगी। अमूक भाति का विषय, अमूक भाति की प्रतिक्रिया। तुलसी ने नविन-परक कविता

यहाँ पर साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति से मेरा क्या अभिप्राय है मेरा क्या तात्पर्य है और वह साधारण अभिव्यक्ति से क्यों कर थोड़ा है—इस बात को स्पष्ट करने के लिए मुझे जरा ब्रुवने दीजिये। दो बात ये, दोनों स्थानों में आर्थिक मंदी के कारण बेरोजगारी छा गई। निर्णय यही हुआ कि लोगों को आर्थिक वृत्ति तो दी ही जाय, इसके सिवा दूसरा कोई चारा ही नहीं है पर वृत्ति प्राप्त करने की शर्त ऐसी बड़ी कर दी जाय कि लोगों को इसके लिये उत्साह न रहे पर परिणाम जो सामने आया वह अति भयकर था। जब कभी जाच करने वाले निरीक्षक उनके यहाँ जाकर छोटी-छोटी बातों की पूछताछ करने लगे उन्हें अचरता और वे समझते कि उनकी विपन्नता का उपहास किया जा रहा है। उन्हें लगता कि उनकी भिक्षुभगी पर उनकी पत्नियाँ, बच्चे आत्म-भ्रान्ति से गले जा रहे हैं। उनमें माहम नहीं रह गया कि वे समाज के अन्य सदस्यों में आखिरी मिला सकें। कुछ ने तो आत्महत्या कर ली। कुछ ने इस विकृत जीवन में चोरी करना और डाका डालना ही श्रेयस्कर समझा। दवा रोग से भी भयकर निकली।

दुमरे प्रान्त में भी वृत्तिदान के द्वारा ही समस्या हल की गई। पर वहाँ पर इसे दान न कह कर दावा कहा गया। प्रायः समझा यही जाता है कि मनुष्य भावों से प्रभावित होता है, “भाव अनूठो चाहिये, भाषा काऊ होय”। पर अब यह बात समझ में आने लगी कि “भाषा” (अभिव्यक्ति) अनूठी चाहिये, ‘भाव काऊ होय’। प्रभावित भाषा, अभिव्यक्ति, में रहती है, भाव में नहीं। वह भाषा-परक है, भाव-परक नहीं। कहा गया कि हम Risk Cover करने के लिये बीमा कराते हैं ही, थोड़ी थोड़ी अर्थ-राशि किस्तों के रूप में जमा करते हैं, जब पालिनी परिपक्व हो जाती है, हमें रकम मिल जाती है। वह तो दान नहीं, हम उनके दावेदार हैं। आज जो समाज में समृद्धि है उसको बनाने में सभी ने थोड़ी-थोड़ी किस्त जमा की है। वह ऐसे ही अवमरो के लिए तो किया गया था। आज अर्थसंकट रुपी दुर्घटना के कारण वह पालिनी मँचूर कर गई है और रुपये प्राप्त हो रहे हैं तो यह उचित ही है। यह सीधा सादा व्यापारिक मामला है, हम हाथ दे उस हाथ ले, अब किस्त की अदायगी अर्थात् वृत्तिदान का प्रारम्भ बड़े धूम-धाम से किया गया। इस समारोह का उद्घाटन राष्ट्रपति के करकमलों के द्वारा किया गया। फोटो लिया गया। वृत्ति-प्राप्त व्यक्तियों का फोटो अखबारों में प्रकाशित किया गया। जहाँ एक प्रान्त में इस दान के कारण अराजकता फैली वहाँ दुमरे में मुराज की स्थापना हुई। प्रश्न यह है कि यह जादू क्यों कर संभव हो सका।

दूसरा उदाहरण लीजिये। जब विश्वव्यापी द्वितीय महायुद्ध चल रहा था। तो एक ही समाचार दो रूप में प्रकाशित किये जाते थे। French army in

उदाहरण के लिये उन स्थिति को ध्यान पूर्वक देखिये जब दो अपरिचित व्यक्ति आपस में मिलते हैं। प्रश्न यह है कि जो अपरिचित की दीवार उनके बीच खड़ी है वह कैसे टूटे और वे किस तरह समीप जायें? पर अब देखिये उनमें किस तरह बान प्रारम्भ होनी है।

“Fine day, isn’t it?” दिन बड़ा सुहावना है।

“It certainly is” हा, बवश्य (मिलन का प्रथम आधार विदु प्राप्त हुआ। आगे बढ़ने का मार्ग प्रशस्त)।

‘Altogether it has been a fine summer सब मिलाकर इस बार ग्रीष्म ऋतु बड़ी अच्छी रही।

“Indeed, it has been What a nice spring too मही है, इस बार वनत ऋतु भी सुखद रही (दो मिलनविदु प्राप्त हो ही गये है। दूसरा व्यक्ति नृतीय मिलनविदु पर सहमति होने का निमंत्रण दे रहा है)।

“हा, वनत ऋतु भी सुखद थी” (तीसरे विदु पर सहमति प्राप्त)।

अब मंत्री का मार्ग प्रशस्त है जिन पर वे आगे बढ़ सकते हैं।

प्रश्न यह है कि अजनबीजन का, अपरिचित का, पृथक्त्व का चट्टान कैसे टूटा? दो लोक के प्राणी एक कैसे हुए?

उत्तर है शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। यहाँ अभिव्यक्ति पर ध्यान दें। यदि यह नहीं होती तो मारे मंत्रीभाव के बावजूद भी वहाँ पर पारम्परिक सम्मेलन की घटना नहीं घट सकती। कल्पना कीजिये कि एक व्यक्ति ने स्पष्ट शब्दों में दूसरे के प्रति अपने मंत्रीभाव की घोषणा की। यह सुनकर दूसरे के हृदय में तुरन्त शका पैदा हुई कि कुछ शल में काला है। यह व्यक्ति ठग है, इसकी दृष्टि मेरी पैली पर है और येन येन प्रकारेण वह मेरे विश्वास को प्राप्त कर मुझे अंत में लूटना चाहता है। जन में जाने आने वान यहाँ तक बढ़ सकती है कि वहाँ साम्प्रदायिक दगा हो जाय, पुलिस को गोली चलानी पड़े और कितने निरीह व्यक्तियों की जान जाये। प्रश्न यह है कि घटनाओं ने यह विचित्र मोड़ क्यों लिया। प्रारम्भ तो मंत्री के प्रदर्शन से ही हुआ था, एक ने दूसरे के प्रति प्रेम के ही भाव प्रगट किये थे। पर वहाँ पर यह दुवद दृश्य कैसे सामने आया? उत्तर है। शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। भाव तो मंत्री के ही थे। प्रेम के ही थे। बड़े सुन्दर भी थे पर वे जिन तरह अभिव्यक्त किये गये वह ढग उग्र था, हिंसात्मक था, उसमें स्वरा थी और उसी में ध्वन के बीज छिपे थे। यही है मन्त्रभाव की अहिंसात्मक अभिव्यक्ति। चाहे तो इसे आप अनौचित्य कह सकते हैं।

जितना उसके आस्वाद पक्ष का, किन्तु यह आरोप तथ्यमूलक प्रतीत नहीं होता कि संस्कृत काव्य-समीक्षकों ने काव्य के सर्जना-पक्ष की सर्वथा उपेक्षा की। अलङ्कारशास्त्र के विभिन्न ग्रंथों में काव्य-सर्जन के विषय में अनेक महत्त्वपूर्ण धारणाओं व विचारों का निरूपण मिलता है जिससे यद्यपि काव्य के निर्माण-पक्ष का समग्र चित्र तो नहीं उभरता, फिर भी काव्य के इस महत्त्वपूर्ण पक्ष के सम्बन्ध में संस्कृत काव्य-विवेचकों की सम्यक् अभिज्ञता का परिचय तो मिल ही जाता है। प्रस्तुत निबन्ध में संस्कृत आलङ्कारिकों के काव्य-सर्जना से संबंधित विचारों की एक संक्षिप्त रूपरेखा प्रस्तुत करने का यत्न किया जा रहा है।

संस्कृत में काव्य-निर्माता का सामान्य अभिधान 'कवि' है जिसकी व्युत्पत्ति 'कु शब्दे' या 'बुद्ध शब्दे' या 'कवृ (वृ) वर्णे' या 'कवृ वर्णने' धातुओं से उणादि इ प्रत्यय के योग से मानी गई है। अतः कवि शब्द का व्युत्पत्ति-रूप्य अर्थ है 'शब्दनीय' 'वर्णनीय' या 'कवि का कर्म'।^१ संस्कृत साहित्य में कवि शब्द का काव्य-रचयिता के अलावा स्तोता, विचारक, विद्वान्, अन्तर्दृष्टि-सम्पन्न, सर्वज्ञ, स्रष्टा, ऋषि, ज्ञानदर्शी, भविष्यद्रष्टा आदि नाना अर्थों में प्रयोग हुआ है। शतपथ ब्राह्मण में कवि को ऋषि से अभिन्न माना गया है। ईशोपनिषद् में ईश्वर के लिए 'कवि' विशेषण का प्रयोग मिलता है—'कविर्मेनीषी परिभू स्वयम्'। शङ्कराचार्य के अनुसार यहाँ कवि का अर्थ है 'ज्ञानदर्शी' या 'संब्रष्टा'। आनन्दवर्धन ने कवि-प्रतिभा के लिए 'दृष्टि'^२ शब्द का प्रयोग करते हुए कवि को मुख्यतः द्रष्टा माना है। राजशेखर का भी यही मत है। उनके अनुसार प्रतिभायुक्त व्यक्ति परोक्ष पदार्थों को भी देख लेता है जब कि प्रतिभाविकल जन को प्रत्यक्ष वस्तुएँ भी अदृष्ट रहती हैं।^३ अन्यत्र राजशेखर ने महाकवि को दिव्य द्रष्टा बनलाने हुए कहा है कि त्रिलोचन शिव तथा सहस्रनेत्र इन्द्र भी जिते नहीं देख पाते उसे कवि अपनी प्रातिभ दृष्टि से अनायास प्रत्यक्ष कर लेता है। राजशेखर के मत में कवियों के भक्तिदर्पण में समस्त विश्व

१. अमरकोश, भानुजी दीक्षित कृत टीका, निर्णय सागर प्रेस, पृ. २५२
२. काव्यमीमांसा, अध्याय ३
३. काव्यानुशासन, अध्याय ८, सूत्र १
४. अभिनवभारती (गायकवाड ओरियन्टल सिरीज) भाग २, अध्याय १६, पृ. २९७ (प्रथम संस्करण)
५. ईशोपनिषद्, मंत्र ८ पर शङ्कराचार्य का भाष्य
६. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३
७. काव्यमीमांसा, अध्याय ४

वहाँ कवि-वाणी की अपरिसीम ।^१ मम्मट के मत में ब्रह्मा की सृष्टि नियति-कृत निरमो से बद्ध है, सुख, दुःख तथा मोह ने आपूर्ण है, उपादान आदि कारणों के परतत्र है तथा केवल पद्मों से ही युक्त है, जब कि कवि-निर्मिति नैसर्गिक निरमो ने रहित, एकमात्र वाह्याद-स्वरूप, बाह्य कारणों में अतीत तथा नवरमो से आप्लावित है ।^२ इस प्रकार मस्कृत काव्य-मीमांशकों ने काव्य को एक मौलिक व अपूर्व मृज्ज मानने हुए काव्यलोक में कवि के मार्गभौम स्वातन्त्र्य को स्वीकार किया है ।^३ कवि ब्रह्मा द्वारा निर्मित जगत् का अनुकर्ता मात्र नहीं है, वह एक नूतन और विलक्षण सृष्टि का विधाता है । उसका विधानत्व न केवल ब्रह्मा के समकक्ष है, अपितु उसने भी श्रेष्ठतर है ।

मस्कृत ममीक्षा-शास्त्र में कवि व्यक्तित्व को पर्याप्त महत्त्व दिया गया है। काव्य कवि-व्यक्तित्व की सृष्टि है, उमी की आत्माभिव्यजना है । जिस प्रकार बीज ही वृक्ष के रूप में विकसित होता है उमी प्रकार कवि की अनुभूति ही काव्य का रूप ग्रहण करती है । अलङ्कारवादी और रीतिवादी आचार्यों की दृष्टि प्रचलनका काव्य के बहिरंग के विश्लेषण-विवेचन तक ही सीमित थी अतः वे काव्य-निर्माण में कवि व्यक्तित्व के अर्थ महत्त्व का समुचित मूल्यांकन नहीं कर सके, यद्यपि उनका एक अस्पष्ट निर्देश उन्होंने अवश्य किया है, किन्तु रस-ध्वनिवादी आचार्यों ने कवि-व्यक्तित्व तथा कृति के सम्बन्ध का विशद निरूपण किया है । अलङ्कारवादी मामह के अनुसार कवि का पायिव रूप तो काल-व्यवहारी हो जाता है परन्तु उनका काव्यमय वपुः चिरस्थायी रहता है ।^४ राजशेखर के अनुसार जैसा कवि का स्वभाव होता है वैसा ही उनका काव्य हुआ करता है ।^५ आनन्दवर्धन द्वारा उद्धृत एक आनुवन्धवशोक के अनुसार यदि कवि शृंगारी हो तो जगत् रम्य हो जाता है यदि वह वीरराग हो तो सब कुछ भीरु प्रतीत होने लगता है ।^६ कुन्तक ने भी वक्रोक्ति-सत्त्व को कवि-व्यापार-जन्य विच्छिन्ति या वैचित्र्य में युक्त भगीभणिति कह कर कृतिगत सौन्दर्य के विधान में कवि-व्यक्ति का सील स्वीकार किया है ।^७ इसी प्रकार रीतियों के वर्गी-

१. लोचन, ध्वन्यालोक उद्योत ४ पृ. ५२७

२. काव्य-प्रकाश, उल्लास १, कारिका १

३. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९८

४. काव्यालङ्कार (मामह इत) १, ६

५. काव्य-मीमांसा, अध्याय १०

६. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९८

७. वक्रोक्ति-जीवित १७

चेत् कविः काव्ये' आदि श्लोक की व्याख्या में लोचनकार ने स्पष्ट कहा^१ है कि यहाँ शृंगारी का अर्थ स्त्री-व्यसनो नहीं है, वरन् 'शृंगाररसोचित विभाव, अनुभाव आदि की चरंचा-रूप प्रतीति में युक्त' यह अर्थ लिया जाना चाहिए। इस प्रकार संस्कृत अलंकारशास्त्र ने कवि के सर्जनपरी अलौकिक काव्यात्मक व्यक्तित्व को काव्य का मूल उन्म स्वीकार किया है।

अब प्रश्न यह है कि कवि काव्य-निर्माण में क्यों प्रवृत्त होता है ? वह कौन-सी महनी प्रेरणा या उत्प्रेरक प्रयोजन है जो उसे सर्जनोन्मुख बना देता है। प्रायः सभी संस्कृत आलंकारिकों ने काव्य के प्रयोजनों पर विचार करते हुए उन्हें दो वर्गों में विभक्त किया है—(१) कवि के प्रयोजन, (२) महर्षय के प्रयोजन। अविक्तर आचार्यों ने कीर्ति, प्रीति, अर्थ-प्राप्ति, अनर्थ-निवारण तथा पुरुषार्थ-चतुष्टय को कवि की दृष्टि से प्रयोजन स्वीकार किया है। भामह के अनुसार महाकवियों के दिव्यगन हो जाने पर भी उनका काव्यमय क्लेश अशुण्य रहता है।^२ जब तक कवि की अनन्तर कीर्ति पृथ्वी और अन्तरिक्ष में व्याप्त रहती है तब तक वह दिव्य लोक में निवास करता है।^३ अब भामह के अनुसार चिरम्यायी कीर्ति की वाछा हो तो मनुष्य को काव्यरूप प्रपल में दत्तचित्त होना चाहिए।^४

रुद्रट के अनुसार भी अलङ्कृत व मरम काव्य के रचयिता महाकवि का यश आकल्प स्थायी रहता है।^५ मम्मट ने यश की काव्य-प्रयोजनता का निरूपण करते हुए कालिदास का दृष्टान्त दिया है।^६ रुद्रट व मम्मट ने अर्थप्राप्ति, रोग विमुक्ति या सिन्धेरक्षति को भी काव्य-प्रयोजन स्वीकारा है।^७ किन्तु हेमचन्द्र ने अर्थ-प्राप्ति व अनर्थ-निवारण को अनैकान्तिक बनलाते हुए केवल आनन्द और यश को ही प्रयोजन माना है।^८ भामह और विश्वनाथ ने पुरुषार्थचतुष्टय को भी काव्य-प्रयोजन के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है।^९ अभिनवगुप्त ने अन्य प्रयोजनों को अस्वीकार करते हुए प्रीति या आनन्द को ही काव्य का प्रमुख व

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३ पृ. ४९८ का लोचन

२. काव्यालंकार (भामह कृत) १, ६

३. वही १, ७

४. वही १, ८

५. वही १, ४

६. काव्यप्रकाश १, २ की वृत्ति

७. काव्यालंकार (रुद्रट कृत) १, ८; काव्यप्रकाश १, २

८. काव्यानुमानन, अध्याय १ सूत्र ३

९. काव्यालंकार (भामहकृत) १, २; साहित्य-दर्पण अध्याय १

भाववेग की स्थिति में मनुष्य की चित्तवृत्ति स्वतः विलाप-प्रलाप आदि के रूप में प्रवाहित होने लगती है उसी प्रकार वाल्मीकि की वह तीव्र शोकानुभूति भी 'मा निपाद' आदि श्लोक के रूप में छलक पड़ी। शोक की यह श्लोक-परिणति आकस्मिक एवं स्वतः स्फूर्त थी जिसमें कि वाल्मीकि को बाद में यह विस्मय हुआ कि शकुनि के शोक में आनं मरे मुख में यह कैसी बाणी फूट पड़ी? यद्यपि आदि कवि की प्रथम बाणी का वाच्यार्थ शोक नहीं है, वह तो शापपरक ही है, तथापि वह व्यजना द्वारा कविगत साधारणीकृत शोक की ही अभिव्यक्ति है। अभिनव के अनुसार वाल्मीकि का यह (साधारणीकृत) शोक आवेश के कारण स्वतः स्फुरणा द्वारा श्लोक-बद्ध हुआ, न कि किसी प्रयत्न के द्वारा। करुण रस या अन्य रसों का स्वभाव ही उच्छलन या छटक पड़ना है। अतः कवि का रमावेग या भावावेग ही काव्य-मज्जना की मूल प्रेरणा है। अभिनव ने अपने मत के समर्थन में भट्टनायक के हृदय-दर्पण का यह वाक्य उद्धृत किया है— 'यावत्पूर्णा न चेतनं तावन्मयं वमन्यभुम्' अर्थात् जब तक कवि-हृदय रस से परिपूर्ण नहीं हो जाता तब तक काव्य का उद्गार नहीं होता। इस प्रकार अभिनव व भट्टनायक दोनों ही काव्य को कवि का भावोद्गार या भावोच्छ्वास स्वीकार करते हैं। किन्तु यहाँ यह स्मरण रखना चाहिए कि रसवादी आचार्यों ने काव्य को कवि की व्यक्तिगत भावानुभूति का उद्गार नहीं माना है। अभिनव के अनुसार वाल्मीकि ने 'मा निपाद' आदि श्लोक में जिस शोक को अभिव्यक्ति दी है वह उनका व्यक्तिगत शोक नहीं था। यदि उसे व्यक्तिगत शोक ही माना जाय तब तो वाल्मीकि को भी कौञ्च के समान शोक से दुःखित मानना पड़ेगा। उस स्थिति में रस की आनन्दस्वरूपता खण्डित हो जायगी। साथ ही लौकिक शोक में संतप्त व्यक्ति की वैसी दशा नहीं सुनी या देखी जाती जैसी कि वाल्मीकि की हुई थी।

यहाँ अभिनवगुप्त का यह तात्पर्य प्रतीत होता है कि वाल्मीकि ने 'मा निपाद' आदि में जिस शोकानुभूति को अभिव्यक्त किया है वह उनकी साधारणीभूत अनुभूति है, व्यक्तिगत नहीं। अग्रिमाण कौञ्च को देखकर कौञ्ची के हृदय में जो शोक उद्बुद्ध हुआ वह एक लौकिक और व्यक्तिगत अनुभव था। किन्तु शोक-विह्वल कौञ्ची के अनुभावादिके अवलोकन में वाल्मीकि के मन में सहानुभूति-वस्तु जिस शोक का उदय हुआ वह वस्तुतः कवि का साधारणीभूत अनुभव था। 'मा निपाद' में कवि के इसी साधारणीकृत अनुभव का अभिव्यजन हुआ है।

अभिनव के पूर्वोक्त मत में यह भी लगता है कि वे साधारणीकरण की प्रक्रिया को महदय तक ही सीमित रखना नहीं चाहते, उनकी दृष्टि में कवि का संवेदनशील हृदय भी अन्य प्राणियों के भुव-दुःख आदि का भासात्कार कर हृदय-

में उनके कर्तृत्व की गभीर व्याख्या की। रम व ध्वनिवादी आचार्य काश्मीर शैवागम के अनुयायी थे अतः उनके प्रतिभाविषयक चिन्तन पर काश्मीरी शैव-दर्शन का गहरा प्रभाव पड़ा है। दार्शनिक दृष्टि में प्रतिभा ईश्वरीय सर्जन-शक्ति का ही मानवगत प्रतिरूप है। वह कवि की सर्जना-शक्ति तो है ही, उसकी तत्त्व-दृष्टि, अन्तर्दृष्टि, मानस-चित्रों का विधान करने वाली कल्पना, काव्यात्मक अभिव्यञ्जना के कौशल, सौन्दर्यानुभूति, प्रातिभज्ञान, वस्तुओं में अपूर्वता का दर्शन करने वाली क्षमता आदि की पर्याय भी है। इस प्रकार संस्कृत आलंकारिकों ने प्रतिभा के रूप में काव्यनिर्मात्री शक्ति का बड़ा ही विस्तृत निरूपण किया है।

आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार महाकवियों की वाणी दिव्य आनन्द रस को प्रवाहित करती हुई अशोकमामान्य व चतुर्दिक् स्फुरणशील प्रतिभा-विशेष को अभिव्यक्त करती है। यों तो इस समार में विभिन्न प्रकार के कवियों की एक बख्क परम्परा रही है परन्तु प्रतिभा-विशेष के धनी महाकवियों की संख्या उँगलियों पर गिनी जा सकती है।^१ यदि कवि में शक्ति या प्रतिभा हो तो कवि के अश्रुतसृजित दोष भी आवृत हो जाते हैं किन्तु प्रतिभा के अभाव से उत्पन्न दोष छिप नहीं पाते।^२ ध्वनिमार्ग का अवलम्बन करने पर कवि की प्रतिभा नि सीम हो जाती है। यह प्रतिभा की ही देन है कि दृष्टपूर्व अर्थ भी काव्य में नित्य नवीनता धारण कर अवनीत होते हैं तथा हर कवि के लिए नूतन निर्माण का क्षेत्र अधुण रहता है।^३

अमिनद्वगुप्त ने प्रतिभा के स्वरूप की इस प्रकार व्याख्या की है—‘प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्मात्रमा प्रजा, तस्या विशेषो रमावेनवैशद्यमौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माण-क्षमत्वम्’ अर्थात् अपूर्व वस्तु के निर्माण में समर्थ प्रजा का ही नाम प्रतिभा है। रमावेन, जित-नैर्मल्य, मौन्दर्यानुभूति व काव्य के निर्माण की क्षमता ही उसका विशेष है। कवि के हृदय-मन्दिर में सनत जाग्रत प्रतिभारूप सरस्वती के अनुग्रह से ही कवि को अपूर्व निर्माण की शक्ति प्राप्त होती है।^४ अन्यत्र लोचनकार ने कहा है—‘शक्ति प्रतिभात वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोन्मेषालित्वम्’ अर्थात् वर्णनीय वस्तुओं के मर्त्य नूतन पक्षों और विशेषताओं का उन्मीलन करनेवाली कवि-शक्ति ही प्रतिभा है।^५ यह प्रतिभा कवि की एक ऐसी विमिश्रण दृष्टि है

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत १, कारिका ६

२. वही उद्योत ३ पृ. ३१६

३. वही उद्योत ४।१-३

४. अमिनद्व-भारती भाग १, अत्राय १, पृ. ४

५. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ६ का लोचन

में काव्य-सर्जना की दृष्टि से प्रतिभा और व्युत्पत्ति को एक ही कोटि में रखा है।^१

कुन्तक ने पूर्वजन्म व इह जन्म के मस्कारों के परिपाक से प्रौढ़ता को प्राप्त करने वाली प्रतिभा को एक विलक्षण व अनिवर्चनीय तत्त्व माना है। उन्होंने कवि-व्यापार के रूप में काव्यगत कवि-कर्तृत्व को महत्त्व देते हुए कहा है कि प्रतिभा में तत्काल उदित एक अनिवर्चनीय परिस्पन्द के कारण लौकिक पदार्थों का स्वरूप एक विशेष उत्कर्ष या विच्छित्ति से आच्छादिन हो जाता है।^२ यह विच्छित्ति ही कुन्तक की वक्रता है जिसे वे काव्य का जीवन स्वीकार करते हैं।

महिम भट्ट के अनुसार जब कवि रसानुकूल शब्दार्थ का चिन्तन करता हुआ एकाग्रचित्त हो जाता है तब क्षणभर के लिए उसे आत्म-माझात्कार की स्थिति प्राप्त हो जाती है। इन आत्म-स्पर्श में उत्पन्न प्रज्ञा को वे प्रतिभा कहते हैं। यह प्रतिभा कवि के लिए शिव के तृतीय नेत्र के समान है जिसके द्वारा वह लोक-त्रयवर्ती पदार्थों का माझात्कार करता है।^३

हेमचन्द्र के अनुसार अज्ञानावर्णन का उपशम हो जाने पर उद्भासित आत्म-चैतन्य ही प्रतिभा है। उन्होंने व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास को प्रतिभा का सस्कारक मात्र माना है।^४

प्रतिभा सबन्धी उक्त विवरण में स्पष्ट है कि भारतीय काव्य-मीमांसकों ने काव्य-सर्जना के लिए प्रायः एक स्वर में प्रतिभा की सत्ता आवश्यक मानी है। माय ही उसके मस्कार के लिए व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास के महत्त्व पर भी उन्होंने बल दिया है। काव्य लोक के प्रति कवि का एक मग्नेषण या आत्म-निवेदन ही है। काव्यानुभूति का मूल आधार भी अन्तः लोक जीवन ही है। अतः कवि के लिए लोकव्यवहार का तथा लोक की बौद्धिक व भावात्मक परम्परा के मूर्त-रूप शान्ति एवं अन्य कवियों के काव्यों का ज्ञान प्राप्त करना आवश्यक है। काव्य एक कलात्मक अभिव्यञ्जना भी है अतः उनकी पद्धति व उपकरणों पर अधिकार प्राप्त करने हेतु कवि के लिए अभ्यास की आवश्यकता का भी निषेध नहीं किया जा सकता। इसीलिए दण्डी व मम्मट आदि ने प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास की मयूक्त काव्य-कारणता अंगीकार की है। केवल व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास द्वारा श्रेष्ठ काव्य की सर्जना संभव नहीं है, क्योंकि प्रतिभा के अभाव में ऐसा काव्य केवल निर्जीव शब्दार्थों की सघटना मात्र होता है।

१. वही अध्याय ४

२. वक्रोक्तिजीदिन १, ९ की वृत्ति

३. व्यक्ति-विवेक २, ११७-११८

४. काव्यानुमानन अ १, सूत्र ७

सर्जन में आरम में अत तक कवि का व्यापार रस से ही प्रसूत एवं उसी की अभिव्यजना में तत्पर रहता है —यत्र परिपाकवता कवीना रसादिनात्पर्यविरहे व्यापार एव न शोभते ।^१ जब कवि रसादि के प्रति तत्पर होकर सर्जन-कर्म में सलग्न होता है तब यह सम्भव नहीं कि कोई वस्तु उसके अभिमत रस का अंग न बने ।^२

रसवादियों के मत में रस काव्य की आत्मा होने के कारण उसका अंगी है और अलंकार, रीति आदि अंग । जिन प्रकार शरीर आत्मा की अभिव्यक्ति है तथा उसके माध्यम से आत्मा ही श्वय को प्रकाशित करती है उसी प्रकार काव्यात्मक वर्णना व अभिव्यजना वस्तुतः कविगत रस का ही वहि प्रकाश है । रस में आश्रित होकर ही काव्य में उन्हें औचित्य प्राप्त होता है ।

कविगत रस का अभिव्यजनरूप महज व्यापार या प्रयत्न ही अलंकारों का स्वतः विघात कर देता है । इस प्रकार में निष्पादित अलंकार ही ध्वनि-मय में स्वीकृत हैं^३ क्योंकि अलंकार का तो लक्षण ही यह है कि वह रस रूप अंगी का अंगभूत हो गया कवि के भावाभिव्यजनरूप व्यापार या प्रयत्न से निर्वर्तित हो । जब कोई अलंकार रस के निवन्धन के लिए कृतमकल्प कवि की उस वामना का उल्लेखन कर यत्नान्तर द्वारा निष्पन्न होता है तब वह रस का अंग नहीं रहता । जो जब वाच्यार्थ लोग अलंकारों का निरूपण करने बैठते हैं तो वे बड़े दुर्घट प्रतीत होते हैं किन्तु जब कोई प्रतिभाशाली कवि रसमहाहित-चित्त होकर काव्य-सर्जन के प्रति उन्मुख होता है तब वे ही अलंकार मानों प्रतिस्पर्धा करने हुए आ आकर गिरते हैं । आनन्दवर्धन ने वाणहृत कादंबरी में चन्द्रापीड द्वारा कादंबरीदर्शन के प्रसंग का इसके दृष्टान्त के रूप में उल्लेख किया है । उनके मत में रसाभिव्यक्ति के कार्य में अलंकार आदि को बहिरंग मानना उचित नहीं है क्योंकि रसों का विनिष्ट वाच्यार्थ के द्वारा आश्रय ही मन्त्र है । वाच्यार्थ का प्रतिपादन गद्दों द्वारा किया जाता है तथा वाच्यार्थ ही वस्तुतः रूपक आदि अलंकार कहे जाते हैं अतः वे रसव्यजना की दृष्टि से अन्तरंग ही हैं । इस प्रकार वस्तु और वर्णना, अनुभूति और अभिव्यजना दो पृथक् एवं स्वच्छिन्न वस्तुएँ नहीं हैं, वे एक ही जीवन्त काव्य-व्यक्तित्व के दो अविभाज्य पहलू हैं । जहाँ शृंगारादि रसों में कवि यमक, श्लेष आदि की योजना करने लगता है वहाँ निश्चय ही उनकी बहिरंगता सिद्ध है क्योंकि उनके निष्पादन के लिए कवि को अपने अनुभूतिप्रसूत, महज अभिव्यजना-व्यापार में

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४२ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९७

२. वही पृ. ४९८

३. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत २, कारिका १६ व उनकी वृत्ति

का वर्णन करें' इस प्रकार के वर्णना रूप द्वितीय व्यापार से काव्य में अलंकारों का सम्पादन होता है। 'भेद शब्दों को समुक्त अर्थों से सघटित करें', यह कवि के तीसरे व्यापार का स्वरूप है। इस प्रकार कवि-कर्म के तीन सोपान हुए— (१) प्रतिभा-रूप प्रथम परिस्पन्द से रस व गुणों की निष्पत्ति (२) वर्णना-रूप द्वितीय व्यापार से अलंकार-योजना तथा (३) तृतीय व्यापार से शब्दार्थ-सघटना।

मग्नपि उक्त विवेचन से काव्य-सर्जन की समग्र प्रक्रिया का तर्कयुक्त प्रतिपादन नहीं होता तथापि रसवाद की दृष्टि से (और यही दृष्टि भारतीय काव्य-शास्त्र की प्रतिनिधि दृष्टि है) काव्य-सर्जन की समस्या पर महत्वपूर्ण प्रकाश पड़ता है। रसवादियों के अनुसार प्रतिभा ही काव्य की मूल सर्जन-शक्ति है। प्रतिभावाली कवि अपनी सहज सहृदयता द्वारा अन्य मनुष्यों व प्राणियों के साथ अपना हृदय-संवाद स्थापित कर तन्मयी-भवन की स्थिति का अनुभव करता है जिसके फलस्वरूप उनकी चित्तवृत्तियाँ साधारणीकृत रूप में जाग्रत हो जाती हैं। इन्हीं साधारणीभूत चित्तवृत्तियों का आस्वादन कविगत रस है जिसे अग्निवर्गुण ने काव्य का बीजस्थानीय माना है। यह रस कवि की अपनी विशिष्ट प्रतिभा की ही देन है। तदनन्तर इस रसानुभव के तात्कालिक संस्कार या स्मृति की प्रेरणा से वह अपनी अनुभूति की वर्णना में प्रवृत्त होता है। इस कार्य में उसे कल्पनाशक्ति, जिसे भारतीय आचार्यों के अनुसार प्रतिभा का ही एक रूप कह सकते हैं, सबसे अधिक सहायता देती है। इस कल्पना शक्ति द्वारा वह प्रथम तो वर्णना का मानसिक साक्षात्कार करता है और फिर उसे शब्दार्थमयी अभिव्यञ्जना में परिणत कर देता है। काव्य-निर्माण की उक्त समस्त प्रक्रिया वस्तुतः कवि-प्रतिभा का ही क्रमिक उन्मीलन है। यह कवि-प्रतिभा काव्य-सर्जना की सभी अवस्थाओं को अनुप्राणित किये रहती है जैसा कि मट्ट तोन ने भी कहा है —

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ।

गुणीभूत व्यंग्य या मध्यम काव्य में कविगत रससंस्कार वर्णना को पूरी तरह अनुप्राणित नहीं कर पाता जिसे वस्तु (कवि की अनुभूति), और वर्णना में अननुपन्न उत्पन्न हो जाता है। फिर भी ऐसे काव्य में कवि की अनुभूति प्रत्यक्ष या अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से व्यक्त अवश्य होती है। चित्रकाव्य में कवि अपने रसानुभव के प्रति निरन्तर उपेक्षाशील रहता है जिनमें उसके काव्य में मात्र रचना-कौशल का वैचित्र्य प्रकट होता है। अतएव ऐसे काव्य को अप्रम काव्य की सज्ञा दी गई है।

आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार ध्वनि या व्यञ्जना ही एक मार्ग है जो कवि की प्रतिभा के गुणों को अनन्त बना देता है जिससे प्राचीन कवियों द्वारा दृष्टपूर्व विषय भी उसी प्रकार नूतन छटा धारण कर लेते हैं जिस प्रकार कि मधुमास में वृक्ष।^१ उम दृष्टि से व्यञ्जना और कवि-प्रतिभा को पर्यायवाची सा माना जा सकता है।

रसवादी आचार्यों ने लोक और काव्य की भूमिकाओं को पृथक् मानते हुए काव्यगत अनुभूतियों को अलौकिक स्वीकार किया है। लौकिक अनुभूति देश, काल व व्यक्तित्व के सीमित बोध से ग्रस्त रहती है जबकि काव्य में व्यक्त कवि की अनुभूति एक साधारणीकृत अतएव लौकिक बोध की सीमाओं से मुक्त चित्तवृत्ति है। काव्य में कवि का व्यक्तित्व लौकिक आवरणों से मुक्त होकर एक सार्वभौम, सार्वकालिक व विश्वजनीन रूप ग्रहण कर लेता है। तब उसकी वाणी केवल उसी का प्रतिनिधित्व नहीं करती अपितु वह समस्त मानवता का मायोद्गार बन जाती है।

संस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र के अनुसार काव्य का सत्य वस्तु-जगत् के सत्य से भिन्न होता है। राजशेखर ने काव्य में निबद्ध वस्तुओं को 'प्रतिभासरूप' माना है। अवन्तिमुन्दरी के अनुसार काव्य में वस्तुओं का कोई निश्चित स्वभाव नहीं होता, विदग्ध कवि की वचन-वक्रता ही काव्य में किसी वस्तु को स्वभाव-विशेष प्रदान करती है।^१ मम्मट ने कविभारती को नियति-कृत नियमों से रहित कहा है। अभिनव के अनुसार काव्य और नाट्य न अनुकरण हैं और न अनुभावन। वे वस्तुतः भावानुकीर्तन या अनुव्यवसाय रूप हैं।^२ काव्य में लौकिक विषयों और भावों का साधारणीकृत रूप में साक्षात्कार कर सहृदयों द्वारा रसानुभूति प्राप्त की जाती है। इसी का नाम भावानुकीर्तन या अनुव्यवसाय-विशेष है। इस प्रकार काव्य मानवमात्र की मूलभूत एकता का, उसके देश, काल व व्यक्ति से अनिवद्ध रूप का दर्शन कराने में समर्थ होता है। इसलिए कवि को भ्रान्त-दृष्टा, सर्व-दर्शी या ऋषि कहा गया है, प्रत्युत कवि ऋषि से भी एक कदम आगे है। ऋषि में केवल तत्त्वदर्शन की क्षमता होती है जब कि कवि अपनी उस प्रतिभा-रूप तत्त्वदर्शिनी दृष्टि को वर्णना द्वारा सर्वगोचर भी बना सकता है —

नानृपि कविरित्युक्तमृपिद्वयं किल दर्शनात् ।

विविधभावधर्मांशतत्त्वप्रख्या तु दर्शनम् ॥

१ वही, उद्योत ४, कारिका ४

२ काव्य-मीमांसा, अध्याय ८

३ अभिनव-भारती, भाग १, पृ. ३५-७

रा. चं. द्विवेदी • आपने काव्य के सर्जनापक्ष का बहुत सुन्दर विवेचन किया है पर मैं समझता हूँ आप जयरथ द्वारा इस प्रसंग में कही गई कुछ मुख्य बातों को अपने निबन्ध में और सम्मिलित कर लेना चाहेंगे । हृदय-संवाद के उसने दो भेद किये हैं—चित्तवृत्तिमवाद और वस्तुमवाद । वस्तुमवाद में उन्होंने वस्तुमवन्वी रचना-प्रक्रिया तथा अनुभूति को अलंकारादि में सन्निहित किया है—ईदृगिद वस्तु इति वस्तुमवाद । और दूसरे संवाद का अर्थ है 'परकीया-याश्चित्तवृत्ते । आत्मीयचित्तवृत्त्यभेदेन सह परामर्शः' । यदि सर्जनापक्ष की दृष्टि से जयरथ की आलोचना करें तो प्रतीत होगा कि जयरथ के मत में कुछ तो ऐसे कवि हैं जो अलंकार रचना में ही तत्पर होते हैं और कुछ दूसरे के मनोभावों को अपने मनोभावों की भाँति अनुभूत करते हुए उन्हें काव्य में व्यक्त करते हैं । साथ ही इस बात का भी पर्यालोचन आवश्यक है कि प्रतिभा का सर्वतोभावेन प्रामुख्य मानने पर भी संस्कृत का परवर्ती साहित्य व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास का उत्तरोत्तर दाम या घनी क्यों बनता चला गया जैसा कि भट्टिकाव्य, नैषध आदि की काव्यमर्जना से प्रमाणित होता है और इन काव्यों के कवियों के अपने वक्तव्य भी हैं । मुझे तो ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि "श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासिता ध्रुव करोत्येव कमप्यनु-प्रहम्" में उल्लिखित अनुग्रह संस्कृत कवियों को अधिक प्राप्त हुआ, आनन्दवर्धन द्वारा निर्दिष्ट—सरम्बन्धैवेवा घटयति यथेष्ट मगवती—सारस्वत प्रसाद कम उपलब्ध हो पाया ।

INDEX

Works and Authors

A

- Abhidhārttimātrkā*, 161, 261n
Abhilāṣitārthacintāmaṇi, 82
Abhinava-bhārati 48, 66, 80, 81,
 104n, 106n, 154n, 162n,
 221, 253-258, 282, 284n,
 286n, 291n, 292n, 294,
 296n, 299n
Abhinavagupta, 13, 14, 36-39,
 43-45, 47, 49, 66, 67, 69,
 73, 74, 78-80, 94, 97, 104-
 6, 110, 111, 147, 152, 154,
 155, 161-63, 176, 183, 187,
 188, 195, 196, 209, 210,
 214, 216, 226, 229, 247,
 251-55, 257, 280, 282, 284,
 286-292, 294, 296-300
Acyutarāya, 266
Aeschylus, 28
Agatha Christie, 3
Agnipurāṇa, 154n, 247
Alaka (Allaṭa) 265, 275
Alankārabhāṣya, 271
Alankāraśaustubha, 195n.
अलंकारमंजरी, 226n
अलंकारमंजूषा, 226n
Alankāraśāstrīnī 271,
अलंकारपीयूष, 226n
Alankārasaṁvāsa, 62, 151, 157,
 268n, 272
Alankārasatnākara, 268, 270-73
अमरचन्द्रिका, 223
Amarakoṣa 206, 283n,
Amarasimgha, 29
Amarutataka, 55, 56
आनन्दप्रकाश दोस्तिन, 222
Ānandavardhana, 6, 36, 38,
 39, 43, 44, 49, 67, 71, 73,

- 74, 76-8, 86, 87, 89-91,
 118-121, 125, 145, 146,
 152, 155, 159-62, 165, 173,
 175n, 176, 177, 180-87,
 190, 191, 203, 207, 208,
 210, 214, 216, 224, 226,
 283-85, 290, 291, 294-96,
 297, 301

Antigony 28

Appayya Dikṣita, 11, 109, 191,
 227n, 261, 266

Aristotle, 18-28, 133-38, 140-
 43, 189, 278

अजुनदास केडिया, 222, 226

Ārīhadyatanikā 222, 223n

Art Of Poetry, 18

Aṣṭādhyāyī, 212

Avantisundarī, 299

Āceta, 30

B

Bacon, 2

बेरीमाल, 226n

Bālabhārata, 80

Bālapriyā, 44

Bāna (Bhaṭṭa), 88, 119, 150,
 204, 222n, 223, 295

बरवैरामायण, 222

बेनीप्रवीन, 226n

Bhagavadgītā, 168, 257

भगवानदीन, 226

Bhāgarata, 130, 194n, 196

Bhaṭṭacandrikā, 199

Bhaktirasāyana, 197n

Bhāmaha, 10-13, 67, 70, 84,
 98-101, 116, 120, 121, 153,
 157-59, 178-180, 190, 201,

E

- E. A. Wallace, 46
 एक आत्मवक्तव्य, 229
 Eliot, 176, 236
An Essay on Man, 177n
Essays in Sanskrit Criticism, 176n,
 201
Essays on Indian Poetics, 157a

F

- F. P. Scott, 17

G

- गङ्गानन मुक्तिबोध, 229
 Ganganath jha, 56
Gargya, 48
 Geldner, 31
Gistakapara (-kulaka,) 13
 (-Vārta) 13
 गीतगोश, 229
 गीतावली, 222
 Gorgias, 129
 Gould Thomas, 197

H

- हजारप्रसाद द्विवेदी, 235
 Har Dutt (H D) Sharma, 59,
 206
 हरिजोष, 222, 226, 227n, 242
Haribhaktiśaśāstrasādhya, 57n,
 195n, 197n
 हरिप्रकाश, 223
 Hegelian, 138
 Helātāja, 131
 हितवर्णिनी, 226n
 Hemacandra, 33, 53, 155n,
 191, 196, 197, 284, 287,
 292, 293
 Homer, 135, 142
Hrdyaśāstra, 36, 39, 162,
 229

I

- I A. Richards, 17
 Ingram Bywater, 18
Iśa Up, 283
Itarapratyabhijñānārtha, 47

J

- Jagannātha (Panditarāja), 58,
 59, 64, 78, 108, 115, 116,
 118-20, 125, 155n, 190-94,
 196, 197, 201, 206, 210,
 221, 227n, 248, 250, 251,
 257, 261, 266, 268 273
 Jahlana, 272n
 Jayadeva, 82, 227n, 261
 Jayanta Bhatta, 166
 Jayaratha, 151, 157, 163, 217,
 268, 271, 286, 301
 जानपी, 222n
Jayamardhana, 277
 Jivagosvāmin, 5, 193, 196
 Joyce, 124
 जुही की कनो, 242

K

- Kālabhāṭi*, 119, 295
Kālidāsa, 3, 13, 36, 38, 53,
 54, 63, 88, 93, 119, 123,
 127, 138, 164, 180, 185,
 202, 204-6, 210, 222n,
 223, 287
 कालिदास की निरंकुशता, 224
 कन्देनाल पोद्दार, 222, 226,
 227n
Kaṇḍikā, 36, 44
Kaṇḍikā Up, 33
Kavikarnapūra, 195
 कविकुन्दकचतुर, 227n
 कविप्रिया, 227n
 Kavirāja, 150, 195
 कविता की मौत, 230

मानसवीथुष, 223
Mandiramarandacampū, 109
 Mānikyacandra, 155
 Mathew Arnold, 17, 121
 मतिराम, 226
 Mayūra, 138
 Medhāvīrudra, 292
Meghadūta, 127
 Milton, 169
 Mīmāṃsādarśana, 264n
Mṛcchakaṭika, 25, 26, 124
Mudrārākṣasa, 25
Mukula Bhatta, 161, 261, 265n
 Murāridāna, 109

N

नगेन्द्र, 235, 236, 238, 242, 245, 249
Naiṣadha, 301
 Nārāyaṇa 191, 192
 Nārāyaṇatīrtha, 199
Nāṭyaśāstra (N.S.) 18-23, 57, 58n, 62, 69, 98, 101, 102n, 105n, 157n, 162, 164, 178, 182n, 187, 205, 225, 247n, 296
 नवरसतरंग, 226n
 नायिकाभेद, 226n
 निराला, 242, 243
Nyāyasmūtra, 265n

O

Ode to the Intimations of Immortality, 122
Ode to Nightingale, 122
Ode to the West Wind, 122
 ओमप्रकाश शर्मा, 228

P

पद्मानरुण, 226n
 पद्माकर, 226n
Pāṇini, 78, 130

Paradise Lost, 2, 169
 Patañjali, 130, 131
 Plato, 131-34, 136-38, 142, 143, 197, 278
Platonic Love, 197n
 Plotinus, 140, 141
Poetics, 18, 142
 Pound (Ezra), 124, 236, 237, 246
 Prabhākara, 191, 192
 प्रसाद, 244
 प्रसाद जी के दो नाटक, 224
 प्रतापनाहि, 221
 Pratibhārendurāja, 161
Pratimānātaka, 129
 Puṇyārāja, 75, 77
 Puruṣavo-vicāra, 13
 P V Kane, 201, 265n

R

Rāghavabhaṭṭa, 223
Rāgharāpāṇḍavīya, 224
Raghurāmā, 36, 98, 127
 Rājasekhara, 37, 80, 103, 104, 154, 155n, 162, 182, 191, 203, 206, 219, 224, 283, 285, 292, 294, 298, 299
 Rāmācandra-guṇācandra, 191
 Rāmānuja, 5
Rāmāyaṇa, 3, 36, 48, 187, 205
 रामचन्द्र शुक्ल, 223, 235
 रामचरितमानस, 168, 222
 रामदहिन मिश्र, 227n
 राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी, 228
 Ram Singh, 106
Rasagangādhara, 59, 78, 108, 109n, 155n, 192n, 221n, 226, 250, 251n, 258, 261n, 266n, 268
 रसकलश, 222, 226n
Rasakumudī, 92
 रसमंजरी, 226, 227n
 रसपीथुपनिधि, 225, 227n

Tempest, 26
 Thomas Hardy, 169
 T.S. Eliot, 17
 तुलसीभूषण, 221, 222n
 तुलसीदास, 168, 221, 222n, 223,
 233, 277

U

Udbhaṭa, 87, 146, 197, 267,
 268n, 270n
 Ugra (works also), 277
 Ujjvalanilamanī, 195n
 Ūpaloconā, 45
 Ūrubbhaṅga, 25
 Uttara-rāmacarita 27, 123

V

Vāgbhata, 191
 Vāgbhaṭāṭlankāra, 155n
 Vaidyanātha, 82, 191
 Vākrokti-yūta, 81, 84, 86, 91,
 150, 285, 293n
 Vākya-padīya, 74-8, 131, 265n
 Vālmiki 35-37, 185, 284,
 288, 289, 294, 300
 Vāmana, 12, 14, 33, 48, 67,
 70, 79-81, 116, 118-20,
 125, 145-52, 154, 159,
 181n, 193, 226, 267
 Vāsavadattā, 33
 Vasubandhu, 158

Vasugupta, 79
 Venīsamhāra, 25, 205
 Vidyābhūṣana, 266
 Vidyācakravartin (Śrī-) 63,
 157
 Vidyādhara, 191
 Vidyānātha, 191
 Viṇṇukā, 41, 42
 Vimarśinī, (*Alankāra*-) 157n,
 217, 257, 268, 271, 272
 Viṇudharmottara, 69, 71-3, 79
 Viśvanātha (kavirāja), 18, 57,
 58, 108, 115, 116, 118-21,
 124, 191-93, 195, 206,
 227, 260, 266, 287
 Viśveśvara, 192
 V Raghavan, 48, 201
 Vṛttivārtika, 261
 Vākaranamahābhāṣya, 265n
 Vāktuvivēka 105n, 224, 265n,
 284n, 293n
 व्यंग्यार्थकीमुदी, 221
 Vyāsa, 185

W

Winter's Tale, 3, 26
 Wordsworth, 119-21, 124

Y

Yajurveda, 21
 Yaśarantayāśabhāṣana, 109